Motor Vehicles Act – Compensation for Accident – Determination of Just Compensation – Appellant suffered 100% permanent disability due to a road accident caused by a rashly driven lorry – Tribunal awarded Rs.58,09,930/- with 6% interest, excluding Rs.1,00,000/- for future medical expenses – High Court enhanced compensation to Rs.78,16,390/- but retained the interest rate – Claimant challenged the calculation of future prospects and inadequacy of compensation under ‘pain and suffering’ [Paras 2, 5.6, 6.2, 7].

Future Prospects – Calculation of Compensation – High Court applied 40% addition for future prospects instead of 50%, as per Pranay Sethi – Appellant contended that being below 40 years and in permanent employment, 50% addition was warranted – Court recalculated income, determining total compensation under loss of future prospects at Rs.75,24,000/- – Total payable compensation revised to Rs.87,29,241/- [Paras 8(i), 9, 10].

Pain and Suffering – Enhanced Compensation – Appellant sustained grievous injuries, including loss of sensation below the neck, complete loss of urinary and bowel control, and permanent wheelchair dependency – Doctor’s assessment confirmed 85% whole-body impairment – Court observed lifelong pain and suffering warranted enhancement of compensation – Award under this head increased from Rs.10,00,000/- to Rs.15,00,000/- [Paras 8(ii), 11, 12, 15].

Judicial Precedents – Assessment of Pain and Suffering – Court referred to cases such as R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) and Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, emphasizing life-altering impacts and the need for reasonable compensation for permanent disabilities – Court underscored the abstract and artificial nature of calculating non-pecuniary damages [Paras 13, 14].

Decision – Appeal allowed in part – Compensation enhanced to Rs.1,02,29,241/- with 6% interest from the date of filing of the special leave petition – Award modified on the grounds of future prospects and pain and suffering – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 16, 17].

Criminal Law – Murder – Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence – Acquittal – Appellants were convicted for abduction, murder, and destruction of evidence under Sections 364, 302, 201, 212, and 120-B of the IPC – Trial Court sentenced them to life imprisonment – High Court upheld their convictions while acquitting co-accused – Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as evidence was inadmissible or unreliable – Appeal allowed, convictions set aside, and appellants acquitted [Paras 1, 17, 18].

Evidence of Eyewitness (PW-26) – Reliability – PW-26 was the sole eyewitness – Material omissions in her testimony, including lack of prior identification of the accused or their specific roles – No test identification parade was conducted – Husband of PW-26, another alleged eyewitness, was not examined – Held: Testimony of PW-26 is unreliable, and an adverse inference is drawn for withholding material evidence [Paras 5-8].

Circumstantial Evidence – CCTV Footage – CCTV footage relied upon by the prosecution lacked a valid certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act – Witnesses (PW-1 and PW-24) admitted no verification of the contents, and the footage could have been tampered with – Trial and High Courts relied on inadmissible footage without viewing it – Supreme Court discarded this evidence, holding it inadmissible and insufficient to prove guilt [Paras 9-12].

Recovery of Dead Body and Articles – Insufficient to Prove Guilt – Body parts of the deceased were recovered based on prior information received by the Police, not at the instance of the accused – Recovery of car, weapon, and articles of the deceased based on disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was insufficient to establish guilt – Prosecution failed to prove a complete chain of circumstantial evidence [Paras 13, 14].

Confessions to Police – Inadmissibility – Statements made by the accused in police custody, including details of alleged conspiracy and roles of co-accused, were inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act – Inadmissible confessions were improperly incorporated in the testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-27) – Held: Trial Court erred in relying on inadmissible evidence, which violated the statutory bar against using custodial confessions [Paras 15-16].

Gruesome Nature of Offence – Standard of Proof – Supreme Court emphasized that the brutality of the crime cannot substitute for the legal requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt – Convictions must rest on cogent, admissible, and clear evidence – Mere suspicion or moral conviction is insufficient for upholding a conviction [Para 17].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgments of the Trial Court and High Court quashed – Appellants acquitted as prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt – Appellants to be released immediately unless required in any other case [Para 18].

Hindu Succession Act – Sections 14(1) and 14(2) – Scope and Application – Property given to a Hindu widow in lieu of maintenance can become her absolute property under Section 14(1) unless a restrictive estate is explicitly prescribed under Section 14(2) – Held: Absolute rights were granted to Smt. Veerabhadramma for 2.09 acres of land, while a life interest was created in 3.55 acres, as explicitly mentioned in the partition deed – Section 14(1) was applicable to the former, but not the latter [Paras 3.6, 4, 9.1–9.4, 11–12].

Property Rights – Interpretation of Partition Deed – A 1933 partition deed granted life interest to Smt. Veerabhadramma in 3.55 acres of land, which would devolve equally to both branches of the family upon her death – Held: No absolute rights were created for this portion of the property, and her rights remained limited as per the deed [Paras 3.2–3.4, 4].

