Facts:

The appellant was convicted for kidnapping, raping, and murdering a 13-year-old girl. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, including DNA analysis, to establish guilt. The trial court and High Court imposed the death sentence.

Issues:

Whether a death sentence can be awarded in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

The impact of "residual doubt" in determining the standard of proof for capital sentencing.

Validity of the conviction under Section 376A based on certain findings not supported by medical evidence.

Held:

The court affirmed the guilt of the appellant based on strong circumstantial and medico-scientific evidence (Para 37).

Emphasized that there is no absolute bar on awarding death sentences in circumstantial evidence cases, considering the potential for abuse by seasoned criminals (Para 37).

Recognized the concept of "residual doubt" in recent cases but concluded that this case did not qualify as the "rarest of rare" deserving the death penalty (Paras 61, 62, 64, 65).

Noted some residual doubts in the case, including inconsistent witness statements and discrepancies in evidence (Para 61).

Acknowledged the erroneous finding related to bleeding due to sexual intercourse but clarified that it did not impact the conviction under Section 376A (Para 39, 60).

Decision: The death penalty was set aside, and life imprisonment was substituted due to the presence of residual doubts and the case not falling within the "rarest of rare" category.

FACTS:

Appellant issued a fire insurance policy to the respondent for plant and machinery.

Claim arose after a fire accident on 23.04.2000.

Appellant offered Rs. 7,98,019/-, which was refused.

A meeting was held on 20.09.2001, where the appellant revised the offer to Rs. 33,80,925/-.

Respondent, dissatisfied, approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which dismissed the complaint.

Matter referred to arbitration, resulting in an award dated 28.06.2004.

ISSUES:

Validity of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The jurisdiction of the Court for re-presentation of the petition.

HELD:

The Court observed that the delay of 8 days in re-presentation was the only issue. It was not justified to re-examine the entire period spent before the Jaipur court as malafide. The Court set aside the orders of the lower courts and allowed the appeal, restoring the proceedings to the file of the Additional District Judge S.No.3, Jodhpur.( Para 12)

The parties were directed to appear before the Jodhpur court on 15.10.2019 for further proceedings. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.( Para 14)

REFERRED CASES:

Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. The Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 169

Joginder Tuli vs. S.L. Bhatia and another (1997) 1 SCC 502

S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. and Anr. vs. Narsamma (dead) through LRs. and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 341

Shri Amar Chand Inami vs. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 115

Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 455

Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470

Facts:

The Okhla Enclave Plot Holders' Welfare Association, in Writ Petition (C) No. 876 of 1996, alleged that the colonizer (respondent no.6) failed to adhere to the terms of the agreement in allotting plots. The matter was referred to arbitration, addressing four crucial questions.

Issues:

The portion of land claimed by the colonizer, the entity responsible for project development and allotments, relaxation of density norms, and the nature of the proceedings (arbitration or a Special Committee).

Held:

The plot holders are entitled to the entire extent of land as per the layout, irrespective of the portion claimed by the colonizer. The colonizer's claim is contingent upon payment of renewal fees and other charges.

The Town and Country Planning Department will undertake development after receiving 90% of the total amount payable by plot owners.

The arbitrator will determine development charges based on square meter cost, apportioning the total cost among eligible plot owners.

Failure to pay development charges within the specified time may result in the denial of amenities, with potential consequences such as forfeiture of plot rights.

The State of Haryana clarified that certain density norms cannot be reduced, and the arbitrator must adjust plots accordingly.

The proceedings are in the nature of a Special Committee constituted by the court, not under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Decision: The court's decision, dated October 3, 2019, establishes the entitlement of plot holders to the entire land as per the layout. The colonizer's claims are subject to specific conditions, and development responsibilities lie with the Town and Country Planning Department. The proceedings are considered a Special Committee, not arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Facts:

Narsingh Yadav, the appellant, enrolled in the Indian Army on December 2, 2003.

Diagnosed with Schizophrenia, disability assessed at 20% for five years.

Invalidating Medical Board's opinion: Disability not attributable to or aggravated by military service.

Appellant discharged from army service on May 8, 2007.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's Schizophrenia can be considered attributable to or aggravated by military service.

