Criminal Law - NIA Act – Section 21 – Appeal against order framing charge – Maintainability – Held: order framing charge is interlocutory for purposes of appeal under NIA Act – appeals dismissed as not maintainable – remedy lies under Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS [Paras 1–20].

Criminal Procedure – National Investigation Agency Act – Section 21 – Appeal – Scope – Expression “judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order” – Interpreted in light of scheme and object of NIA Act – Held: “order” refers to final orders capable of appellate scrutiny on facts and law – Not intermediate orders such as framing of charge [Paras 15–18].

Charge – Framing of – Nature of order – Though treated as “intermediate order” for purposes of revision under Section 397 CrPC, such classification not applicable while interpreting appellate provision under Section 21 NIA Act – Order framing charge does not finally determine rights and proceedings continue till conviction or acquittal – Hence interlocutory for appeal under NIA Act [Paras 11–12, 16–18].

Statutory Interpretation – Purposeful interpretation – NIA Act enacted to ensure expeditious investigation and trial of scheduled offences affecting national security – Bar on revisions and limited appellate remedy intended to avoid delay – Permitting appeals against charge-framing orders would defeat legislative intent [Paras 13–16].

Appeal vs. Revision – Distinction – Jurisprudence on “intermediate orders” developed in context of revisional jurisdiction under CrPC (Amar Nath; Madhu Limaye) – Same concept cannot be bodily imported into appellate jurisdiction providing appeal “on facts and law” – At stage of charge, factual adjudication impermissible [Paras 8–12, 16].

Remedy of Accused – Availability – Though appeal under Section 21 NIA Act not maintainable, accused not remediless – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS remains available to challenge framing of charge on limited grounds of abuse of process, lack of jurisdiction or manifest injustice [Paras 16–18].

Precedent – V.C. Shukla v. State – Constitution Bench – Order framing charge held interlocutory under Special Courts Act – Principles applied while interpreting Section 21 NIA Act – Appeal against charge-framing order not envisaged [Paras 11–12].

Decision: Appeals dismissed on ground of maintainability – All pending applications disposed of [Paras 19–20].

Service Law – Recruitment to Ashram Hostels – Advisory Committee – Chairman and Convener – Recruitment Notification dated 07.01.2025 issued by Chairman-cum-Convener of Block Level Advisory Committee under Resolution dated 11.12.2006 – Petitioner contended that as per later order dated 18.12.2024, Headmaster/Teacher-in-Charge should act as Member-Convener – Held: Recruitment process having commenced pursuant to policy direction dated 11.03.2024 relying on Resolution of 2006, subsequent modification in constitution of Advisory Committee would not invalidate recruitment already initiated [Paras 10–12].

Administrative Law – Change of Policy – Prospective Operation – Modification of Advisory Committee composition by order dated 18.12.2024 cannot retrospectively affect recruitment process already set in motion under prevailing policy – State authorities justified in continuing recruitment under earlier framework [Paras 10–11].

Recruitment Process – No Prejudice to Candidates – Petitioner neither participated in selection process nor demonstrated any change in eligibility criteria or prejudice caused due to Chairman acting as Convener – Mere technical objection regarding authority issuing notification insufficient to vitiate recruitment [Paras 13–14].

Tribal Welfare – Preference to Candidates Familiar with Tribal Ethos – Guidelines – Letter dated 18.06.2025 regarding preference to candidates acquainted with tribal language, culture and milieu issued after publication of recruitment notice – Held: Subsequent advisory guidelines cannot nullify completed selection process when no participating candidate has challenged the same [Para 11].

Judicial Review – Limited Interference – High Court reiterated that courts should not interfere with recruitment processes conducted transparently and in accordance with prevailing policy unless arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of statutory provisions is established – No such infirmity found in present case [Paras 12–14].

Decision – Writ petition dismissed – Recruitment process upheld – Direction issued to Headmaster, Paramanandapur Jagannath Institution to allow selected candidate (respondent no. 10) to join forthwith [Para 14].

Arbitration – Jurisdiction – Statutory Arbitration – National Highways Act – Section 3-G(5), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 42 – Petitioner NHAI contended that Section 34 petition filed by landowners challenging award of arbitrator should lie before District Judge, Mandi, as arbitrator was Divisional Commissioner, Mandi – Held: Notification under Section 3-G(5) merely specifies territorial jurisdiction of arbitrator and does not designate “seat” of arbitration – Office location or venue of hearings at Mandi does not ipso facto constitute seat of arbitration – Neither parties nor arbitrator fixed seat – In absence of designated seat, court where first application under Part I was filed (Bilaspur) would have exclusive jurisdiction under Section 42 – District Judge Bilaspur rightly retained jurisdiction [Paras 11–16, 22–23].

Arbitration – Seat vs Venue – Interpretation of “Place” under Section 20 – Juridical Seat – Mandi not fixed as seat – Mere fact that arbitrator holds office or conducts hearings in Mandi does not confer status of “seat” – Reference made to Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium and BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC – Held: Seat of arbitration is the legal anchor of arbitration, and once chosen, confers exclusive jurisdiction – In present case, no agreement or determination regarding seat made – Thus, “Mandi” was only the venue and not the seat of arbitration [Paras 12–16].

Arbitration – Section 42 – First Application Rule – Exclusive Jurisdiction – Where Section 34 petition filed first – Respondents (landowners) filed Section 34 petitions before District Judge, Bilaspur prior in time to petitions filed by NHAI before District Judge, Mandi – As per Section 42, once an application is made in a “court” under Part I of the Act, that court alone has jurisdiction for all subsequent applications – Held: Bilaspur court has exclusive jurisdiction – Petitions by NHAI seeking transfer to Mandi court are devoid of merit [Paras 17–23].

