Facts:

Protests were being held in various parts of the country, including the Kalindi Kunj-Shaheen Bagh stretch in Delhi, where public roads were blocked, leading to severe inconvenience for commuters. A writ petition was filed before the Delhi High Court, which was disposed of with directions to the authorities. However, the situation remained unchanged, prompting the present appeal.

Issues:

Whether the right to protest and freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to assemble peacefully without arms under Article 19(1)(b) are subject to reasonable restrictions?

Whether protests causing encroachments on public ways and spaces can be considered acceptable?

Held:

The Court acknowledges that Article 19 of the Constitution confers upon citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peacefully without arms. However, these rights are subject to reasonable restrictions, which include considerations of public order, sovereignty, and the integrity of India. (Para 16)

The Court recognizes the importance of the right to peaceful protest against legislation. However, it emphasizes that public ways and spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely, and democracy and dissent should be expressed within designated areas. (Para 17)

The present case involved a blockade of a public way, causing significant inconvenience to commuters. The Court deems such occupation of public ways for protests as unacceptable and urges the administration to take action to keep areas clear of encroachments or obstructions. (Para 19)

The Court criticizes the High Court for not effectively monitoring the matter and disposing of the writ petition without resolving the issue satisfactorily. (Para 20)

Facts:

T. K. David filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging an order of compulsory retirement. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, and the petitioner's appeal against the High Court's order was also dismissed. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an SLP before the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court, which was also dismissed. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a review petition before the High Court against the order passed in the writ appeal, which was also dismissed by the impugned order.

Issues:

Whether the SLP filed by the petitioner against the order of the High Court rejecting the review petition is maintainable when the main order in the writ petition has not been challenged.

Held:

The court referred to the case of Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2000) 6 SCC 359: [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 538, to emphasize the importance of an SLP and the scope of its applicability.( Para 5)

The court relied on the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Yashwant Singh Negi [2013] 2 SCR 550, to explain the rationale for not entertaining an SLP challenging the order of the High Court rejecting a review petition when the main order in the writ petition is not challenged. (Para 11)

The court cited the case of Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. (2016) 4 SCC 696: [2016] 1 SCR 266, to reiterate that when the main judgment of the High Court cannot be affected in any manner, no relief can be granted by the Supreme Court in an SLP filed against an order rejecting a review application to review the main judgment of the High Court. (Para 15)

The court held that the SLP challenging the earlier judgment (the one filed against the order of the High Court) had already been dismissed, and therefore, it became final between the parties. Since the main judgment of the High Court remained unaffected and no relief could be granted in the SLP, the court dismissed the Special Leave Petition.

REFERRED CASES:

Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr. vs. Union of India and Anr., (2016) 4 SCC 696.

DSR Steel (Private) Limited vs. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 6 SCC 782

Hussain Sasansaheb Kaladgi vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1987 SC 1627

J.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. K.P. Agarwal and Another, (2007) (2) SCC 433

Kunhayammed and Ors. vs. State of Kerala and Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359.

Manohar S/o Shankar Nale vs. Jaipalsing S/o Shivlalsing Rajput, (2008) 1 SCC 520

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Yashwant Singh Negi, (2013) 2 SCR 550.

Shanker Motiram Nale vs. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput, (1994) 2 SCC 753

State of A.P. vs. A.P. Jaiswal, (2001) 1 SCC 748

Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. State of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372 : (1964) 5 SCR 174

FACTS:

The appellant was accused of forging and fabricating a Power of Attorney in 2011, and an FIR was lodged against him in 2014. However, he was arrested only in 2020. The High Court granted him conditional interim bail for eight weeks but refused to allow him to travel to the US, where he has been a resident since 1985. The appellant is an Indian citizen and holds an Indian passport. He has regularly traveled between the US and India on multiple occasions between 2015 and 2020, indicating that he has maintained contact with India contrary to the High Court's view.

ISSUES:

Whether the conditions imposed for granting bail are proportionate to the purpose of imposing them?

Whether the appellant should be permitted to travel to the US for eight weeks?

HELD:

The Court observed that while the competent court has the discretion to impose conditions for granting bail, the conditions must be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the accused's presence, and prevent the misuse of liberty to obstruct justice. (Para 14)

The Court emphasized that the issue before it is limited to whether the appellant should be permitted to travel to the US for eight weeks. In making this determination, the nature of the allegations, the appellant's conduct, and the risk of evading prosecution must be considered. (Para 21)

The Court found that the appellant had frequently traveled between the US and India even after the FIR was lodged. The conditions for granting bail must balance public interest and the accused's rights. (Para 23)

There was no reason to deny the appellant permission to travel to the US for eight weeks. He is an Indian citizen and a US resident since 1985. The lodging of an FIR should not prevent him from traveling to the US, especially when it could result in the invalidation of his Green Card. The appellant was allowed to travel, subject to an undertaking to return to India after eight weeks and be available for all court hearings unless exempted from personal appearance. (Para 24)

REFERRED CASES:

Dataram Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 3 SCC 22

Kunal Kumar Tiwari v The State of Bihar, (2018) 16 SCC 74

Sumit Mehta vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 15 SCC 570

Facts:

The complainant had entered into a hire-purchase agreement with the appellant-financier, wherein the vehicle would be transferred to the complainant upon payment of all 35 instalments. However, as the complainant had not paid all the instalments, the financier repossessed the vehicle without notice, leading to the complaint.

