Motor Vehicles – Seizure – Authority – Competent Officer – Power to seize or detain a motor vehicle is vested only in officers of the Motor Vehicles Department not below the rank of Inspector of Motor Vehicles or officers of the Police Department not below the rank of Inspector of Police — Vehicle in question was seized by one Mr Ranjit, an officer posted at the Bangalore South office who was only part of a Special Checking Squad constituted under the supervision of the Regional Transport Officer, Mysore West — Official memorandum (Annexure R-11) only assigned the officer a limited duty of submitting a report and did not confer upon him independent statutory powers of seizure — Held: Officer acted beyond the scope of his authority — Seizure without jurisdiction and declared illegal [Paras 9, 11].

Statutory Power – Specific Officer – Delegation – Settled principle of law that when a statute confers a specific power upon a designated class of officers, the same cannot be exercised by any other person not expressly authorised — Any action taken in violation of such statutory limitation is liable to be treated as illegal and unsustainable — Scope of assignment was limited to investigation and reporting — Held: Action of seizure clearly exceeded the scope of authority [Para 9].

Registration Cancellation – Pendency of Writ Petition – Sub Judice – Conduct of respondent authorities in cancelling the vehicle's registration on 16.01.2026 during the pendency of the writ petition amounts to a flagrant disregard for Court proceedings — Any precipitative action by authorities affecting the subject matter of a writ petition once the Court has seized of the matter is wholly unwarranted — Held: Cancellation of registration during pendency of writ petition is legally untenable and cannot be sustained — Order of cancellation deserves to be set aside [Para 10].

RTO Officials – Public Duty – Officials of the RTO Department are not merely enforcers of statutory provisions but representatives of the State in their dealings with citizens — Their conduct has a direct bearing on public confidence in governance — They are expected to act with fairness, transparency, empathy, and a high sense of public duty [Para 12].

Decision: Writ petition allowed — Impugned Investigation Report (Annexure-A) quashed — Order dated 16.01.2026 cancelling Registration Certificate quashed — RTO directed to restore registration of vehicle forthwith — Respondent authorities directed to release and hand over vehicle to petitioner forthwith — No order as to costs.

Constitutional Law – Article 21 – Writ Jurisdiction – Compensation for Negligent Death – Three minor children of the petitioner drowned in the forebay tank of the Chenani Hydel Project on 09.06.2008 — tank contained deep water with steep plastered slopes and was secured only by a parapet wall of two feet in height — petitioner alleged gross negligence of respondent authorities in failing to provide adequate fencing or protective barriers — respondents denied negligence and raised preliminary objection that writ petition was not maintainable as disputed questions of fact were involved — Held: Where negligence or inaction of State authorities results in deprivation of life, writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is fully available and the alternative remedy of a civil suit does not operate as a bar [Paras 25–28].

Tort Law – Res Ipsa Loquitur – Hazardous Installation – Negligence of State Authorities – Respondents' own admission that only a two-feet parapet wall existed around a hazardous reservoir constituted admission of foundational facts — no disputed question of fact survived for civil trial — drowning of three minor children in a reservoir maintained by respondents raises a presumption of negligence that the respondents failed to rebut by placing cogent material — a parapet wall of two feet cannot by any standard constitute an adequate safeguard against accidental entry into a deep water reservoir — Held: Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur squarely applicable; respondents clearly negligent [Paras 29–35].

Constitutional Law – Article 21 – Tender Age – Contributory Negligence Cannot Be Attributed to Children – Respondents sought to attribute negligence to parents for lack of supervision — children of tender age are incapable of appreciating risk and the law expects a higher degree of care from those maintaining dangerous premises in areas where presence of children is foreseeable — doctrine of contributory negligence cannot ordinarily be invoked against children of tender age — Held: Attempt to shift blame onto parents or deceased children is neither legally sustainable nor morally tenable [Paras 37–42].

