Facts:

The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 184 of the Finance Act 2017, addressing appointments and service conditions of members of various tribunals. The judgment also delves into concerns regarding the impact on judicial independence, the need for a financial impact assessment, and the amalgamation of existing tribunals.

Issues:

Constitutional validity of Section 184 of the Finance Act 2017.

Judicial impact assessment of tribunals.

Appointment and service conditions impacting the independence of the judiciary.

Need for an independent statutory body overseeing tribunal workings.

Prescription of qualifications for tribunal members.

Held:

The Court upholds the constitutional validity of Section 184 of the Finance Act 2017. Emphasizes the need for a financial impact assessment of all tribunals under Sections 158 to 182 and directs the Union of India to assess requirements and allocate sufficient resources for each tribunal.( Para 188 (Ranjan Gogoi, CJI))

Calls for a revisit of provisions allowing direct appeals to the Supreme Court against tribunal orders. Urges the Union of India to consult the Law Commission or another expert body to review such provisions and proposes appeals to Division Benches of High Courts.( Para 223 (Ranjan Gogoi, CJI))

Highlights the imbalance in the distribution of case-load among existing tribunals and recommends amalgamation based on homogeneity after a Judicial Impact Assessment.( Para 224 (Ranjan Gogoi, CJI))

Directs the Union to rationalize and amalgamate existing tribunals based on case-load and subject matter commonality, following the Law Commission's recommendations. Also, emphasizes the need for circuit benches of all tribunals at major jurisdictional High Courts.( Para 226 (Ranjan Gogoi, CJI))

Calls for the Union to ensure the amalgamation of "niche" tribunals and the establishment of circuit benches after a Judicial Impact Assessment.( Para 227 (Ranjan Gogoi, CJI))

Stresses the impact of the appointment method on the judiciary's independence. Recommends the constitution of a "National Tribunals Commission" to oversee tribunal member selection, appointment criteria, salaries, common eligibility criteria, and removal procedures.( Para 1-3 (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J))

Calls for legislative intervention to establish the National Tribunals Commission and an All India Tribunal Service for non-adjudicatory personnel, ensuring uniform service conditions.( Para 4-5 (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J))

FACTS:

The Commissioner of Police, Aurangabad, passed an order to detain the respondent as a 'dangerous person' under Sections 3(1) and (2) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act. The State Government approved the order, and it was challenged by the respondent before the High Court, which quashed and set aside the detention order on the ground that the specified 12-month detention period was in breach of Section 3 of the Act.

ISSUES:

The interpretation of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act and whether mentioning a 12-month detention period in the order rendered it contrary to the Act.

HELD:

Interpretation of Section 3(2): The Court clarified that Section 3(2) relates to the period for which the order of delegation issued by the State Government is to remain in force and has no relevance to the period of detention. The legislature entrusted the power of detention to the State Government, allowing delegation for a maximum period of three months initially.

Validity of Detention Order: The Court emphasized that neither Section 3 nor Section 13 of the Act mandates the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained. Quoting T. Devaki vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, the Court stated, "the Act does not require the detaining authority to specify the period for which a detenu is required to be detained."

High Court's Error: The High Court's finding that the 12-month detention period in the order is contrary to Section 3 of the Act was deemed incorrect. The Court held that the High Court had misinterpreted Section 3(2) and set aside the decision on this ground.

Directions Issued by High Court: The Court deemed the directions issued by the High Court, including those related to legal aid, as unwarranted and set them aside.

REFERRED CASES:

T. Devaki vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1990) 2 SCC 456

Facts:

Multiple Writ Petitions (Civil) challenging the order of the Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, under Article 32. The petitioners, Karnataka MLAs, faced disqualification. The primary contention was the maintainability of the Writ Petition directly under Article 32.

Issues:

Whether the Writ Petition challenging the Speaker's order under Article 32 is maintainable?

The impact of resignation on disqualification.

The Speaker's discretion to reject resignations.

Held:

Establishes the importance of Article 32, an integral part of the Constitution, and emphasizes that Parliament cannot abrogate or take away its jurisdiction. Highlights the duty of all constitutional functionaries to adhere to their constitutionally circumscribed powers.

Petitioners challenged the order directly under Article 32, bypassing the judicial hierarchy. Acknowledges the Court's jurisdiction but advises parties to approach the High Court first, ensuring a considered verdict. Analysis of the extent of judicial review postponed.

Disqualification and resignation issues addressed. Disqualification relates back to the act of defection; resignation does not vaporize disqualification. Even if resigned, pending disqualification actions not impacted.

Legislator's right to resign highlighted. The 33rd Constitutional Amendment requires the Speaker's acceptance for a seat to become vacant. Speaker's limited discretion in rejecting resignations discussed.

Discussion on Speaker's discretion to reject resignations under Article 190(3)(b). The 33rd Constitutional Amendment confers discretion but limited to cases where the Speaker is not satisfied that the resignation is voluntary or genuine.

Defines "genuine" and "voluntary" in the context of resignation. Speaker's satisfaction based on objective material and subject to judicial review. Extraneous factors not permissible.

