Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Cheque Bounce – Criminal Appeal against High Court and lower courts' conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Supreme Court quashes conviction, holding that civil court's decree on the same cheque being only a security renders the criminal proceedings unsustainable. [Paras 1-13]

Interaction Between Civil and Criminal Proceedings – Analysis – Held – Decisions of civil courts binding on criminal courts; Criminal courts not bound by civil decrees for sentencing and damages. Constitution Bench ruling in Iqbal Singh Marwah vs. Meenakshi Marwah clarified that conflict of findings between civil and criminal courts is permissible given differing standards of proof. However, in this case, the criminal court bound by civil court's declaration of cheque as security. [Paras 9-11]

Decision – Quashing of Criminal Conviction and Damages – Based on the civil court's decree declaring the disputed cheque as merely a security, Supreme Court finds criminal proceedings under Section 138 N.I. Act against appellant unsustainable. Orders quashing of conviction and return of damages imposed by lower courts. [Para 12]

Decree Execution and Limitation Issue – Appellants’ challenge to the High Court's decision affirming Munsiff Court's dismissal of execution application as time-barred - Pertaining to a property possession decree dated 10.12.1986, with finality attained on 09.11.2000 - Execution application filed on 18.12.2000, initially rejected by Tehsildar for jurisdictional reasons, later filed in Munsiff Court and dismissed as barred by limitation – High Court affirmed dismissal [Paras 2-5, 8, 10, 14].

Civil Procedure – Limitation – Execution of Decree – Application for Execution and Exclusion of Time – Civil Appeal allowed by Supreme Court – Overturning High Court and Munsiff Court decisions that had deemed execution application as time-barred – Case hinged on whether time spent pursuing execution before the Tehsildar is to be excluded for limitation computation – Held, time from 18.12.2000 to 29.01.2005 to be excluded as per Section 14 of the Limitation Act, thus rendering execution application within prescribed limitation period – Impugned orders set aside, execution application restored for fresh consideration. [Paras 24-40]

Exclusion of Time – Section 14 of the Limitation Act – Applicability and Interpretation – Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 14 – Focus on advancing justice by allowing exclusion of time where proceedings pursued in good faith in a court lacking jurisdiction – Key conditions of Section 14 discussed, including due diligence, good faith, and civil nature of proceedings – Application to the current case resulted in exclusion of time period where Plaintiff pursued remedy before Tehsildar under bona fide belief of its jurisdiction. [Paras 30-37]

Jurisdiction – Execution Proceedings – Wrongful Forum Selection – Assessment of Plaintiff’s approach to Tehsildar for execution of decree – Court finds no malafide intent or lack of due diligence – Wrong forum selection under genuine belief does not negate bona fides or due diligence for Section 14 applicability – Advances cause of justice by acknowledging honest mistakes in jurisdiction selection. [Paras 17-20, 37-38]

Decision – Supreme Court allows appeal – Sets aside High Court and Munsiff Court orders – Execution application restored for fresh consideration by Munsiff Court, Hiranagar, with exclusion of time spent before Tehsildar in limitation period calculation – Execution application held within the 3-year limitation of Article 182 of the J&K Limitation Act [Paras 38-41].

Land Reforms Act and Surplus Land Computation – Interpretation and Application – The Supreme Court affirms the High Court's interpretation of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. The judgment upheld the High Court's decision that the state cannot reopen the holdings of the purchasers/petitioners under the pretext of computing the holding of Syed Mohammed Ali Khan, thereby compelling the petitioners to surrender the land. The court asserts the impermissibility of reopening the computation of holdings of the purchasers/petitioners under the Act, which had attained finality in 1975. [Paras 6-7]

Sale and Possession of Land – Effect on Title and Ownership –Supreme Court recognizes that the entire subject land was sold to the private respondents in 1960-1961. Despite one of the three legal heirs not executing the sale deed, the court finds that the private respondents have been in uninterrupted physical possession of the land since the sale, substantially fulfilling the agreement's conditions. The court notes the lack of assertion of title by the non-executing heir post-enactment of the 1973 Act or during the required declaration in 1975, concluding that the subsequent attempt to reopen the issue was barred by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. [Para 9]

Judicial Finality and Non-Reviewability – Supreme Court underscores the principle of finality in legal proceedings, observing that neither the state nor Syed Mohammed Ali Khan challenged the computation of the holdings of the purchasers/petitioners when declared in 1975. It emphasizes the prohibition of collateral attack under the guise of computing holdings at a later stage, thereby reaffirming the finality of the High Court's judgment. [Para 7]