Constitutional Law – Directive Principles – Duty of State to Safeguard Life – Articles 38, 39(e)(f) and 47 of the Constitution cast a corresponding obligation upon the State to secure and protect the lives of its citizens — failure to adopt adequate precautions around hazardous installations constitutes a breach of constitutional duty — State bears strict liability where its action or inaction results in infringement of the right to life — compensation in public law is not intended to value human life but to provide solace and enforce constitutional obligations [Paras 43–55].

Compensation – Quantum – Multiplier Method Inapplicable – Uniform Award – Deceased were minor children with no independent source of income and assessment of future earnings would be wholly speculative — application of the multiplier method would result in variation of compensation among similarly placed claimants whereas pain and suffering of parents remains the same — Held: Multiplier method inappropriate; just, fair and reasonable compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- per deceased child (total Rs. 6,00,000/-) awarded as a public law remedy [Paras 49–53, 67].

Decision: Writ petition allowed — Respondents directed to pay compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- per deceased child, totalling Rs. 6,00,000/-, within eight weeks — Respondents further directed to take immediate steps to ensure proper fencing, installation of warning signboards and adequate safeguarding of the forebay tank and all similar hazardous installations — Chief Secretary of the Union Territory directed to formulate a comprehensive policy for safety measures around reservoirs, water bodies and other hazardous installations.

Service Law – Dismissal from Service – CRPF – Absence of Departmental Enquiry – Petitioners, Constables (GD) in the 39th Battalion CRPF, dismissed w.e.f. 09.11.2009 by invoking Section 11 of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27-CC(ii) of the CRPF Rules, 1955, on the basis of FIR No. 12/2009 for offences under Sections 147, 148, 294, 506-B and 307 IPC – Disciplinary authority formed opinion that regular departmental enquiry was not reasonably practicable and no enquiry was held – No witness examined, no opportunity of hearing granted – Held: Procedure under Section 11 of the CRPF Act read with Rule 27-CC(ii) of the CRPF Rules not followed in its true spirit – Impugned orders of dismissal, appeal and revision set aside [Paras 3, 6, 11].

Natural Justice – Major Penalty – Mandatory Procedural Safeguards – Removal from service entails serious civil consequences – Delinquent employee must be afforded adequate opportunity at every stage including show cause notice, framing of charges, supply of documents, examination of evidence and cross-examination – Mere assertion that witnesses were unwilling to depose cannot justify dispensing with a full-fledged enquiry – Satisfaction recorded by disciplinary authority not supported by cogent or compelling material – Held: Imposition of major penalty without proper enquiry and reasonable opportunity of hearing cannot be sustained [Paras 12, 16, 21].

Criminal Acquittal – Effect on Departmental Action – Petitioners convicted under Section 323 IPC by Trial Court – Conviction set aside in Criminal Appeal No. 744/2012 vide judgment dated 15.05.2014 by this Court on benefit of doubt – Judgment of acquittal attained finality – Though departmental and criminal proceedings operate in distinct spheres, once departmental enquiry itself was not conducted in accordance with law and criminal conviction also did not survive, foundation of impugned dismissal becomes unsustainable – Held: Basis of dismissal ceased to exist [Paras 13, 14, 22].

Discrimination – Similarly Situated Employees – Reinstatement – Co-delinquents dismissed by same order dated 09.11.2009 and subsequently acquitted were reinstated in service – Denial of same benefit to present petitioners whose conviction was also set aside amounts to manifest arbitrariness and hostile discrimination – Violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India – Held: Discriminatory treatment not justified [Paras 15, 23].

Relief – Reinstatement – Back Wages – Petitioners entitled to reinstatement in service – However, back wages denied having regard to long period during which petitioners remained out of service – Period from date of removal till reinstatement to be treated as service for all other purposes including continuity of service and retiral benefits – No order as to costs [Paras 25, 26, 27, 28].

Decision: Writ petitions allowed — Orders of removal from service, appellate and revisional orders quashed — Petitioners directed to be reinstated in service — Back wages denied — Period of absence to count for continuity of service and retiral benefits.

