Land Acquisition – Compensation – Co-sharers – Entitlement to Similar Compensation – Execution Petition – Execution petition filed by petitioner-landowner seeking compensation at par with co-sharers in acquired land was dismissed by the Executing Court solely on the ground that petitioner had not preferred any reference under Section 18 or 28-A of the Act – Held: The issue stands concluded by the Supreme Court in Ramphal & Ors. vs. Haryana State Industrial And Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 391-398 of 2026, decided on 13.01.2026), wherein co-sharers were held entitled to similar compensation as awarded to co-owners, though interest was restricted to five years reckoned backwards from the date of the Supreme Court's order – Impugned order set aside – Matter remitted for fresh adjudication [Paras 5–8].

Interest on Compensation – Restriction – Co-sharers entitled to compensation as determined under the award passed under Section 18 or as modified by the High Court or Supreme Court in appellate jurisdiction along with interest for a period of five years only reckoned backwards from the date of the Supreme Court's order in Ramphal's case – Not entitled to interest for any other period – Disbursement to be made within stipulated time frame – Default in adherence to timeline to attract interest at 9% per annum [Para 6].

Decision: Revision allowed – Impugned order dated 23.12.2025 set aside – Matter remitted to Executing Court for fresh adjudication – If petitioner found to be co-sharer in acquired land parcels, compensation with statutory benefits and interest to be released within time period stipulated in Ramphal's case.

Service Law – Pension – Counting of Past Service – Rule 26, M.P. Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 – Petitioner initially appointed with MPEB in 1981, subsequently appointed as Sub-Inspector in Police Department in 1988 after obtaining NOC from MPEB – Retired as Inspector in 2017 – Claim for counting past service with MPEB towards pension declined by District Pension Officer on the ground that Rule 26 does not cover service rendered with MPEB as it is not State Government service – Held: Service conditions of MPEB employees were determined by the State Government since the Board was constituted and its members appointed by the State Government under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and MPEB had power to frame service regulations – Objection of District Pension Officer overruled – Petitioner entitled to count service from 21/06/1981 to 15/01/1988 towards qualifying service – Petition allowed [Paras 9-19, 24].

Qualifying Service – Rule 3(p) – Scope and Construction – Rule 3(p) defines qualifying service as service under the State Government but its latter part extends it to service qualifying under any other order or rule in force – Cumulative reading makes clear that service rendered under any pensionable arrangement, including one governed by rules other than the 1976 Rules, qualifies – When pension rules are capable of more than one interpretation, courts must lean in favour of the employee [Paras 11-13, 17].

Prior Permission – NOC from Earlier Employer – Objection that petitioner did not take up subsequent appointment with prior permission of earlier employer – Rejected – NOC granted by MPEB on 13/11/1987 specifically stated no objection to petitioner's selection as Sub-Inspector – Application also forwarded through Board's authority – Petitioner served for about 30 years before retirement – Raising objection of absence of prior permission at this stage not permissible – Prior permission to be presumed unless State establishes contrary [Paras 20-23].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Objection raised by District Pension Officer overruled – Respondents including District Pension Officer, Shivpuri, directed to process petitioner's claim for counting service from 21/06/1981 to 15/01/1988 in pursuance of order dated 15/05/2018 [Para 24].

Service Law – Departmental Proceedings – Acquittal in Criminal Case – Effect on Disciplinary Action – Constable dismissed from service on charges of misconduct arising out of alleged involvement in narcotic trafficking under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C) and 29 of the NDPS Act – Criminal court acquitted the respondent recording categorical finding that prosecution failed to establish his involvement and that plea of alibi stood proved by cogent documentary and oral evidence – Disciplinary authority proceeded to dismiss despite acquittal, relying on same set of witnesses whose testimony was discarded by the criminal court – Single Judge set aside dismissal and directed reinstatement – Held: Where the foundation of the departmental proceedings rests on the same factual matrix as the criminal case and the same witnesses whose evidence was rejected by the criminal court form the basis of the inquiry, the departmental proceedings are based on "no evidence" and are unsustainable – Writ Appeal dismissed [Paras 3–21].

