Facts:

The testator executed a Will bequeathing immovable property to his eldest daughter. Probate was obtained 20 years later with no objection certificates attached. Subsequently, a partition suit was filed by the younger daughter against the eldest daughter, claiming the property was gifted by the mother. The partition suit was dismissed, and the property was later sold by legal heirs of the eldest daughter. The appellant, daughter of the testator's younger daughter, filed for the revocation of probate.

Issues:

Delay in filing the revocation application.

Lack of citation to the younger daughter in probate proceedings.

Genuineness of the no objection certificates.

Alleged lack of awareness of probate proceedings by the appellant.

Held:

The High Court erred in concluding there was inordinate delay without establishing prior knowledge of probate proceedings by the appellant. No finding supports the assertion of filing with inordinate delay.( Para 20)

No delay can be imputed to the appellant, who filed the revocation application promptly after inspecting PLA records in 2011.( Para 21)

Probate of an unregistered Will was granted without issuing citations to legal heirs, raising questions about procedural adherence.( Para 25)

Rule 5A requires the mention of family members in probate applications. Rule 9 mandates citation to rightful parties, but it is specified for letters of administration, not probate.( Para 27)

Section 283 confers discretion on the District Judge to issue citations. While discretion exists, it must be exercised with care based on case specifics.( Para 31)

Probate proceedings lacked cautious consideration, relying on notarized no objection certificates without proper verification.( Para 34)

The suit for partition filed in 1984 did not reference the Will or probate proceedings, casting doubt on the alleged consent given in probate by the younger daughter.( Para 35)

The Single Judge erred in not issuing a citation to the younger daughter and mechanically granting probate without verifying the genuineness of no objection certificates.( Para 36)

The High Court's order is set aside, and the application for revocation is allowed. The probate is revoked, reviving the PLA application before the Single Judge.( Para 39)

The High Court's decisions only pertain to the revocation proceedings. The matter should be considered concerning the appellant's application for revocation.( Para 40)

Facts:

The plaintiff purchased a property where the predecessors of defendants No.1 and 2 were tenants. After the purchase, defendants No.1 and 2 continued as tenants. The plaintiff, through a communication dated 06.12.1986, informed defendants No.1 and 2 about the purchase, seeking payment of rents. Upon the defendants' failure to pay, the plaintiff initiated a civil suit for eviction.

Issues:

Defendants No.1 and 2 contended that, following the death of the original tenant, the two sisters, legal heirs, were not made defendants. Additionally, they argued that the suit property was agricultural, falling under the MTAL Act, and the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction.

Held:

The Trial Court and the Appellate Court assessed the evidence and recorded findings based on oral evidence and documents. The finding that defendants No.1 and 2 were defaulters and not entitled to continue as tenants was not considered perverse.

The claim of the two sisters to be considered as tenants under the statutory tenant was deemed belated, lacking support in the evidence. The sisters did not take steps in earlier proceedings to establish their rights.

The contention that the suit property was agricultural and governed by the MTAL Act was dismissed. No document indicated that the MTAL Act's procedure was followed, and the claim of the predecessor of defendants No.1 and 2 becoming the landlord by operation of law was unsubstantiated.

The executing court, considering the order of the High Court, rejected the claim that the suit property was agricultural, and the entry in the 7/12 extract was not sufficient evidence.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 13-B of the Rent Act and its extension to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The matter arose from the Notification dated 09.10.2009, issued under Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act, extending Section 13-B and related sections.

Issues:

The validity of the extension, the legislative competence of the State Legislature of Punjab, and the reasonability of Section 13-B. The classification of Non-Resident Indian landlords as a separate category and its compliance with Article 14 were also contested.

Held:

The court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 13-B and its extension to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It affirmed that the extension fell within the ambit of conditional delegation and was valid. The challenge based on excessive delegation, separation of powers, and the law of agency was rejected.( Para 1-18)

The court discussed the legislative competence of the State Legislature of Punjab, emphasizing that the Amendment Act was well within its scope. The power to extend laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, as per Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act, rested with the Central Government, and it was deemed permissible.( Para 19-28)

Addressing the reasonability of Section 13-B, the court emphasized the statutory safeguards and checks in place. It highlighted the restrictions and conditions imposed on landlords seeking eviction, ensuring the genuineness of their need and preventing frivolous evictions.( Para 29-38)

The court dismissed the argument that Section 13-B created an arbitrary classification, stating that it was not unconstitutional under Article 14. It reasoned that the legislation aimed to balance the rights of Non-Resident Indian landlords and tenants through specific policy objectives.( Para 39-44)

The court concluded by rejecting the challenges to the classification, affirming the constitutionality of Section 13-B.( Para 45)

Facts:

The vehicle of Respondent no. 2, parked under valet parking at the appellant-hotel, was taken by a third party. The insurer and the vehicle owner filed a complaint against the hotel, initially dismissed on the insurer's locus standi. The National Commission allowed the complaint, and the hotel's appeal was dismissed.

