Environmental Law – Amendments to Water and Air Acts – Substitution of Imprisonment with Monetary Penalties – New Adjudicatory Framework – Court noted that 2023–2024 amendments replaced imprisonment with fines (up to ₹15 lakhs) for most contraventions, introducing adjudicating officers and appeals to the NGT – Punishment by imprisonment retained only for limited contraventions such as failure to obtain consent or pay penalties – Court highlighted these changes as part of decriminalisation and trust-based governance reforms [Paras 3-7].

Regulatory Asymmetry – Variance Between Water and Air Acts – After amendments, significant asymmetry exists: (i) Appeals under Water Act go to State Appellate Authority; under Air Act, appellate jurisdiction is wider; (ii) Revisional powers with State Governments exist under Water Act, not under Air Act; (iii) Directions under Section 33A of Water Act are appealable to NGT, but Section 31A Air Act directions are not – Composite orders under both Acts create confusion – Court held such inconsistency undesirable and a source of unnecessary litigation [Paras 9-12].

Judicial Precedent – TNPCB v. Sterlite Industries – Applicability – Court reiterated earlier holding that directions under Section 31A of Air Act are not appealable, unlike Water Act Section 33A directions – The statutory scheme intentionally differentiates between “orders” and “directions” – Confirms need for harmonisation of regulatory appellate structures [Para 12].

Climate Change Imperative – Need for Effective Legal Framework – Court emphasised that environmental laws from 1974–1986 were enacted in a different era – With climate change posing imminent threats, environmental regulatory framework must be redesigned for clarity, efficiency, and adaptability – Inconsistencies delay enforcement and impair public health protection [Paras 10, 14].

Union of India Impleaded – MoEFCC to Respond – To address statutory inconsistencies and evolving environmental governance needs, Court impleaded Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) as party respondent – Directed appellant’s counsel to file impleadment application – Appointed Ms. Shibani Ghosh and Mr. Ninad Laud as amici curiae to assist Court – Matter listed for further hearing [Paras 15-17].

Decision – Appeals Allowed – Judgment delivered in favour of DPCC – Reportable judgment signed and placed on record [Para 2].

Criminal Law - Sexual Assault on Minor by Father – POCSO Act S. 6 & IPC Sect. 506 – Concurrent Conviction Upheld – Petitioner convicted for repeatedly committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault on his 10-year-old daughter—Trial Court relied on clear, cogent victim testimony corroborated by elder sister, medical and forensic evidence including DNA match—High Court affirmed—Supreme Court held presumption under Sect. 29 POCSO Act stood unrebutted—Defence plea of false implication due to strained domestic relations rejected—Credible child victim testimony requires no corroboration but was in fact amply supported here—SLP dismissed in limine [Paras 2–7, 17].

Presumption under POCSO Act §29 – Once foundational facts proved, statutory presumption applies—Burden on accused to rebut—In present case, no credible rebuttal offered—Victim’s disclosure, though delayed, found truthful, consistent, and medically corroborated—Delay explained by threats and trauma [Paras 5–7].

Sentencing – Familial Sexual Abuse – Heinousness and Deterrence – When perpetrator is father, betrayal is personal and institutional—Home must remain sanctuary; such offences warrant severest condemnation—No scope for leniency or mitigation—Life sentence upheld [Paras 8–13, 17].

Victim Compensation – Article 142 – In addition to sentence, SC directed payment of ₹10,50,000 to victim under NALSA “Compensation Scheme for Women Victims/Survivors of Sexual Assault/Other Crimes, 2018”—₹7,00,000 to be kept in fixed deposit for 5 years with quarterly interest to victim; ₹3,50,000 to be paid directly—Himachal Pradesh SLSA to monitor—Objective: rehabilitation and affirmation of dignity of child survivor [Paras 14–16].

Interference under Article 136 – Where two courts have concurrently found guilt based on unimpeachable evidence and findings are not perverse, SC will not interfere—Petition dismissed in limine—Prayer for bail declined [Paras 11–12, 17].

