Facts:

The appellants, in this case, were accused of cheating in a land sale transaction. The complainant alleged that the appellants did not disclose relevant information about a pending partition suit involving their brother, leading to criminal charges under various sections of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the complainant's allegations established the elements of intentional deception and fraudulent intention by the accused at the beginning of the land transaction.

Held:

The court, after examining the complaint, found that the essential elements of cheating were not adequately established. The complainant's assertion that the accused did not disclose the pending partition suit did not explicitly or implicitly show intentional deception at the outset. The court emphasized the necessity of proving fraudulent or dishonest intention right at the beginning of the transaction for a charge of cheating.

The court invoked the power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings, considering it an abuse of the court's process. The judgment followed the principles laid down in various decisions, including the necessity for sparing and circumspect use of the power to quash criminal proceedings.

Facts:

Tender notice issued for Tendu leaves in 1995.

Appellant declared the highest bidder for Lot No. 597, but his bid was later canceled.

Fresh tenders were invited, and the appellant again emerged as the highest bidder.

A writ petition by another party (respondent No. 4) without impleading the appellant resulted in a stay order, preventing the appellant from benefiting from his bid.

The appellant deposited a security amount, but due to the stay order, he couldn't lift the perishable Tendu leaves.

Issues:

Can a person be penalized when circumstances beyond their control, such as a stay order, hinder the execution of a tender?

Can the appellant be directed to forfeit a part of the security amount due to the pendency of a writ petition by another party?

Should equity clauses be invoked in favor of the State when the affected person is found not to have benefited due to a court-issued stay order?

Held:

The Court found that the appellant, through no fault of his own, was prevented from fulfilling the tender due to the stay order.

The Court applied the maxims of equity, stating that an act of the Court should not prejudice any individual and that the law does not compel a person to perform the impossible.

The Division Bench's direction to deduct Rs. 30,000 from the appellant's security amount was deemed unjustified. The appellant was held entitled to a refund of the entire earnest money.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Division Bench's order, and restoring the decision of the learned Single Judge, declaring the appellant entitled to a refund of the entire earnest money.

Facts:

The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for possession by way of redemption against the appellants, claiming ownership of land mortgaged for 99 years. The trial court decreed the suit, and the appellate courts upheld the decision, finding the mortgage period to be a clog on the equity of redemption.

Issues:

Whether the 99-year period in the mortgage deed is a clog on the equity of redemption.

Whether the plaintiff has the right to redeem the mortgaged property before the stipulated period.

Held:

The courts below held that the 99-year mortgage period was a clog on the equity of redemption, considering the financial position of the mortgagor. The appellants were deemed to be in an advantageous position, deriving usufructs for over 26 years on payment of a meager sum.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the findings that the 99-year mortgage period constituted a clog on the equity of redemption.

Facts:

The landlord sought eviction of the tenant under Items (i) and (ii) of Sub-clause (3) of Clause 13 of The Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, alleging habitual default in rent payments. The tenant contested, asserting rent payments were as per convenience.

Issues:

Whether the tenant's sporadic rent defaults qualify as "habitual" under Clause 13 of the Order.

The impact of a civil court order directing rent payment to the court on the tenant's liability.

Held:

The term "habitual" was not defined in the Order. Citing legal dictionaries, the court interpreted it as repetitive and persistent default. A single default does not establish habit. The court considered the tenant's history of repeated defaults and rejected the argument that a civil court order suspended the tenant's legal obligation to pay rent.

Decision: The court upheld the lower authorities' findings that the tenant, by repeatedly and continuously defaulting, qualified as a habitual defaulter. The appeal was dismissed, with each party bearing its costs.

Facts:

On March 2, 1960, the respondent, a tailor, occupied premises in Delhi.

An arrangement between the landlord's father and the respondent led to litigation.

The trial court decreed in favor of the landlord in 1974; the appellate court reversed in 1979.

The High Court in 1991 modified the rent to Rs. 140 per month.

In 1992, the landlord issued a notice demanding rent from 1960 to 1992.

The tenant paid rent for three years before September 1992.

Issues:

The interpretation of "legally recoverable arrears of rent" and whether the arrears from 1960 to 1989 are barred by limitation.

