FACTS:

The Appellant conducted a Chit Fund from 1978 to 1990.

Respondents defaulted in 12 installments from 24.11.1981 to 24.11.1984.

Two Suits filed for recovery of installments.

Subordinate Judge decreed both Suits in favor of the Appellant on 09.04.1990.

Single Judge of the Kerala High Court affirmed the decision on 27.06.1994.

Division Bench of Kerala High Court, in the impugned Judgment dated 15.01.2009, allowed recovery of past installments but not future ones.

ISSUES:

Nature of the relationship between a chit fund entity and subscribers.

Applicability of Kerala Chitties Act, 1975.

Validity of stipulations in chit agreements.

HELD:

The court disagrees with the division bench's view, stating that when a prized subscriber is allowed to draw the chit amount, it is in the nature of a loan, subject to repayment in installments.( Paragraph 10)

The court refers to Section 32 of the Chits Funds Act, 1982, empowering the foreman to recover the consolidated payment of all future subscriptions from a defaulting prized subscriber.( Paragraph 12)

Tthe court concludes that the relationship between a chit subscriber and the foreman is contractual, creating a debt on the day of subscription. On default, the foreman can recover the consolidated amount in a lump sum.( Paragraph 15)

The Civil Appeal is allowed.( Paragraph 16)

REFERRED CASES:

Janardhana Mallan & Ors. vs. Gangadharan & Ors. AIR 1983 Ker 178

K.P. Subbarama Sastri and Ors. vs. K.S. Raghavan and Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 424

P.K. Achuthan and Anr. vs. State Bank of Travancore, Calicut, AIR 1975 Ker 47

Shriram Chits & Investment (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1993 SC 2063

State of Kerala and Ors. vs. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. and Ors. (2012) 7 SCC 106

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the appellant, along with other accused, committed the murder of the appellant's wife by throttling her. The charges included Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 498A of the Penal Code. The trial court convicted all accused, but the High Court acquitted all except the appellant.

Issues:

The appellant contested that since the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of other accused, it must be inferred that the case against the appellant under Section 302 alone was not proven.

Additionally, the appellant argued that the victim had committed suicide by hanging.

Held:

The evidence supported the case of throttling, with the prosecution establishing motive through threats made by the appellant to the victim. The threat was corroborated by witnesses, and both trial and High Court believed in its credibility (Para 38).

The High Court's finding that the appellant and his wife had a separate room, indicating a custodial death, was upheld. The timing of the death around 3:30 a.m. further implicated the appellant (Para 39).

The provisional death certificate issued by two doctors immediately after the post-mortem indicated acute cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to throttling, aligning with the post-mortem report. Despite a gap in dates, the court found assurance in the corroboration of the provisional death certificate with the post-mortem report (Para 41-42).

Inconsistencies between injuries noted in the Inquest report and the post-mortem report were deemed less significant, with reliance on the medical doctor's expertise in identifying injuries. The nature of injuries pointed to death by throttling (Para 43).

FACTS:

The appellant challenged the denial of financial approval for his service by the District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur Nagar.

The appellant's appointment against a substantive vacancy was contested, alleging non-compliance with the prescribed procedure.

ISSUES:

Whether the Management followed the correct procedure for the appointment against a substantive vacancy.

Adherence to the guidelines in the First Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981.

HELD:

The Management has a limited scope to make appointments to substantive vacancies, and the Division Bench observed non-compliance with paragraph 5 of the First Removal of Difficulties Order in the present impugned order.( Paragraph 12)

The appellant's appointment by the Management was not in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Removal of Difficulties Order, and the decision in Radha Raizada was correctly applied to the present facts.( Paragraph 13)

The State coffer should not be burdened with salary obligation for an appointment not made by them. The decision repudiating the salary claim for the appellant is found to be in order since the Management failed to adhere to the due process in filling up the substantive vacancy. The State had imposed a ban on appointment during the relevant period. Therefore, the appellant cannot enforce a claim for salary against the State. The appeal is found devoid of merit and dismissed.( Paragraph 14)

REFERRED CASES:

Prabhat Kumar Sharma and Others vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (1996) 10 SCC 62

Radha Raizada vs. Committee of Management Vidyawati Darbari Girls Inter College and Ors, 1994 All.L.J. 1077

Facts:

The case involves a housing project within the catchment area of Sukhna Lake, situated at a short distance of 123 meters from Sukhna Wildlife Sanctuary. The project faced a legal challenge.

Issues:

The key issues revolve around the environmental clearance for the housing project, particularly considering its proximity to Sukhna Wildlife Sanctuary.

Held:

The proposed Buffer Zone of 100 meters from Sukhna Wildlife Sanctuary was not accepted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), leading to the need for resubmission with a suggested 1 km Buffer Zone.

The State of Punjab failed to send a proposal for the revised Buffer Zone, likely due to the involvement of the project concerning Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs).

The Greater Mohali Area Development Authority's Regional Plan prohibits development within 5 km of the Sukhna Wildlife Sanctuary, emphasizing the need to conserve the buffer zone against urban development.

The MoEF has designated a 2–2.75 km area as an eco-sensitive zone around the Sukhna Wildlife Sanctuary.

Decision: Considering the proximity of the housing project to the wildlife sanctuary, the Court quashed the entire clearance process for the project. The State of Punjab was found to have failed in adhering to the Doctrine of Public Trust. The Court emphasized the responsibility to protect and preserve the environment, wildlife, and the eco-sensitive zone.

