FACTS:

Brother-in-law of the appellant created two trusts for the benefit of two minor children of the appellant, Kapoor Chand.

The trusts became partners in a partnership firm, which earned profits in the relevant year.

The Assessing Officer included the income of the trusts in Kapoor Chand's income under Section 64(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Kapoor Chand contested the assessment, arguing that since the minors had no immediate access to the income, Section 64(1)(iii) should not apply.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) ruled in Kapoor Chand's favor, but the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal overturned this decision.

The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, leading Kapoor Chand to appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the income earned by the trusts for the benefit of minor children should be included in Kapoor Chand's income under Section 64(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

HELD:

The income earned by the trusts for the benefit of minor children should not be included in Kapoor Chand's income under Section 64(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Section 64(1)(iii) requires immediate or deferred benefit to the minor child, which was not fulfilled in this case as the income was not available to the minors until they reached the age of majority.

The trusts' stipulation that income would only be given to the minors upon attaining majority meant that Section 64(1)(iii) did not apply.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed Kapoor Chand's appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment.

Referenced Cases:

Commissioner of Income-Tax v. M.R. Doshi (211 ITR 1) Yogindraprasad N. Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City-I (1977) 109 ITR 602

Facts:

The plaintiff-daughter-in-law sought a share in the joint family properties, particularly the 'B' schedule property, which was dismissed by the trial court and first appellate court.

Issues:

The validity of a gift deed executed during the proceedings and the rightful devolution of the property upon the death of the defendant.

Held:

The trial court and first appellate court erred in not granting a share to the plaintiff in the 'B' property despite evidence of its joint family nature and the plaintiff's husband's contribution to its construction.

The gift deed executed by the defendant during the proceedings was invalid under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, as it was executed without seeking leave from the court and couldn't be acted upon by the defendants due to the plaintiff's possession of the property.

The property would devolve upon the deceased husband of the plaintiff along with other legal heirs upon the death of the defendant.

Decision: The judgments of the trial court and first appellate court regarding the 'B' property were set aside. Each party was assigned a 1/4 share in the property.

Facts:

Vijay Mallya, the appellant, was summoned by the Enforcement Directorate regarding a transaction involving Flavio Briatore of M/s. Benetton Formula Ltd. Allegedly, Mallya entered into an agreement without obtaining requisite permissions from the Reserve Bank of India, violating FERA provisions. Mallya failed to appear in response to the summons issued, leading to a criminal complaint being filed against him under Section 56 of FERA.

Issues:

The Mallya's non-compliance with the summonses and the legality of the criminal proceedings initiated against him under FERA.

Held:

The Court dismissed Mallya's appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions. The court emphasized that the offense under Section 56 read with Section 40 of FERA is independent and not contingent upon the outcome of adjudicating proceedings.

Exoneration by departmental authorities, despite an appeal pending in the High Court, does not absolve Mallya of criminal liability.

The court rejected the argument that withdrawal of the complaint should be considered, emphasizing the seriousness of the offense.

The Supreme Court imposed exemplary costs of rupees ten lakhs to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Service Authority, denouncing any abuse of the legal process.

Facts:

On 3rd of April, 2006, a 'Barkhana' was organized at 85, Armoured Regiment to bid farewell to the outgoing Risaldar, Major Madan Lal.

During the Barkhana, an altercation occurred between the Appellant and Risaldar Nand Lal Prasad, resulting in physical violence.

The altercation led to the accused stabbing Dafadar Ram Pratap, resulting in his death.

The accused confessed his guilt at the police station and before commanding officers.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Whether the confession made by the accused holds legal weight.

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented is conclusive in nature.

Held:

The Division Bench found that the chain of circumstances presented established the guilt of the accused beyond a shadow of doubt.

The court emphasized that the confession made by the accused, recorded under Rule 23 of the Army Rules, was voluntary and followed due process.

The Bench concluded that the minor discrepancies in the evidence did not undermine the prosecution's case, and the circumstantial evidence was conclusive in nature.

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part-II of Section 304, Indian Penal Code, was upheld.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur concerning the sanction for prosecution granted by the Secretary, Law and Legislative Affairs, Government of Madhya Pradesh.

The respondents, government officials, were accused of being involved in a criminal conspiracy related to construction work. The Economic Offences Wing (EOW) sought sanction for their prosecution, which was initially declined by the Administrative Department.

Subsequently, the Court directed that the sanction should be obtained from the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs. The Department granted the sanction, but the respondents challenged its validity in the High Court, arguing that the Department was not the competent authority.

Issues:

Whether the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs had the authority to grant sanction for prosecution against the respondents.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs was indeed competent to grant the sanction for prosecution. This authority was conferred upon the Department by an amendment to the Madhya Pradesh Works (Allotment) Rules in 1988.

