Judicial Misconduct – Inquiry and Suspension of Judicial Officer – Appeal Allowed – The appellant, a Sub-Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, was suspended by the High Court of Kerala for allegedly failing to examine the Investigating Officer and allowing no opportunity for cross-examination in a criminal case (CC No.24/2016) – The Supreme Court found that the High Court had issued the suspension order without receiving the case records and without providing the appellant's counsel an opportunity to present his case – Held: The High Court’s order dated 23/12/2022, suspending the appellant and ordering an inquiry, was set aside as legally invalid – The disciplinary proceedings initiated based on this order were also quashed [Paras 5-12].

Procedural Irregularity – Early Listing Without Case Records – The Court noted that the records requisitioned by the High Court from the CJM were not received before the order of suspension was passed – The Supreme Court held that passing an order without complete records and without allowing proper representation renders the High Court’s decision flawed [Paras 8-10].

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the impugned orders of the Kerala High Court dated 23/12/2022 and 21/06/2023 were set aside. The disciplinary proceedings were quashed, and the original petitions were restored for hearing before the Kerala High Court.

Juvenility Claim – Application Filed After Final Conviction – Section 94 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Claim Accepted - The applicant, convicted for offences under Sections 302, 307, and 34 IPC, filed an application seeking release on the ground of juvenility at the time of the offence. The Supreme Court held that a claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after conviction. The applicant's date of birth, verified through school records and other documents, established that he was 17 years, 3 months, and 13 days old on the date of the offence, entitling him to the protection of the Juvenile Justice Act. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the applicant was acquitted [Paras 3-6, 14-16].

Discrepancy in Identity – Slight Variance in Name – No Bar to Juvenility Claim - The Court dismissed objections raised regarding discrepancies in the applicant’s name across various records, emphasizing that such minor inconsistencies could not negate the substantial evidence proving the applicant’s juvenility. The Court observed that the applicant’s parentage was not in dispute, and the variance in name was immaterial to the adjudication of juvenility [Paras 7-9].

Belated Plea of Juvenility – No Time Limit on Juvenility Claims – Application Not Barred - The Court rejected the State’s objection regarding the delayed claim of juvenility, reaffirming that such claims can be made at any stage, even post-conviction, as per the ruling in Abuzar Hossain v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489. The delay in raising the plea was not a ground for dismissal [Paras 10-12].

Final Decision – Conviction Set Aside – Applicant Acquitted Due to Juvenility - The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the applicant based on his established juvenility and acquitted him of all charges. The interim bail granted earlier was confirmed, and the bail bonds were cancelled [Paras 17-19].

Criminal Law – Child Pornography – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Appeal – High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused under Section 67B of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, and Section 15(1) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, citing that mere possession or viewing of child pornography without publication or transmission does not constitute an offense under these provisions – Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interpretation of the law, especially under Section 15(1) of the POCSO, which penalizes possession of child pornographic material with an intent to transmit or share, even if no actual transmission occurs – Held: The criminal proceedings against the accused are restored and must proceed to trial [Paras 9-13, 261].

Interpretation of Section 15 POCSO Act – Nature of Offense – Supreme Court emphasized that Section 15 of the POCSO Act penalizes storage or possession of child pornography with specific intent, even without actual transmission – The Court distinguished between three distinct offenses under subsections (1), (2), and (3) of Section 15, holding that intent can be inferred from the manner of possession and failure to delete or report such material – Held: The High Court wrongly ignored the scope of Section 15, which criminalizes possession of child pornographic material under certain circumstances [Paras 222-231].

Information Technology Act – Section 67B – Transmission or Publication of Child Pornography – High Court ruled that downloading or watching child pornography in private does not constitute an offense under Section 67B of the IT Act – Supreme Court clarified that Section 67B covers a wide range of activities related to child exploitation online, including possession, consumption, and propagation – Held: The act of viewing or possessing child pornography with intent to transmit is punishable, even if transmission does not occur [Paras 11-12, 259].

