Facts:

The case involves the bifurcation of the unified State of Madhya Pradesh into the reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh and the new State of Chhattisgarh under the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000. The issue revolves around the applicability of sales tax exemptions or deferments to industrial units after the reorganization when engaging in inter-state transactions.

Issues:

The central issue pertains to whether industrial units, previously granted sales tax exemptions in the unified State of Madhya Pradesh, would continue to enjoy such benefits when conducting inter-state transactions between the reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh and the new State of Chhattisgarh.

Held:

The second part of Section 78 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act introduces a deeming fiction, indicating that the laws of the unified State of Madhya Pradesh would continue to apply to the areas forming part of the new State of Chhattisgarh and the reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh. However, this deeming fiction does not imply that the territories, post-reorganization, would remain part of the other state. It serves the limited purpose of enforcing laws as they existed in the unified State of Madhya Pradesh to the new State of Chhattisgarh.

Section 79 provides for the adaptation or modification of earlier laws in the unified State of Madhya Pradesh by the governments of the reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh and the new State of Chhattisgarh. The court emphasizes the need for interpretation in a manner facilitating the application of laws to the successor states, even if not modified within the stipulated period. Section 85 of the Reorganisation Act gives primacy to its provisions over any other law, subject to the legal and constitutional effects envisaged by the Constitution.

As per Article 286 of the Constitution (before amendment on 16th September 2016), states are not competent to enact legislation related to the taxation of inter-state sales. The expression "inter-state" trade has a specific legal connotation, referring to the movement of goods from one state to another. The judgment asserts that the creation of two separate states does not alter the legal and constitutional impact regarding the inter-state character of transactions.

Referring to an analogous case involving the Bihar Reorganisation Act, the court underscores that the legal fiction created by such acts ensures the continuity of laws in the new state without implying that the new state lacked political or constitutional existence. The judgment overrules previous observations, emphasizing the need to give full legal effect to the creation of a new political state.

Facts:

Raman Singh appointed as an ad-hoc Lecturer in English on 11 August 1993.

Appointment against a short-term vacancy due to the incumbent's leave.

Regularly appointed lecturer's death on 1 October 1993 led to the appellant's continued service.

Management sought to absorb him into the substantive vacancy, but DIOS approval allegedly not received.

Writ petition filed in April 1996 seeking mandamus for permanent appointment and salary release.

DIOS declined approval in a letter dated 14 July 1994, citing non-compliance with relevant laws.

Appellant moved Supreme Court under Article 136, expressing no claim to the post but seeking to continue until a regular appointment.

Issues:

Validity of the ad-hoc appointment's conversion into a substantive appointment.

DIOS's non-approval and its legal implications.

Appellant's right to continue in service and receive salary.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the ad-hoc appointment could not materialize into a substantive appointment after the incumbent's death. The DIOS had rejected the appointment over two decades ago, citing a violation of applicable laws. The appellant continued in service through interim orders, and the management proposed him as an in-charge Principal. The Court directed steps to fill the post regularly within four months and allowed the appellant to continue on an ad-hoc basis until a regular candidate is appointed. The Court also directed payment of the appellant's salary for the period he works until a regular candidate is appointed. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

Appellant, Randhir Singh, enrolled in the 43 Armed Brigade in 1996.

Allegation: Inappropriately touching a colleague's spouse on 11th August 2007.

Summary Court Martial (SCM) held on 22nd May 2008, leading to appellant's dismissal.

Issues:

Legitimacy of convening an SCM almost a year after the alleged incident.

Proportionality of the dismissal as punishment.

Held:

The Court held that the convening of the SCM in May 2008, almost a year after the incident, was contrary to law as there was no grave reason for immediate action. Due to the significant time elapsed since the incident and the practical difficulty in finding witnesses, the Court did not order a new inquiry.

In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court modified the punishment. The appellant's discharge from service would take effect after completing fifteen years of service, making him eligible for pension benefits. The arrears of pension were to be paid within three months.

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

A tripartite memorandum of settlement was signed, outlining the payment terms for contract labor engaged by the Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL).

Prohibition notification dated March 17, 1993, allowed contract labor engaged before the notification to continue working until April 1996.

No fresh agreement was executed during the period from March 17, 1993, to April 1996.

Contract labor sought parity with wages of direct/regular employees of SAIL.

Issues:

Whether the duties of each contract laborer were the same or similar to those of regular employees?

Applicability of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, after the issuance of the prohibition notification.

Held:

The court observed that the burden was on the contract laborers to establish the similarity of duties with regular employees. In the absence of such proof, the onus could not be shifted to SAIL.

The court clarified that the Minimum Wages Act primarily focuses on fixing rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, and related matters. It is not intended for the enforcement of payment of wages, which is covered by other laws like the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, is deemed a complete code regulating contract labor in certain establishments. The court emphasized that the Act doesn't provide for total abolition but regulates employment and can lead to abolition in specific circumstances.

After the prohibition notification, the provisions of the Contract Labour Act or Central Rules, 1971, would not be available to either party. The court asserted that the claimed minimum wages could be independently pursued under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

The court noted the inappropriate claim by contract laborers that, post-prohibition notification, they automatically became employees of SAIL. It emphasized that a mere assertion of similar work is insufficient to claim wages applicable universally to all steel industries.