Conclusion – Dismissal of Appeals – The appeals are dismissed, upholding the High Court's judgment. The court finds no merit in the appeals, affirming that the private respondents' possession and the title of the land remain unaffected by the impugned judgment. It is stated that the judgment does not affect the land already declared surplus in the hands of the purchasers in compliance with the 1973 Act. [Para 11]

Quashing of Conviction and Sentences – Criminal Appeal against High Court's reversal of acquittal – Appellants convicted under Sections 302, 201 and 34 IPC for murder of Mahesh Sahu – Supreme Court finds High Court erred in reversing well-reasoned acquittal based on conjectures and surmises – Held, the trial judge's findings were on correct appreciation of evidence, and High Court’s interference was unwarranted – Convictions and sentences against appellants set aside, appellants acquitted. [Paras 1-23]

Principles of Circumstantial Evidence – Examination – Supreme Court reiterates the established principles for convicting based on circumstantial evidence – Emphasizes the necessity of establishing a conclusive chain of circumstances, leaving no reasonable ground for innocence – Finds prosecution failed to establish such a chain in the present case. [Paras 6-7, 12-13]

Appellate Interference in Acquittal – Scope and Limitations – Highlights limited scope for appellate interference in cases of acquittal – Interference justified only when trial court’s findings are perverse or impossible – In the present case, trial court's acquittal based on sound appreciation of evidence, High Court's reversal deemed unwarranted. [Paras 9, 20-21]

Decision – Restoration of Trial Court’s Acquittal – Supreme Court allows appeal, sets aside High Court's judgment, restores trial court's order of acquittal – Appellants acquitted of all charges, bail bonds discharged. [Para 23]

Definition of ‘Workman’ – Interpretation – Held –Court clarifies that mere absence of power to appoint, dismiss, or hold disciplinary inquiries does not alone determine whether a person is a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The decision in Ved Prakash Gupta relied on by the High Court is distinguished. The Court notes the need for a holistic assessment of the employee’s role, including nature of duties and managerial responsibilities. [Paras 18-25]

Scope of Judicial Review – High Court’s Power under Article 226/227 – Held –Court reiterates the limited scope of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, emphasizing that the High Court should not re-appreciate facts or act as an appellate authority unless there is a significant infirmity in the Tribunal’s order. [Para 26]

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(s) – Applicability –Court finds that the respondent, employed as a Senior Manager with substantial salary and perks, performing supervisory roles over managers, and lacking in power to appoint or dismiss employees, does not fall under the definition of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. [Paras 19-23, 29]

Employment Resignation – Voluntariness – Assessment – In considering the voluntariness of the respondent’s resignation, the Court observes that dissatisfaction with appraisal ratings and a sense of not being properly appreciated, without direct evidence of coercion by the employer, does not equate to a forced resignation. [Paras 27-28]

Decision – Appeal Allowed –Court allows the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the Single Judge, and restoring the judgment of the Labour Court. It is held that the respondent is not a ‘workman’ under the ID Act, making the reference to the Labour Court against the appellant company not maintainable. [Para 29]

Employee Date of Birth Discrepancy – Respondent no.3, employed at Barsua Iron Ore Mines, declared different dates of birth during his employment – Initially declared 27.12.1948, later changed to 12.03.1955 – Discrepancy affected retirement date and subsequent claims. [Paras 4-7, 16-17]

Submission by Appellant – Appellant argued against the change in date of birth, contending that initial declaration (27.12.1948) made the employee eligible for employment – Any alteration, especially without proof, was considered as taking undue advantage and misleading. [Paras 11, 16]

Response by Respondent No.3 – Respondent no.3 claimed unawareness of initial date of birth recorded – Submitted a School Transfer Certificate as proof of correct date of birth (12.03.1955) – Argued for correction in records and eligibility for back wages. [Paras 12-15]

Court Analysis and Conclusion – Supreme Court found respondent no.3’s conduct dubious – Initial declaration considered deliberate for employment eligibility – Change in date after a decade, and without documentary proof initially, raised questions about authenticity – Court deemed the appellant’s decision to consider the first recorded date as final was justified. [Paras 16-17, 21-22]

Principles of Estoppel and Precedents – Court applied principles of estoppel – Respondent no.3 barred from contradicting initial declaration – Referred to previous judgments emphasizing consistency in date of birth declarations. [Paras 18-20]