Facts:

The judgment pertains to the Ayodhya Verdict concerning the disputed land of 2.77 acres. The dispute involves the possession and worship rights of Hindus and Muslims over the land. The mosque constructed over 450 years ago was desecrated in 1949, leading to subsequent events, including the destruction of the mosque in 1992.

Issues:

The primary issues revolved around establishing the historical possession and worship rights of Hindus and Muslims, the events leading to the desecration and destruction of the mosque, and the legal remedies for the parties involved.

Held:

Historical Worship Rights of Hindus: The judgment emphasized that there was clear evidence indicating the uninterrupted worship by Hindus in the outer courtyard. The possession by Hindus in the outer courtyard was firmly established, even with the presence of a grill-brick wall set up in 1857.

The court found evidence on a preponderance of probabilities to establish Hindu worship before the British annexation of Oudh in 1857. This historical continuity strengthened the Hindus' claim to the disputed land.

Lack of Exclusive Possession by Muslims: The Muslims were unable to provide sufficient evidence to indicate exclusive possession of the inner structure before 1857. The court noted the absence of proof establishing Muslim exclusive possession before the British annexation.

Despite the setting up of the grill-brick wall, evidence suggested that namaz was offered within the precincts of the mosque. However, the Muslims were unable to establish exclusive possession before the annexation.

Desecration and Destruction of the Mosque: The judgment highlighted the events of 22/23 December 1949, where the mosque was desecrated by the installation of Hindu idols. The ouster of Muslims from worship and possession was deemed unlawful and calculated to deprive them of their place of worship.

The destruction of the mosque on 6 December 1992 was identified as a blatant violation of the rule of law. The court considered this an egregious act that needed remediation.

Formulation of a Scheme under Ayodhya Act 1993: The court directed the Central Government to formulate a scheme under Sections 6 and 7 of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993. This scheme would involve the establishment of a trust with a Board of Trustees or an appropriate body.

The scheme was expected to cover various aspects, including the management of the trust, powers of the trustees, and matters related to the construction of a temple on the disputed land.

Possession of Inner and Outer Courtyards: The court ordered the possession of the inner and outer courtyards to be handed over to the Board of Trustees of the Trust or the constituted body. This decision was made to ensure the proper functioning and development of the disputed land.

The Central Government was given the liberty to make suitable provisions for the management and development of the remaining acquired land, in accordance with the formulated scheme.

Possession Until Notification under Ayodhya Act 1993: The possession of the disputed property was directed to continue vesting in the statutory receiver under the Central Government until a notification, under Section 6 of the Ayodhya Act 1993, was issued, transferring the property to the trust or other body.

Allotment of Land to Sunni Central Waqf Board: The court, considering the unlawful destruction of the mosque, directed the allotment of 5 acres of land to the Sunni Central Waqf Board. This land would be allocated either by the Central Government out of the acquired land or by the Government of Uttar Pradesh within Ayodhya.

The allocation of land was to be conducted simultaneously with the handing over of the disputed site, comprising the inner and outer courtyards.

Exercise of Article 142 Powers: The court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution, asserting its inherent powers to ensure justice. It stated that justice would not prevail if the court were to overlook the entitlement of Muslims, who were wrongfully deprived of their mosque.

The court, in the exercise of Article 142 powers, aimed to remedy the wrongs committed, uphold constitutional values, and ensure restitution for the affected parties.

Facts:

The case involves a construction contract dispute where the arbitrator allowed the claims of the contractor but rejected the counter-claim for liquidated damages/compensation.

Issues:

The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the award, arguing that the question of levying liquidated damages was not arbitrable.

Held:

The Single Judge of the High Court upheld the award, considering the delay in completion as the responsibility of both parties. However, the court failed to acknowledge the implications of Clause 2 of the contract, which empowered the Superintending Engineer to decide compensation for non-compliance.( Para 13 and 14)

Clause 2 of the Contract granted the Superintending Engineer the right to levy compensation and provided a mechanism for determining liability. The finality clause in the contract made it clear that such decisions were not arbitrable, as seen in Clause 25 of the Contract.( Para 15 and 16)

The respondent notified the contractor of compensation under Clause 2, specifying the amount and conditions. The final bill reconciliation process was communicated to the contractor.( Para 17)

Clauses 13 and 14 of the agreement dealt with compensation but lacked a finality clause, indicating arbitrability. Claim No.6 sought to challenge the Superintending Engineer's decision, violating Clause 2.( Para 18)

The parties agreed that the Superintending Engineer's decision on compensation was final, making it an "excepted matter" not subject to arbitration.( Para 21)

The Division Bench rightly set aside the arbitrator's decision on claim No.6, affirming the finality of the Superintending Engineer's decision on compensation.( Para 25)

Facts:

The main appeal (C.A. No. 364 of 2005) centers around the dispute over the intake capacity of a specific institution offering architectural education. The Council of Architecture (CoA), after an inspection in 2004, restored the intake capacity to 40 students per year, which was earlier reduced to 30. However, the Director of Technical Education fixed it at 30 students based on norms established by AICTE.

Issues:

The final authority in cases of contradiction between the Council of Architecture (CoA) and the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) regarding the grant of approval to institutions for conducting architectural courses and monitoring their operations.