Applicability of Rule 14 of the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982.

Validity of the decision of the Armed Forces Tribunal rejecting the claim for disability pension.

Held:

The court applied Rule 14(d) and emphasized that entitlement to disability pension should be considered only if it is established that the cause of the disease was adversely affected due to factors related to conditions of military service.

Mental disorders, like Schizophrenia, are difficult to detect at the time of recruitment.

The appellant, posted in a peace station as a Vehicle Mechanic, did not face conditions causing stress and strain leading to disability attributed to military service.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Tribunal.

FACTS:

The case involved a dispute over the allotment of land, particularly Survey No. 129/45/D, to Andhra Prabha Publications under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.

A learned Single Judge directed a survey to determine if the allotted land was indeed Survey No. 129/45/D.

The Division Bench initially set aside the Single Judge's judgment, but the Supreme Court disagreed in its judgment on 16.08.2017, restoring the Single Judge's direction for a survey.

Despite subsequent orders, the demarcation of Survey No. 129/45/D had not taken place as directed.

ISSUES:

Whether the land allotted to Andhra Prabha Publications was the same as Survey No. 129/45/D.

HELD:

In light of the extraordinary facts and the reluctance of authorities to part with the valuable land, the Court, using powers under Article 142, rejected the second Survey Report. The Court declared that the land marked as Survey No. 19/P, specifically 'PQRS' in the map, is actually Survey No. 129/45/D. The allotment to Andhra Prabha Publications was set aside, and they were directed to deliver the land to the government within eight weeks. The miscellaneous application is accordingly disposed of. ( Para 13)

All amounts paid by Andhra Prabha Publications to the Government were ordered to be refunded within twelve weeks, along with simple interest at 6 percent per annum.( Para 14)

Facts:

The case involves a review petition challenging the guidelines issued in the case of Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra. The guidelines pertained to arrests under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, specifically requiring approval for the arrest of public servants and a preliminary inquiry by a Dy.S.P for non-public servants.

Issues:

The validity of the guidelines issued in the Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan case.

The impact of the guidelines on the rights and protections afforded to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the 1989 Act.

Held:

The court holds that Section 18 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is not violative of Article 21. The court emphasizes the historical discrimination faced by these communities and the need for protective discrimination. The existing provisions regarding arrests are analyzed, and the court concludes that the guidelines in question restrict the right to arrest.

The court discusses the right to live with dignity and the concomitant provision of compensation for human rights violations under Article 21. It emphasizes that the Act of 1989 is in essence aligned with various facets of Article 21, providing protections and compensation. The court rejects the notion of a presumption that members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may misuse the law and argues against discrimination in procedures.

The court refutes the idea that the caste of a person is the cause for lodging false reports under the Act. It highlights the vulnerable position of these communities and the need for special protections. The court dismisses the argument that the high number of cases registered in 2016 indicates misuse of the Act and stresses that such misuse can be addressed through existing legal mechanisms.

The court addresses concerns related to the approval of arrests by the appointing authority for public servants. It argues that Section 197 of the Cr.PC already provides protection, and requiring appointing authority approval at the arrest stage would be discriminatory and encroach upon legislative territory.

The court rejects the idea that approval of the SSP is necessary for the arrest of non-public servants, emphasizing that it may cause delays and is not statutorily envisaged.

The court concludes that requiring the Magistrate to scrutinize reasons for further detention is unnecessary when approval from the appointing authority or SSP has not been granted. It emphasizes that this process may delay proceedings under the Act of 1989.

The court recalls guidelines (iii) and (iv) issued in the Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan case, stating that they encroach upon legislative territory and are against the concept of protective discrimination under Article 15(4). As a result, direction No.(v) also becomes irrelevant.

Facts:

Dispute over ownership of land in Survey No. 493 of Patwari Halka No.76 at Village-Purani Chhabani, Guna.

Original landowners sold land to Urmila Devi, who later sold a portion to the appellants.

Plaintiff, Matadin, claimed adverse possession based on Khasra entries for 1960-1961.

Trial court decreed in favor of the plaintiff, but the first appellate court allowed the appeal by the appellants.

High Court, in a second appeal, reversed the first appellate court's order and restored the trial court's decree in favor of the plaintiff.