Public Interest – Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Material (CSEAM) – Supreme Court acknowledged the broader public interest in combating child pornography and ordered that the term "child pornography" be replaced with "child sexual exploitation and abuse material" (CSEAM) in legal discourse – The Court called for amendments to the POCSO Act and comprehensive sex education to prevent child exploitation – Directed Union of India to consider these suggestions and take appropriate legislative and administrative action [Paras 223-246, 260].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside – Criminal proceedings against the accused restored for further trial – Suggestions to amend the POCSO Act and measures to address child exploitation recommended to the Union of India [Paras 261-263].

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) – Challenge to Sanction – Appellant challenged the validity of sanction granted under Section 45 of UAPA, arguing that the statutory timelines in Rules 3 & 4 of the 2008 Rules were violated and that the requirement of independent review was not fulfilled – High Court dismissed the writ petition – Supreme Court held that the validity of sanction should ideally be challenged at the earliest stage, but may be raised at a later stage if justified – Held: Timelines in Rules 3 & 4 are mandatory and must be strictly followed, but the challenge to sanction must be raised at trial and not delayed unnecessarily [Paras 19-18].

Independent Review – Application of Mind – Appellant argued that the independent review by both recommending and sanctioning authorities was not properly conducted as they took merely a day each to perform their functions – Court held that while independent review is required, the short time taken by authorities is not enough to invalidate the sanction without specific evidence of non-application of mind – The question of independent review is to be determined by evidence and should be raised at trial [Paras 41-44].

Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) – Misjoinder of Charges – Appellant contended that two disjointed transactions were combined, making him an accused alongside others under Section 223 of CrPC – Supreme Court held that joinder of charges must consider potential prejudice to the accused and the risk of judicial delay – Found that the transactions were part of the same continuing offence, and the issue should be raised at trial for appropriate consideration [Paras 43-46].

Corporate Liability – Section 22A of UAPA – Appellant claimed he was not in control of the company accused of aiding unlawful activities and that his identity had been stolen – Supreme Court held that exemption under Section 22A depends on the ability to prove lack of knowledge or reasonable effort to prevent the offence, which must be established through evidence at trial [Paras 47-50].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – The challenge to sanction under UAPA must be raised at trial, and questions of independent review, misjoinder of charges, and corporate liability will be decided based on evidence presented during the trial. Pending applications disposed of [Paras 51-53].

Writ Jurisdiction – Interim Relief – Stay of Criminal Proceedings – Abuse of Process of Law – Petitioners sought quashing of multiple FIRs, alleging that disgruntled borrowers had misused criminal law against financial institutions – Supreme Court granted stay of proceedings in its interim order dated 28.04.2023, continued until petitions before respective High Courts were filed – Held: Petitioners permitted to challenge FIRs before jurisdictional High Courts – Stay on coercive steps continued only until the filing of petitions, not until their final disposal – Interim protection applied only to petitioners, not others involved [Paras 5, 18].

Maintainability of Miscellaneous Applications – Recall of Orders – Principles of Finality – Miscellaneous applications seeking modification/recall of final orders should be entertained only in rare cases – Recall of orders is permissible where a party is denied a hearing – Enforcement Directorate was impleaded without being heard, justifying recall of order – Held: The order dated 04.07.2023, to the extent it affects the Enforcement Directorate’s proceedings, was recalled – High Courts directed to adjudicate the matter uninfluenced by the Supreme Court’s interim order [Paras 10-15].

Inherent Powers of the Court – Modification of Orders – Prevention of Abuse of Process – The Supreme Court invoked its inherent powers under Rule 6 of Order LV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, to modify its previous order to prevent any potential abuse of process – Modification was necessary to ensure that the High Courts are not unduly influenced by observations made in the earlier order – Held: The High Courts are to decide the cases on their own merits, and the interim protection for the petitioners ends upon filing of their respective petitions before the High Courts [Paras 12, 18].

Natural Justice – Opportunity of Hearing – No adverse orders should be passed against a party without providing them an opportunity to be heard – The Enforcement Directorate was not given a hearing before adverse directions were issued against it – Held: Order affecting the Enforcement Directorate recalled and set aside for violation of the principles of natural justice [Paras 14-15].

