Facts:

The case involved an application for the appointment of a guardian by an unwed Christian mother for her child. The question at hand was whether it was obligatory for the unwed mother to serve notice to the putative father under Section 11 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890.

Issues:

Whether notice to the putative father was mandatory in a guardianship or custody petition preferred by the natural mother of the child, especially when she is the sole caregiver.

Held:

The court held that there is no mandatory procedural requirement for the unwed mother to serve notice to the putative father in connection with a guardianship or custody petition when she is the sole caregiver of the child.

Section 11 applies when guardianship of the child is sought by a third party, not when one of the parents petitions the court for appointment as guardian.

The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration, and notice to the putative father may not be necessary if it could jeopardize the child's future or lead to unnecessary controversy.

The court emphasized the importance of protecting the rights of the mother, especially in cases where the father has shown no concern for the child.

Guardianship orders are not permanent and can be challenged if the child's welfare is at risk, even by the uninvolved parent.

The court directed the mother to disclose the father's name to the child in a sealed envelope, to be opened only under specific court direction, in order to safeguard the child's right to know the identity of their parents.

Authorities issuing birth certificates should require only an affidavit from a single parent or unwed mother for children born from their womb, unless there is a court directive stating otherwise.

Decision: The court emphasized the welfare of the child as the primary consideration and directed the Guardian Court to reconsider the mother's application for guardianship without requiring notice to the putative father.

Facts:

The case concerned the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed by a Single Judge originating from other tribunals or authorities. The primary issue was whether such appeals were permissible under the legal framework.

Issues:

Whether a Letters Patent Appeal would lie against orders passed by Single Judges originating from other tribunals or authorities.

The significance of impleading the court or tribunal whose order is being challenged as a party in the writ petition.

Held:

The court held that orders passed by civil courts are only amenable to scrutiny by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, no intra-court appeal is maintainable against such orders.

Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from that under Article 226. Therefore, neither Letters Patent Appeal nor an intra-court appeal is permissible concerning orders from civil courts.

The maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal depends on various factors, including the nature and character of the order passed by the Single Judge and the jurisdictional perspectives in the constitutional context.

It is essential to implead the court or tribunal whose order is being challenged as a party in the writ petition. Failure to do so may render the petition not maintainable, particularly in cases where relief of certiorari is sought.

Decision: The Court held that Letters Patent Appeal or an intra-court appeal is not maintainable against orders passed by Single Judges originating from civil courts. Impleading the court or tribunal whose order is being challenged as a party in the writ petition is essential for the petition's maintainability.

Facts:

Mainuddin Abdul Sattar Shaikh (the Appellant) booked a flat in a project developed by M/s. Salvi Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., paying Rs. 74,200 to Vijay D. Salvi (the Respondent). The project did not materialize, and the Appellant requested a refund. After persuasion, Salvi issued a cheque of Rs. 74,200 to the Appellant, drawn on his personal account. When the Appellant presented the cheque, it bounced, leading the Appellant to send a notice of demand to Salvi under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Upon Salvi's failure to pay within 15 days, the Appellant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.

Issues:

Whether the Respondent can be made liable in his personal capacity when the Company has not been made a party to the complaint.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Salvi, as the drawer of the cheque, was liable under Section 138 of the NI Act, even though the company was not named in the complaint. It was emphasized that the drawer's personal liability is upheld under Section 138, and no other person, including the company or its directors, can be made liable. The Court cited precedents to support the strict interpretation of Section 138. It was noted that specific averments about the accused's role in the company were not necessary if they were a managing director or joint managing director.

Decision: The Court awarded compensation to the complainant, twice the cheque amount with simple interest, and sentenced Salvi to five months of simple imprisonment. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the lower courts were set aside, directing Salvi to undergo the sentence immediately if he failed to pay the compensation.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 11th February, 1992, resulting in two cross cases being registered.

Respondent No. 2 lodged a complaint against the appellants 16 years after the incident, after being convicted in a cross case.

The delay in filing the complaint was deemed unreasonable, especially considering the possibility of seeking simultaneous trial of the cross case earlier.

The appellants challenged the order of summoning and sought to quash the complaint.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the complaint justified quashing the criminal proceedings.

Whether the conduct of the parties warranted interference in the ongoing proceedings.

Held:

The Court held that while mere delay in completing proceedings may not by itself warrant quashing, considering the seriousness of the charges, the conduct of the parties, and the extent of delay, it could be justified in certain cases to prevent abuse of the court's process. The delay in this case, coupled with the complainant's conviction in a cross case and the lack of effort to seek simultaneous trial earlier, rendered it unfair and unjust to allow the prosecution to proceed.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and quashed the proceedings in Criminal Complaint Case No. 1066 of 2008 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate-II, Hardoi.

Facts:

The appellant, the State of Madhya Pradesh, challenged the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which quashed the FIR and subsequent criminal proceedings based on an out-of-court settlement between the parties involved.