Held:

Recognition of Degrees: The judgment affirms that, concerning recognition of degrees and diplomas in architecture education, the Architects Act, 1972, shall prevail. AICTE is not entitled to impose regulatory measures in connection with degrees and diplomas in architecture.

Implementation of Recognition Process: In an appeal arising from SLP(C) No.5400 of 2011, the court directs the implementation of the recognition process under the 1972 Act for the subject institution before any further admission takes place. However, admissions undertaken based on interim orders are not to be disturbed.

Dismissal of Appeals: The appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.8443 of 2011 is dismissed. In the appeal arising from SLP(C) No.20460 of 2011, the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is set aside, but no independent directions are issued.

Disposal of Appeals: Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos.17005 and 17006 of 2016 are disposed of in terms of the decision in the main appeal (C.A. No.364 of 2005).

Setting Aside Decision: In the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.28121 of 2018, the decision of the Kerala High Court is set aside, and the institution involved is entitled to operate with recognition obtained under the 1972 Act. All interim orders passed in these appeals are dissolved.

Facts:

Complainant Awadesh Kumar filed an FIR alleging the accused fired on his mother, leading to her death.

Accused No. 1 was convicted by the Trial Court under Section 302 IPC; High Court modified it to Section 304 Part I IPC.

Appellant challenged the High Court's decision, arguing the act falls under Clause fourthly to Section 300 IPC.

Issues:

Whether the act of the accused constituted culpable homicide amounting to murder under Section 302 IPC.

Applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC regarding the absence of prior intention and a sudden quarrel.

Held:

The Court, after considering the evidence, held that the act falls under Clause fourthly to Section 300 IPC. The accused fired from close range, intending to cause death or severe bodily injury. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC was wrongly applied by the High Court, as there was no mutual provocation or bilateral transaction. The conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC was quashed, and the original conviction under Section 302 IPC was restored.

Facts:

A news item reported the apprehension of three judicial officers from Bihar by Nepal Police, allegedly involved in a compromising position with Nepali women in a guest house at Biratnagar, Nepal. The Full Court passed a resolution for their dismissal, bypassing disciplinary proceedings, utilizing the powers under Article 311(2)(b).

Issues:

Validity of the Full Court resolution for dismissal without a disciplinary inquiry.

Authority of the High Court to invoke Article 311(2)(b) in matters related to the subordinate judiciary.

Application of Article 311(2) to a judicial officer who has retired or attained superannuation.

Held:

Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked to impose punishment after recording in writing that it is impracticable to conduct an inquiry before imposing the punishment. The Division Bench clarified the consequences of quashing the dismissal order, allowing the High Court to proceed in accordance with the law, without restricting the use of Article 311(2)(b).

The earlier dismissal order dated February 12, 2014, was set aside for not recording reasons for dispensing with the departmental inquiry. The annulled order doesn't adjudicate on the merits of the allegations, leaving room for further proceedings. The Division Bench did not prohibit the High Court from invoking Article 311(2)(b) at an appropriate stage after recording reasons.

The contention that the power to dispense with an inquiry vests exclusively with the Governor, as per Nripendra Nath Bagchi, is rejected. The High Court retains authority to decide whether the conditions for invoking Article 311(2)(b) are met, and the Governor's role is in formalizing orders.

The Full Court re-recommended dismissal of the judicial officers, dispensing with the departmental inquiry in August 2015. However, the matter is pending with the State Government due to a stay order from the Supreme Court. The challenge to the order cannot be made in anticipation, and the appellants have reserved their right to challenge it when passed.

Facts:

The respondents, initially engaged as GDS in the postal department, were subsequently selected in regular posts. The issue revolves around the calculation of qualifying service for pension entitlement, specifically whether the services rendered as GDS should be factored in.

Issues:

Whether services as GDS can be considered in determining the qualifying service for pension in regular posts.

Interpretation of Clause 49(3) of the 1972 Rules regarding additional period computation.

Application of Rule 88 of the 1972 Rules for relaxing the mandatory qualifying service requirement.

Held:

The respondents cannot be deemed work-charged employees, and their services as GDS should not be considered an extension of their service in regular posts. The High Courts' view favoring GDSs in pension eligibility is not accepted, as the original applicants did not meet the 10-year qualifying period.

No specific Rule or administrative circular specifies the computation of GDS service to fill the qualifying service gap. The benefits of the 1991 circular are not applicable, given the part-time nature of GDS employment.

The interpretation of Clause 49(3) is clarified, indicating a one-time benefit for service exceeding three months in a fraction of a year.

Rule 88 empowers the ministry or department to relax Rules for preventing undue hardship. The court acknowledges the appellants' concern about the potential endless exercise but emphasizes executive discretion.

The services rendered as GDS or Extra–Departmental Agents cannot be factored in for calculating qualifying services in regular posts for pension purposes. The judgments under appeal are not sustained.

Authorities should consider Rule 88 for cases with marginal shortfalls in qualifying service, and if the Central Government or postal department issued pension orders, they should not be disturbed. For other cases without pension orders, the ministry may consider relaxing the qualifying service rule.