Decision: The order dated 04.07.2023 stands modified and recalled in part – The High Courts are directed to decide the petitions on merits, uninfluenced by any observations made in the earlier Supreme Court order – Interim relief for the petitioners is limited to the period until the filing of their petitions before the respective High Courts – Miscellaneous applications and interlocutory applications disposed of accordingly [Paras 16-18].

Criminal Law – Conviction Based on Identical Evidence – Principle of Parity – The appellant was convicted for facilitating the issuance of a second passport to accused No.1, while other co-accused, who faced similar charges, were acquitted – Supreme Court held: When two accused face identical or similar charges and evidence, one cannot be convicted while the other is acquitted unless there is a clear distinction in the evidence presented – Held: The conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained in light of the acquittal of other co-accused who faced similar allegations [Paras 10, 15].

Evidence – Hostile Witness – Reliability – The appellant’s conviction was partly based on the testimony of PW-3, who turned hostile during the trial – The court held: A conviction cannot be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a hostile witness, especially when the prosecution fails to elicit material evidence during cross-examination – Held: The testimony of PW-3 is unreliable, and the conviction cannot rest upon it [Paras 11, 12].

Expert Testimony – Handwriting Expert’s Opinion – Standard of Proof – The handwriting expert (PW-16) expressed uncertainty regarding whether the handwriting on a returned postal cover matched the appellant’s handwriting – Supreme Court reiterated: It is unsafe to convict an accused solely on expert opinion without corroboration by other substantive evidence – Held: The expert’s opinion lacked sufficient reliability and corroboration to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt [Para 13].

Passports Act, 1967 – Section 12(2) – Knowledge of False Information – The appellant was charged with abetting the offense of obtaining a second passport through false information under Section 12(2) of the Passports Act – Supreme Court held: The prosecution failed to prove that the appellant had knowledge of the false information or that accused No.1 already possessed a passport – Held: In the absence of such evidence, the conviction under Section 12(2) cannot stand [Paras 14-15].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 420 of IPC and Section 12(2) of the Passports Act are set aside – Appellant acquitted of all charges – The bail bonds of the appellant are cancelled [Paras 16-17].

Eviction Suit – Judgment on Admission – Order XII Rule 6 of CPC – Admission Must be Clear and Unambiguous – Judgment Set Aside - The appellants challenged the eviction decree based on the alleged admission in a different case regarding the succession of tenancy rights. The Court emphasized that a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 requires an unequivocal and unconditional admission. The alleged admission in this case did not meet that standard, as it was mixed with questions of law and fact. The decree passed by the Single Judge and upheld by the Division Bench was set aside [Paras 2-4, 8-9, 14].

Tenancy Succession – Interpretation of Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 – Retrospective Application Not Intended - The Court held that the 1997 Act did not retrospectively extinguish tenancy rights accrued under the 1956 Act. The phrase "whichever is later" in Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act was deemed superfluous, and the appellants’ tenancy rights, inherited under the 1956 Act, could not be nullified by the 1997 Act [Paras 19-21, 48-50].

Retrospective Legislation – Presumption Against Retrospective Operation of Statutes - The Court reiterated that unless expressly stated, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively. The rights vested in the appellants under the 1956 Act were protected, and the 1997 Act could not retrospectively divest those rights [Paras 25, 28-30].

Decision – Appellants’ Tenancy Rights Affirmed – Eviction Order Set Aside - The Court concluded that the appellants’ tenancy rights did not expire with the introduction of the 1997 Act. The eviction order passed by the Single Judge and upheld by the Division Bench was set aside, and the appeals were allowed [Paras 48-50].

Criminal Law – Filing of False Proceedings – Misuse of Judicial Process – Appellants filed appeals in the name of Bhagwan Singh challenging orders of the Allahabad High Court – During proceedings, it was revealed that Bhagwan Singh had not authorized any such filings and had no knowledge of the SLPs in his name – Multiple advocates were involved in submitting forged documents, including a falsified 'Vakalatnama' purportedly signed by Bhagwan Singh – Court found that the entire proceedings were a fraud, orchestrated by respondents Sukhpal Singh and Rinki with the assistance of advocates【Paras 5-17, 20-25】.

