Facts:

The case revolves around an agreement to sell a disputed property in 1986 between the original vendor and original vendees. Subsequently, in 1987, the original vendees executed agreements to sell different portions of the property to the respondents in this case. Legal proceedings ensued, involving withdrawal of suits, impleadment applications, and amendments seeking execution of the 1986 agreement.

Issues:

Privity of contract between the appellants (original vendors) and respondent No.1 (vendees in 1987 agreement).

Assignability of contracts without the consent of the promisee.

Validity and enforceability of the 1987 agreements.

The impact of withdrawal of the suit for specific performance of the 1986 agreement.

Held:

The court observed that there was no privity of contract between the appellants and respondent No.1. To seek specific performance, respondent No.1 had to sue as 'representatives-in-interest' under Section 15(b) of the Specific Relief Act.

The term 'representative-in-interest' includes the assignee of a contractual interest, but assignability requires the consent of the other party. Section 15(b) clarifies conditions for specific performance by an assignee.

Contracts may involve intertwined rights and obligations. Promisors cannot contract out their responsibility to a stranger without the promisee's consent, especially in contracts of a personal nature.

The 1986 agreement, while not expressly barring assignability, required consideration of the context and the parties' intentions regarding assignability.

The 1986 agreement was a contract combining mutual rights and obligations. The 1987 agreements were not a simple assignment but involved assuming obligations akin to a development agreement.

Respondent No.1 could seek specific performance only by proving appellants' knowledge and consent. The court emphasized that the 1987 agreements were contingent and unenforceable after the cancellation of the 1986 agreement.

Consent for assignment was not established, and the 1987 agreements were void. Respondent No.1 could not seek specific performance against the appellants.

The original vendees' rights under the 1986 agreement lapsed due to non-payment. The withdrawal of the specific performance suit indicated an abandonment of rights.

The court acknowledged collusion to frustrate the 1987 agreements and directed compensation for the loss of opportunity and inconvenience suffered by the respondents.

Facts:

Appellant, a resident of village Saini, objects to the attempted takeover of a 'common-pond' by private entity Sharp.

Appellant claims the water bodies were vested in Gram Sabhas per Section 117 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Appellant alleges environmental clearances not obtained, and statutory authorities neglected to assess the project's impact.

Disputed land's status contested due to the repeal of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, by the UP Revenue Code, 2006.

Issues:

Legality of the allotment of water bodies to private industrialists.

Repeal of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and its impact on the disputed land.

Held:

The repeal of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and vesting of ponds in the State by the UP Revenue Code, 2006, does not change the nature of land or defeat local rights.

Schemes extinguishing water bodies, as per the 2016 Government Order, are violative of Constitutional principles and struck down.

Allotment of water bodies to Respondent No. 6 and any similar third party declared illegal and quashed.

The court directs restoration, maintenance, and protection of subject-water bodies in village Saini, removing obstructions from the catchment area within three months.

Facts:

Genpact India Private Limited disputed the assessment order related to Section 115QA of the Income Tax Act, denying liability. The High Court disposed of the writ petition, citing the availability of an alternative remedy under Section 246A.

Issues:

Whether determination under Section 115QA falls under Section 246(1)(a)?

Is an appeal maintainable against the determination of liability under Section 115QA?

Is a writ petition under Article 226 maintainable when an alternative remedy exists under Section 246A?

Held:

Scope of Sections 246(1)(a) and 246A(1)(a):

The expression "denies his liability to be assessed" in Section 246(1)(a) encompasses cases where the assessee denies liability under the Act. It is not confined to issues arising solely from assessment proceedings under Section 143 or 144.

Section 115QA falls within the ambit of the first contingency in Section 246(1)(a), involving determination of liability or quantification of the distributed income. The scope of such expression should not be restricted to issues related to Sections 143 or 144.

Appeal against Determination under Section 115QA:

An appeal is maintainable against the determination of liability under Section 115QA. The issues may extend beyond the company's liability to include questions of extent and computation. Denying an appeal would deprive the assessee of regular channels of challenges available under the Act.

Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226:

The High Court rightly refused to entertain the writ petition. Preliminary objections were not conclusively disposed of, and the matter was still open. The High Court's consideration of the alternate remedy issue was not incorrect, as the preliminary objection had not been conclusively addressed.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed. The Court upholds the High Court's decision, stating that an appeal is maintainable against the determination of liability under Section 115QA, and the High Court rightly refused to entertain the writ petition.

Facts:

The respondents were appointed after a public advertisement and selected through interviews, working since 1997-8.

Initial contractual appointments extended over time.

Posts for Entomologists were created on 14 July 2008, and respondents were working against seven out of twelve sanctioned posts.

The Tribunal considered the outbreak of dengue as a reason for the initial engagement.

Issues:

Regularization and monetary benefits for the appointed Entomologists.

Dispute regarding the starting date for granting monetary benefits.

Held:

The court declined to entertain the appeal on regularization.

Monetary benefits granted from the date of the Central Administrative Tribunal's judgment, i.e., from 1 October 2015.

Respondents entitled to notional pay fixation and continuity of service.

Compliance ordered within two months from the date of the order.

The appeal is disposed of with the specified modifications.

Facts:

Ownership of land by 'S.'

'S' had two sons, 'J' and 'P.'

Appellant's father predeceased 'J' and 'S.'

After 'S's death, 'J' and 'P' partitioned the property.