Facts:

The case involved criminal appeals and a writ petition arising from Special Leave Petitions. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) was the appellant, and the respondents faced charges under different sections of the IPC, Arms Act, and Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. The appeals were heard by a Division Bench comprising Arun Mishra and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Issues:

The misuse of the Forum of PIL, the examination of the merit of the case, the fairness of the CBI's investigation, and concerns about the bona fide nature of the petition filed.

Held:

The Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that the Forum of PIL had been misused in this instance.

The court examined the case and found it to be meritless, stating that the CBI had thoroughly and fairly investigated the case, establishing the conspiracy between the accused persons.

Observations made by the High Court, which were set aside, were deemed based on a lopsided approach without considering the entire evidence on record.

The court expressed concerns about the bona fide nature of the petition and the undue interference in the course of justice.

The judgment clarified that, in the absence of a provision indicating who can move the court under Article 32, any member of the public acting bona fide can espouse the cause of a person or class of persons for the judicial enforcement of fundamental rights.

Decision: The petition was dismissed on the grounds that the Forum of PIL had been misused, and there was no merit found to direct further investigation or re-investigation. The concerns about the bona fide nature of the petition were highlighted, and the court emphasized the fairness of the CBI's investigation.

Facts:

Christopher Raj borrowed Rs.30,000 from K. Vijayakumar on 12.08.2001 and issued a post-dated cheque.

The cheque bounced due to insufficient funds, leading to a complaint by Vijayakumar.

Trial court acquitted Christopher Raj, stating the cheque wasn't presented within the valid period.

High Court reversed the acquittal, convicting Christopher Raj and imposing a fine.

Issues:

Christopher Raj did not appear during the appeal before the High Court.

High Court criticized for not appointing counsel (amicus curiae) or issuing a second notice when the accused was unrepresented.

Held:

The accused, Christopher Raj, did not appear in the High Court during the appeal. The Supreme Court emphasized that in such cases, the High Court should have issued a second notice, appointed an advocate, or taken the assistance of amicus curiae.( Para 9)

Concluding, the Supreme Court declared that the High Court's decision to reverse the acquittal without affording proper representation was an error. The matter was remitted to the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court for fresh consideration, instructing the appellant to appear on a specified date.( Para 10)

Facts:

The accused-respondents faced trial in Sessions trial No. 80 of 2014 for offenses under Sections 452, 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. They were acquitted by the trial court on December 19, 2016. The State sought leave to appeal, but it was declined. The victim, Naval Kishore Mishra, filed an appeal, which was dismissed on November 23, 2017, based on the reasoning that leave had not been granted to the State for its appeal.

Issues:

Whether the victim has the right to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal under Section 372 proviso to CrPC, as amended by Amendment Act 5 of 2009?

Whether the victim, being a legal heir, is required to seek leave as in the case of the State under Section 378 of the CrPC?

Held:

The court, relying on the recent judgment in Mallikariun Koclacialli (d) through legal representatives Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 752, held that the victim, as a legal heir, has the right to file an appeal without seeking leave under Section 372 proviso to CrPC. The court emphasized that the amendment in 2009 enlarged the rights of the victim. The appeal by the victim was wrongly dismissed on the ground that leave had not been granted to the State for its appeal.

Facts:

Tripartite agreement among the appellant, contractors, and contract labor in captive mines.

Payment of wages in compliance with the 1948 Act.

Prohibition notification issued on March 17, 1993, under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour Act.

Extension of the existing agreement without execution of a fresh agreement during the interregnum period.

Contract labor continued under the same terms until termination in April 1996.

Issues:

Validity of the contract after the issuance of the prohibition notification.

Determination of the nature of the contract – genuine or sham and bogus.

Held:

The Supreme Court, citing a Constitution Bench judgment, clarified that neither Section 10 nor any provision in the CLRA Act mandates automatic absorption of contract labor upon issuing a prohibition notification. The principal employer is not legally obligated to absorb contract labor.

The Tribunal's factual finding that the contract was not sham and bogus until the date of the prohibition notification was upheld. The High Court's contention that the contract became sham and bogus post-notification was deemed unsustainable.

The High Court's finding is deemed unsustainable as the Constitution Bench had settled the effect of the prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act. Mere issuance of the notification does not render the contract void ab initio.

The Tribunal's conclusion that the contract was not sham and bogus, and there is no automatic absorption of contract labor, was proper. The High Court's interference was considered a manifest error within the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226/227.

The High Court's decision was set aside. The respondent was granted the liberty to pursue remedies for alleged breaches of the CLRA Act, if desired, in accordance with the law.

Facts:

GPSC issued an advertisement for ACF and RFO positions with specified reservations for various categories.

Appellant applied in the SEBC category, cleared the examination, and was listed in the select list.

Dispute arose over the interpretation of circulars and the inclusion of reserved category candidates in the general category merit list.

Issues:

Whether age relaxation for reserved categories is an incident of reservation.

Interpretation of circulars regarding the inclusion of reserved category candidates in the general category merit list.

Held:

The Court held that age relaxation granted to candidates belonging to SC/ST and SEBC category is considered an incident of reservation under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that relaxation in age at the initial qualifying stage would not violate circulars dated 29.01.2000 and 23.07.2004. The distinction between the preliminary and final examination was considered misconceived, emphasizing that a person availing age relaxation at the initial stage will necessarily avail the same relaxation at the final stage. The Court dismissed the appeal, directing the parties to bear their own costs.