Facts:

The government decided to provide employment to displaced abkari workers by reserving 25% of daily wage vacancies in the Corporation.

A subsequent change in policy favored dependent sons of deceased abkari workers who lost employment after 1996.

The affected abkari workers filed a writ petition seeking the implementation of the initial government order.

Issues:

Whether there was a legitimate expectation for re-employment for all displaced abkari workers.

Whether the change in policy was arbitrary or in the public interest.

Whether the altered assurance to consider dependent sons of deceased abkari workers was justified.

Held:

The Court held that no assurance was given to provide re-employment to all displaced abkari workers. The government promised to reserve 25% of future daily wage vacancies, and no vested right accrued to all abkari workers.

The change in policy was deemed justifiable due to administrative difficulties in implementing the initial order, considering the insufficient number of vacancies.

The Court recognized the principle of substantive legitimate expectation but emphasized that administrative policies may change with evolving circumstances.

The decision makers' freedom to change policy in the public interest cannot be fettered by applying the principle of substantive legitimate expectation.

The expectation of the respondents for consideration against future vacancies was deemed not legitimate, considering the change in policy. The decision to alter the policy was made to balance the interests of displaced abkari workers and unemployed youth.

The requirement of giving an opportunity before altering the policy was discussed, noting that displaced abkari workers were consulted through their representatives.

The Court acknowledged that a claim of legitimate expectation can be raised if an administrative authority reneges from a promise without giving an opportunity, especially if past practice dictates so.

The principle of procedural legitimate expectation was discussed, emphasizing exceptions in cases where the government announces a policy but subsequently withdraws it due to overriding public interest.

The Court differentiated between primary and secondary review, stating that the Court can ask the State to justify the policy during primary review, but secondary review shows deference to the executive's decision.

The Court explained the test of proportionality involving a 'balancing test' and 'necessity test.'

The change in policy was held not disproportionate, considering the balancing act between the interests of displaced workers and unemployed youth.

The Court applied the test of proportionality to review the impugned decision of the Government, given the challenge was on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 19, and 21.

The Court rejected the argument that the order dated 07.08.2004 was a continuation of the earlier order dated 20.02.2002.

The findings recorded by the High Court regarding a right of appointment accruing to the respondents were disapproved. The Order dated 07.08.2004 was issued in modification of the Order dated 20.02.2002.

Facts:

Incident occurred on 01-11-1983 at about 06:30 PM.

Appellants and others were members of an unlawful assembly armed with spears and lathis.

Deceased was surrounded to prevent escape; initial assault on the head with a lathi.

Witnesses (PW7 and PW8) were also assaulted; appellants convicted under Section 302/149 IPC.

Issues:

Defective charge under Section 147 against four persons.

Prejudice in defense due to inadequate Section 313 CrPC questioning.

Inconsistencies in prosecution evidence and challenges to witness credibility.

Absence of injury reports for PW7 and PW8.

False implication due to previous enmity.

Held:

Omission in framing charge under Section 147 deemed inadvertent and non-prejudicial.

Absence of injury reports considered a case of defective investigation, not discrediting witness credibility.

Challenges to convictions based on procedural irregularities require demonstration of actual and material prejudice.

Despite objections to Section 313 CrPC questioning, no prejudice found; upheld convictions.

Bail canceled; appellants directed to surrender for remaining sentence.

Facts:

The appellant, DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD., manages 14 tea gardens, and the Central Government, under the Tea Act, took control of 7 gardens. The appellant defaulted on payments to the respondent-operational creditor for pesticides.

Issues:

The maintainability of insolvency proceedings under the IBC without the prior consent of the Central Government as mandated by Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act.

The applicability of Section 16G of the Tea Act considering the continued management and control of the appellant over the tea gardens.

Held:

In effect, the appellant continues to be in management and control of the tea estates, despite the Central Government's control over 7 gardens. The Court noted that Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act is not applicable as the appellant remains in control. The provisions of the IBC override the Tea Act, and no prior consent of the Central Government is required for insolvency proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC.

