Facts:

The respondent-assessee did not claim depreciation for the assessment year. However, the Income Tax Officer allowed it. The Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, but the High Court held that without the claim by the assessee, the Income Tax Officer couldn't grant depreciation allowance.

Issues:

Whether the depreciation allowance can be granted in the absence of a claim by the assessee, and if the assessment based on a revised return allows the claim of depreciation made in the original return.

Held:

Section 34 of the Income-tax Act mandates that depreciation as a deduction under Section 32 shall be allowed only if prescribed particulars are furnished. In the absence of these particulars, there is no mandate for the Income Tax Officer to compute income by allowing depreciation.

Although Rule SAA of the Income Tax Rules, providing particulars for deduction under Section 32, was deleted, the return of income requires detailed particulars for claiming depreciation.

Circulars highlight that depreciation cannot be allowed without the required particulars, and if no claim is made in the return, the Income-Tax Officer must compute income without allowing depreciation.

A valid revised return, where the claim of depreciation is withdrawn, prevails over the original return for granting depreciation.

"Actually allowed" in the context of depreciation means the deductions claimed. If an assessee hasn't claimed depreciation, it cannot be notionally allowed. the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The turnover of rectified spirit and denatured spirit was initially deemed non-taxable under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The Trade Tax Tribunal, Muzaffar Nagar, held this position for certain assessment years. The Department filed a review application based on amendments to the Principal Act. The High Court, in a subsequent revision, interpreted Section 39(2) of the Amendment Act concerning the time frame for review applications.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 39(2) of the Amendment Act, specifically regarding the time limitations for review applications and the coexistence of powers of review and rectification.

Held:

The validating Act aimed to rectify defects identified by authorities, enabling the taxation of alcohol turnover. Section 22 of the Principal Act allowed rectification of mistakes, with a proviso extending the time for disposal of applications made within three years. Section 39(3) specified a period for rectification, while Section 39(2) mandated a review application deadline with no prescribed time limit for disposal.( Paragraph 6)

The Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between the powers of review and rectification. The scheme of the Amendment Act supported the alternative exercise of both powers. If the High Court's interpretation were accepted, the provision for review would become redundant, negating the purpose of differentiation between the two powers.( Paragraph 7)

The High Court's order was set aside, and the Tribunal's decision was restored. The appeals were allowed, and no costs were imposed.( Paragraph 8)

Facts:

Appellant mortgaged a plot to Col. Joginder Singh.

Suit for foreclosure filed by Col. Joginder Singh after the appellant failed to deposit the required amount as per the preliminary decree.

Auction of the property on August 25, 1976, with Nazar Singh (respondent) as the purchaser.

Appellant challenges the auction sale through objections under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C., rejected on November 28, 1977.

Sale confirmed on November 29, 1977.

Appellant deposits sums of Rs. 47,250/- on May 3, 1985, and Rs. 525/- on August 19, 1985, during the pendency of appeals in the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the deposits made by the appellant during the pendency of appeals.

Interpretation of Order 34, Rule 5, C.P.C. in the context of the timing of deposits.

Held:

The Division Bench erred in concluding that deposits made during the pendency of appeals were not valid under Order 34, Rule 5, C.P.C. The Court, relying on precedent, emphasized that if an appeal is pending against an order refusing to set aside the sale, the confirmation of sale remains in a nebulous state. The judgment debtor has the right to make necessary deposits under Order 34, Rule 5 to protect the property from being transferred.

Decision: Appeals allowed, judgment of the Division Bench set aside, and the judgment of the single Judge restored.

Facts:

The case involves appeals against the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, regarding the extension of benefits to technicians appointed prior to 1-1-1986. The government issued orders on 22-10-1990 and 31-3-1992, granting benefits for training periods, but the controversy arose regarding the cut-off date.

Issues:

The primary issue is whether the benefit of Government Order dated 31-3-92 should be extended to technicians appointed before 1-1-1986, and if the cut-off date of 1-1-1986 is valid.

Held:

The Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, had previously overruled the Bangalore Bench's decision, stating that the cut-off date was valid. The Court emphasizes the different nature of technical and non-technical posts, justifying the government's decision for a cut-off date based on the financial burden.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, setting aside the judgment of the Bangalore Tribunal. The Court upholds the validity of the cut-off date as per the Full Bench decision of the Madras Tribunal.

Facts:

Respondent appointed as a Conductor in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation in 1965.

Accused of issuing incorrect tickets in 1981, leading to a departmental enquiry and eventual termination.

Respondent challenged termination through appeals, including a Writ Petition in the Allahabad High Court.

Issues:

Main contention: The severity of the punishment (dismissal) in relation to the charges.

Discrepancy in ticket issuance location: High Court questioned the adequacy of evidence, emphasizing the lack of passenger statements or examination during the trial.

Held:

The High Court exercised discretion under Article 226, questioning the proportionality of the punishment.

Emphasized the importance of evidence collection, noting the failure to examine passengers during the trial.

Referred to B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, highlighting that the court can interfere if the punishment shocks the conscience.

Upheld the High Court's decision to intervene in the quantum of punishment.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.

Facts:

Respondent, a driver, was charge-sheeted for habitual absence, unauthorized use of a bus, and misconduct involving a drunken demand for money.

Enquiry conducted by a retired District Judge found the habitual absence charge unproven, but established unauthorized use of the bus and the misconduct charge.

Respondent was removed from service after a show cause notice, leading to an industrial dispute.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court had the authority to interfere with the quantum of punishment.

The propriety of the punishment imposed on the respondent.

