Disciplinary Appeal Under Section 37 Of Advocates Act 1961 Is Amenable To Challenge Only Before Supreme Court Under Section 38: Delhi High Court

"The revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC is supervisory in nature, and is to be exercised only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction, an illegality or a perversity." Delhi High Court, in a ruling dated 14 September 2026, dismissed a criminal revision petition seeking to challenge an order of the Bar Council of India, clarifying that the exclusive remedy against such appellate orders lies before the Supreme Court under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav observed that the petitioner sought to collaterally attack professional disciplinary proceedings through criminal jurisdiction, which was fundamentally misconceived.

The petitioner, a legal professional facing disciplinary action for misconduct, had approached the High Court after his complaint against the disciplinary orders was rejected by the Principal District and Sessions Judge. The petitioner alleged that the disciplinary proceedings were tainted by malafide intent and constituted offences under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, as well as several sections of the IPC, including 166, 217, 218, 219, and 417.

Exclusive Remedy Under Advocates Act

The court underscored that the disciplinary authority’s findings regarding professional misconduct are subject to a specific statutory hierarchy. Under Section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961, an appeal against an order of the State Bar Council lies before the Bar Council of India. Once the BCI adjudicates such an appeal, the aggrieved party is statutorily mandated to approach the Supreme Court under Section 38.

Court Rejects Collateral Challenge

The High Court held that the petitioner could not bypass this statutory route by invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC. The court noted that the disciplinary punishments were clearly referable to the petitioner's professional conduct, and there was no factual basis to support the invocation of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

No Scope for Supervisory Interference

Justice Kaurav emphasised that the scope of revisional jurisdiction is limited to correcting patent errors of jurisdiction or instances of perversity. Referring to the Supreme Court’s precedents in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and O.N. Mohindroo v. Bar Council of Delhi, the court found that the petitioner’s attempt to characterize administrative disciplinary action as criminal offences was a gross misuse of the process of the court.

"An order passed by the disciplinary committee of the BCI, in appeal under Section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961, is amenable to challenge only by way of an appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 38 of the said Act."

The court concluded that the impugned order passed by the District Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity. Consequently, the High Court found no merit in the petition, noting that the petitioner had no cause of action, and directed the dismissal of the petition entirely.

Date of Decision: 14 September 2026