Facts:

A contract dated 07.02.2006 included an arbitration clause referring disputes to three arbitrators.

The contract specified a fee schedule for arbitrators based on a 2004 policy circular of NHAI.

Disputes arose, and arbitration was invoked by the appellant in 2017.

The respondent referred to a 2017 NHAI circular, seeking a change in arbitrators' fees.

Issues:

Dispute over the applicable fee schedule for arbitrators.

Application under Section 14 to terminate arbitrators' mandate based on alleged disregard of the agreement.

Held:

The fee schedule in the 2017 NHAI circular would operate, and arbitrators were entitled to charge fees accordingly, not as per the Fourth Schedule to the Arbitration Act.

The application to terminate the arbitrators' mandate was disingenuous; arbitrators did not become de jure unable to perform functions for following the law laid down by the Delhi High Court.

The change in language of Section 31(8) and Section 31A dealt with costs, not arbitrators' fees. The Fourth Schedule did not directly govern contracts with a pre-agreed fee structure.

Facts: The appellants' appeals were rejected by the Appellate Authority under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, or the 2005 VAT Acts of AP or Telangana. The rejection was based on the appellants' failure to produce proof of payment of admitted tax dues for the relevant assessment year.

Issues: The primary issue revolved around the interpretation of the provisos in Section 19 of the 1957 Act and Section 31 of the AP VAT Act, which imposed conditions related to the limitation period for filing appeals and the requirement to produce proof of tax payment.

Held: 3.1 The first proviso in Section 19 pertains to the limitation period for filing an appeal and the discretion of the Appellate Authority to condone the delay in filing. The second proviso is an independent condition mandating the appellant to produce proof of payment of tax dues, which can be fulfilled until the appeal is considered for the first time.

3.2 The second proviso does not specify a period for tax payment at the time of filing, allowing the appellant to file within the statutory period and deposit the specified tax dues later, but before the appeal is first considered.

3.3 The Appellate Authority has no power to extend the time for depositing specified tax dues. The proviso is not a provision of pre-deposit at the filing stage but requires payment as a prerequisite for considering the appeal on merits or condoning the delay.

3.4 To prevent misuse, the Appellate Authority must consider every appeal for admission or condonation of delay within 30 days from filing, institution, or presentation.

3.5 In cases where the appellant has deposited tax dues before the first consideration, the proviso does not apply as an institutional defect.

3.6 However, if the deposit is made after the rejection of the appeal, it does not fulfill the proviso's requirements, and the appeal stands dismissed.

Decision: The impugned High Court judgment is set aside, and the writ petitions are allowed. The concerned appeals are restored to the Appellate Authority for consideration in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The Government of Maharashtra decided to shift the wholesale market to reduce congestion.

APMC constructed galas/shops, and a committee was appointed to suggest norms for their allotment.

Dispute arose over the lottery-based allotment of Gala No.F-158.

Appellant won the lottery, but respondent No.1 challenged the decision.

High Court ordered allotment to respondent No.2, who filed a writ petition seeking Gala No.F-158.

Issues:

Validity of the decision to conduct a lottery.

Allotment dispute, particularly regarding Gala No.F-158.

Transfer of booking amount from respondent No.2's father.

Eligibility of the appellant, respondent No.2, and other parties as per the Daud Committee norms.

Legality of the Director of Agricultural Marketing's order in favor of respondent No.2.

Held:

Claim of Respondent No.2: The High Court's order in favor of respondent No.2 set aside. Norms fixed by the Daud Committee strictly applied. Transfer of booking amount not permissible. Illegality in favor of an individual cannot be perpetuated. (Para 23, 26, 27-29, 32)

Claim of Appellant: Appellant deemed to marginally fall short of norms. High Court's decision favoring respondent No.2 alone set aside. Appellant, 'GS', and 'RVD' declared eligible for Gala No.F-158. (Para 33, 34)

Claim of 'GSS': High Court's finding that 'GSS' is not eligible set aside. Small gala allotted to 'GSS' considered for eligibility. Eligible to claim large gala. (Para 35, 40)

1.4 M/s 'RVD': High Court's decision against 'RVD' affirmed. Partnership firm not separately eligible. Registration in 2014 without compliance with Daud Committee norms. (Para 41, 47, 48)

1.5 Conclusion: Respondent No.1 and respondent No.2 not eligible for large gala. Appellant, 'GS', and 'RVD' eligible for the allotment. High Court's judgment set aside. (Para 49-51)

1.6 Re-Allotment Process: Instead of a lottery, sealed offers invited. Appellant to vacate Gala No.F-158. Upset value fixed at Rs.55,00,000. Re-allotment based on the highest bid. (Para 52-54)

Facts:

The appellant, P. Ramesh, was convicted for the murder of his wife and an offense under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. During the trial, the prosecution sought to adduce the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4, the minor children of the appellant and the deceased. However, the trial judge, based on the children's inability to identify the judge and lawyers, concluded that their testimony was unacceptable, leading to the appellant's conviction. The High Court, finding the trial judge's reasoning erroneous, remanded the case to assess the capacity of the child witnesses.

Issues:

Competency of child witnesses in criminal proceedings.

Appropriate judicial response to the trial judge's erroneous reasoning.

Held:

The High Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, exercised its powers under Section 386 of the CrPC to remand the case. The competency of child witnesses must be objectively assessed, and their evidence recorded in a child-friendly environment. The appellant has the right to cross-examine the witnesses. The decision to remand was justified, considering the erroneous approach of the trial judge, and the interests of justice. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, dismissing the appeal.