Facts:

Members of the Army Postal Service (APS) were on deputation from the Department of Posts and Telegraph.

The Army Instructions indicate that APS members hold a lien in their parent department, and their pension is governed by civil rules.

The respondents argued for OROP based on higher pensions than their counterparts in the Department of Posts.

Issues:

Whether APS members on deputation are entitled to OROP.

Interpretation of Army Instructions 1959 and 1985 regarding Temporary Commission and pension.

Held:

The grant of Temporary Commission was meant for Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Warrant Officers (WOs) who have passed the examination of the Department of Posts. Officials of the Department of Posts continue to have a lien over the posts under the Union (Para 11).

Army Instructions 1959 and 1985 cover all officers of the Department of Posts, not just Gazetted Officers. The respondents' lien in the Department of Posts was not terminated (Para 14).

The argument that higher pensions justify OROP is not tenable. The respondents continue to hold a lien in the Department of Posts (Para 15).

The Circulars dated 7th November, 2015, and 3rd February, 2016, granting OROP are not applicable to APS members, as they are not drawing pensions from Defence Establishments (Para 20).

Exclusion in Circulars only pertains to those in receipt of pension for services in the armed forces, which does not apply to APS members (Para 21).

The respondents were holders of Temporary Commission for rank benefits, not Commissioned Officers. Territorial Army members' inclusion in OROP does not apply to APS members (Para 23).

Retirement age aligns with civil posts, indicating APS members are not Ex-servicemen entitled to OROP (Para 25).

Persons on deputation to APS from the Department of Posts are not entitled to OROP (Para 26).

Facts:

The case involves the conviction of appellants (accused no. 1 and 2) under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code for inflicting fatal knife blows on the stomach of the victim-deceased. Six accused were initially charged, and the incident occurred when the deceased, riding a motorcycle, was obstructed by all accused, leading to the fatal injuries.

Issues:

The quality of evidence, the credibility of eyewitness testimonies (PW-1 and PW-2), and the convictions of appellants in contrast to the acquittals of other accused. The defense raised concerns about deficiencies in the investigation, delay in FIR registration, and the absence of evidence regarding previous enmity.

Held:

The Supreme Court, under Article 136, refrains from reappreciating evidence unless a manifest error of law or procedure is demonstrated or the conclusion of lower courts is evidently perverse. (Para 12)

The testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, the eyewitnesses, were extensively cross-examined but remained unshaken regarding the appellants' involvement in inflicting fatal injuries. The Court upheld their credibility, emphasizing the distinct role of the appellants. (Paras 15-16)

Discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses about the condition of the deceased when admitted to the hospital do not undermine the case, considering medical reports confirming the semi-conscious state. The Court rejects the argument of uniformity in witness reactions. (Para 23)

The Court dismisses the appeal, upholding the concurrent view of the Trial Court and the High Court on the appellants' guilt. The so-called deficiencies pointed out by the appellants in the investigation are deemed insignificant. (Para 22)

The delay in registering FIR was considered and rejected by the Trial Court, with the Supreme Court upholding this finding. The Court relies on the contemporaneous record to support the absence of delay. (Paras 24-26)

The defense's contradictory stands regarding the cause of injuries were dismissed as baseless, with the Court highlighting the lack of evidence supporting these claims. The acquittal of accused in cross-cases related to another incident does not impact the appellants' guilt in the present case. (Paras 27-28)

Facts:

The incident on December 28, 2018, at the Shri Jagannath Temple is highlighted. A Bhitar Chhu Sevak, responsible for opening the Sanctum-Santorum for daily puja/nitis, delayed the process due to personal issues with the Police Administration of Puri Town.

Issues:

The delay in the performance of seva and puja due to the Sevak's refusal to open the temple doors raises concerns about antitemple activities. The court must address misbehavior/misconduct against Temple Administration employees and devotees.

Held:

The Court expresses deep concern about the unpardonable delay in opening the temple doors on December 28, 2018.

No one has the right to obstruct temple rituals, especially with approximately 60,000 daily visitors. The incident reflects total maladministration and chaos.

The Chief Administrator of the Temple is authorized to take immediate steps against servitors/incumbents causing obstructions in seva/puja/niti and involved in misbehavior. The nature of indiscipline will determine appropriate disciplinary actions.

Decision: The Court emphasizes the need for strict disciplinary control to maintain order in the temple. The Chief Administrator is granted authority to take necessary actions against those disrupting rituals and misbehaving with employees or devotees.

Facts:

Man Singh, the respondent, was prosecuted for offenses under Sections 468, 471, and 419 of the Indian Penal Code. The charges included the use of a forged transfer certificate to secure a job in the Veterinary Department.

Issues:

Whether a High Court judge can use Section 482 CrPC to alter a sentence previously imposed by the same High Court.

The legality of granting probation in this case, especially after the conviction and service of sentence.

Held:

The High Court had no jurisdiction to review its order under Section 362 or Section 482 of CrPC. The inherent power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be utilized to reopen or alter an order disposed of on merits. The Court, once functus officio, cannot entertain a petition to alter a sentence. The manner in which probation was granted was deemed improper and not in accordance with the law.

The order granting probation was illegal as it violated the provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The Court should have obtained a report from the Probation Officer before releasing the offender on probation. The High Court's directive that the sentence already undergone would not affect the respondent's service career was beyond its authority.

Even if benefit of probation was given, it did not entitle the employee to retain the job obtained through forged documents. The employer has the discretion to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude.

The appeal is allowed