Issues:

Whether serious offenses like attempt to murder and violations of the Arms Act can be quashed solely on the basis of an out-of-court settlement.

Held:

The Court held that certain serious offenses, such as those under Sections 307, 294, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, along with Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, cannot be treated as private disputes and quashed based on out-of-court settlements.

The Court referred to the principles laid down in the Gian Singh case, emphasizing that the power to quash criminal proceedings based on out-of-court settlements must be exercised judiciously. Offenses with a serious impact on society cannot be compromised through settlements between the victim and the accused.

Therefore, the High Court's decision to quash the FIR and proceedings was overturned. The Supreme Court directed the trial court to proceed with the trial in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The case involved allegations of harassment and dowry demands against the deceased, Raj Banshi Devi, by her in-laws shortly after her marriage. The deceased's brother, Basisth Narayan Yadav, testified to the harassment his sister faced and presented a letter written by her expressing fear of being killed by her in-laws if dowry demands were not met. Medical reports showed the deceased had sustained injuries before her death due to burn injuries. The defense claimed the death was accidental, but failed to provide convincing evidence.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to establish the offense of dowry death.

Whether the accused presented a credible defense to refute the charges.

Held:

The court found that despite shortcomings in the prosecution's case, there was sufficient evidence to establish the offense of dowry death under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. The deceased had suffered injuries indicative of physical assault, and her hands were tied with iron wire, suggesting foul play. The defense's claim of accidental death lacked supporting evidence and failed to explain the circumstances surrounding the incident.

Consequently, the court restored the conviction and sentencing of two accused persons, Ranjit Kumar and Yogendra Rai, who were residents of the house where the deceased died.

Facts:

The State of Bihar expropriated land under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for constructing residential quarters for State officials. However, delays in passing the award within the stipulated time resulted in the lapse of proceedings. Despite subsequent notifications, no award was passed. The landowners filed a writ petition alleging malafide resort to Section 17, seeking just and fair compensation for their land.

Issues:

Whether the resort to Section 17 for land acquisition was malafide.

Whether the delay in passing the award deprived landowners of just and fair compensation.

Whether the State's actions were in compliance with statutory provisions.

Held:

The Court held that the landowners were being denied just and fair compensation despite the High Court's directions to pass an award within four months. The legislative intent behind Section 11A was to provide a remedy in case of delayed awards, ensuring protection for landowners.

The Court emphasized the importance of strict adherence to statutory provisions, particularly regarding the timely passing of awards and offering compensation before possession. Provisions such as Section 17(3A) were deemed mandatory, necessitating payment of estimated compensation before possession.

The judgment clarified the distinction between setting aside acquisition and reverting possession to landowners, highlighting the need for compliance with statutory requirements.

Decision: The Court directed the State to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings or take other legal actions in accordance with the law (para 6). It restrained the State from contending that the land was no longer required or should revert to the appellants.

Facts:

The prosecutrix, a minor girl, was allegedly kidnapped and raped by the accused on January 3, 2003.

The accused was initially convicted by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the Indian Penal Code.

The accused appealed against the conviction before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, which acquitted him based on doubts about the age of the prosecutrix.

The State of Madhya Pradesh appealed against the High Court's decision to the Supreme Court of India.

Issues:

The central issue was the determination of the age of the prosecutrix.

Whether the High Court erred in its reliance on certain documents and medical opinions.

Held:

The determination of the age of the prosecutrix. The Supreme Court held that the discrepancy of two days in the dates mentioned in the birth certificate and the middle school certificate was immaterial. It relied on Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, which specifies that certificates issued by schools can be relied upon for ascertaining the age of the victim. The Court concluded that the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident based on the documents presented by the prosecution.

The Court emphasized that medical opinions regarding age should be sought only in the absence of alternative methods described under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii). It criticized the High Court's reliance on the ossification test conducted by a doctor without proper consideration of the documentary evidence.

The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and upheld the conviction by the Trial Court. It directed that the accused be taken into custody to serve the sentence.

Facts:

The case involved the alleged rape of a minor who was also of unsound mind. The incident supposedly occurred near a pond while the prosecutrix and her sister were on their way to their field. The prosecutrix's father filed a police complaint, and medical examination revealed signs of sexual intercourse. The prosecution presented several witnesses, including family members and the doctor who conducted the medical examination. However, inconsistencies were found in their testimonies, especially regarding the sequence of events and the extent of the prosecutrix's injuries.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution's case was supported by credible evidence.

Whether the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses undermined the prosecution's case.

Whether the medical evidence aligned with the prosecution's narrative of the incident.

Held and Decision: The Court found inherent inconsistencies and flaws in the prosecution's case. Despite the allegations of rape, the testimonies of the witnesses, particularly the major eyewitnesses, were irreconcilable. The statements regarding the sequence of events and the alleged infliction of knife wounds did not align with the medical evidence. Furthermore, the medical examination did not fully support the prosecution's narrative, as there were discrepancies regarding the timing of the sexual intercourse and the condition of the prosecutrix. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal against the acquittal of the accused.