Plea of Alibi – Established by Cogent Evidence – Effect on Departmental Proceedings – Respondent established during criminal trial that on the date of alleged offence he was undergoing official training at Phulbani from 25.05.2015 to 30.05.2015 – Training records and testimony of D.W.1 accepted by the trial court – Criminal court recorded that respondent was not even present at the spot – Inquiry officer relied on the very same witnesses whose statements before the criminal court were rejected – Held: Once the plea of alibi is judicially accepted and attains finality, the entire genesis of the departmental charge stands washed away on facts – Departmental findings based on no evidence [Paras 17–20].

Judicial Review – Scope in Disciplinary Matters – Perversity of Findings – Appellants contended that the Single Judge exceeded permissible limits of judicial review by re-appreciating evidence – Held: High Court's interference was not by way of appellate re-appreciation but on the ground that the findings of the disciplinary authority were based on no evidence, being premised entirely on witnesses whose version stood judicially discredited – Interference was warranted and cannot be faulted on law or facts [Paras 13–14, 20].

Decision: Writ Appeal dismissed – Order of Single Judge setting aside dismissal and directing reinstatement with all consequential service and financial benefits upheld.

UAPA – Section 43-D(5) – Bail – Prima Facie Standard – Prolonged Incarceration – Article 21 – Appellants arrested between 21-22.10.2021 and in custody for over four years – Charged as OGWs and hybrid cadres for TRF, alleged to have shared extremist content, propagated IS ideology and attended radicalising lectures – Trial Court rejected bail in March 2023 – Charges framed in July 2024 under Sections 120B, 121A IPC and Section 18 UAPA; discharged of Sections 20, 38, 39 and 40 UAPA – Prosecution proposes to examine 359 witnesses, only 12 examined – Trial likely to take decades at present pace – Held: Appellants have met the test for bail as laid down in Gulfisha Fatima – Role attributed predominantly digital and non-violent – No allegation of creating groups or independently sharing content – Key prosecution witness X-8 failed to identify accused no. 14 before Trial Court – Continued detention disproportionate given the limited role attributed – Appeals allowed – Bail granted subject to stringent conditions [Paras 49-59].

Section 43-D(5) UAPA – Scope of Inquiry – Structured Test – The expression "prima facie true" mandates a threshold judicial inquiry, neither perfunctory nor adjudicatory – Inquiry is accused-specific and directed to individual role and attribution – Bail stage is not a forum for evaluating defences or conducting a mini-trial – Court must examine: (i) whether prosecution material discloses a prima facie case satisfying statutory ingredients; (ii) whether role attributed reflects a real and meaningful nexus to unlawful/terrorist activity as distinct from mere association or peripheral presence; and (iii) whether the statutory threshold is crossed qua the individual accused – Where requirements are not met, the embargo on bail stands lifted [Para 45].

Article 21 – Prolonged Pre-Trial Detention – Differentiated Inquiry – All accused cannot be treated identically irrespective of their roles – Conspiracy law explaining joint liability does not answer the separate question of how long each individual's liberty may be restrained before guilt is proved – Bail adjudication requires consideration of what is attributed to each accused, how that fits within statutory ingredients, and whether continued detention serves a legitimate purpose – Differentiation is not an exception to conspiracy law but a constitutional discipline imposed upon bail jurisdiction – Where prolonged custody disproportionately burdens those with limited roles, the balance between individual liberty and collective security may call for conditional release [Para 47].

Terrorist Activity – Ideological Alignment vs. Operational Participation – Possession of Extremist Digital Content – Sympathy for a cause or possession of literature and digital content associated with a banned organisation does not by itself constitute membership of such organisation or active participation in its terrorist activities, absent a demonstrated nexus to actual terrorist acts – Distinction between ideological alignment and operational participation is constitutionally significant – Material found on digital devices propagating anti-national content may not justify continuation of prolonged detention at trial stage where appellants are not alleged to be creators of such content or to have independently disseminated it [Para 53].