Service Law — Recruitment — Denial of Appointment — Pending Criminal Case — Truthful Disclosure — Petitioner selected for the post of Junior Assistant through U.P. Subordinate Services Selection Commission and allotted to Department of Cane and Sugar — Appointment denied solely on ground of pendency of a criminal case under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act — Case registered primarily against petitioner's elder brother (main accused) arising out of a matrimonial dispute; petitioner implicated as co-accused with only general and sweeping allegations of dowry demand without specific role attributed — Petitioner had truthfully disclosed the pendency of the case in terms of Clauses 15(9) and 15(14) of the advertisement — No other adverse material found against the petitioner — Held: Pendency of a criminal case based on general allegations arising out of a matrimonial dispute does not constitute a valid ground to deny appointment — Impugned order quashed — Appointment directed subject to outcome of criminal trial [Paras throughout].

Avtar Singh v. Union of India — Guidelines — Pending Criminal Cases at Stage of Recruitment — Where candidate has truthfully disclosed pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, the employer may in its discretion appoint the candidate subject to the decision of such case — Employer's right to consider antecedents does not translate into an automatic bar on appointment in every case of pending criminal proceedings — Youthful indiscretions and minor offences ought not to result in branding a person as a criminal for life — Approach should be reformative rather than punitive — Minor infractions, particularly those arising from personal or family circumstances, deserve to be condoned rather than resulting in lifelong adverse consequences — Offences alleged in the present case, though cognizable, do not in the facts of the case appear to be of such gravity as to render petitioner unsuitable for public employment [Para 38.6 of Avtar Singh guidelines].

Decision: Writ petition allowed — Impugned order dated 06.07.2020 quashed — Respondent No. 2 directed to issue appointment letter to petitioner forthwith — Appointment subject to outcome of the criminal trial/appeal, if any.

Family Law – Alienation of minor's undivided interest in joint family property – Requirement of Court's permission – Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Sections 6, 8 and 12 – Appellant-mother sought permission to sell minor daughter's 1/4th share in undivided joint family property for her higher education – Lower court appointed her guardian but refused permission to sell – Held: Under Section 12, no guardian can be appointed for a minor's undivided interest in joint family property if it is under the management of an adult member – Father having died, the mother is the adult member managing the joint family property and the natural guardian under Section 6 – Restrictions under Section 8(2) do not apply to the fluctuating undivided interest of a minor in joint family property managed by an adult member – Mother is competent to sell the minor's share for legal necessity and welfare – Refusal of permission by the lower court is unsustainable [Paras 26–29, 34–36].

Family Law – Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Section 12 – Interpretation of "adult member" – Held: The adult member of the family managing the joint Hindu family property may be either male or female, not necessarily the Karta – Mother, being an adult female member in management of the joint family property after the death of the father, is fully competent to manage and deal with the undivided interest of the minor – Minor being a Hindu and having an interest in undivided joint family property is protected by the management of the mother – Lower court's order set aside and permission granted for the welfare of the minor [Paras 27, 31–36].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and order dated 17.07.2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge is set aside – Prayer of the appellant to sell the minor's undivided share for her higher education is granted.

Maintenance – Divorced Wife – Section 125 CrPC – Revision – Petitioner-husband, employed as Assistant Manager in State Bank of India drawing a monthly salary of Rs.60,000/-, challenged the Family Court's order granting maintenance of Rs.10,000/- per month to the opposite party-wife from 22.12.2017 along with Rs.3,000/- as litigation expenses – The marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce passed by Family Court, Nellore vide judgment dated 21.12.2010 – The divorced wife claimed maintenance as a divorcee under the Explanation to Section 125 CrPC, which expressly includes a divorced woman who has not remarried within the definition of "wife" – Held: The contentions raised stand authoritatively covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Rajnesh v. Neha; petitioner directed to file affidavit regarding securing the maintenance amount [Paras 5, 7, 8, 10].

Section 125 CrPC – Wife Earning Income – Not a Bar to Maintenance – It is well settled that merely because the wife is capable of earning or is actually earning does not operate as a bar to her claim for maintenance – The court must determine whether the wife's income is sufficient to enable her to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in the matrimonial home – No oral or documentary evidence was adduced by the husband before the Family Court to prove the wife's alleged income of Rs.6,00,000/- per annum – Reliance placed on Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 [Paras 7, 8].