Issues:

Whether the actions of the financier constitute an unfair trade practice under Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Whether there was a deficiency in service by the financier for not providing notice before repossession.

Whether the complainant is entitled to damages and compensation.

Held:

The court, in this case (Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2019), considered the applicability of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, particularly Sections 2(1)(r) and 12, to a complaint filed against M/S. MAGMA FINCORP LTD. by Rajesh Kumar Tiwari. The complainant alleged unfair trade practices and deficiency in service by the appellant-financier, arising from a hire-purchase agreement for the purchase of a vehicle. The contention was that despite paying 7 out of 35 instalments, the financier repossessed and sold the vehicle without notice, rejecting the complainant's request for an opportunity to clear the outstanding instalments. The lower fora allowed the complaint, directing the financier to refund the instalments paid with interest, pay damages and litigation costs, and reimburse the amount paid directly to the vehicle dealer by the complainant.

The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence of any unfair trade practice under Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and the complaint did not establish any deficiency in service. The hire-purchase agreement allowed the financier to repossess the vehicle upon default in payment of instalments, and there was no specific requirement for prior notice. The court emphasized that the Consumer Protection Act does not override the Contract Act and other applicable laws. The complainant failed to prove any loss or damage due to the non-receipt of notice. Therefore, the lower courts' directions for compensation and damages were erroneous, as they provided the complainant with the benefit of free use of the vehicle for an extended period without proper assessment of loss or depreciation.

Facts:

A young married lady with two minor children committed suicide.

The Trial Court convicted the husband-appellant under Section 306 IPC and sentenced him to four years of rigorous imprisonment.

The conviction under Section 306 IPC was upheld by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish cruelty against the husband or the in-laws.

Whether there is evidence to show which particular hope or expectation of the deceased was frustrated by the husband.

Whether there is evidence of wilful neglect by the appellant that led to the suicidal death.

Whether the state of mind to commit the crime of abetment, as specified under Section 107 IPC, is visible to determine the appellant's culpability.

Whether the prosecution has proven the appellant's mens rea (guilty mind) to abet the suicide of the deceased.

Held:

The Court found no direct evidence of cruelty against the husband or the in-laws. There was no indication of which particular hope or expectation of the deceased was frustrated by the husband. Additionally, evidence of wilful neglect by the appellant leading to the suicidal death was lacking. (Para 11)

To prove abetment under Section 107 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible. Mens rea has to be established, but the Trial Court and the High Court failed to examine whether the appellant had the requisite guilty mind. The conviction based on the theory of harassment leading to suicide was unsupported by evidence. (Para 15)

The evidence did not show any overt act or illegal omission by the appellant towards his deceased wife. There was no indication of persistent harassment from the husband's side. The Trial Court and the High Court speculated on the unnatural death without any evidence, leading to the quashing of the appellant's conviction under Section 306 IPC. (Para 19)

Cases Referred

Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707

Mangat Ram vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 12 SCC 595

SS Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190

Facts:

In this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, a trade union with a state-wide presence and another with a national presence challenged the validity of two notifications issued by the State of Gujarat on 17.04.2020 and 20.07.2020. The notifications exempted all registered factories from various provisions related to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest, etc., for adult workers under Sections 51, 54, 55, and 56 of the Factories Act, 1948. The State government justified its action on the ground of financial stringency caused by the economic downturn during the COVID-19 outbreak, claiming it as a 'public emergency' under Section 5 of the Factories Act.

Issues:

Whether the power under Section 5 of the Factories Act can be exercised in a 'public emergency'?

Whether the COVID-19 pandemic qualifies as an 'internal disturbance' threatening the security of the State?

Whether the notifications issued by the State of Gujarat violate the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948?

Whether the exemptions granted to factories affect the rights and welfare of workers, rendering the protections of the Act illusory?

Held:

The Court held that the power under Section 5 of the Factories Act can only be exercised in cases of a 'public emergency' of grave nature threatening the security of India or a part of its territory caused by war, external aggression, or internal disturbance. The economic slowdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic does not qualify as an internal disturbance threatening the security of the State. The notifications issued by the State of Gujarat, which exempted factories from key provisions of the Factories Act, make significant departures from the Act's mandate, adversely affecting worker welfare. Therefore, the notifications dated 17.04.2020 and 20.07.2020 are quashed, and the overtime wages of eligible workers must be paid in accordance with Section 59 of the Factories Act.