Hindu Widow’s Right to Maintenance – Pre-Existing Rights and Statutory Protection – Right to maintenance under Shastric law, recognized by statutes like the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, can elevate property given in lieu of maintenance into absolute ownership – However, rights created by explicit life interest clauses are not transformed under Section 14(1) – Held: Life interest in the disputed land remained as per the 1933 partition deed, and subsequent bequeathing by Will was invalid [Paras 9.2–9.4, 11].

Concurrent Findings of Courts Below – Appellate Court and Trial Court consistently upheld the limited nature of rights granted under the partition deed – The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings [Paras 3.8, 5, 13].

Limitations of Section 14(1), Hindu Succession Act – Section 14(1) operates to remove restrictions where possession is traceable to a lawful pre-existing right – In this case, life interest created in 3.55 acres was not rooted in such a right but in a new and restricted grant – Held: Section 14(2) applies, upholding the limited estate [Paras 7, 9.1–10].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Findings of the Trial Court and Appellate Court affirmed – Pending applications disposed of [Para 13].
 

Civil Law - U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act – Claim of Co-Tenancy – Disputed Land – Appellant challenged the High Court’s decision restoring the order of the Consolidation Officer, which dismissed the claim of Smt. Gulabi to co-tenancy over the disputed land – High Court found the Appellate and Revisional Authorities acted perversely, reversing findings supported by evidence – Held: High Court rightly upheld the Consolidation Officer’s order, rejecting Gulabi’s claim as unsupported by credible evidence – Appeal dismissed [Paras 1, 3, 11, 21].

Evidence – Burden of Proof – Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act – Burden to prove paternity and co-tenancy rights was on Smt. Gulabi – Consolidation Officer and High Court found her evidence insufficient and contradictory – Birth register, the primary documentary evidence, lacked credibility and corroboration – No testimony from relatives or credible witnesses was provided to substantiate her claim [Paras 5, 12–15].
Revisional Powers – Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act – Scope of Review – Deputy Director of Consolidation can interfere with findings of fact only when they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or contrary to law – High Court correctly found the Revisional Authority exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence de novo instead of examining procedural regularity or legal propriety [Paras 7–10, 21].

Delay and Laches – Unexplained Delay in Challenging Mutation Order – Mutation was ordered in 1959, but no challenge was made until 1973 – High Court noted the 14-year delay as unexplained and suggestive of laches – Such delay impacted the credibility of the claim [Paras 19–20].

Findings of Fact – Testimonies and Documentary Evidence – Witnesses presented by Smt. Gulabi were found unreliable, offering contradictory statements – High Court and Consolidation Officer noted discrepancies in the birth register and lack of corroborative evidence – Voter lists were deemed self-serving and insufficient to establish her claim [Paras 12–14].

Jurisdiction – High Court’s Supervisory Role – High Court exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 to correct errors of law and procedural irregularities by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities – Held: High Court acted within its authority by setting aside findings based on inadmissible evidence and misappreciation of facts [Paras 16–17].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – High Court’s judgment restoring the Consolidation Officer’s order upheld – Pending applications disposed of [Para 21].

Order: Findings of the Consolidation Officer affirmed, and Smt. Gulabi's claim to co-tenancy rights rejected.
 

Limitation Law - Condonation of Delay – Litigant's Responsibility – Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation Denied - The Court emphasized the litigant’s duty to vigilantly monitor proceedings initiated by them. The excuse of advocate negligence was deemed insufficient to justify a delay of 534 days – Held: The delay cannot be condoned solely on allegations of advocate negligence, as litigants are expected to actively protect their rights [Paras 10-12].

Limitation Principles – Vigilance Required – The Court reiterated the principle of “vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt,” underlining that limitation statutes aim to ensure timely action, prevent stale claims, and preserve the efficacy of evidence – Held: Delay of such magnitude without sufficient justification is untenable [Para 12].

Ex Parte Decree – Misrepresentation and Non-disclosure – The petitioners were found to have suppressed material facts regarding their knowledge of the counterclaim – Held: Courts cannot exercise discretion to condone delay when the litigant approaches without clean hands [Para 9].

Dismissal of Petitions – Absence of Error in High Court’s Decision – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's refusal to condone delay, finding no error in law warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution – Held: Special Leave Petitions dismissed [Para 13].

Specific Performance – Subsequent Purchaser – Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act – The plaintiff sought specific performance of an oral agreement of sale for property subsequently sold to appellants – High Court held that appellants were not bona fide purchasers as they failed to inquire into the rights of the plaintiff, who was in possession – Supreme Court affirmed High Court's findings, emphasizing the obligation of a subsequent purchaser to conduct due diligence under Section 19(b) – Appeal dismissed [Paras 10-12, 16-19].

Good Faith – Due Diligence and Bona Fide Purchasers – Good faith requires honesty and due care – Subsequent purchasers must inquire about the rights of individuals in possession at the time of purchase – Wilful abstention from inquiry constitutes constructive notice – Supreme Court applied principles from R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab and Ram Niwas v. Bano to hold that appellants failed to establish good faith in their purchase [Paras 11, 13-18].