Bail Conditions – UAPA Matters – Bail granted subject to: personal bond of Rs. 50,000 with two sureties; no travel abroad without permission; surrender of passports; weekly attendance before SHO; no contact with witnesses; no joining of social media groups circulating anti-national material; no dissemination of such material; full cooperation with trial; no media comments – Health condition of appellant Haris Nisar Langoo (cervical spondylosis) noted as additional relevant factor though not independently decisive [Paras 56, 60].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned order of Special Court (NIA) dated 03.03.2023 set aside – Appellants directed to be released on bail subject to conditions specified – Observations not to be construed as expression on merits of the case [Paras 59-64].

Public Procurement – Tender Conditions – Geographical Restriction – RBSN Food Items Supply – Petitioners challenged Clause A(1) requiring bidders to own manufacturing unit in Uttar Pradesh prior to tender floating date as arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of Constitution – Respondents justified condition on grounds of timely supply, quality control, supervision, prevention of pilferage of subsidised raw materials (wheat and rice allocated by Government of India), short shelf life of three months, and compliance with Allahabad High Court directions in Shipra Devi case – Raw materials provided at subsidised rates on ex-godown basis from FCI depots in Uttar Pradesh – Held: Condition reasonable and not arbitrary – Formulation of tender conditions is prerogative of State – Courts interfere only if policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide – Physical supervision and inspection feasible when units located within State – Condition ensures permanency, timely delivery within 15 days of award, and uninterrupted supply to 16 million beneficiaries under National Food Security Act, 2013 [Paras 62-72]

Tender Conditions – Annual Turnover Requirement – Clause A(2) requiring minimum annual turnover of Rs.75 crores from THR supplies for each of last three financial years challenged as arbitrary – Total tender value approximately Rs.2,768 crores – State divided into 9 clusters with potential award of two clusters per bidder totaling approximately Rs.600 crores – Held: Turnover requirement rational and proportionate to ensure bidder possesses experience and financial capacity for large-scale uninterrupted supply – Not arbitrary or tailored to favour certain suppliers [Para 74]

Eligibility Criteria – Pending Litigation Disqualification – Clause A(12) disqualifying bidders with pending legal/criminal cases or disputes associated with THR supplies challenged as arbitrary and violating constitutional right to legal remedies – Petitioners had pending arbitration proceedings and recovery disputes with State of Uttar Pradesh – One petitioner had award in its favour with State having filed Section 34 petition – No blacklisting or debarment of petitioners – No adjudicated finding of deficiency against petitioners – Court observed prima facie merit in petitioners' submission that disqualification based solely on pendency without adjudicated findings of guilt or deficiency appears unjust – However issue became academic as petitioners failed to comply with mandatory Clause A(1) regarding manufacturing unit location [Paras 76-82]

Judicial Review – Tender Conditions – Scope of Interference – Courts cannot substitute their view for that of employer on what tender conditions should be – Courts interfere only if policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by bias – Tendering authority entitled to pragmatic adjustments based on particular circumstances – Greater latitude to be conceded to State authorities in formulating conditions for ensuring public welfare schemes – Public interest in timely fulfillment and quality of work must be safeguarded – Technical evaluation by courts impermissible – Principle of restraint to be followed when decision consonant with tender document purpose [Paras 71, 83]

General Financial Rules – Compliance – Petitioners challenged non-compliance with Rules 159, 160 and 161 of GFR 2017 regarding mandatory e-publishing on Central Public Procurement Portal and Government e-Marketplace – Court did not specifically adjudicate this challenge given dismissal on other grounds [Paras 19-21]

Decision: All three writ petitions dismissed – Tender conditions upheld as reasonable and not arbitrary – Pending applications also dismissed.

Contract Law – Government Contract – Delay in Performance – Extra Expenditure – Shared Responsibility – Plaintiff contracted for construction of MVIP Kuravilangad distributory; work delayed from agreed completion date of 07.10.2008 to actual completion on 31.07.2009 due to public agitation against blasting of rocks, Panchayat stop memo, police interference, and interim injunctions in OS 187/2008 and OS 231/2008 – Held: While plaintiff could not be wholly absolved of responsibility for delay, he could not be held solely responsible; defendants also failed to take any steps to ensure smooth execution of the work – On totality of facts, plaintiff entitled to one-half of extra expenditure assessed [Paras 8-9, 13].