Maintenance – Date of Award – From Date of Application – As authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha, maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is to be awarded from the date of filing of the application in all cases – The right to claim maintenance must date back to the date of filing as the period of pendency is not within the control of the applicant – Family Court's direction to pay maintenance from 22.12.2017 (date of application) is consistent with this settled position [Para 8, Para 109 of Rajnesh v. Neha].

Procedural Direction – Security for Maintenance Amount – In light of the observations in Rajnesh v. Neha that the amount directed under Section 125 CrPC is in the nature of a money decree, the petitioner-husband is directed to file an affidavit indicating whether and how he proposes to secure the maintenance amount directed by the Family Court – Matter listed for fresh admission in the week commencing 20.04.2026 [Paras 10, 11].

Decision: Matter adjourned — Petitioner directed to file affidavit regarding securing the maintenance amount — Listed for fresh admission in the week commencing 20.04.2026.

Civil Law – Preliminary Issues – Order XIV Rule 2 CPC – Discretionary Nature – Post-1976 Amendment – Suit for cancellation of Will instituted in 2006 – Issues framed in December 2008 – Plaintiff's evidence substantially recorded – Application by defendant filed in July 2025 to decide issues of limitation and bar under Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act as preliminary issues – Held: After the 1976 Amendment, Rule 2 of Order XIV is no longer mandatory – The word "shall" of the unamended rule has been replaced by "may," making it discretionary for the court to decide issues of jurisdiction or bar to suit as preliminary issues – Only issues of law which do not require inquiry into facts can be tried as preliminary issues – Plea of limitation being a mixed question of fact and law cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts – Application filed after 18 years is not bona fide – Direction to decide all issues simultaneously at the time of final decision issued [Paras 4–23].

Preliminary Issue – Limitation – Mixed Question of Law and Fact – A plea of limitation cannot be decided as a preliminary issue as the starting point of limitation is entirely a question of fact requiring evidence – Where the decision on an issue of law depends upon decision of facts, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue – Court has no jurisdiction to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues [Paras 17–18].

Bona Fides – Belated Application – Where defendant chose not to press for decision of issues as preliminary issues for 18 years from the date of framing of issues, and the application was filed only after substantial recording of plaintiff's evidence, such application cannot be regarded as bona fide – It would be appropriate for the court below to consider and decide all issues simultaneously at the time of final decision [Paras 21–23].

Decision: Petition disposed of – Trial court directed to decide all issues framed in Original Suit No. 859 of 2006 simultaneously – Trial court to endeavour to decide the suit expeditiously, preferably within one year from production of certified copy of this order.

POCSO – Gang Rape of Minor – Suspension of Sentence – Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. – Post-Conviction Stage – Presumption of Innocence Not Available – The appellant was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 376(DA) IPC and Section 6 POCSO Act for gang rape of a minor victim – A previous application for suspension of sentence (I.A. No. 1464 of 2023) had already been rejected by this Court on 17.10.2023 after considering the consistent testimony of the victim (PW-1) and her corroborative statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. – In the second application, the appellant reiterated the same grounds and claimed parity with co-convicts who were subsequently granted bail vide order dated 18.11.2025 – Held: At the post-conviction stage of suspension of sentence, the presumption of innocence does not arise and the principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception is not attracted – The Court is required to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal coupled with other factors and there must be strong and compelling reasons for grant of bail which must be recorded in the order as mandated under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. – Detailed reappreciation of evidence is not required and the Court should not try to pick up lacunae in the prosecution case [Paras 42–44].