Section 16G(1)(c) refers to winding up proceedings. The Court clarified that proceedings under Section 9 of the IBC are not limited to winding up and are focused on corporate insolvency resolution. The IBC's objective is to ensure the revival of the corporate debtor. Section 238 of the IBC, being a subsequent Act to the Tea Act, takes precedence, and the IBC's provisions override the Tea Act.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the NCLAT decision, stating that the insolvency petition under Section 9 of the IBC initiated by the respondent-operational creditor is maintainable.

Facts:

Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. filed a suit before the Commercial Court seeking registration of a mortgage deed related to an immovable property.

The High Court held that the immovable property was not used for trade or commerce, making the suit not maintainable before the Commercial Court.

Issues:

Whether the dispute arising from the agreement qualifies as a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act.

Whether the immovable property was used exclusively in trade or commerce.

Held:

The court examined Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, which defines commercial disputes arising from agreements related to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce.

The plaintiff's suit sought specific performance of the MoU terms, but neither the agreement nor the plaint indicated exclusive use of the immovable property for trade or commerce.

Emphasized the need for basic pleadings and a purposive interpretation of the Commercial Courts Act to avoid burdening the system with non-commercial disputes.

Stressed the importance of entertaining only disputes that fit the definition of 'commercial disputes' and ensuring a strict procedure for such litigation.

Highlighted that a dispute involving immovable property becomes a commercial dispute only if the property is "used exclusively" in trade or commerce, and the term "used" means "actually used."

Described the facts of the case involving a Memorandum of Understanding executed in 2017 and the execution of a mortgage deed, emphasizing that the property's use was not exclusively for trade or commerce.

Pointed out that the trial court incorrectly assumed the property's use based on the plaintiff's business activities, and the property was not being exclusively used in trade or commerce in 2012.

Reiterated the purpose of Commercial Courts for speedy resolution of commercial disputes, and the need for meaningful interpretation to benefit litigants engaged in trade and commerce.

Conclusion: The court held that the suit did not qualify as a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) due to the lack of pleadings indicating exclusive use of the property for trade or commerce. The Commercial Court was directed to return the plaint to the court with jurisdiction.

Facts:

Air Commodore Naveen Jain, along with nine other officers, was being considered for promotion to the rank of Air Vice Marshal against five vacancies. Despite securing the top position in the merit list, he was not promoted due to his placement at serial number 3 in seniority.

Issues:

The interpretation and application of the Promotion Policy dated February 20, 2008. The appellant's contention was centered on lost promotion opportunities as he reached superannuation before vacancies arose.

Held:

The Promotion Policy does not explicitly state whether promotion is based on "merit-cum-seniority" or "seniority-cum-merit." However, clauses 17 and 22 clarify that the select list is prepared from the merit list and rearranged in order of seniority.( Para 10)

The Court emphasized that the Promotion Policy, as per clauses 17 and 22, ensures the determination of the final list based on merit first and then rearranging it in order of seniority. The policy, therefore, is not illegal, arbitrary, or discriminatory and does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.( Para 18)

The Court held that the lack of promotion due to non-availability of vacancies before superannuation is not a ground to strike down the Promotion Policy. The two-stage policy, involving shortlisting based on eligibility criteria and marks, does not make the applicability of seniority arbitrary or irrational.( Para 21)

Promotion to the post of Air Vice Marshal is governed by the Circular dated February 20, 2008, and can be claimed only in terms of eligibility and the norms fixed therein. The policy provides equal opportunities to officers within the zone of consideration, and the appellant is estopped from challenging the policy after participating in the selection process based on it.( Para 22)

The Court affirmed that the Promotion Policy, in line with the executive instructions, does not discriminate and provides equal opportunities to officers within the zone of consideration and subsequent promotion.( Para 23)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the validity of the Promotion Policy and finding it legally sound, non-discriminatory, and in compliance with constitutional provisions.

Facts:

Appellants filed a suit seeking declarations and injunctions related to the affairs of the first respondent-society.

Interlocutory Applications (I.A.) seeking interim orders of injunction were filed.

Trial Court granted an order of injunction on 26.04.2018 after considering arguments and documents.

Issues:

High Court set aside the trial Court's injunction order under Article 227.

High Court criticized the alleged haste in the trial Court proceedings.

Failure to consider a pending appeal (C.M.A. No. 1 of 2018) and the availability of an appeal under CPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and elections conducted under it.

An Advocate Commissioner appointed to organize General Body and Executive Committee elections.