Facts:

The lease between Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Limited and Ajit Nain (Respondent) expired on May 31, 2014.

A meeting on May 20, 2014, discussed the lease renewal, but terms proposed by Bengal Chemicals were not agreed upon.

A letter on May 30, 2014, proposed new terms for renewal, including increased rent.

Respondent did not agree to the terms and has not paid rent since June 1, 2014, except for a deposit made in compliance with a court order.

Estate Officer issued a notice on May 23, 2018, under the Public Premises Act.

High Court quashed the Estate Officer's order, remitting the matter for fresh consideration.

Issues:

Validity of the proposed lease renewal terms.

Non-payment of rent by the respondent.

Legality of the Estate Officer's order and subsequent High Court decision.

Held:

The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, directing the respondent to pay damages for use and occupation. Respondent is ordered to pay Rs. 2,50,000 per month as damages from June 2014 to May 2018 and Rs. 3,00,000 per month from June 2018 until the matter is disposed of afresh by the Estate Officer. Arrears are to be paid in three equal installments. The Estate Officer will determine the appropriate quantum of damages. Appellant is permitted to withdraw the deposited amount, and water supply is to be restored on the deposit of the first installment. Failure to deposit any installment may result in forfeiture of the right of defense, leading to an eviction order.

FACTS:

The appellant filed applications seeking relief against interference in the working and management of Hamdard Laboratories. Despite a court judgment upholding his appointment as Chief Mutawalli, the respondents allegedly continued to assert joint management. An inadvertent mistake in the previous judgment, using the term 'management' instead of 'banking operations,' was noted.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondents were wrongfully asserting joint management despite the court's judgment.

Clarification of the term 'management' in the previous judgment, with a focus on the resolution dated April 28, 2015.

Apprehension of non-cooperation by respondents in approving payments.

Representation of Hamdard in various criminal proceedings against the appellant.

HELD:

The court acknowledged an inadvertent mistake in the use of the term 'management' and substituted it with 'banking operations.' The resolution dated April 28, 2015, related only to two bank accounts. The court clarified that the restoration of the order was about continuing arrangements related to banking operations voluntarily arrived at.( Paragraphs 9 and 10)

While acknowledging the appellant's apprehension of non-cooperation, the court expressed hope for resolution between the parties in the interest of Hamdard's reputation and charitable work.( Paragraph 11)

Contempt petitions were dismissed in view of the orders passed in the miscellaneous applications.( Paragraph 12)

An additional application seeking direction on representation in criminal proceedings was directed to be addressed in the civil suit, as it was beyond the scope of the appeals.( Paragraph 16)

Facts:

Dispute over the termination of the Head Mistress's services after a disciplinary enquiry.

Charge sheet issued on 15 January 1998 with 53 charges, including misappropriation.

Enquiry Committee formed under Rule 36 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981.

Combined report submitted on 29 June 1998, with one member expressing a dissenting view.

Employee's services terminated on 3 July 1998.

Issues:

High Court set aside the termination, citing a breach of Rule 37(6) due to lack of evidence of Committee members' assembly and deliberation.

Employee had already retired and later died on 26 September 2013.

High Court directed the management to pay 50% of arrears of salary from 3 July 1998 until August 2009, but family pension was denied.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the records and found that the requirements of Rule 37(6) were fulfilled. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, concluding that the basis for allowing the writ petition was misconceived. The Court closed the proceedings since the employee had passed away, and the legal representatives were pursuing the case. The appellants agreed to make an ex gratia payment of Rupees one lakh fifty thousand to the respondents in full and final settlement. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The case involves the bifurcation of the unified State of Madhya Pradesh into the reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh and the new State of Chhattisgarh under the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000. The issue revolves around the applicability of sales tax exemptions or deferments to industrial units after the reorganization when engaging in inter-state transactions.

Issues:

The central issue pertains to whether industrial units, previously granted sales tax exemptions in the unified State of Madhya Pradesh, would continue to enjoy such benefits when conducting inter-state transactions between the reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh and the new State of Chhattisgarh.

Held:

The second part of Section 78 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act introduces a deeming fiction, indicating that the laws of the unified State of Madhya Pradesh would continue to apply to the areas forming part of the new State of Chhattisgarh and the reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh. However, this deeming fiction does not imply that the territories, post-reorganization, would remain part of the other state. It serves the limited purpose of enforcing laws as they existed in the unified State of Madhya Pradesh to the new State of Chhattisgarh.

Section 79 provides for the adaptation or modification of earlier laws in the unified State of Madhya Pradesh by the governments of the reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh and the new State of Chhattisgarh. The court emphasizes the need for interpretation in a manner facilitating the application of laws to the successor states, even if not modified within the stipulated period. Section 85 of the Reorganisation Act gives primacy to its provisions over any other law, subject to the legal and constitutional effects envisaged by the Constitution.

As per Article 286 of the Constitution (before amendment on 16th September 2016), states are not competent to enact legislation related to the taxation of inter-state sales. The expression "inter-state" trade has a specific legal connotation, referring to the movement of goods from one state to another. The judgment asserts that the creation of two separate states does not alter the legal and constitutional impact regarding the inter-state character of transactions.

Referring to an analogous case involving the Bihar Reorganisation Act, the court underscores that the legal fiction created by such acts ensures the continuity of laws in the new state without implying that the new state lacked political or constitutional existence. The judgment overrules previous observations, emphasizing the need to give full legal effect to the creation of a new political state.