Professional Misconduct – Role of Advocates in Fraudulent Proceedings – Advocates involved in the case were found to have knowingly filed false documents and misled the Court – Advocate-on-Record (AOR) attested signatures on the ‘Vakalatnama’ without Bhagwan Singh’s presence or consent – Advocates were directed to adhere to high standards of professionalism, as their actions directly impacted the integrity of the judicial process【Paras 9-10, 25-32】.

Judicial Process – Fraud on Court – Misuse of Legal System – The Court held that filing false proceedings using forged documents, with the involvement of advocates, constituted a fraud on the judiciary – The case reflected systemic abuse of the justice delivery process, where unscrupulous litigants and their counsel exploited procedural loopholes to file false claims【Paras 4, 20, 30-32】.

Witness Protection – Harassment of Key Witness in Nitish Katara Case – Respondent No. 2, Ajay Katara, a key witness in the Nitish Katara murder case, had been implicated in multiple false cases, including this one, as part of a larger effort to intimidate him for his testimony against high-profile convicts – The Court acknowledged the continuous threats and harassment faced by Katara, underscoring the vital role of witness protection in the justice system【Paras 16-18, 25-26, 28】.

Investigation Ordered – Involvement of CBI – The Court ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct an investigation into the fraudulent activities surrounding the filing of false proceedings – The CBI was tasked with identifying all individuals responsible for the fraud and submitting a report to the Court within two months【Paras 32, 43】.

Corrective Measures – Regulation of Professional Ethics and Procedures – The Court emphasized the need for strict adherence to professional ethics by advocates – It directed the Bar Council of India and the Government of India to take necessary actions based on this judgment – The Court also laid down guidelines for the proper marking of advocates' appearances in court records to prevent misuse【Paras 33-42】.

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Directions issued for CBI investigation and corrective measures for professional conduct – Matter listed for submission of CBI report on November 25, 2024【Paras 43】.

Land Acquisition – Payment of Compensation – The appellant (M/s Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd.) challenged the High Court’s direction to pay compensation under the Supplementary Award dated 02.05.2022 – High Court had ruled that the appellant should pay the compensation first and recover the amount from Jaiprakash Associates Limited (JAL) later – The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reliance on Clause 7.1 of the Scheme of Arrangement between the appellant and JAL was erroneous – The acquisition proceedings commenced before the Scheme's "Effective Date," and liabilities associated with the land remained with JAL – Held: JAL is liable for the compensation determined under the Supplementary Award [Paras 16, 20, 27, 32, 56].

Land Ownership – Liability of Payment – The subject land was acquired for a safety zone under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for JAL's cement project – The land was not transferred to Ultra-Tech Cement under the Scheme of Arrangement – Supreme Court clarified that ownership of the land and liabilities relating to the land acquisition, including compensation, remained with JAL – Hence, the appellant could not be directed to pay the compensation amount for land not transferred to it – Held: Compensation liability remains with JAL, not Ultra-Tech Cement [Paras 27, 29, 32].

Return of Acquired Land – Unutilized Land under Section 101 of the 2013 Act – JAL contended that the subject land had remained unutilized and should be returned to the original landowners – The Court rejected this contention, holding that the land was acquired as a safety zone and was being utilized for that purpose – The argument that the land was unutilized did not hold since the purpose of acquisition was being fulfilled – Held: The return of land under Section 101 is not applicable in this case [Paras 33, 36-38].

State's Role – Article 300-A of the Constitution – The Court emphasized the constitutional duty of the State to ensure fair compensation for landowners – The Himachal Pradesh government failed in ensuring timely payment of compensation, contrary to the welfare State principles under Article 300-A – The Court held that the State should have facilitated payment to the landowners rather than leaving them to seek compensation from corporate entities – Held: The State must compensate landowners and recover the amount from JAL [Paras 43-52].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside – Respondent Nos. 7 (State of Himachal Pradesh) and 10 (Land Acquisition Collector) directed to pay compensation to the landowners and recover it from JAL – Compensation to be paid within 15 days with interest at 9% from the date of the Supplementary Award [Paras 56-58].