The Commissioner will ensure proper nominations, register forms with the Registrar of Societies, and act as Secretary until elections.

The decision aims to end multiple litigations between the parties.

Facts:

The nature of clubs registered under Section 25 of the Companies Act, emphasizing the prohibition of dividend payments and the application of profits to promote the club's objectives. The distinction between proprietary clubs and clubs with a corporate form was highlighted.

Issues:

The interpretation of the doctrine of mutuality in the context of sales tax and service tax, the impact of the 46th Amendment on taxation of club transactions,

The application of relevant legal provisions to incorporated and unincorporated members' clubs.

Held:

The judgment clarified that the doctrine of mutuality applies to clubs registered under Section 25 of the Companies Act. Such clubs, lacking shareholders and dividends, cannot be treated as separate legal entities from their members.

The 46th Amendment sought to tax sales by unincorporated clubs, assuming sales by corporate clubs were already taxable. The expression "any unincorporated association or body of persons" in the amendment was deemed applicable only to clubs not in corporate form.

The definition of "body of persons" in Article 366(29-A)(e) and Section 65B(44) was analyzed. The judgment argued that the term excludes incorporated entities like companies and registered cooperative societies, particularly in the context of service tax.

Explanation 3 in Section 65B(44) post-2012 was considered, and it was concluded that it did not apply to incorporated members' clubs, as the term "body of persons" does not include bodies corporate.

The judgment affirmed that the doctrine of mutuality remains applicable to both incorporated and unincorporated members' clubs after the 46th Amendment. Previous judgments, including Young Men’s Indian Association, continued to hold relevance.

Sub-clause (f) of Article 366(29-A) was determined to have no application to members' clubs.

The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed, and show-cause notices related to service tax on incorporated members' clubs were declared void.

Facts:

The victim child went missing at approximately 4:00 p.m.

The appellant was observed distributing chocolates to children around the time of the child's disappearance.

The police apprehended the appellant, finding him with the victim child in a naked condition.

The victim had suffered brutal assault, including vaginal and unnatural intercourse, resulting in multiple injuries.

Issues:

The reliability of evidence, burden of proof, the severity of the crime, and the appropriateness of the death penalty.

Held:

The court held that the appellant, Ravi s/o Ashok Ghumare, was conclusively proven to be responsible for the heinous crimes against the two-year-old victim (Para 30).

The medical evidence, eyewitness accounts, circumstantial evidence, and DNA analysis collectively established the appellant's guilt (Para 35, 36).

The burden to prove that the injuries were not caused by the appellant rested on him, and he failed to discharge this burden (Para 30).

The court, by majority, upheld the death sentence for the appellant, emphasizing the gravity of the crime and the lack of remorse shown by the appellant (Para 61).

Dissenting Opinion on Sentencing:

One judge dissented on the death penalty, arguing for the modification to life imprisonment based on mitigating factors, including the appellant's intoxication at the time of the crime, age, and lack of evidence on rehabilitation possibilities (Para 34).

FACTS:

Appellant issued a fire insurance policy to the respondent for plant and machinery.

Claim arose after a fire accident on 23.04.2000.

Appellant offered Rs. 7,98,019/-, which was refused.

A meeting was held on 20.09.2001, where the appellant revised the offer to Rs. 33,80,925/-.

Respondent, dissatisfied, approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which dismissed the complaint.

Matter referred to arbitration, resulting in an award dated 28.06.2004.

ISSUES:

Validity of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The jurisdiction of the Court for re-presentation of the petition.

HELD:

The Court observed that the delay of 8 days in re-presentation was the only issue. It was not justified to re-examine the entire period spent before the Jaipur court as malafide. The Court set aside the orders of the lower courts and allowed the appeal, restoring the proceedings to the file of the Additional District Judge S.No.3, Jodhpur.( Para 12)

The parties were directed to appear before the Jodhpur court on 15.10.2019 for further proceedings. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.( Para 14)

REFERRED CASES:

Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. The Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 169

Joginder Tuli vs. S.L. Bhatia and another (1997) 1 SCC 502

S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. and Anr. vs. Narsamma (dead) through LRs. and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 341

Shri Amar Chand Inami vs. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 115

Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 455

Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470