Electricity Law - Recovery of Arrears - Limitation – Disconnection-Limitation on Recovery of Arrears - Electricity Supply – Letters Patent Appeal challenging disconnection of electricity due to arrears under Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 – Held: PSPCL cannot disconnect electricity supply for arrears beyond two years from the date of first demand. Arrears prior to 07.11.2003 cannot be recovered through disconnection. The corporation can pursue other legal remedies for recovery. [Paras 8-15]

Plea of Limitation - Permissibility in Writ Proceedings – Analysis – Held: The plea of limitation, being purely legal, can be raised for the first time in writ proceedings, even if not raised in earlier civil suits or appeals. The limitation period under Section 56(2) began from the date of demand, i.e., 07.11.2005, limiting recovery to amounts due after 07.11.2003. [Para 8]

Alternative Remedy - Civil Suit Barred – Consideration – Held: The appellant initially filed a civil suit seeking to prevent disconnection and declare the supplementary demand illegal. The suit was barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as an alternative remedy was available before the Disputes Settlement Committee. [Para 4]

Decision: The appeal is allowed. PSPCL cannot recover arrears beyond 07.11.2003 through disconnection. The corporation can pursue other legal remedies for such recovery. PSPCL is directed to raise a supplementary demand from 07.11.2003 onwards. Any amount already paid by the appellant shall be adjusted against the balance amount due. [Paras 15-16]

Stamp Duty - Demand for Difference - Letters Patent Appeal under Section 47A - The appellant challenged the demand for the difference in stamp duty raised by the Collector without issuing a show-cause notice. The property was purchased as residential, but a complaint after five years claimed it was commercial, leading to a revised stamp duty demand. The Court held that the prescribed procedure under Section 47A and the relevant rules, which includes issuing a show-cause notice and conducting an inquiry with reasonable opportunity for the appellant to be heard, was not followed. The impugned orders were quashed, and liberty was given to the State to reissue notice following the proper procedure. [Paras 1-18]

Procedure for Assessment - Analysis - The Court emphasized the importance of following the prescribed procedure for assessing stamp duty, including the issuance of a show-cause notice and allowing the appellant to present evidence and contest the assessment. The lack of adherence to this procedure rendered the Collector's demand unsustainable. [Paras 10-13]

Decision - Quashing of Demand Notice - The Court quashed the orders passed by the authorities, including the Commissioner and the learned Single Judge, due to non-compliance with Section 47A and the relevant rules. The appeal was allowed, with directions for the State to follow the proper procedure if they wished to reassess the stamp duty. [Paras 17-18]

Reservation for Scheduled Castes - Public Employment - Scheduled Caste Certificate – Migration- Scheduled Caste Certificate - Validity Across States – Letters patent appeal challenging the denial of reservation benefits due to a Scheduled Caste certificate issued by the State of Haryana – Held: A resident of a particular state generally cannot claim reservation benefits in another state. However, given the historical context of Punjab and Haryana's partition, if a person belongs to a caste recognized as Scheduled Caste in both states, the authorities cannot insist on obtaining a certificate from Punjab alone. The concept of migration does not apply in this context. [Paras 1, 72]

Denial of Reservation Benefits - Constitutional Mandate – Analysis – Held: Denying the appellant the benefit of reservation on the grounds of the certificate being issued by Haryana defeats the constitutional provisions of Articles 16, 19, 340, and 341. The Balmiki caste is recognized as Scheduled Caste in both Punjab and Haryana, and the historical partition of Punjab supports the validity of Haryana-issued certificates for such purposes. [Paras 69-70, 72]

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order dated 20.02.2018 by the learned Single Judge in CWP No.3761 of 2014 is set aside. The respondents are directed to allow the appellant to join pursuant to the appointment order dated 16.03.2012 within six weeks and grant notional seniority and consequential benefits without monetary benefits from 16.03.2012. [Paras 73-74]

Sales Tax – Refund of Excess Tax – Unjust Enrichment – Appeal against the refusal of refund based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Held: The officer determining the refund amount cannot review or revise the assessment order but must respect it and only quantify the refund. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was entitled to a refund as per the assessment order. [Paras 1-12]

Refund Authority's Limits – The Court emphasized that the refund-determining officer's role is limited to quantifying the refund amount based on the assessment order and cannot exercise powers of review, appeal, or revision over the assessment. The impugned orders of the Excise and Taxation Commissioner and the Haryana Tax Tribunal were set aside. [Paras 7-9]

Precedents – Binding Nature – The Court relied on its previous ruling in M/s Raghbar Dass Hukam Chand v. State of Haryana, which established that the refund must follow the assessment order's findings, and any higher authority in the sales tax department cannot nullify the assessment in the guise of refund approval. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. [Paras 8-9]

Decision – Refund Granted – The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted a refund in accordance with the assessment order dated 11.02.2003 for the assessment year 1998-99. [Paras 11-12]

Criminal Revision Petition - Juvenile in conflict with law - Transfer of trial - Mental and physical capacity to commit the offense - Understanding of consequences - Compliance with Supreme Court's directions - Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.

Applicability of Juvenile Justice Act - Heinous offense - Age of the juvenile - Preliminary assessment of mental and physical capacity - Transfer of trial to Children's Court - Compliance with Supreme Court's directions - Adherence to legal provisions.