Held:

The Labour Court has the power to consider the proportionality of punishment under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act and Article 226 of the Constitution.

The discretion to interfere is limited to cases where the punishment is "shockingly disproportionate."

The Labour Court, in this instance, was not justified in modifying the order of removal as the serious charge of misconduct stood proved.

The High Court failed to correct the erroneous order of the Labour Court, leading to a potential miscarriage of justice.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Labour Court's award. No costs are awarded.

Facts:

The respondent, engaged in the purchase and crushing of stone boulders for further sale, contested the imposition of sales tax on the resultant products. The argument posited that since sales tax was already paid during the boulder purchase, the subsequent goods should not be subject to taxation.

Issues:

Whether the processed goods (gitti, stone chips, and dust) were distinct enough to warrant separate taxation, considering the initial payment of sales tax during boulder acquisition.

Held:

The Tribunal, in a majority decision upheld by the High Court, concluded that the processed goods retained their identity as stone and should not be considered commercially different for the purpose of sales tax. The court analyzed the definition of 'manufacture' under Section 2(e-1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, emphasizing that every activity altering or processing goods falls under this definition. However, it was clarified that for sales tax purposes, the focus should be on the emergence of distinct commercial commodities.

In examining the goods listed in Entry 40 of the September 7, 1981 notification, the court affirmed that once separate commercial commodities emerge from a process, they become individually taxable. Despite potential differences in size, the goods, such as gitti, kankar, and stone ballast, maintained their identity as stone. The court rejected the notion that Entry 40 intended to categorize these goods as something other than stone.

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1 filed a civil suit against the appellant regarding a plot, claiming that it was open land and not covered by the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. The appellant contested, arguing that it was a residential house. A decree was initially passed, but the appellant appealed.

ISSUES:

Applicability of Clause 13-A introduced by amendments during the pendency of the appeal.

Retrospective or prospective effect of the amendments.

Whether the expression "premises" includes open plots.

HELD:

The court established that an appeal is a continuation of the hearing of the suit, and amendments to statutes apply to pending appeals. Citing Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, the court emphasized that an appeal is in the nature of a re-hearing. (Para 6)

The court clarified that the amendments were not retrospective; they had retroactive force. It reasoned that the amendments only imposed a limitation for the future, not affecting actions done in the past. The expression "premises" in the Act applied when the suit or proceeding was pending for eviction. (Para 8)

DECISION: The appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's order. The matter was remitted to the High Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with the law. No order as to costs. (Para 11)

REFERRED CASES:

Lakshmi Narayan Guin and Others Vs. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 SC 111 : (1984) 2 SCALE 924 : (1985) 1 SCC 270 : (1985) 1 SCC 200 : (1985) 2 SCR 202 : (1985) 17 UJ 294

Garikapatti Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 : (1957) 1 SCR 488

Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam Singh and Others, AIR 1974 SC 2068 : (1975) 77 PLR 19 : (1974) 2 SCC 363 : (1975) 1 SCR 605

The Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs and Central Excise Cochin and Others, AIR 1970 SC 1950 : (1978) 2 ELT 375 : (1969) 3 SCC 112 : (1970) 2 SCR 830

Motiram Ghelabhai (Dead) through Lr Maniram Motiram Vs. Jagan Nagar (Dead) through Lrs and Others, AIR 1985 SC 709 : (1985) 1 SCALE 360 : (1985) 2 SCC 279 : (1985) 2 SCR 1051 : (1985) 17 UJ 691

Bakul Cashew Co. and Others Vs. Sales Tax Officer Quilon and Another, AIR 1987 SC 2239 : (1986) 159 ITR 565 : (1986) 1 SCALE 380 : (1986) 2 SCC 365 : (1986) 1 SCR 610 : (1986) 62 STC 122 : (1986) 2 UJ 121

Income Tax Officer, Alleppey Vs. M.C. Ponnoose and Others, AIR 1970 SC 385 : (1970) 75 ITR 174 : (1969) 2 SCC 352 : (1969) 2 SCC 351 : (1970) 1 SCR 678

H. Shiva Rao and Another Vs. Cecilia Pereira and Others, AIR 1987 SC 248 : (1986) 2 SCALE 909 : (1987) 1 SCC 258 : (1987) 1 UJ 15

Facts:

The appellant was challenging a detention order issued under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981.

The appellant was accused of extorting money from a businessman, making threats in public places, and engaging in activities affecting public order.

Issues:

Legibility of documents supplied to the appellant.

Whether the alleged activities amounted to a breach of public order.

The nature of the criminal proceeding against the appellant and its relevance to the detention.

Held:

The grounds of detention referred to a criminal proceeding against the appellant, involving an assault on Harishchandra Gupta and his brother. When seeking help, none came forward due to fear of the appellant, indicating disturbance to the life of the people in the area.( Para 5)

Referring to precedent cases, the court clarified that the disturbance caused by the appellant's activities must go beyond ordinary law, affecting the community at large or a significant section of society to qualify as a breach of public order.( Para 7)

The court determined that the appellant's actions, including extortion and threats, undoubtedly disturbed the even tempo of life in society, qualifying as a disturbance of public order.( Para 9)

The appellant argued that the criminal proceeding was for bailable offenses. However, the court noted that none dared to help the victims due to fear of the appellant, indicating a disturbance in public order.( Para 10)

Addressing the issue of delay, the court found that there was no undue delay in passing the detention order, and the actions were taken in a routine manner.( Para 12)

The High Court's dismissal of the petition was upheld, and there was no reason to interfere with the order.( Para 13)

The appeal is dismissed.