Issues:

Maintainability of the insurer's complaint.

Liability of hotels for vehicles under valet parking – strict liability or prima facie negligence.

Existence of a bailment relationship.

Validity and enforceability of exemption clauses in parking tags.

Held:

Complaint Maintainability The complaint filed by the insurer as a subrogee, along with the original owner as a co-complainant, is maintainable as per Economic Transport Organisation conditions. (See Paras 8, 9)

Liability of Hotels Strict liability for loss or damage to vehicles is deemed burdensome; the court adopts the prima facie negligence rule, departing from the common law strict liability rule. (See Paras 15.2, 16)

Existence of Bailment Relationship The existence of a bailment relationship hinges on the degree of control exercised by the hotel. If the hotel actively undertakes parking, safekeeping, and return of the vehicle, a bailment contract is established. (See Paras 18, 18.7)

Complimentary Valet Parking Even if valet parking is provided gratuitously, the hotel benefits, and an implied consideration for the bailment contract exists. The hotel cannot deny bailment by claiming a complimentary nature. (See Para 18.3)

Duty of Care in Bailment The hotel bears the burden of proving reasonable care in handling the bailed vehicle, as per Sections 151 and 152 of the Contract Act, applicable to both gratuitous and reward-based bailments. (See Para 19)

Exclusion of Liability by Contract Hotels cannot exclude liability for negligence through contracts. The higher standard of care under Section 151 cannot be contracted out of. Exemption clauses may apply only after the hotel proves fulfillment of the standard of care. (See Paras 28-30)

Complaint Maintainability and Negligence Rule The consumer complaint is maintainable, and strict liability is rejected in favor of prima facie negligence. The hotel failed to prove its non-negligence, leading to the imposition of liability. (See Para 31)

Facts:

The plaintiff made a request in a prescribed form under Section 3 of the Act, seeking the exercise of requisite power by the Central Government. The rules framed under Section 13 of the Act specify a particular form for such requests.

Issues:

The plaintiff's communication with the second defendant and the subsequent failure to constitute an Inter-State River Water Disputes Tribunal.

Held:

The Court holds that the absence of a direct request for the constitution of a Tribunal cannot be inferred as the second defendant's fault. The Court directs the plaintiff to make an appropriate application within four weeks, invoking the powers of the Central Government under the Act.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, emphasizing that the plaintiff can seek the constitution of an Inter-State River Water Disputes Tribunal by following the proper procedure outlined in the Act.

FACTS:

The petitioners sought a review of the Rafale contract, praying for the registration of an FIR and investigation by the C.B.I. The petitioners raised concerns about the decision-making process, pricing, and the choice of offsets partner.

ISSUES:

Whether the decision-making process in the Rafale contract was fair.

Whether the pricing of the deal was justifiable.

Whether the choice of the offsets partner was appropriate.

HELD:

The Court considered the petitioners' submission unfair, as all counsels had addressed elaborate submissions on the decision-making process, pricing, and offsets partner. The Court held that the petitioners cannot seek a different adjudication process after availing the available remedy. It emphasized that competent authorities thoroughly considered all aspects, and entertaining varied opinions on technical matters would defeat the purpose of debate in the decision-making process. Decision: Review petition dismissed.

The Court asserted that determining prices is not within its function, and suspicions without proper evidence cannot be entertained. The internal mechanism for pricing would address the situation. The Court found that comparing the pricing of basic aircraft showed competitiveness. The judgment highlighted that decisions on loading the aircraft and additional pricing should be left to the best judgment of competent authorities. Decision: Petition dismissed.

REFERRED CASES:

Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma and others (1979) 4 SCC 389

Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Municipality AIR 1953 Bom 133

Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee, (1957) 1 WLR 582 : (1957) 2 All ER 118

CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1305

Chhajju Ramv. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112]

Deo Narain Singh v. Daddan Singh and others 1986 (Supp) SCC 530

G.L. Gupta v. D.N. Mehta [(1971) 3 SCC 189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279 : (1971) 3 SCR 748, 750

Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.N. Mehta and another AIR 1971 SC 2162

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others AIR 1955 SC 233

Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (Smt.) and others (2006) 4 SCC 78,

Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited. v. Mawasi and others (2012) 7 SCC 200

J.A.C. Saldanha [(1980) 1 SCC 554 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 272

Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1369

Jain Studios Ltd. Through Its President v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. (2006) 5 SCC 501

Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and others (2013) 8 SCC 320

King-Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad Khwaja AIR 1945 PC 18

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Lily Thomas and others v. Union of India and others (2000) 6 SCC 224

M.C. Abraham and another v. State of Maharashtra and others (2003) 2 SCC 649

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Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 8 SCC 149

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P.N. Eswara Iyer And Others v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India (1980) 4 SCC 680

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Sow Chandra Kante and another v. Sheikh Habib (1975) 1 SCC 674

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Facts:

Formation of SDJV with M/s. SSPPL and M/s. AIL.