Detailed assessment - Mental age and intelligence functioning - Clinical assessment and psychological reports - Social Investigation Report - Absence of parental neglect or abuse - Family circumstances and socio-economic status.

Upholding previous decisions - Affirmation of Juvenile Justice Board's order - No illegality in the decision - Adherence to Supreme Court's directions - No interference warranted - Trial expedited.

Decision:

The Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed. The impugned order of the Juvenile Justice Board, which transferred the trial of the juvenile in conflict with law to the Children's Court, is upheld.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Acquittal – Appeal – The appellant's appeal against the judgment of acquittal was based on a statement made by the respondent agreeing to pay the disputed amount. Held: Such a statement cannot be considered a confession as it might have been made under duress or for other reasons. The appellant failed to provide evidence of goods supplied to the respondent or establish legal liability. Appeal dismissed. [Paras 1-15]

Confession and Legal Liability – Insufficient Evidence – The Court held that the respondent's statement to pay the amount does not constitute a confession of guilt. Additionally, the appellant did not produce account books or any other evidence to show that the goods were supplied and the cheques issued were in discharge of legal liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the Act was rebutted by the respondents. [Paras 11-12]

Defense Evidence – Handwriting Expert – The respondent presented a handwriting expert who confirmed that the disputed signatures on the cheques were forged. The respondent also provided evidence that she was not involved in the firm's operations during the relevant period, further weakening the appellant's case. [Paras 11-12]

Decision – Acquittal Upheld – The Court found that the findings of the trial court were well-reasoned and did not warrant interference. The appellant's application for leave to file an appeal was declined, and the appeal was dismissed. [Paras 13-15]

Criminal Law – Appeal against Conviction – Section 411 IPC – Appeal against conviction for the offence under Section 411 IPC. Appellant was convicted based on the recovery of Rs. 13,000, a photograph, and a bag. Held: In the absence of strong evidence, particularly the lack of proof that the appellant knew or had reason to believe the property was stolen, the conviction under Section 411 IPC cannot be sustained. Prosecution's evidence primarily relied on the disclosure statements of co-accused, which is insufficient. Appeal allowed, and conviction set aside. [Paras 1-18]

Knowledge of Stolen Property – Insufficient Evidence – The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant's knowledge or belief that the property in his possession was stolen, an essential ingredient for conviction under Section 411 IPC. The primary evidence was the disclosure statements of the co-accused, all of whom were acquitted, leaving the prosecution's case weak and unsubstantiated. [Paras 8-16]

Mens Rea and Disclosure Statements – Weak Evidence – The Court emphasized that mens rea, or the guilty mind, is crucial for proving an offence under Section 411 IPC. The disclosure statements of the co-accused do not provide sufficient proof of the appellant's knowledge that the property was stolen. [Para 11, 16]

Decision – Acquittal – The appeal was allowed, and the conviction under Section 411 IPC was set aside due to lack of evidence proving the appellant's knowledge of the stolen nature of the property. [Para 18]

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of Kalendra – Initiation of Proceedings – Petition challenging the initiation of proceedings by SHO for offences under Section 211 IPC. Held: The initiation by SHO violates mandatory provisions of Sections 195 and 340 Cr.P.C., rendering the prosecution and consequent proceedings void. Presentation of Kalendra barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. Petition allowed. [Paras 1-18]

Prosecution Bar – Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Section 195 Cr.P.C. mandates that for offences under Sections 193-196, 199, 200, 205-211, and 228 IPC related to court proceedings, a written complaint by the concerned court or an authorized officer is required. The initiation by the SHO without a court complaint is invalid, making the proceedings void. [Paras 7-13]

Limitation Period – Section 468 Cr.P.C. – The offence under Section 182 IPC, punishable by up to six months, has a one-year limitation period for taking cognizance. The Kalendra was presented more than three years after the alleged offence, making it time-barred. [Paras 14-15]

Decision – Quashing of Kalendra – The Court quashed the Kalendra and the summoning order due to non-compliance with Section 195 Cr.P.C. and the bar of limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. [Paras 16-17]

Family Pension - Right Under Statutory Rules – Deemed Option – The petitioner, whose husband died on 01.04.1994 while in service with the Municipal Council, Moga, was entitled to family pension under the Punjab Municipal Employees Pension and General Provident Fund Rules, 1994 – The petitioner’s husband did not exercise the option within the stipulated four months from the publication of the rules on 16.03.1994 – As per Rule 3(1)(c), he is deemed to have opted for the pension scheme – The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to family pension by virtue of the deeming clause. [Paras 1-14]

Application of Municipal Council Rules vs. Municipal Corporation Rules – The respondents applied the Punjab Municipal Corporation Employees Pension and General Provident Fund Rules, 1994, which were not applicable as the husband of the petitioner was governed by the Municipal Council rules – The impugned order was set aside as it was based on the wrong set of rules. [Paras 11-13]

Decision – Quashing of Impugned Order and Grant of Family Pension – The Court quashed the impugned order and directed the respondent corporation to grant family pension to the petitioner from the date of her husband’s death – The petitioner was also directed to deposit the employer’s share of CPF with interest, and the respondents were instructed to pay arrears of pension along with 8% interest per annum – Costs of Rs. 20,000 were awarded to the petitioner. [Paras 14-17]