Criminal Law – Section 482 CrPC – Challenge to Dismissal of Petition – Appeal Allowed – The appellant challenged the Rajasthan High Court’s order dismissing her petition under Section 482 CrPC concerning the non-taking of cognizance against her in-laws despite allegations in her Section 164 CrPC statement – The Investigating Officer had filed a chargesheet only against the husband (since deceased), and failed to communicate this action to the appellant, thereby denying her the opportunity to file a protest petition under Section 173(8) CrPC – The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to consider the core issue of non-communication of the police report under Section 173(2)(ii) CrPC – Held: Appeal allowed, High Court’s order set aside, and petition restored for fresh hearing [Paras 3-10].

Criminal Proceedings – Non-communication of police report – Section 173(2)(ii) CrPC – Duty of Investigating Officer – Appeal Allowed - The appellant was not served a copy of the police report and remained unaware of the action taken under the FIR – The non-communication prevented her from exercising her statutory right to file a protest petition – The High Court’s failure to address this grievance was held to be a serious omission warranting interference [Paras 5-6].

Cognizance – Magistrate’s Jurisdiction – Bar under Section 362 CrPC – Review not Permissible – Appellant’s application seeking cognizance against in-laws was dismissed by the Magistrate on the ground that it would amount to reviewing the earlier order taking cognizance only against the husband – The Supreme Court observed that the focus should have been on whether the appellant was ever informed about the outcome of the investigation as per Section 173(2)(ii) CrPC [Para 3(v)].

Right to Protest Petition – Section 173(8) CrPC – Precondition of Communication – Protest Petition Denied - Since the appellant was not informed about the police report, she was effectively denied the opportunity to challenge the exclusion of her in-laws from the chargesheet by filing a protest petition – This vitiated the process and rendered the dismissal of her petition unsustainable [Paras 5-7].

Failure of High Court – Lack of Reasoning – Cryptic Order – Set Aside - The High Court’s order dismissing the petition was held to be cryptic and lacking judicial reasoning – The Supreme Court emphasised that the real issue in controversy, namely, whether the appellant was communicated the action taken under the FIR, was not even considered [Paras 6-7].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Petition Restored – Matter Remanded – The Supreme Court set aside the impugned High Court order dated 10.10.2024 – Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 378 of 2022 was directed to be restored and heard along with Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 8362 of 2021 within four months – All contentions of parties left open [Paras 8-10].

Contempt of Court – Advocates Act – Enrolment Fees – Compliance with Judgment in Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India – Petition Closed – Petitioner alleged that Karnataka State Bar Council was collecting fees of ₹6,800 and ₹25,000 as “optional charges” in addition to statutory enrolment fees – Bar Council of India affidavit confirmed that most State Bar Councils charge only ₹750 (General) / ₹125 (SC/ST), except Karnataka which collects additional amounts – Supreme Court held that there is nothing like “optional fees” and no SBC/BCI can collect any sum beyond Section 24(1)(f) of Advocates Act – Directions in para 109 of the main judgment reiterated – Contempt petition closed with clarification that such additional collections must stop [Paras 2, 5-9].

Enrolment Fee – Scope of Section 24(1)(f), Advocates Act – Statutory Limit – Section 24(1)(f) specifically prescribes the fiscal preconditions for enrolment – State Bar Councils and Bar Council of India cannot demand any fee other than the prescribed enrolment fee and stamp duty, if any – Any additional or “optional” charge violates Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) – Supreme Court reiterated that only ₹750 (General) and ₹125 (SC/ST) can be charged [Paras 4, 8].

Contempt Jurisdiction – Directions Already Enforced by BCI – No Wilful Disobedience – BCI demonstrated issuance of circulars directing compliance and received responses from State Bar Councils affirming adherence – Court accepted that directions are substantially complied with – However, clarified that Karnataka’s practice of charging optional fees is impermissible and must cease forthwith – Petition closed without further coercive orders [Paras 4-7, 9-10].

Decision – Petition Closed – Clarification Issued – Supreme Court reiterated that no additional or optional enrolment fee can be charged by any SBC or BCI beyond statutory prescription – Contempt petition disposed of with these observations [Paras 7-11].

Environmental Law - Powers of Pollution Control Boards – Scope of Sections 33A and 31A – Restitutionary vs Punitive Action – Held: Pollution Control Boards can impose compensatory or restitutionary damages or require bank guarantees under Sections 33A and 31A as an ex-ante measure – This power is distinct from the punitive penalties that can only be imposed via adjudication under Chapters VI and VII of the Air and Water Acts respectively – Exercise of this power must be guided by transparency and principles of natural justice to be detailed in subordinate legislation [Paras 2, 18-20, 27-30, 33-36].

