Facts:

Saraswati Medical College filed a Special Leave Petition against the decision of the Delhi High Court dismissing its writ petition.

The college sought permission to establish a new medical college for the academic year 2015-16.

Despite the college's efforts to rectify deficiencies pointed out by the Medical Council of India (MCI), new issues were found during a surprise inspection.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the decision of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to disapprove the college's application.

Issues:

Whether the college adequately addressed all deficiencies highlighted by the MCI.

Whether the MCI followed proper procedure during inspections.

Held:

In the judgment, it was held that neither the college nor the MCI completely adhered to the prescribed procedure and requirements under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. The court directed the MCI to conduct a fresh inspection within two months and submit a report. It was further ordered that the MCI should assess whether any deficiencies found are remediable.

The Union of India was tasked with making a decision within a month after receiving the final inspection report, enabling the college to proceed with the establishment process for the academic year 2016-2017. This special leave petition was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appellants, S. Nihaal Ahamed and Gayathri, sought admission to the M.B.B.S. Course for the academic year 2013-14 at a medical college affiliated with the Tamil Nadu Dr. M.G.R. Medical University.

Despite being placed in the merit list, they were denied admission due to alleged delays and malpractice by the medical college.

The appellants filed writ petitions seeking admission and were awarded compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs each by the learned Single Judge.

The Division Bench reversed the decision, denying both admission and compensation.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to admission and compensation due to the fault of the medical college.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and referring to previous judgments, including Chandigarh Administration Vs. Jasmine Kaur, upheld the compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge.

The court noted that if a candidate is not selected due to the fault of the institutions/authorities and the scope for admission is lost due to the lapse of time, appropriate compensation should be granted to offset the loss caused.

Therefore, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals and restored the order of the Single Judge awarding compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs to each appellant, along with a time schedule for payment.

Facts:

The Golden Forest India Limited (GFIL) went into liquidation, and its assets were to be sold to pay off debts. The GFIL Committee was tasked with selling these assets. The applicants participated in an auction and were declared successful bidders for several properties. However, despite fulfilling their obligations, the GFIL Committee did not hand over possession of the properties. Legal proceedings ensued, and the court directed the refund of the sale consideration and allowed the applicants to claim a refund of stamp duty from the State Government.

Issues:

Whether the applicants are entitled to claim a refund of stamp duty paid for a failed property transaction, despite the State's initial rejection on technical grounds.

Held:

The court held that the applicants are entitled to claim the refund of stamp duty from the State Government. The original purpose of the transaction failed due to circumstances beyond the applicants' control. The court's orders directing the refund of the sale consideration implied a right to claim a refund of stamp duty. The principle of equity, "actus curiae neminem gravabit" (an act of the court shall prejudice no one), supported the applicants' claim.

The court interpreted relevant sections of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and the Indian Contract Act, 1872, to support the applicants' claim. Even if the applications were dismissed on the ground of limitation, the applicants still had the right to claim the refund based on the circumstances of the case.

Facts:

The dispute involves a hundred-year-old building in Lucknow covered under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act.

The building was originally owned by Barrister Mohammad Wasim and later vested with the Custodian of Evacuee Property and settled in favor of Rai Bahadur Lakshman Das.

Appellant Anil Kalra claimed ownership along with his relatives through sale deeds executed in the 1980s.

Despite a release order issued in favor of the appellant and co-landlords, unauthorized occupants, including the respondents, occupied the building.

Issues:

Whether the respondents had the authority to occupy the building in violation of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act.

The enforcement of the release order and the future use of the building.

Held:

The court found that the respondents failed to demonstrate authority for occupying the building in violation of Section 11 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act.

The court directed the Competent Authority to execute Form-D for the release of the building and granted a three-month period for occupants to vacate voluntarily.

After this period, occupants were to be forcibly dispossessed, with assistance from the District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police.

The court clarified that the released building could not be let out in its existing condition and must be demolished for reconstruction, as per the purpose for which it was released.

The appeal filed by the landlord (Anil Kalra) was allowed, and the appeals filed by the respondents were dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves Essar Teleholdings Ltd. and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) before the Supreme Court of India. It stems from allegations of offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act and criminal conspiracy related to the grant of UAS licenses in 2008. The CBI filed multiple chargesheets, including a second supplementary chargesheet implicating the petitioners for offenses under Sections 120B and 420 of the IPC. The Delhi High Court appointed a Special Judge to handle cases related to the 2G scam, including those under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Essar Teleholdings Ltd. filed writ petitions challenging the jurisdiction of the Special Judge, which were dismissed by the Supreme Court. Subsequently, Essar Teleholdings Ltd. requested a joint trial, which was denied by the Special Judge.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the Special Judge, the discretion of the court in ordering a joint trial, and preventing miscarriage of justice.

Held:

The Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Special Judge appointed to handle cases related to the 2G scam. It emphasized the discretion of the court in ordering a joint trial and the importance of preventing miscarriage of justice.