Expert Report – Erroneous Calculation – Addition of Tender Excess to Market Rate – Expert assessed extra expenditure at market rates prevailing during 2008-09 but erroneously added 40% tender excess thereon; since the market rate already reflected the current period cost, addition of tender excess was impermissible – Decree of trial court based on such flawed calculation liable to modification [Para 10].

Supplemental Agreements – Execution Under Compulsion – Not Binding – Defendants relied on supplemental agreements wherein plaintiff undertook to carry out extended work at original contract rate – Trial court found that refusal to execute supplemental agreements would have resulted in termination of contract – Held: Agreements executed under compelling circumstances and threat of termination cannot be enforced to negate legitimate claims for additional expenditure incurred during extended period [Para 11].

Precedent Distinguished – General Manager, Northern Railway v. Sarvesh Chopra – Relied upon by defendants to contend contractor precluded from claiming enhanced rates after undertaking not to do so – Held: On facts of present case, pinning plaintiff to original 2004 schedule of rates for work completed during 2008-09 would be harsh and inequitable; judgment not applicable [Para 12].

Decision: Appeal allowed in part – Decree of trial court set aside and modified – Plaintiff entitled to realise ₹24,53,677/- (comprising ₹20,09,108/- being one-half of extra expenditure and ₹4,44,569/- retained amount) with interest at 6% per annum from date of suit till realisation – Plaintiff also entitled to proportionate costs throughout.

SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018 — Section 15A(3) — Mandatory Notice to Victim or Dependent — Bail Proceedings — Non-Compliance Renders Order Non-Est — Eight accused granted regular bail by Special Court after 25 to 43 days of custody in a case of mob lynching resulting in death of a Scheduled Caste member — Special Judge held that Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST (POA) Act would not attract as accused had no prior knowledge of victim's caste identity, and consequently dispensed with notice to victim's dependent — Held: When offences under the SC/ST (POA) Act are involved, even the question whether such offences attract or not cannot be decided unilaterally without issuing notice and hearing the victim or his dependent; issuance of notice under Section 15A(3) is mandatory in all proceedings under the Act including bail proceedings — Common order passed without hearing dependent of deceased is non-est in law and liable to be set aside [Paras 11–15].

BNS, 2023 — Section 103(2) — Mob Lynching — Graver Offence — New Provision — Section 103(2) of BNS, 2023 is a new provision introduced to address the menace of mob lynching; where murder is committed by a group of five or more persons acting in concert on grounds of race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language or personal belief, each member is liable to death or imprisonment for life — Legislature intended this offence to be treated as more serious than ordinary murder under Section 103(1) [Para 16].

Bail Cancellation — Premature Grant — Habitual Offenders — Mechanical Approach of Special Judge — Prima facie case of mob lynching at a primitive stage of investigation — Accused Nos. 1 to 5 and 9 are habitual offenders with multiple criminal antecedents — Special Judge granted bail mechanically without considering: (i) availability of police custody during initial 60 days under Section 187 BNSS; (ii) statutory presumption of knowledge of caste identity under Section 8(c) of SC/ST (POA) Act; and (iii) adverse impact of premature bail on investigation — Held: Grant of bail was unsustainable; cancellation warranted [Para 17].

Mob Lynching — Constitutional Values — Rule of Law — Apex Court in Tehseen S. Poonawalla observed that lynching is an affront to the rule of law and constitutional values; vigilantism undermines State institutions and, unless controlled, may lead to anarchy — State has a sacrosanct duty to protect citizens and curb such incidents — Hate crimes born of intolerance and prejudice cannot be tolerated [Para 16].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Common order granting bail to respondent Nos. 1 to 8 set aside — Bail bonds cancelled — Respondents directed to surrender before jurisdictional court within three days — On failure to surrender, Investigating Officer at liberty to arrest — Respondents at liberty to file fresh bail applications; Special Court to adjudicate after providing notice and hearing to dependent of victim in compliance with Section 15A(3) of SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018.