The Court emphasized that statutory rules prevail over conflicting administrative instructions, and thus, the power granted to the Department by the statutory rule amendment was valid.

The High Court's decision was overturned, and the sanction granted by the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs was upheld as valid.

Facts:

The Food Corporation of India (FCI) engaged the Food Handling Co-operative Society for operational works at its depots.

The respondents claimed to have been directly employed by FCI as casual workers, while FCI asserted they were contractual laborers engaged through the cooperative society.

A dispute arose regarding the mode of engagement of the respondents, leading to legal proceedings and a series of judgments by various courts.

Issues:

Whether the respondents were entitled to regularization of their services.

Whether the post of Dusting Operator was a direct recruitment post or a promotional one.

Held:

The Court set aside the High Court's order and remitted the matter back for fresh consideration in light of additional evidence provided by both parties.

Without expressing any opinion on the merits, the Court directed the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court to afford an opportunity to both parties and reconsider the matter in accordance with the law.

The appeal was disposed of without any order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant entered into an agreement with the respondents to purchase property, contingent upon obtaining consent from a labor union.

The appellant paid earnest money as per the agreement, but the labor union refused to give consent. The respondents then informed the appellant of the cancellation of the agreement and their intention to return the amount.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's pleadings allowed for the introduction of new evidence inconsistent with the original pleadings.

The credibility of letters purportedly from the labor union presented by the appellant.

The significance of the condition regarding obtaining consent from the labor union in the agreement.

Held:

The appellant's original pleadings alleged collusion between the labor union and the respondents. However, during the evidence stage, the appellant introduced a new case without amending the pleadings, which was impermissible.

Fresh evidence inconsistent with original pleadings couldn't be considered unless the pleadings were amended. Since the appellant didn't amend the plaint, the new evidence regarding the labor union's agreement couldn't be considered.

The letters presented by the appellant from the labor union were deemed lacking in credibility due to their contradictory contents and insufficient evidence of authenticity.

The condition regarding obtaining consent from the labor union was essential to the agreement. Since the labor union did not give consent, the agreement couldn't be performed, and the appellant was entitled only to a refund of the amount paid, along with interest.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the appellant was entitled only to a refund of the amount paid under the agreement, as the condition regarding labor union consent was not fulfilled.

Facts:

The case involves a contract of insurance between M/S. BHS Industries, the exporting proprietary concern, and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation. The dispute arises when certain consignments sent by the exporter face non-acceptance by the buyer, some of which were insured and some not. The insured party communicates both the non-acceptance and uninsured shipments to the insurer, seeking an insurance claim. However, the insurer repudiates the claim, alleging a breach of policy terms by the insured.

Issues:

Whether there was a violation of the terms of the insurance policy by the insured?

How should the clauses regarding declarations and liability exclusion in the policy be interpreted?

Held:

The Court examines Clause 5 of the policy and determines that there was no violation concerning the period for payment. The insured fixed the debt within the specified period, thus complying with the policy terms.

The terms of the policy must be strictly construed, with a preference for interpretation favoring the insured in cases of ambiguity. Clauses 8(a) and 19(a) regarding declarations and liability exclusion are clear and obligatory for the insured. Failure to comply with declaration requirements absolves the insurer from liability.

Decision: The Court dismisses the appeal, affirming the insurer's right to repudiate the claim based on the insured's non-compliance with policy terms.

Facts:

The Magistrate found the investigation conducted by the Inspector, Crime Branch biased and unacceptable.

As a result, the Magistrate directed the Additional Director General of Police to confer the power to the Inspector of the Crime Branch CID (CBCID) for further investigation.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to set aside the Magistrate's order was justified.

Whether the Magistrate had the authority to direct another investigating agency to conduct further investigation.

Held:

The appellate court found that the High Court erred in its analysis of the Magistrate's order. The Magistrate's inclination for further investigation was evident, though he opted for another agency, using the term "reinvestigation." Thus, the court set aside this part of the Magistrate's order and directed the original investigating agency to proceed with further investigation under the supervision of the concerned Superintendent of Police.

Regarding revisional jurisdiction, the court emphasized the need for cautious exercise, particularly in matters of factual appreciation. It clarified the Magistrate's authority to disagree with the police report, take cognizance, and independently assess the investigation's facts. The Magistrate lacked the jurisdiction to direct another agency to reinvestigate, as that would exceed the scope of further investigation.

Decision: The court upheld the Magistrate's discretion in ordering further investigation and clarified the limits of revisional jurisdiction. The original investigating agency was directed to continue the investigation, supervised by the relevant Superintendent of Police.