Facts:

The case involved a FIR filed by a power-of-attorney holder regarding alleged attempts of extortion and fraudulent activities related to agricultural land. The investigation was conducted, a charge-sheet was filed, and the Magistrate took cognizance, issuing summons to the accused.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate possessed the authority to order further investigation post the filing of a charge-sheet and after cognizance is taken.

Held:

The court highlighted the expansive nature of the Magistrate's power under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, emphasizing the Magistrate's responsibility to ensure a fair and just police investigation, as mandated by Article 21 of the Constitution. This power includes the authority to order further investigation even after a police report is submitted.

The introduction of Section 173(8) grants the police the power to continue investigations after a report has been forwarded to the Magistrate until the trial commences.

Overruling previous judgments, the court rejected a restrictive view of the Magistrate's powers post the issuance of process or the accused appearing before the Magistrate.

The discretion to order further investigation lies with the Magistrate, who must exercise it based on the facts of each case and in accordance with the law.

In the specific case, the court observed that the facts alleged for further investigation were akin to a cross-FIR. However, considering doubts raised by the Commissioner of Revenue, the court directed the police to register an FIR and investigate specific facts mentioned in a communication.

Facts:

Dismissal of a workman with another industrial dispute pending.

Application under Section 33(2)(b) seeking permission for dismissal.

Labour Court dismissal of the application, upheld by the Single Judge of the High Court.

Division Bench of the High Court set aside previous orders, stating Section 33(2)(b) does not allow the introduction of new evidence.

Issues:

Interpretation of the scope of Section 33(2)(b) concerning the dismissal of a workman.

Examination of the relationship between Section 33(2)(b) and the self-contained mechanism provided by Section 10 read with Sections 11(3) and 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Clarification on whether Section 33(2)(b) permits an expanded procedure for adjudicating the legality, propriety, justifiability, or sustainability of punitive actions against a workman.

Held:

The Industrial Disputes Act provides a self-contained mechanism for adjudicating industrial disputes related to the dismissal of a workman.

Section 33(2)(b) is distinct and not meant for adjudicating the legality or justifiability of punitive actions; its purpose is to prevent adverse alterations during pending conciliation or dispute proceedings.

Section 33(2)(b) contemplates a summary inquiry into the conduct of a proper domestic enquiry, focusing on principles of natural justice.

The Labour Court/Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b), should not evaluate the proportionality of punishment, as this falls under Section 11A of the Act.

Two-phase scope for enquiry under Section 33(2)(b): Prima facie assessment based on domestic enquiry records and, if defects are found, allowing parties to present evidence.

Orders under Section 33(2)(b) have no binding effect in Section 10(1)(c) or (d) proceedings; both are independent.

Criticism of lower courts for misunderstanding the scope of Section 33(2)(b).

Remittance to the Labour Court for a fresh decision and directions for dispute settlement through mediation.

Decision: Partly allowing the appeal, the Court remits the matter to the Labour Court for a fresh decision within the limit and scope of Section 33(2)(b). The parties are directed to settle the dispute through mediation, and proceedings before the Labour Court are stayed until the mediation process concludes.

Facts:

The accused, including appellant no. 1, were facing charges under the Arms Act and the TADA Act.

The arrest occurred based on information received by the police regarding the presence of appellant no. 1 in a village.

The FIR was filed under the Arms Act, and subsequently, Section 5 of the TADA Act was added with the approval of the District Superintendent of Police.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the compliance with Section 20-A(1) of the TADA Act.

Whether the information about the commission of an offence under TADA Act could be recorded by the police without the prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police.

Held and Decision:

Held:

Section 20-A(1) of the TADA Act is mandatory and starts with a non-obstante clause.

Non-compliance with Section 20-A(1) vitiates the entire proceedings related to offences under TADA Act.

The bar under Section 20-A(1) applies to information recorded under Section 154 of CrPC but does not apply to a rukka or communication sent by the police to the District Superintendent of Police seeking sanction.

Decision:

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the order of the Designated TADA Court.

The appellants were discharged from the offences under TADA Act but could be proceeded against under other applicable laws.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the accused were found in possession of poppy husk in a vehicle. The trial court convicted them, but the High Court acquitted them, citing non-compliance with Section 50 in the personal search.

Issues:

Whether non-compliance with Section 50 in the personal search of the accused invalidates the recovery of contraband material from the vehicle.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the recovery from the vehicle, even if there was non-compliance with Section 50 in the personal search, should not be invalidated. The court referred to previous judgments, including the Baldev Singh case, stating that non-compliance with Section 50 may render the recovery suspect but does not vitiate the trial if other evidence exists. The court set aside the High Court's acquittal, restored the trial court's conviction, and reduced the sentence to 10 years. The accused were given until November 15, 2019, to surrender. The appeals stand allowed in aforesaid terms.

Facts:

The appellant, H. S. Yadav, filed an appeal under Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011, directly to the Supreme Court. The constitutional challenge revolved around the authority of the State Legislature to enact a law allowing such a direct appeal.

Issues:

Whether the State Legislature has the competence to enact a law providing an appeal directly to the Supreme Court under the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011.

The validity of Section 13(2) in this context.

Held:

The court emphasized that the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court are exclusive to the Union, and the State Legislature lacks the power to enact laws in this regard (Para 12).

Entries 77 and 65 of Lists I and II were referenced, supporting the argument that legislative competence on the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court lies solely with the Union (Para 11).

The court questioned the rationale behind making the order appealable directly to the Supreme Court, criticizing the lack of consideration for the hierarchy of courts in the Act (Para 13).