Polluter Pays Principle – Applicability in Indian Environmental Law – Remedial and Preventive Measures Permissible – Held: The principle includes not only compensation and restoration after environmental damage, but also anticipatory measures to avoid pollution – Boards have a duty to act even in the absence of proven damage, where a risk of environmental degradation exists [Paras 20-23, 27(III)-(IV)].

Distinction Between Penalty and Environmental Damages – Penal Action Requires Statutory Procedure – Held: Monetary penalties or imprisonment for offences under Water and Air Acts require a fair trial – However, Boards may recover costs for environmental restoration and preventive action without resorting to punitive procedures, provided such powers are exercised judiciously [Paras 18-19, 24-25, 30-31].

Interpretation of Environmental Statutes – Need for Expansive and Purpose-Oriented Interpretation – Held: Given constitutional obligations under Articles 48A and 51A, and the preventive goals of environmental legislation, Sections 33A and 31A must be construed to include compensatory directions, aligning with statutory and constitutional mandates [Paras 16-17, 27(V)].

Decision – High Court’s restrictive reading of Sections 33A and 31A set aside – Pollution Control Boards empowered to issue directions imposing environmental damages or requiring bank guarantees – However, show cause notices issued in 2006 not to be revived – Amounts already collected to be refunded by DPCC within six weeks – Subordinate legislation required to operationalise these powers transparently and fairly [Paras 28-29, 37-39].

Electricity Act - Tariff Determination – Wind Energy Projects – Accelerated Depreciation – Separate Tariff Permitted – Wind energy producers who did not avail of accelerated depreciation under the Income Tax Act are entitled to seek case-specific tariff determination from the GERC despite having entered into PPAs with a fixed tariff meant for those availing such depreciation – Held: The Commission’s order permitting case-wise determination stands affirmed – [Paras 5, 22-25].

PPA and Regulatory Oversight – Statutory Price Prevails – Even where PPAs contain fixed tariffs, regulatory commissions retain statutory authority to review and revise such tariffs in public interest – Held: The GERC is not bound by the tariff in PPAs if it contradicts the statutory scheme and policy objectives – [Paras 14, 21].

Electricity Act, 2003 – Role of State-Instrumentality – GUVNL Bound by Renewable Energy Policies – The Court emphasized that GUVNL, as a state instrumentality, must comply with government policy promoting renewable energy, and cannot act solely on commercial interests like a private entity – [Paras 17-20, 24].

Income Tax Act – Exercise of Depreciation Option – Timing Critical – Held: The option to choose accelerated depreciation can only be exercised when filing returns, and not before – Hence, PPAs executed before such statutory option is exercised cannot bind producers permanently to a tariff applicable only to those availing depreciation – [Paras 22-23].

Estoppel – No Written Commitment by Developers – No Estoppel Applies – In absence of a written commitment by the power producers to avail accelerated depreciation, GUVNL cannot prevent them from seeking a revised tariff – [Paras 24-25].

Decision – Appeals Dismissed – The Court upheld the findings of the GERC and APTEL allowing wind energy producers to claim separate tariff – GUVNL’s conduct of enforcing inapplicable tariff without consent or statutory backing held untenable – [Para 25].

Criminal Law - Juvenility Determination – Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice Act and Rule 12 of JJ Rules, 2007 – Juvenility Rejected – The appellant challenged concurrent findings of the courts below which declared the accused a juvenile based on a school transfer certificate indicating date of birth as 18.04.1995 – Supreme Court found the certificate unreliable as it was based solely on an oral representation by the father without supporting proof – Held: Declaration of juvenility was incorrect and cannot be sustained [Paras 6-8, 13, 17, 23].

Public Records and Evidence Act – Preference for Statutory Documents – Documentary Evidence Considered – Family Register maintained under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act and 2012 Voter List showed year of birth as 1991 – Both deemed public documents under Sections 35 and 74 of the Evidence Act – Held: Greater evidentiary weight to be accorded to such official records over unverified school documents [Paras 18-22].

Medical Evidence – Greater Weightage in Case of Serious Offences – Age Determination – Medical Board constituted by the Trial Court determined the accused’s age as 22 years in 2012 – Supreme Court held medical opinion carries higher credibility in absence of authentic school records – Cited Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan to support precedence of medical over speculative evidence [Paras 23-25].