Nomination of SSPPL as the 'Lead Partner' with a 95% share.

Contract Agreement dated March 9, 2006, for the Salma Dam Project.

Revision of rates and the subsequent AoA dated June 9, 2015.

Dispute between JV partners after the execution of AoA.

Revocation of Power-of-Attorney by AIL on September 21, 2016.

Filing of a petition under s.11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by SSPPL on behalf of SDJV.

Issues:

Validity of the arbitration agreement after the execution of AoA.

Authority of SSPPL to represent SDJV in arbitration proceedings.

Held:

The Technical Committee was not constituted under the CoPA as assumed by the High Court but under AoA. The High Court's reasoning on this point is deemed manifestly wrong and unsustainable.( Para 30)

The High Court incorrectly assumed the date of AoA as June 9, 2005, instead of the correct date, June 9, 2015. This error led to the rejection of the appellant(s) claim. The AoA, executed in 2015, resolved the claims when 97% of the project was already completed.( Para 31)

The High Court's reliance on the unmodified Clause 20 of CoPA is misplaced. The substantive provision regarding arbitration was explicitly eliminated in AoA. The failure to modify Clause 20 in CoPA does not resurrect the remedy of arbitration.( Para 32)

The High Court's reasons for rejecting the appellant(s) argument regarding the non-existence of an arbitration agreement are found wanting. The Arbitration Petition was not maintainable due to the absence of a subsisting arbitration agreement on the filing date.( Para 33)

Parties consciously adopted AoA, giving up claims under the existing agreement, including any future arbitration. Having chosen this path, the contractor cannot resurrect claims resolved in terms of the amended agreement.( Para 34)

Facts:

In 2011, the respondent-insured obtained a Standard Fire and Special Peril Policy from the appellant, covering goods in three godowns. A fire occurred in 2012, leading to a claim of ₹14.88 crores. The appellant released ₹3.50 crores, and the respondent signed a discharge voucher. A new surveyor assessed the claim at ₹7.16 crores, offered to the respondent in 2014 for a full and final settlement.

Issues:

The respondent, citing economic duress, withdrew its earlier acceptance and informed the appellant of the unresolved claim difference. The application under Section 11(6) sought the appointment of an arbitrator to address the dispute.

Held:

The court recognized the possibility of economic coercion leading to the signing of a discharge document. The respondent's repeated claims of facing financial crisis, supported by correspondence and reports over two years, were considered. The court, at this stage, focused on being prima facie convinced of the genuineness of the coercion claim, emphasizing the need to avoid detailed scrutiny. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the reasoning in the impugned judgment.

Facts:

The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 184 of the Finance Act 2017, addressing appointments and service conditions of members of various tribunals. The judgment also delves into concerns regarding the impact on judicial independence, the need for a financial impact assessment, and the amalgamation of existing tribunals.

Issues:

Constitutional validity of Section 184 of the Finance Act 2017.

Judicial impact assessment of tribunals.

Appointment and service conditions impacting the independence of the judiciary.

Need for an independent statutory body overseeing tribunal workings.

Prescription of qualifications for tribunal members.

Held:

The Court upholds the constitutional validity of Section 184 of the Finance Act 2017. Emphasizes the need for a financial impact assessment of all tribunals under Sections 158 to 182 and directs the Union of India to assess requirements and allocate sufficient resources for each tribunal.( Para 188 (Ranjan Gogoi, CJI))

Calls for a revisit of provisions allowing direct appeals to the Supreme Court against tribunal orders. Urges the Union of India to consult the Law Commission or another expert body to review such provisions and proposes appeals to Division Benches of High Courts.( Para 223 (Ranjan Gogoi, CJI))

Highlights the imbalance in the distribution of case-load among existing tribunals and recommends amalgamation based on homogeneity after a Judicial Impact Assessment.( Para 224 (Ranjan Gogoi, CJI))

Directs the Union to rationalize and amalgamate existing tribunals based on case-load and subject matter commonality, following the Law Commission's recommendations. Also, emphasizes the need for circuit benches of all tribunals at major jurisdictional High Courts.( Para 226 (Ranjan Gogoi, CJI))

Calls for the Union to ensure the amalgamation of "niche" tribunals and the establishment of circuit benches after a Judicial Impact Assessment.( Para 227 (Ranjan Gogoi, CJI))

Stresses the impact of the appointment method on the judiciary's independence. Recommends the constitution of a "National Tribunals Commission" to oversee tribunal member selection, appointment criteria, salaries, common eligibility criteria, and removal procedures.( Para 1-3 (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J))

Calls for legislative intervention to establish the National Tribunals Commission and an All India Tribunal Service for non-adjudicatory personnel, ensuring uniform service conditions.( Para 4-5 (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J))