Cannot Impose Double Fine When Imprisonment Sentences Run Concurrently To Avoid Double Punishment: Supreme Court

"Section 53 IPC also includes fine as a punishment to be part of sentence. In that view when the sentence is directed to run concurrently, the appellant cannot be made to pay fine twice," Supreme Court of India, in a significant ruling dated April 8, 2026, held that when multiple sentences of imprisonment are directed to run concurrently, the monetary fines imposed for those offences must also operate concurrently to avoid double punishment.

A bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria observed that since a fine is a "punishment" under Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code, compelling a convict to pay a double amount of fine when the substantive sentences are concurrent is legally impermissible.

The appellant and a co-accused were intercepted in a car from which a commercial quantity of 4.1 kilograms of charas was recovered from beneath the appellant's seat. A Special Judge convicted the appellant under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act, and separately under Sections 25 and 29, sentencing him to 12 years of imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,20,000 for each of the two sets of offences. The High Court reduced the substantive sentence to 10 years but confirmed the separate convictions and the imposition of a double fine, prompting the present appeal.

The primary question before the court was whether independent and separate punishments could be awarded for offences under Sections 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act alongside the principal offence under Section 20. The court was also called upon to determine whether a convict could be directed to pay separate fines for each offence when the substantive sentences of imprisonment were explicitly ordered to run concurrently.

Sections 25 And 29 Are Independent Offences

The Supreme Court first addressed the appellant's argument that Sections 25 (allowing premises/conveyance to be used) and 29 (criminal conspiracy) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act do not prescribe independent sentences and are merely extensions of the main offence. Rejecting this, the court clarified that Chapter IV of the Act creates distinct offences. The bench noted that an individual permitting the use of a vehicle to facilitate a crime commits a distinct act, observing that allowing premises to be used is "conceived by the legislature to be a separate offence and engrafted in the Act accordingly."

Legislation By Reference

Addressing the phraseology of Sections 25 and 29, which state that an offender shall be punishable with the "punishment provided for that offence," the court applied the doctrine of legislation by reference. The bench explained that the punishment provided for the main offence under Section 20 is bodily referred to and incorporated into Sections 25 and 29. Therefore, the lack of an explicit numeric sentence in these sections does not preclude independent punishment.

"Occupier" Liable Under Section 25

The court dismissed the appellant's contention that, not being the registered owner of the car, he could not have "knowingly permitted" its use. The bench highlighted that Section 25 explicitly covers an "occupier" or a person having "use of conveyance." Since the appellant was sitting on the front seat beneath which the contraband was found, the court ruled that he fell squarely within the ambit of the provision and could be said to have committed the crime in the capacity of an occupier.

Conspiracy Fetter Removed Under Section 29

Examining the conviction for criminal conspiracy, the court observed that Section 29 of the NDPS Act operates as an exception to the general penal provisions. The bench noted that the statutory fetters regarding the term of imprisonment mentioned in Section 116 of the IPC are expressly done away with under Section 29. The court reiterated that conspiracy is an independent substantive offence, capable of attracting separate punishment even if the main offence does not materialise.

Interconnected Offences And Concurrent Sentences

While upholding the legality of separate convictions, the court added a crucial caveat regarding sentencing for offences arising from a single transaction. The bench observed that while offences under Sections 25 and 29 are distinct, they often occur alongside substantive offences and can be "parasitic and derivative." The court noted that "it would be the rule of wisdom to be followed by the court that in such cases, the sentence is made to run concurrently" to avoid the risk of double jeopardy.

"One of the objects of concurrent running of the sentence is to avoid double punishment. This principle would readily apply when two separate punishments are awarded, and sentences are imposed for two offences relatable to one set of facts."

Fine Is A Punishment Under Section 53 IPC

Turning to the question of the double fine, the court examined Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code, which classifies both imprisonment and fine as "punishments." The bench reasoned that treating imprisonment as concurrent while treating the fine cumulatively is illogical. Imposing a double fine when the jail terms are concurrent defeats the very purpose of concurrent sentencing, which is to prevent a person from being punished twice for one indivisible transaction.

Default Imprisonment Is A Penalty, Not A Sentence

Relying on its earlier judgment in Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, the court drew a sharp distinction between a substantive sentence and imprisonment in default of payment of fine. The bench reiterated that default imprisonment is merely a penalty incurred for non-payment, whereas the fine itself constitutes the actual sentence. The court categorically held that imposing cumulative fines under these circumstances amounts to impermissible double punishment.

The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, confirming the substantive conviction and the concurrent 10-year prison sentence, but quashed the imposition of the double fine. Noting that the appellant had already undergone 11 years of incarceration—which successfully covered both the substantive sentence and the default imprisonment period—the court directed his immediate release.

Date of Decision: 08 April 2026