The court referred to the case of L. Chandrakumar vs. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119, which affirmed the writ jurisdiction of High Courts over tribunals constituted under Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution (Para 16).

The court suggested that the appellant can seek redressal through the High Court under Article 227 and dismissed the appeal filed under Section 13(2) (Para 17).

Facts:

The case involves an appeal challenging an interim order from the Delhi High Court in a writ petition related to the Black Money Act.

The issues concern the retrospective application of the Act, specifically Sections 50 and 51, and the one-time declaration opportunity under Section 59.

Issues:

Whether the High Court correctly observed the retrospective application of penal provisions.

The impact of the date change in sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Black Money Act on the one-time declaration opportunity.

Held:

The court holds that the High Court was not correct in deeming the penal provisions retrospective.

The date change in sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Black Money Act was intended to allow assesses to benefit from Section 59.

The penal provisions (Sections 50 and 51) apply when an assessee fails to utilize Section 59 for disclosure and payment of tax and penalty.

The interim order by the High Court is quashed, and the case is remanded for a decision on its merits.

Concludes by allowing the appeal, quashing the interim order, and requesting the High Court to decide the writ petition on its merits.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The contention arises from the acquisition process initiated through Section 4 notification and subsequent transactions involving the purchased land.

Issues:

The legality of land transactions after the Section 4 notification, the rights of subsequent purchasers under the Act of 2013, and the interpretation of Section 24(2) concerning the restoration of land or the lapse of acquisition.

Held:

The judgment holds that incumbents who purchased land after the Section 4 notification have no right to question the acquisition. The Act of 2013 is designed to benefit landowners mentioned in the Section 4 notification, not subsequent purchasers. (Para: 6, 8, 9.)

The definition of "affected family" and "landowner" as per Sections 3(c) and 3(r) is discussed. A person acquiring interest after the Section 11 notification is not considered part of the "affected family" or a "landowner."( Para: 10, 12.)

Section 24(2) is examined, and it is emphasized that subsequent purchasers cannot claim rights under this provision. The proviso to Section 24(2) reinforces the rights of recorded owners at the time of the Section 4 notification to receive compensation.(Para: 16, 17.)

The judgment asserts that the Act of 2013 does not confer any right on purchasers whose sale is ab initio void. Transactions made after the Section 4 notification are considered void, and such void transactions are not validated under the Act of 2013.(Para: 18-21.)

The objective of the Act of 2013 is outlined, emphasizing the acquisition of land with minimal disturbance to landowners, fair compensation, and rehabilitation. Subsequent purchasers are not considered landowners entitled to restoration of land. (Para: 22, 23, 24)

Decision: The Court dismisses the appeal, affirming that purchasers after the Section 4 notification cannot question the acquisition or claim rights under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.

Facts:

The plaintiffs, successors of the ex-Zamindar, filed a suit seeking declaration of Bhumiswami rights and permanent injunction for certain land.

The State denied the claims, stating that the land was not Khud-kasht but recorded as 'Bir' (Grass) land before the Zamindari abolition.

Issues:

Whether the land, recorded as 'Grass' before the date of vesting, can be considered Khud-kasht land of the ex-Zamindar?

Whether the entries in revenue records support the claim of the plaintiffs?

Held:

The Court held that for land to be saved from vesting, it must fulfill three requirements: personal cultivation (as per Section 2(c)), recorded as Khud-kasht, and recorded before the date of vesting (as per Section 4(2)).

The Khasra entry of 2007, presented by the plaintiffs, was found to be spurious, manipulated, and against the instructions, leading to no presumption of correctness under Section 52.

The land, not recorded as Khud-kasht, did not meet the requirements of Section 4(2), and thus, it automatically vested in the State under Section 4(1).

The Court emphasized that the provisions of Section 4(1) prevail, and the grassland, i.e., 'Bir' land, vests in the State.

The decision of the High Court, which favored the plaintiffs, was set aside, and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court were restored.

Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's decision, and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court were restored. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

The case involves the State of Uttarakhand's recruitment of Junior Engineers (JEs) in the Irrigation Department, where 200 posts were advertised. The promotion to the next higher post, Assistant Engineers (AE, Civil), was governed by the 2003 Rules, which included a 10% accelerated promotion quota for JEs (Civil) holding a Degree in Civil Engineering with 3 years of service. An amendment in 2004 sought to alter the appointment ratio, resulting in writ petitions filed by Diploma-holders challenging the accelerated promotion quota.

Issues:

The classification based on educational qualifications for accelerated promotion and the constitutional validity of the amendment in 2004, particularly the accelerated promotion quota.

Held:

Qualification-Based Classification (Para 16): The court holds that the State has the right to provide different periods of experience for Degree-holders and Diploma-holders at the time of promotion, considering both promotion and direct appointment to AEs may require a Degree as the essential qualification.

Justifiability of Classification (Paras 26-28): The court emphasizes that higher educational qualifications, intrinsically linked with exclusive, earlier, or accelerated promotion, bring in specific skills with a nexus to the job. Administrative authorities are deemed best suited to evaluate this nexus.

Equality Principle in Service Jurisprudence (Paras 26-28): While acknowledging the importance of the equality principle, the court recognizes that classifications are a necessity in service jurisprudence, balancing equality with the principle of classification.

Historical Perspective (Paras 29-33): The court notes that historical support exists for the accelerated promotion quota, as even the State of Uttar Pradesh had a similar quota, unchallenged by any party.

Decision (Paras 29-33): The court deems the impugned judgment unsustainable and dismisses the writ petitions filed by Diploma-holders, allowing the appeal of the Government.