138 NI Act | Explaining Wrong Cheque Details During Plea Recording Under Section 251 CrPC Is A Structural Defect Vitiating Trial: Calcutta High Court

"A criminal trial that convicts an individual for a transaction completely different from the one put to him during his formal arraignment cannot be sustained under our constitutional scheme of due process." Calcutta High Court has ruled that explaining an entirely different cheque number and an inflated amount to an accused during the recording of a plea under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) constitutes a structural defect that goes to the root of a fair trial.

A single-judge bench of Justice Uday Kumar observed that such a fundamental breakdown of procedural due process cannot be treated as a mere curable irregularity under Section 465 of the Code.

The petitioner, a practising Chartered Accountant, faced prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, for allegedly dishonouring a cheque of Rs. 1,50,000 issued to the complainant to repay a friendly loan. The trial court convicted the petitioner and sentenced him to six months of simple imprisonment along with a compensation order of Rs. 3,00,000. This judgment was subsequently affirmed by the first appellate court, prompting the petitioner to approach the High Court through a revisional application.

The primary question before the court was whether the stark mismatch between the transaction put to the accused during his arraignment under Section 251 of the CrPC and the actual cheque under prosecution strikes at the core of the trial's legality. The court was also called upon to determine whether the statutory presumptions under the NI Act stood properly rebutted when the complainant failed to examine the source of her loan funds.

Section 251 CrPC Is Not A Routine Bureaucratic Box

The court emphasised that in summons trials, compliance with Section 251 of the CrPC is the cornerstone of a fair trial. The bench firmly stated that the provision is not an empty formality but a critical mechanism meant to inform the accused of the precise allegations levelled against him. The judge noted, "It serves as a vital statutory surrogate for a formal charge. Its overarching purpose is to explicitly apprise the accused of the precise allegations and facts levelled against him, so that he may consciously shape and prepare his defence."

Arraignment For Fabricated Liability Is Incurable

Reviewing the trial court records, the High Court found that while the actual complaint pertained to a cheque of Rs. 1,50,000, the Magistrate had erroneously arraigned the petitioner for a completely different cheque amounting to Rs. 5,00,000. The bench rejected the respondent's contention that this was merely a typographical error curable under Section 465 of the CrPC. The court observed that there is a vast difference between correcting a minor clerical slip and confronting an accused with a completely fabricated financial liability.

"The petitioner was legally called upon to defend himself against a five-lakh rupee transaction, but he was ultimately tried and convicted for a one-and-a-half-lakh rupee transaction."

Evidentiary Gap In Proving Financial Capacity

Addressing the reverse onus clause under Section 139 of the NI Act, the court reiterated that while a statutory presumption exists in favour of the complainant, it is rebuttable on a preponderance of probabilities. The bench observed that the complainant, an unemployed woman, claimed her father had provided the loan amount but failed to examine him or produce documentary proof. Relying on the Supreme Court's framework in K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan, the court held that this failure created a "significant evidentiary gap", which was further compounded when the trial court failed to put this crucial circumstance to the accused during his Section 313 CrPC examination.

Valid Service And Acknowledgment Of Debt

The court, however, dismissed the petitioner's secondary arguments regarding time-barred debt and defective service of notice. It clarified that delivering a signed cheque operates as a valid written acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, thereby resetting the limitation period. Furthermore, the bench noted that under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, a demand notice dispatched to a verified office address and accepted by an office assistant constitutes legally valid service.

NI Act Aimed At Restitution, Not Retribution

Despite the procedural breakdown warranting a fresh trial, the court noted that the litigation had been pending for two decades, and remanding the matter would cause undue hardship. Taking note that the petitioner had already deposited Rs. 3,00,000 (double the cheque amount) as per an interim judicial directive, the bench highlighted the economic nature of the statute. The court remarked, "The Act of 1881 is an economic statute designed to provide financial restitution rather than simple retribution."

The High Court allowed the revisional application in part. Citing the full financial restitution made by the petitioner and the significant procedural errors during the trial, the bench set aside the six-month imprisonment sentence while affirming the compensation order. The court directed that the deposited amount be treated as full satisfaction of the compensation and formally discharged the petitioner from his bail bonds.

Date of Decision: 15 July 2026