Crininal Law – Murder – Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC – Culpable Honicide Not Anounting to Murder – Sudden Fight – Appellants convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC for death of deceased caused by axe blow to the head during a dispute over stone-pelting on the previous night – Counter-case lodged by accused against deceased on the same day, and evidence of accused Prafulla having sustained injuries, lent weight to the defence plea of mutual assault – No pre-planned notive established; assault arose suddenly in the heat of the nonent during altercation – Held: Case squarely falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC; conviction of accused Prafulla nodified fron murder to culpable honicide not anounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC; sentenced to 7 years rigorous inprisonment with set-off [Paras 13, 15, 18–20].

Evidence – Onission in FIR – Names of Co-Accused Absent – Subsequent Inplication Doubtful – Informant/P.W.1 named only accused Prafulla in the written FIR and in his statement under Section 161 CrPC recorded on the very next day; names of accused Pratap and Pankaj conspicuously absent – In court, informant inproved upon original version to inplicate them – I.O. admitted the onission – Held: Onission of inportant facts affecting probabilities of the case is relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act; in absence of cogent explanation, subsequent inplication of co-accused is doubtful and cannot be accepted [Paras 16–17].

Defence Evidence – Standard of Appreciation – Preponderance of Probability – Trial court discarded defence evidence on surmises and conjectures without cogent reasons – Held: Defence evidence is to be appreciated on the principle of preponderance of probability and not on the strict standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt; court must consider whether a plausible defence has been made out – Counter-case and injury to accused Prafulla ought to have been given due inportance [Para 15].

Witness Credibility – P.W. 2 – Spot Map Discrepancy – P.W. 2 clained to be an eye-witness brushimg his teeth in front of his house when the assault took place – Spot map (Exhibit 9) showing all 14 house owners in the locality does not include the house of P.W. 2 – Held: His presence as an eye-witness becones doubtful and his testinony cannot be relied upon as that of an eye-witness [Para 11].

Weapon Discrepancy – Tangia vs. Farsa – Witnesses stated a Tangia was used; weapon sent for medical examination described as Farsa – Doctor described weapon as "Tangia (Farsa)" in Exhibit 4; I.O. also described M.O.1 as Tangia in Exhibit 6 – Held: Both Tangia and Farsa are sharp cutting weapons; discrepancy not material enough to discredit the prosecution evidence of assault by a sharp cutting weapon [Para 12].

Decision: Appeal allowed in part – Accused Pankaj and Pratap acquitted; bail bonds discharged – Accused Prafulla's conviction nodified fron Section 302/34 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC; sentenced to 7 years rigorous inprisonment with set-off – Bail bonds of accused Prafulla cancelled; to be taken into custody forthwith.

Property Law – Title by Sale Deed – Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet – Validity of Successive Transfers – Appellant claimed 1/3rd share in suit land on the basis of a sale deed dated 08.12.2000 executed by Harjinder Kaur, who had purchased from Baldev Singh – First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of revenue records and prior sale deeds, found that Baldev Singh had already alienated 14 kanals 13 marlas out of his total share and retained only about 8–8½ marlas at the time of the impugned sale – Held: A vendor cannot convey a better title than he himself possesses; plaintiff's claim to 2 kanals 15 marlas based on a sale deed executed beyond the vendor's remaining share is not sustainable [Paras 7-8].

Mutation Entries – Evidentiary Value – Fiscal Entry Only – Contention that sanctioned mutation in favour of appellant conferred valid title – Held: Mutation does not confer title and is merely a fiscal entry for revenue purposes; the same cannot be treated as proof of ownership [Para 9].

Non-Joinder of Necessary Parties – Suit for Declaration – Other Vendees from Common Vendor – Plaintiff sought declaration regarding specific khasra numbers forming part of a joint holding without impleading other co-sharers and vendees whose rights were directly affected – Held: Any declaration in their absence would cast a cloud on their title and lead to multiplicity of litigation; suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties [Para 10].

Second Appeal – Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC – Substantial Question of Law – Findings of First Appellate Court based on proper appreciation of documentary evidence including certified copies of earlier sale deeds, sanctioned mutations and jamabandis – Findings neither perverse nor based on misreading of evidence – Held: No substantial question of law arises; no interference warranted [Para 11].

Decision: Regular Second Appeal dismissed – Judgment and decree dated 04.10.2017 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Moga affirmed.