The suit property came into the exclusive share of 'J.'

'J' executed a registered sale deed in favor of his grandsons.

Appellant sought a share in the property.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, being the daughter of a predeceased son, has a claim to the ancestral property.

The validity of the partition and the registered sale deed.

Held:

Considering the factual matrix, the court noted that 'S' inherited ancestral property, and the appellant's father predeceased him in 1957. As per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, during 'J's lifetime, the appellant's father could not have succeeded to the property. The court held that the appellant, being the daughter, couldn't claim any right higher than that of her father.

The court affirmed the view that the grandchild is excluded from heirs in Class-I. After the partition in 1967 and the registered sale deed in 1979, which were unchallenged, the suit property became the exclusive share of 'J.' The court upheld the decision that the appellant couldn't claim a higher right than her father.

Facts:

The trustees settled a plot of land in 1921 for the construction of a choultry.

The choultry was found inadequate during religious festivals, leading to a Deed of Settlement in 1926.

Bagyammal was entrusted to construct an additional choultry, specifically for pilgrims visiting the Devasthanam.

Clear terms in the deed restrained encumbrance, mandated public use, and maintenance by Bagyammal and her successors.

Issues:

Whether the Deed of Settlement dated 4 June 1926 constitutes a 'specific endowment' under Section 6(19) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1959.

Held:

The definition of 'specific endowment' in Section 6(19) is attracted as the property was endowed for a religious charity in the temple. The Deed's terms show a clear intention for public use, restraining encumbrance. The Trial Court's conclusion was in error, and the High Court correctly reversed it. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the interception of one 'A' carrying 8 Kgs. of gold of foreign origin valued at Rs. 2.71 crores by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Kolkata Zonal Unit. 'A' indicated his engagement with the detenus, who were later apprehended. Bail was rejected, and they were remanded to judicial custody.

Issues:

The Detaining Authority passed detention orders against individuals already in judicial custody. The High Court quashed the detention orders, challenging the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority.

Held:

The Detaining Authority, while passing the detention orders, was aware of the detainees' custody, the possibility of their release on bail, and the likelihood of their involvement in prejudicial activities. The Supreme Court held that even if a person is in judicial custody, they can be detained under relevant acts, provided there is a proper application of mind by the Detaining Authority.

The detenus were indeed granted bail on the same day the High Court quashed the detention orders. The court justified the Detaining Authority's apprehension about the possibility of release on bail. The court pointed out procedural discrepancies in the forwarding of 'A's retraction petition, asserting that the Detaining Authority was not aware of it when passing the detention orders.

Writ petitions challenging the detention orders were dismissed based on the judgment in Criminal Appeal. The court emphasized the error of the High Court in interfering with the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction.

Facts:

Udai Bhan Singh was appointed as a Postal Assistant in the Head Post Office at Allahabad on 13 December 1978.

Charge-sheet issued on 31 August 1988, with four articles of charge related to misconduct during the period from 15 July 1985 to 10 February 1986.

Charges included the unauthorized payment of commission under the National Savings Certificate Scheme to fake agents, resulting in a fraudulent payment of Rs. 6,65,693.60.

Issues:

Violation of principles of natural justice during the departmental inquiry.

Vitiating delay in the disciplinary proceedings.

Held:

The High Court was in error in interfering with the disciplinary jurisdiction on both grounds.Non-production of documents was adequately assessed by the appellate authority and the Tribunal.No application of mind by the High Court, and Rule 27 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Rules was erroneously invoked.( Para 9)

The charges against Udai Bhan Singh were based on failures in verifying bills and supervising the payment process to NSC agents.The disciplinary authority, after the tribunal's order, issued a notice to show cause and took a fresh view after the show cause response.( Para 12)

The High Court's finding on a breach of natural justice was vague, without specifying which documents were not supplied and the resulting prejudice.Rule 27 had no relevance to the case, and the High Court failed to analyze the non-availability of documents.( Para 13)

The delay in issuing the show cause notice and passing a final order did not cause prejudice, as the Respondent had been reinstated during this period.( Para 14)

The aspect of delay must be considered on a case-by-case basis, and in this case, there was no condonation of lapses by the Appellants, and the delay did not result in prejudice to the Respondent.( Para 15)

The High Court erred in setting aside the punishment and ordering reinstatement with back wages. The penalty imposed was not disproportionate or arbitrary.( Para 17)

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Tribunal's judgment dismissing the Original Application was affirmed.No recovery shall be made from the Respondent for the period worked with reinstatement, and no costs were awarded.( Para 18)

Facts:

The first Respondent, appointed as a Junior Engineer in 1985, faced a series of transfers and promotions within the Aurangabad Municipal Corporation.

Dispute arose regarding his position in the seniority list and his subsequent reversion from the post of Town Planner.

The Municipal Commissioner's decision to revert the first Respondent was challenged in the High Court, leading to a series of legal proceedings.

Issues:

Legality of the order reverting the first Respondent from the post of Town Planner.

Procedural irregularities in the decision-making process.

Held:

The Court quashed and set aside the order passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 28 August 2002 on the ground that it was passed in manifest violation of principles of natural justice. The reversion of the first Respondent from the post of Town Planner without affording him an opportunity of being heard was deemed contrary to law. The Court clarified that the Municipal Corporation could take recourse to its remedies in accordance with the law. The decision of the High Court was not binding on the rights and contentions of the parties. The appeals are accordingly allowed.