Possession as Notice – Explanation II to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act – Actual possession of a person is deemed constructive notice of their rights – Subsequent purchasers were bound to inquire into the plaintiff's possession – Failure to do so negates claims of bona fide purchase [Para 16].

Standard for Good Faith – Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita and General Clauses Act – Definitions of "good faith" emphasize honesty and due care – Supreme Court reiterated that negligence or dishonesty precludes claims of good faith in property transactions [Paras 13-15].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Plaintiff entitled to execute the decree for specific performance – No error of law in High Court's findings regarding the lack of bona fide purchase by appellants [Paras 20-22].

Property Law - Marumakkathayam Law – Partition and Property Nature – Tharwad or Individual Ownership – Appeal Dismissed – The appellants contended that properties partitioned under Marumakkathayam law ceased to be joint tharwad property and became individually owned. Held: The properties inherited by a thavazhi remain tharwad property, jointly held by its members. The Court upheld the High Court's decision affirming the Trial Court’s preliminary decree dividing the properties among members of the Andippillil Tharwad [Paras 22, 50-55].

Partition – Effect on Property Nature – Dissenting View Accepted – Prospective Application – The Court resolved the doctrinal difference in Mary Cheriyan v. Bhargavi Pillai Bhasura Devi (Full Bench of Kerala High Court), holding that property obtained by a single female on partition ceases to be tharwad property. However, this interpretation applies prospectively, not affecting past or ongoing transactions [Paras 38-48].

Concurrent Findings – Non-Interference Principle – High Court and Trial Court Findings Affirmed – Findings on itemized properties were concurrent across courts. The appellants failed to meet the exceptional circumstances warranting Supreme Court interference under Article 136 [Paras 51-55].

Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The Court upheld the preliminary decree of the Trial Court as affirmed by the High Court, concluding that the disputed properties are tharwad properties held jointly by the thavazhi of Parukutty Amma. The Trial Court was directed to proceed with final decree proceedings as per law. No costs were imposed.

Civil Law - Specific Performance – Time as Essence – Enforceability of Agreement – Buyers’ Conduct – Agreement Unenforceable - The agreement for sale specified that time was of the essence, yet allowed extensions implicitly through conduct – Buyers argued four-month performance period began only upon tenant vacating the property, which was contested – Courts determined both clauses in the agreement to be read harmoniously – Time was not strictly of the essence [Paras 3-5, 19-21].

Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Financial Capability – Buyer’s Readiness Disputed – Equity Denied - Court emphasized the equitable nature of relief – Found the buyer’s inability to prove continuous readiness and willingness, financial incapacity, and unexplained delay undermined entitlement – Buyer’s failure to utilize opportunities to complete the sale or return advance earlier weighed against her – Specific performance denied [Paras 21-29].

Jurisdictional Fact – Maintainability of Suit – Necessity of Declaratory Relief – Suit Barred Without Declaratory Relief - Vendor canceled the agreement unilaterally; buyer’s failure to seek declaratory relief invalidating cancellation rendered suit non-maintainable – A jurisdictional fact essential to granting relief was absent, vitiating the court's jurisdiction [Paras 30-33, 41-43].

Equity and Hardship – Market Value Increase – Equitable Discretion Upheld – Market Value Increase and Buyers’ Conduct Justified Denial - Court noted the substantial increase in market value of property and emphasized equitable discretion in denying relief – Sellers were not deemed solely responsible for non-performance [Paras 34-36].

Decision: Appeals allowed. High Court judgment reversed; Trial Court decision dismissing the suit restored. Buyer entitled only to refund of advance with applicable interest [Paras 47-49].

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 CrPC – FIR alleging rape under Section 376(2)(n) and criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC – High Court refused to quash FIR citing lack of consent by the complainant – Supreme Court holds FIR and statements do not substantiate essential ingredients of offences under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC – Relationship between the appellant and complainant was consensual, and prosecution would amount to abuse of the legal process – FIR and trial quashed [Paras 2, 17-19, 21].

Consent in Sexual Relationships – Promise to Marry – Complainant alleged physical relationship based on false promise of marriage – Supreme Court observes that no promise of marriage was established at the outset of the relationship – Relationship continued voluntarily despite the appellant's subsequent marriage – Held: Consensual relationships cannot be criminalized due to breakup or unfulfilled marital intentions [Paras 17-19, 22].

Abuse of Process – Continuation of Prosecution – Appellant and complainant are now married to different individuals – Continuation of trial would be futile and cause injustice – High Court erred in failing to exercise powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings – Held: Quashing warranted to prevent abuse of court process [Paras 20-21].

Relevant Case Law – Principles of Consent – Reiterated principles from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 – False promise of marriage must be shown to have been made in bad faith to constitute rape – Active consent of complainant evident from facts [Paras 11, 22].

Decision – Appeal allowed – FIR No. 272 of 2019 and related proceedings quashed – Held: Ingredients of Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC not made out – Prosecution would amount to abuse of process [Paras 23].