Role of Courts – Duty in Juvenility Determination – Caution Against Misuse – Supreme Court cautioned against casual acceptance of juvenile claims in serious offences like murder – Held: Courts must ensure that benefit of juvenile protection is not misused based on questionable documents or deliberate manipulation [Paras 13, 24, 25].

Decision – Juvenility Set Aside – Trial to Proceed – Orders of the Trial Court and High Court declaring the accused a juvenile were set aside – Accused held to be a major at the time of offence – Directed to face trial as an adult with proceedings to be concluded by July 2026 – Held: Benefit of three-year detention period under juvenile law to be considered if convicted [Paras 26-30].

Motor Accident Claim – Compensation under Section 163A – Owner’s Legal Heir as Claimant – Conflict Noted – Reference to Larger Bench - The petitioner, a minor, sought compensation for the death of her parents, including her father who was also the owner of the vehicle – Tribunal allowed the claim but High Court held claim not maintainable as the owner could not be made a defendant posthumously – Supreme Court disagreed and observed that Section 155 permits continuation of claim despite owner’s death – However, issue whether legal heir of deceased owner can maintain a claim under Section 163A when claimant also succeeds to owner’s estate – Held: The question is complex, impacted by earlier conflicting decisions – Referred to larger bench [Paras 1-4, 14, 17-20].

Motor Vehicles Act – Scope of Section 163A – Not Limited to Third Party Claims – Non-obstante Clause Interpreted – The Court held that Section 163A is a special beneficial provision and includes claims beyond third-party risks – Non-obstante clause overrides entire Act and any policy terms – The insurer’s liability under a valid policy survives even in claims made by the legal heirs of deceased owners – Rejected narrow reading confining such claims to third parties – Referred to larger Bench due to divergence from existing two-judge decisions [Paras 15-18].

Conflict in Precedents – Co-ordinate Bench Doubt – Need for Authoritative Pronouncement – The Court questioned the correctness of earlier two-judge bench rulings including Ningamma, Rajni Devi, and Dhanraj, which limited the scope of Section 163A to third-party claims – Held: Statutory language and object of Section 163A support broader construction – Directed matter to be placed before Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute larger bench [Paras 17-20].

Decision – Reference Made – Petition kept pending - The SLP was not finally decided but referred to a larger bench for authoritative interpretation of Section 163A vis-à-vis claims by legal heirs of deceased vehicle owners – Status quo on lower court orders maintained [Para 20].

Service Law – Section 12(3) and 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 - Premature Retirement – Medical Grounds – Alternate Employment Denied – Industrial Settlement Upheld – Appellant, a driver with TSRTC, was prematurely retired upon being declared colour blind – Corporation failed to explore alternate posts despite Clause 14 of a binding industrial settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act mandating such employment – Held: Retirement was arbitrary and in violation of binding obligations and constitutional protections [Paras 1-6, 10-17, 39-42].

Industrial Disputes Act – Settlement under Section 12(3) – Binding Nature – Specific vs General Clauses – Alternate Employment Required – Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979 specifically mandated alternate jobs for colour blind drivers – Subsequent MOS of 1986 did not override this clause – Held: Specific provision continues to govern despite general later terms – Circulars contrary to the settlement cannot override its statutory force [Paras 15-23].

Reasonable Accommodation – Constitutional and Statutory Duty – Acquired Disability during Service – Colour blindness, though not categorised as a statutory disability, still triggers duty of accommodation – Corporation’s failure to explore even a basic reassignment to non-driving role violates principles of equality and dignity under Articles 14 and 21 – Held: Reasonable accommodation is not discretionary but mandatory when impairment occurs during service [Paras 24-27, 30-38].

Judicial Precedents – Distinction between Disability Law and Contractual Rights – Inapplicability of B.S. Reddy – Applicability of Kunal Singh and Mohamed Ibrahim – High Court’s reliance on B.S. Reddy misplaced – The present case rests not merely on disability statute but on enforceable industrial agreement and constitutional norms – Held: Precedents like Kunal Singh and Mohamed Ibrahim rightly apply to safeguard rights of employees with acquired disabilities [Paras 28-38].

Decision – Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside – TSRTC directed to appoint appellant to a suitable post with pay protection within eight weeks – 25% of back wages awarded – Continuity of service directed to be maintained for all purposes [Paras 39-43].