Decision – Appeal allowed – Award by CGIT and High Court's judgment set aside – Respondent no.3’s retirement date to be considered as per initially declared date of birth (27.12.1948) – Direction for 50% back wages from retirement till notional superannuation in 2015 also set aside. [Para 22]

Criminal Law – Abetment of Suicide (Section 306 IPC) – Quashing of Proceedings –  applicability of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code in the context of the appellant’s involvement in the alleged abetment of suicide. The Court examined the evidence and allegations to ascertain the presence of incitement or instigation leading to the suicide. [Para 1, 7-11]

Absence of Proximate Incitement – held – emphasized that for establishing the charge of abetment under Section 306 IPC, there must be a clear act of instigation or incitement to commit suicide. Mere allegations or indirect insinuations are insufficient. In this case, the Court found no proximate or direct incitement by the appellant leading to the suicide of the deceased. [Para 10-11]

Significance of Temporal Proximity – applied – underlined the necessity of temporal proximity between the accused's actions and the victim's suicide. The Court noted the absence of evidence indicating the appellant's involvement or communication with the deceased near the time of the suicide, leading to the conclusion that there was no abetment. [Para 9-11]

Quashing of Proceedings – Decision – The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and quashed the proceedings against the appellant, citing insufficient evidence to sustain the charge of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. The Court clarified that this decision pertains exclusively to the appellant, allowing the trial court to proceed against other accused in accordance with the law. [Para 12]

Decision – Appeal Allowed – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the proceedings against the appellant, Amudha, in the context of the alleged abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. [Para 13]

Transfer of Civil Suit – Jurisdiction –  Court considered the appropriate jurisdiction for a civil suit involving specific performance of a Memorandum of Understanding related to immovable property. The suit was filed by respondent no.1 in Sehore, Madhya Pradesh, with a counter-suit by petitioner in Calcutta, West Bengal. The Court evaluated the principles under Sections 16 and 20 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to determine the competent court for adjudicating the dispute. [Paras 1-6, 8-9]

Jurisdiction Determination under CPC – held – emphasized that jurisdiction for suits concerning immovable property is primarily determined by the location of the property as per Section 16, CPC, and not by the place of execution of the agreement or the residence of the parties. Section 20, CPC, was found to be a residuary provision not applicable in the current scenario. [Para 6]

Precedence of Filing and Section 10, CPC – applied – The Court noted the application of Section 10, CPC, mandating that no court shall proceed with a trial if the matter in issue is already pending before another competent court. The precedence of filing and the consequent stay of later suits were considered vital in adjudicating the transfer petitions. [Para 7]

Decision – Transfer of Suit to Sehore, Madhya Pradesh – The Supreme Court dismissed Transfer Petition (C) No.2664 of 2023, thereby upholding the jurisdiction of the Sehore court for the suit filed by respondent no.1. Concurrently, Transfer Petition (C) No.499 of 2024 was allowed, transferring the suit filed by the petitioner in Calcutta to Sehore, Madhya Pradesh, for consolidated proceedings. [Paras 8-9]

Directive for Consolidated Proceedings – The Court directed the transfer of relevant records to the Court of Principle Judge, Sehore, and allowed the petitioner to withdraw the transferred suit or file a counterclaim in the existing suit in Sehore, Madhya Pradesh. The matter was ordered to proceed from the stage it was left at the City Civil Court, Calcutta, West Bengal. [Paras 9-11]

Criminal Law – Bail Application – Dismissal – The Supreme Court deliberated on the bail granted to the accused in a murder case by the High Court, emphasizing the need for detailed reasoning in bail decisions. The case involved the alleged involvement of the respondent in a murder, not initially named in the FIR but later implicated through investigation. [Para 2-8]

Consideration of Bail Applications – held – the Supreme Court underscored the importance of detailed examination and reasoning in bail applications, especially in cases involving heinous crimes. It criticized the High Court's cursory analysis and reliance on the respondent's arguments without thorough consideration of the materials against him. [Para 4, 8]

Reversal of High Court’s Bail Order – applied – The Supreme Court found that the High Court's order granting bail lacked proper legal foundation and detailed reasoning. This omission was deemed particularly significant given the gravity of the crime involved. [Para 8]

Decision – Cancellation of Bail – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and canceling the bail of the respondent. The respondent was given three weeks to surrender, with the clarification that this order would not prejudice future proceedings related to the crime nor prevent the respondent from applying for bail anew. [Para 9]