Issues:

Validity of the plaintiff's claim of adverse possession.

Corrections in Khasra entries and their impact on the claim.

Whether the High Court erred in re-evaluating the evidence.

Held:

The court observed that the plaintiff's claim of possession originating in 1960-1961 was questionable, especially considering the suspicious corrections in the Khasra entries. The court noted that the son and nephew of the plaintiff were clerks in the collectorate, and they faced departmental proceedings and criminal prosecution for making false entries. The court highlighted that the entries in the name of Urmila Devi, the purchaser, were in blue ink, while the entries in the name of the plaintiff were in red ink.

The court concluded that the first appellate court's finding on possession being with Urmila Devi, supported by the court commissioner's report and the subsequent sale deed to the appellants, did not require interference. The High Court's finding that Urmila Devi never acquired possession, and the plaintiff established adverse possession, was considered perverse. The court emphasized that the plaintiff failed to establish peaceful, open, and continuous possession demonstrating a wrongful ouster of the rightful owner.

In light of these findings, the court set aside the High Court's order, restored the first appellate court's order, and dismissed the suit in favor of the appellants. The appeals were allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a criminal complaint against an MLA, Satish Ukey, alleging the non-disclosure of two criminal cases in Form 26, as required by the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Issues:

The interpretation of Sections 33-A and 125-A of the 1951 Act, along with Rules 4A and Form 26 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.

The central question is whether the information to be furnished by a candidate under Section 33-A includes cases where cognizance has been taken by the court, in addition to cases where charges have been framed.

Held:

The highlight that Section 33-A, as initially drafted, required information about convictions and cases where charges had been framed but excluded cases where cognizance had been taken. However, the court emphasizes that Form 26 mandates disclosure not only for cases where charges have been framed but also for cases where cognizance has been taken by the court.( Paragraph 8 and 9)

address the crucial question of whether the word 'information' in Section 125-A includes information beyond what is mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 33-A(1). The court notes the requirement of providing information in Form 26 under Section 33-A(2).( Paragraphs 12 and 13)

Discuss the amendments made to Form 26 in 2012, explicitly mandating the disclosure of information about cases where cognizance has been taken. The court stresses that the new Form 26 requires information on both framed charges and cases where cognizance has been taken.( Paragraphs 15, 16, and 17 )

Refers to letters from the Election Commission emphasizing that candidates must furnish information on cases where a competent court has taken cognizance, along with cases where charges have been framed.( Paragraph 18)

Concludes that the information to be furnished under Section 33-A includes not only the information in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 33-A(1) but also information required under the Act or the Rules, to be provided in Form 26.( Paragraph 19 )

Declares that the trial court's order, upheld by the High Court, is legally untenable. The complaint will be reconsidered afresh by the trial court.( Paragraph 20 )

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the orders of the lower courts are set aside. The complaint will be reconsidered afresh by the trial court.

Facts:

The petitioner, Sudam @ Rahul Kaniram Jadhav, filed Review Petition (Crl.) Nos.401-402 of 2012 challenging his conviction under Section 302 IPC based on circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

The scope of review jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the correctness of the death sentence, and the petitioner's conduct in prison.

Held:

The scope of review jurisdiction in criminal proceedings is limited to correcting miscarriages of justice caused by an error apparent on the face of the record, guided by Article 137 of the Constitution and Order XL Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules. The court cannot re-appreciate evidence in its entirety during the review (Para 1 to Para 6.5).

The petitioner's conviction under Section 302 IPC based on circumstantial evidence was upheld, and there were no grounds for interference with the findings on the "last seen" circumstance, extra-judicial confession, and motive. The chain of circumstances established the guilt beyond reasonable doubt (Para 10 to Para 17).

Though evidence being circumstantial may be a relevant consideration in sentencing, there is no bar on awarding the death sentence. The decision depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, considering both aggravating and mitigating factors (Para 18.1 to Para 18.2).

The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to a mitigating circumstance in the nature of circumstantial evidence. Incorrect observations regarding the deceased's facial injuries affected the decision. Life imprisonment alone would be inadequate, and the petitioner was ordered to remain in prison for life with restrictions on remission (Para 20 to Para 22.1).