Held:

The court determines that the arrears of rent became legally recoverable from the inception of the tenancy.

The court rejects the argument that rent only became due after the High Court determined the rent in 1991.

It holds that the cause of action to recover rent arose when the true state of affairs was declared by the court.

The court emphasizes that the appellant's attempt to circumvent the law rebounded against her.

Decision: The judgment of the High Court, dated November 28, 1996, is deemed legal. The appeal is dismissed, and there are no costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Nirmal Singh, was convicted for murder and attempted murder based on a shooting incident. The trial court awarded the death penalty, which was later commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court.

Issues:

Applicability and compliance with Section 299 CrPC for the use of witness statements in the absence of the accused.

Adequacy of evidence and procedural irregularities in the trial.

Held:

The court examined the compliance with Section 299 CrPC, focusing on the circumstances justifying the use of witness statements. While there was no explicit order by the trial judge, the High Court found evidence of the accused's absconding and the deaths of witnesses. The court held that the statements could be admitted as evidence.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant for offenses under Sections 302, 307 IPC, and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act.

Facts:

Raipur Development Authority (Appellant) vs. Anupam Sahkari Griha Nirman Samiti and Others (Respondent).

The case involves the quashing of a draft scheme for the development, published under Section 50(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Town and Country Development Act, 1973.

The respondent sought deemed permission under Section 30(5) of the Act, claiming the appellant's failure to communicate a decision on their application within 60 days.

The respondent purchased land based on a government policy encouraging housing societies.

Issues:

Validity of the deemed permission claimed by the respondent.

Timeliness of the draft scheme publication under Section 50(3).

Interpretation of Rule 18(2) regarding the simultaneous publication in the Gazette and local newspaper.

The necessity and legality of the application for a no objection certificate.

Held:

The court rejects the claim of deemed permission under Section 30(5), citing the closure of the case by the authority due to the respondent's failure to provide requested information.

The publication of the draft scheme is deemed valid within the two-year period from the date of the second declaration under Section 50(2).

Simultaneous publication in the Gazette and local newspaper is not mandatory for the validity of the draft scheme.

The rejection of the application for a no objection certificate is deemed lawful, considering the existence of the published development scheme.

Facts:

The case involved a heinous crime of rape committed by the respondent, a married man of 49 years, on a girl aged 7/8 years. The trial court imposed a sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment (R.I.), emphasizing the cruel nature of the act. However, the High Court reduced the sentence to 4 years R.I. citing factors such as the accused's social status, illiteracy, and family dependence.

Issues:

The appropriateness of the sentence imposed by the High Court, considering the gravity of the offense and the factors influencing the reduction of the sentence.

Held:

The court emphasized the duty of sentencing courts to operate the system judiciously, imposing sentences that act as deterrents for similar offenses.

Socio-economic status, religion, race, caste, or creed of the accused or the victim should not influence sentencing policy. The focus should be on the conduct of the accused, the age of the victim, and the gravity of the crime.

The court criticized the High Court's reasoning for reducing the sentence, stating that the factors presented were neither special nor adequate. The court held that mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would be a travesty of justice.

The sentence was enhanced from 4 years R.I. (as imposed by the High Court) to 10 years R.I. for the offense under Section 376 of the IPC. The fine and default clause were maintained.

Facts:

The prosecutrix, a 15-year-old girl, alleged rape by the accused-respondent.

Prosecution based on the victim's testimony, medical examination reports, and her father's account.

Trial court convicted the accused; High Court acquitted citing doubts about age, absence of injuries, and delay in lodging FIR.

Issues:

Validity of the High Court's interference with the trial court's judgment.

Examination of the prosecutrix's age and the relevance of consent.

Consideration of medical evidence, absence of injuries, and societal factors causing a delay in reporting.

Held:

The High Court erred in interfering; accused-respondent found guilty under Section 376 IPC.

Lack of visible injuries doesn't imply consent, especially considering the young age of the prosecutrix.

Sensitivity required in handling sexual assault cases; societal factors justify delay in reporting.

Decision: The appeal is allowed; the accused-respondent is sentenced to the period already undergone in jail, a fine, and further imprisonment in default of payment.