DV Act Proceedings Are Civil, Not Criminal – Quashing Under Section 482 CrPC Impermissible: Madras High Court

“Nature of Relief, Not Tribunal, Determines Character of Proceedings”, In a firmly reasoned and precedent-rich decision Madras High Court held that proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 do not attract criminal jurisdiction unless they escalate to offences under Section 31. Accordingly, the quash petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was dismissed at the SR stage for being not maintainable.

Justice N. Sathish Kumar, while rejecting the attempt of the petitioners (relatives of the complainant’s husband) to quash the domestic violence proceedings, reiterated the binding authority of the Full Bench ruling in Arul Daniel v. Suganya [(2022) SCC OnLine Mad 5435], which categorically held that:

“A petition under Section 482 CrPC challenging proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act is not maintainable, as such proceedings are civil in nature.”

The Court also issued a direction to the Registry not to number or entertain any future petitions under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS seeking to quash DV Act proceedings unless they arise under Sections 31 or 32 of the Act.

“Reliefs Under Chapter IV of DV Act Are Civil – No Criminality Until Section 31 Is Invoked”: Clear Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Remedies

The Court emphasized that Chapter IV of the DV Act, which includes Protection Orders (Section 18), Residence Orders (Section 19), Monetary Reliefs (Section 20), Custody (Section 21), and Compensation (Section 22), provides civil remedies. Only a breach of such orders—which attracts Section 31—results in a criminal offence.

“The breach of a protection order or interim protection order alone is made cognizable under Sections 31 and 32 of the Act. Only when the Court takes cognizance does the Code of Criminal Procedure come into play,” the Court clarified.

Relying on the Constitution Bench ruling in S.A.L. Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas [(1965) 57 ITR 149], the Court stressed:

“The character of the proceeding depends not upon the nature of the tribunal… but upon the nature of the right violated and the appropriate relief claimed.”

This distinction becomes crucial as the DV Act, while triable before a Magistrate, remains civil in content until criminal liability under Section 31 is triggered.

“Shaurabh Kumar Judgment Did Not Consider Binding Precedents”: Court Declines to Follow Supreme Court’s 2025 View Due to Non-Consideration of Earlier Decisions

Though the petitioners relied on the recent Supreme Court judgment in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal [(2025) SCC OnLine SC 1158], which seemingly permitted quashing of DV Act proceedings under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court refused to follow it, pointing out that crucial binding precedents were not brought to the Supreme Court's notice in that case.

“The earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan (2022), which approved the Madras High Court view that DV Act proceedings are civil in nature, was not cited,” the Court observed.

Justice Sathish Kumar added that even more authoritative rulings, such as:

The four-judge bench decision in Dargah Committee v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1962 SC 574), and

The Constitution Bench in S.A.L. Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas (1965)

were not considered in Shaurabh Kumar, making it per incuriam in the specific legal context.

“Binding precedents of the Constitution Bench cannot be overridden by a decision rendered per incuriam,” the Court noted, reaffirming the hierarchy of judicial authority.

“Magistrate Under DV Act Is Not a Criminal Court for Section 12 Applications”: Application Must Be Challenged Through DV Act Framework

The Court reaffirmed the view adopted in Dr. P. Pathmanathan v. V. Monica [(2021) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 311], subsequently approved by both the Full Bench in Arul Daniel and the Supreme Court in Kamatchi, that a Magistrate dealing with Section 12 applications acts under a special statutory framework, and does not issue summons under Section 204 CrPC, but rather notice under Form VII of the Domestic Violence Rules, 2006.

“Such Magistrate is not exercising criminal jurisdiction, and therefore, Section 482 CrPC cannot be invoked to quash such proceedings,” the Court said.

The proper remedy, the Court held, is:

Appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, or

Raising objections before the Magistrate including jurisdictional and maintainability challenges.

“Registry Must Refuse to Entertain Such Petitions at SR Stage Itself”: Court Issues Procedural Direction

Concluding the judgment, the Court issued a binding direction to the Registry to strictly comply with the Full Bench’s mandate in Arul Daniel, holding that:

“Registry shall not number any petition under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS seeking to quash proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act which have not reached the stage of cognizance under Sections 31 or 32.”

This procedural safeguard is aimed at preventing judicial time being wasted on maintainability issues and reinforces a uniform protocol across subordinate and High Court benches.

The Madras High Court’s decision in S. Dhanalakshmi v. S. Vennila reiterates a crucial distinction in the interpretation of legal remedies under the Domestic Violence Act: not every proceeding before a Magistrate is criminal in nature, and therefore not every grievance is amenable to quashing under Section 482 CrPC.

By placing constitutional discipline and judicial hierarchy at the center of its reasoning, the Court reinforced that:

“The forum may be criminal, but the relief sought determines whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.”

This ruling will act as a guiding precedent in ensuring that DV Act litigations are routed through proper legal channels, especially as misuse of quash petitions under Section 482 CrPC had become increasingly frequent in such cases.

Date of Decision: 23 September 2025