Suspension of Sentence – Parity with Co-Convicts – Not Available as a Matter of Right – Wrong Order Cannot Be Perpetuated – Article 14 – The co-convicts were initially refused suspension of sentence vide order dated 06.03.2024 and thereafter granted bail vide order dated 18.11.2025 by a co-ordinate Bench which took a different view on different facts including the FSL report not establishing rape and the victim's contradictory stand on relationship with the accused – Held: Parity is focused on the role played by the accused and cannot be utilized solely because another accused person was granted bail in the same offence – Parity cannot be claimed as a matter of right – Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or irregularity and if a benefit has been conferred on an individual without legal justification, others cannot claim the same on that basis – This Court is not sitting in appeal over the co-ordinate Bench's order but the basis on which suspension was granted to co-convicts was different on facts and cannot be imported to the present application [Paras 33–41].

Suspension of Sentence – Long Period of Custody – Not Sole Ground for Suspension of Life Sentence – The appellant contended that he had been in judicial custody for approximately five years and this fact alone justified suspension of sentence – Held: Period of custody cannot be the sole ground for suspending sentence and must be considered coupled with the attributability of the accused as found and substantiated in the trial – In cases of life imprisonment, mere factual incarceration for a period and likelihood of delay in disposal cannot be a reason for invocation of power under Section 389 Cr.P.C. without reference to relevant factors – The nature of the offence, the manner of commission, the gravity of the offence, and desirability of releasing the convict must be considered objectively – In heinous crimes such as gang rape on a minor, the period of custody cannot override the gravity of offence as established at trial [Paras 45–53].

Decision: I.A. No. 1770 of 2026 dismissed — Prayer for suspension of sentence rejected — Observations not to prejudice the parties on merits of the pending appeal.

Service Law – Departmental Proceedings – Acquittal in Criminal Trial – Plea of Alibi Established – Dismissal Based on No Evidence – The respondent-constable was dismissed from service vide order dated 05.07.2022 by the Superintendent of Police, Kandhamal following departmental inquiry into alleged involvement in narcotic trafficking under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C)/29 of the NDPS Act, arising out of Kandhamal Sadar P.S. Case No.68/2015 – The criminal trial before the Addl. Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Phulbani concluded in acquittal vide judgment dated 26.11.2018 under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C., with the court categorically holding that the respondent had successfully established his plea of alibi through training records and supporting testimony showing his presence at an official training programme from 25.05.2015 to 30.05.2015 – The departmental inquiry was founded on the same factual matrix and the same set of witnesses whose testimony was discarded by the criminal court – Held: Where the plea of alibi is established and believed by the criminal court and has attained finality, the entire genesis of the departmental case is washed away on facts and the departmental proceedings and their conclusion must be treated as based on "no evidence" – Dismissal order unsustainable [Paras 17–20].

Criminal Proceedings vs. Departmental Proceedings – Identity of Witnesses and Evidence – Effect of Acquittal – The inquiry officer examined ASI-A.K. Behera, ASI-J.K. Digal, S.I.-B.P. Rout, Havildar-K.C. Nayak, Havildar-P. Malik and Havildar-T.R. Naik, who were the same witnesses examined as P.Ws.2, 3, 4, 10, 13 and 14 respectively before the trial court – The versions of these witnesses before the inquiry officer and the trial court showed no variation – Despite such identity, the trial court discarded their testimony and returned a finding of acquittal based on the alibi plea – Held: Where there is complete identity of the evidence base and the criminal court has judicially discarded the same evidence, departmental findings founded on such evidence cannot be sustained – The acquittal in this case was not merely technical but based on failure of the prosecution to establish involvement [Paras 17–20].

Scope of Judicial Review – Writ Jurisdiction – Limitation – Perversity – The State urged that the Single Judge exceeded the permissible limits of writ jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence and substituting findings of the disciplinary authority – Held: Interference by the High Court in writ jurisdiction is warranted where findings are based on no evidence, are perverse or where natural justice is violated – In the present case, since the departmental action rested on the same discarded evidence with no independent material, the Single Judge's intervention was within the proper bounds of judicial review and not an impermissible appellate exercise [Paras 13–14, 20].

Decision: Writ appeal dismissed – Judgment of the Single Judge affirmed – Respondent entitled to reinstatement with all consequential service and financial benefits.