Confession Made in Presence of Police Cannot Be Treated as Voluntary —Calcutta High Court Acquits Man Convicted of Killing His Parents

“Mere Recovery Is No Proof—Without a Section 27 Discovery Statement, Recovery Becomes Legally Redundant”, Reinforcing the golden thread of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof, the Calcutta High Court on 29 August 2025, overturned the conviction of Rabi Murmu, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the alleged brutal murder of his parents. The Division Bench comprising Justice Rajarshi Bharadwaj and Justice Apurba Sinha Ray held that the entire case rested on a chain of circumstantial evidence which was incomplete and legally insufficient, and that the confession on which the trial court had placed reliance was inadmissible in law as it was made in the presence of police officers.

The Court minced no words in stating that the conviction was based on an “extremely fragile foundation” and declared that fundamental safeguards under criminal law had been ignored during investigation and trial.

“Between ‘May Be True’ and ‘Must Be True’, the Law Demands Unbroken Certainty—This Case Falls Short”

The trial court had convicted the appellant on 15–16 May 2013 under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC, based solely on alleged extra-judicial confessions, recovery of weapons, and oral testimony of local witnesses. The prosecution alleged that Rabi Murmu had confessed to killing his parents—Sukram Murmu and Nilmoni Murmu—with a knife and an axe, and had led the police to recover the bodies and weapons.

The High Court, however, was emphatic in rejecting the voluntariness and admissibility of the alleged confession. It observed:

“It is found that when the appellant had made such alleged extra-judicial confession before those local witnesses, he was with the police personnel… It cannot be said that such extra-judicial confessions were made by the appellant free from influence, threat or intimidation.”

Relying on State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180, the Court reiterated that a confession must be made voluntarily and without coercion, and that when it occurs in the shadow of police custody, its evidentiary value is seriously undermined.

“Recovery Without Discovery Is Void in Law—Section 27 of Evidence Act Not Invoked”

The Court found a fatal legal flaw in the manner the recoveries were made. Though the police claimed to have recovered the alleged murder weapons and body based on the appellant’s statement, no discovery memo was recorded, nor was any statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act brought on record. The Court was unequivocal:

“Recovery of weapons was done on the basis of information given by the appellant without recording any discovery statement of the appellant. This renders the recovery inadmissible.”

Further, the prosecution failed to submit any forensic evidence to connect the weapons to the crime. The blood-stained clothes and weapons were not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, and no report was produced to prove the presence of human blood.

The autopsy surgeon (PW12) also stated that the injuries on the deceased could not have been caused by the alleged weapon ("kait"), which had not even been shown to him during examination. The Court found this lapse devastating to the prosecution’s case.

“The prosecution has failed to prove that human blood was found on the seized weapons. Moreover, the offending weapons were never shown to the autopsy surgeon either during the post-mortem or the trial.”

“A Broken Chain of Circumstances Cannot Sustain a Conviction—Each Link Must Lead Only to the Guilt of the Accused”

The Bench invoked the five golden principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, to assess whether the circumstantial evidence pointed irresistibly to the guilt of the accused. The Court found several broken links:

There was no eye-witness, no direct evidence, no valid confession, and no scientific or forensic corroboration. Even the alleged recovery of weapons was legally inadmissible, and the presence of the accused at the crime scene was not conclusively established.

The Court held: “The prosecution has failed to show that the chains of circumstances or the events are complete which only point to the guilt of the accused. Such missing links in the chain of events are fatal to the prosecution’s case.”

“Legal Proof, Not Moral Panic, Is the Standard for Conviction—Courts Must Not Act on Conscience Alone”

Though the alleged crime—murder of one’s own parents—was indeed gruesome, the Court reiterated that sentiment cannot override due process. Citing Subhas Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 702, the Bench observed:

“Though the offence is gruesome and revolts human conscience, an accused can be convicted only on legal evidence. Between ‘may be true’ and ‘must be true’, there is a long distance to travel.”

The trial court, in its anxiety to convict, had ignored glaring deficiencies in the case. The High Court categorically stated:

“The Learned Trial Judge did not consider this vital issue properly in delivering the impugned judgment. The prosecution failed to bring home the charge.”

Allowing the appeal, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence. Rabi Murmu, who had spent over a decade in custody following a conviction founded entirely on defective investigation and incomplete circumstantial evidence, was acquitted.

“There are several lacunae—no recovery statement, no FSL report, extra-judicial confession made in presence of police—and the prosecution is unable to show that the chain of circumstances is complete pointing only to the guilt of the accused.”

The Court ordered that the appellant be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

This judgment underscores the non-negotiable principle that a person’s liberty cannot be sacrificed at the altar of incomplete investigations and procedural shortcuts, no matter how heinous the alleged crime may be.

Date of Decision: 29 August 2025