Decision: The Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the notifications dated 17.04.2020 and 20.07.2020, and directed the payment of overtime wages to eligible workers as per Section 59 of the Factories Act.

Facts:

During the COVID-19 lockdown, the government banned all domestic and international flights from 25th March to 24th May 2020. Consequently, passengers sought refunds for their airfare. In response, the Ministry of Civil Aviation issued an advisory on 16th April 2020 to address the issue of airfare refunds during this period.

Issues:

The primary issue was whether passengers were entitled to a full refund for tickets booked during the lockdown period (25th March to 24th May 2020) for travel during that same period.

Another concern was the immediate full refund for tickets booked through travel agents during the lockdown period for travel within the lockdown period.

The Court also considered how to handle refund requests for tickets booked before 24th May 2020, but intended for travel after that date.

Additionally, the Court addressed the provision of incentives to compensate passengers for the delayed refund process.

Held:

The Court held that for tickets booked during the lockdown period for travel during the same period, airlines must refund the full amount collected without any cancellation charges. The refund must be processed within three weeks from the date of cancellation.

In cases where tickets were booked through travel agents during the lockdown period for travel within that same period, airlines must provide immediate full refunds. The agents are required to pass on the refunded amount to the passengers without delay.

For tickets booked at any time but intended for travel after 24th May 2020, the refund process shall be governed by the provisions of Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR).

The Court decided to provide incentives to compensate passengers for the delayed refund process. The incentive would be 0.5% of the face value (fare collected) for every month or part thereof between the date of cancellation and 30th June 2020. After 30th June 2020 until 31st March 2021, the incentive would increase to 0.75% of the face value per month.

Facts:

The prosecution's case was that the appellants, along with others, assaulted two individuals who were returning from the market on bicycles. One of the victims died on the spot, and the other passed away in the hospital. Originally, five accused persons were named, but accused nos. 3 and 5 were acquitted on the benefit of doubt. There was no appeal against their acquittals. The appellants contended that since two accused were acquitted based on the same evidence, their own convictions were unjustified.

Issues:

whether the convictions of the appellants under Section 302/34 were justified given the acquittal of two other accused based on the same evidence.

Held:

The depositions of witnesses P.W. 5, 6, 7, and 9 established that appellant no. 1 stopped the deceased, appellant no. 2 assaulted one of them resulting in his immediate death, and appellant no. 3 assaulted the other victim causing injuries. When the second victim tried to flee, he was chased, caught, and brutally assaulted. He later succumbed to his injuries in the hospital. The court found no reason to doubt the presence and assault on the two deceased by appellant nos. 2 & 3 and refused to grant them acquittal based on the benefit of doubt or parity with the acquitted accused. (Para 11)

The court reiterated that the acquittal of accused nos. 3 and 5 does not raise any doubts about the guilt of the appellants, as the evidence against the appellants was independent and sufficient. (Para 12)

The court explained the concept of common intention, which involves several persons acting in unison to achieve a common purpose, irrespective of their individual roles. The presence of the mental element or intention to commit the act, if cogently established, is sufficient for conviction, without requiring actual participation in the assault. Common intention can be inferred from the cumulative assessment of evidence, and there may not be direct evidence to establish it. (Para 13)

As for appellant no. 1, the court found that he lay in wait with the other appellants, stopped the two deceased, and the assault followed. Since there was evidence of a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert, appellant no. 1's conviction was justified, and there was no need to prove his active participation in the assault. (Para 18)

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellants.

Facts:

The case involves the petitioners seeking premature release from imprisonment under the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938. The respondents, representing the State of Uttar Pradesh, have refused their release without giving proper reasons based on the three-factor evaluation mandated by the Act.

Issues:

The need to strike a balance between public safety and individual liberty while considering premature release.

The importance of reformative principles in sentencing, especially for first-time offenders.

The evaluation criteria for granting premature release under the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938.

Held:

The court upholds the principles of reformative theory, emphasizing that a civilized society cannot be achieved through punitive attitudes alone. First-time offenders should be granted a chance to reform and rebuild their lives. The court reaffirms the constitutional provisions and statutory laws that provide for the suspension, remission, or commutation of sentences.

The court criticizes the State's refusal of premature release solely based on the length of the sentence or gravity of the original crime. It stresses that the assessment of the likelihood of committing future crimes after release should be based on antecedents and conduct during incarceration, not on age or apprehensions of victims and witnesses.

The court orders the release of the petitioners on probation under Section 2 of the UP Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938. However, the release is subject to the imposition of conditions by the State to balance public safety with individual liberty. The court cautions that the order of premature release can be recalled in the event of any future misconduct or breach by the petitioners.