The court found no infirmity in the judgment of the Special Judge, which denied the request for a joint trial. Thus, the appeal and the writ petitions were dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the killing of the deceased, who was the Sarpanch of the village, and causing injuries to another individual.

The prosecution charged the accused under several sections of the Indian Penal Code.

The appellants alleged that the FIR was ante-dated and that they were falsely implicated. They also pointed out inconsistencies in the evidence presented by the prosecution.

Issues:

Whether the FIR was ante-dated and if the appellants were falsely implicated.

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was consistent and credible.

Held:

The court dismissed the appeals filed by the appellants against their conviction. The bench found no merit in the appellants' arguments regarding the alleged ante-dating of the FIR and inconsistencies in the evidence.

The court determined that there were contemporaneous documents and actions supporting the timing of the FIR and that the injuries sustained by the witness were genuine. Despite minor discrepancies, the prosecution's case was deemed credible.

The delay in forwarding the Express Report to the Magistrate was considered inconsequential as it did not prejudice the appellants' case. Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, affirming the appellants' conviction and dismissing their appeals.

Facts:

The appellant challenges the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent, who is accused of serious offenses including murder. The High Court granted bail based on parity and without adequate consideration of the respondent's criminal history.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in granting bail without considering the respondent's criminal antecedents and the seriousness of the offenses.

Held:

The Court found that the High Court's decision to grant bail was erroneous due to its failure to consider the respondent's criminal history and the gravity of the offenses. The court emphasized the need for judicious exercise of discretion in bail matters, especially in cases involving heinous crimes.

Consequently, the High Court's order granting bail was set aside, and if the respondent is at large, he is to be taken into custody immediately. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves an incident of mob violence resulting in the death of one person and injuries to others. During the trial, nine eyewitnesses, including injured eyewitnesses, turned hostile as regards the identity of the accused persons. The prosecution primarily relied on the testimony of PW12, the wife of the deceased, while the accused were defended by their advocates.

Issues:

The key issues in this case revolve around the reliability of the sole eyewitness testimony, the application of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code regarding vicarious liability in cases of mob violence, and the identification and conviction of the accused based on the evidence presented.

Held:

The testimony of PW12, being the sole eyewitness, is pivotal in this case. It is held that a conviction can be founded upon the testimony of a sole witness, provided it is confidence-inspiring, beyond suspicion, and corroborated by other evidence.

PW12's deposition is deemed reliable and trustworthy, as it is natural, devoid of exaggeration, and corroborated by other material on record.

The recovery of weapons of offense at the instance of the accused, supported by the investigating officer's testimony, further strengthens the prosecution's case.

Regarding vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC, the Court emphasizes that membership in an unlawful assembly is sufficient to hold individuals liable for offenses committed by other members, provided there is a common object.

In cases of mob violence, determining the existence of a common object can be challenging. However, those who share the common object are liable for the acts committed by others in the assembly.

The trial court's reliance on the testimony of PW12 is deemed justified, and the High Court's decision to acquit based on doubts about her testimony is overturned.

Out of the eight accused found guilty by the trial court, six are identified as directly responsible for the fatal assault, while two are acquitted due to doubts about their involvement.

Decision: The Court partly allows the appeal, confirming the conviction of six accused based on the reliable testimony of PW12 and other supporting evidence, while acquitting two accused due to doubts about their involvement.

Facts:

The respondent, Gu Rappa (deceased), represented by legal representatives, had filed a suit (O.S. No. 255 of 1984) which was subsequently dismissed. Thereafter, another suit (O.S. No. 39 of 1993) was filed by the respondent with certain modifications in parties and description of the suit property. The Trial Court framed issues and examined documents in the first suit, but the parties, subject matter, and the decision on merits were different in both suits.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent suit (O.S. No. 39 of 1993) filed by the respondent is barred by res judicata?

Whether a notice under Section 80 of CPC was necessary when filing a suit against a Municipal Council?

What is the burden of proof in a suit for declaration of title and possession?

Held:

The principle of res judicata, codified under Section 11 of CPC, aims to provide finality to judicial decisions and prevent multiplicity of proceedings between the same parties and on the same subject matter. For res judicata to apply, the parties, subject matter, and the decision on merits must be identical in both suits.

In this case, since the parties, subject matter, and decision on merits were different in the previous suit and the subsequent one, the subsequent suit (O.S. No. 39 of 1993) cannot be held barred by res judicata.

A notice under Section 80 of CPC is not necessary when filing a suit against a Municipal Council, as it is not considered a public officer.

In a suit for declaration of title and possession, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to establish their title independently. Mere failure of the defendant to prove their title does not automatically result in a decree in favor of the plaintiff.

Decision: The subsequent suit (O.S. No. 39 of 1993) filed by the respondent is not barred by res judicata. Additionally, no notice under Section 80 of CPC was necessary when filing the suit against the Municipal Council. However, in a suit for declaration of title and possession, the plaintiff must independently prove their title, and the burden of proof lies upon them.