Arbitration – Court under Section 2(1)(e) – Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction – Applicability of Section 42 – District Judge, Bilaspur is a “court” under Section 2(1)(e) – Once Section 34 application was validly filed there, no subsequent application could be filed before Mandi court – Petitioner’s Section 34 application before Mandi filed after respondents’ application in Bilaspur – Held: District Judge Bilaspur had valid and exclusive jurisdiction [Paras 21–23].

National Highways Act – Section 3-G Arbitration – Applicability of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 3-G(6) expressly applies Arbitration Act, 1996 to arbitrations under National Highways Act – Section 2(4) of Arbitration Act also deems statutory arbitrations under any enactment, including National Highways Act, to be governed by Part I of the Arbitration Act – Hence, Section 34 and Section 42 apply in full to such statutory arbitrations [Paras 2–7].

Decision: All petitions dismissed – Impugned order dated 28.06.2025 passed by District Judge, Bilaspur upheld – District Judge, Bilaspur has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide all applications arising out of the arbitral proceedings – Mandi court has no jurisdiction in view of first application rule under Section 42 – Miscellaneous applications also dismissed. [Para 24]

Real Estate – RERA Registration – Ongoing vs. Completed Project – Completion Certificate Issued Pre-RERA – Appellant’s project had received a valid completion certificate on 17 March 2015 – Tribunal wrongly held project as ongoing due to absence of fire safety certificate – Held: Under Regulation 67 of BDA Regulations, fire NOC suffices at completion stage – Completion certificate valid – Project not registrable under RERA [Paras 10–19]

Statutory Interpretation – Completion Certificate vs. Occupancy Certificate – Occupancy certificate (Sec. 2(zf)) and completion certificate (Sec. 2(q)) have distinct legal purposes – RERA registration depends on completion certificate – Absence of occupancy certificate does not render a project ongoing under the Act [Paras 12–13]

Fire Safety – Compliance Requirements – Regulation 67 of BDA Regulations requires fire NOC, not fire safety certificate, for completion – Fire safety certificate required only at occupancy stage – Tribunal’s reliance on fire safety certificate to invalidate completion certificate is legally incorrect – Project completed before Fire Safety Rules came into force [Paras 14–19]

Binding Effect of BDA Determination – BDA’s 2022 order confirming no need for fresh completion certificate after revised plan was final – Not challenged – Tribunal erred in disregarding binding decision of competent authority under Section 2(p) RERA – Project to be treated as complete [Paras 18–19]

Applicability of RERA – Retroactivity – Supreme Court in Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. clarified that RERA applies only to ongoing and future projects – Project completed before 1 May 2017 falls outside the purview of the Act – Tribunal misapplied settled law [Paras 10, 14, 20]

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of the OREAT dated 27 September 2024 in Appeal Nos. 96 and 97 of 2023 and review orders dated 13 November 2024 in Review Petition Nos. 15 and 16 of 2024 are set aside – Project held to be completed prior to commencement of RERA – Complaints held non-maintainable – No order as to costs.

Criminal Law – Bail – Cancellation – Anticipatory bail granted by Sessions Judge and confirmed by ACJM in serious offence of abduction and murder – Opposite party, a WBCS officer, allegedly masterminded the act using official vehicle and position – High Court held that anticipatory bail was granted without considering gravity of offence and role of accused – Bail cancelled [Paras 12-17]

Criminal Procedure – Section 438 CrPC and Section 483 BNSS – Jurisdiction of Court – Objection raised by accused that the matter was not listed before the correct Bench – Held: Issue of cancellation of bail rightly referred to Court exercising powers under Section 439 CrPC, as anticipatory bail stands exhausted once the accused surrenders and is granted bail – Court competent to adjudicate [Paras 15-16]

Evidentiary Material – Ocular and Electronic Evidence – Case diary revealed multiple eyewitnesses identifying accused in act of abduction, assault, and concealment of body – CCTV footage and post-mortem report corroborate – Affidavit by injured eyewitness recorded under Section 164 CrPC – Role of accused held to be principal and premeditated [Paras 11-13]

Judicial Discretion – Exercise of Bail Jurisdiction – Sessions Court granted anticipatory bail solely on the ground that accused is a government officer – ACJM mechanically followed Sessions order without independent reasoning – Held: Bail orders passed without application of mind and in ignorance of relevant facts are perverse and liable to be set aside [Paras 14, 17]

Court Procedure – Affidavit Irregularity – Affidavit submitted by State was blank in material parts and still affirmed by Commissioner – Court imposed cost of ₹10,000 on Oath Commissioner for gross negligence – Registrar directed to recover the same [Para 18]

Decision: Impugned orders dated 26.11.2025 (Sessions Court) and 29.11.2025 (ACJM) set aside – Bail cancelled – Accused directed to surrender within 72 hours – Cost imposed on Oath Commissioner.

Criminal Law – Compromise after Conviction – Non-Compoundable Offences – Sections 324, 148, 149 IPC – Accused convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment up to two years – During pendency of appeal parties entered into voluntary compromise – Trial Court verified compromise and reported it to be genuine and without coercion – Held: High Court can quash proceedings and set aside conviction in exercise of inherent powers to secure ends of justice even in non-compoundable offences [Paras 4–8, 14–17].

Criminal Procedure – Section 482 CrPC – Scope – Distinction between Compounding and Quashing – Though offences are not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC, inherent jurisdiction of High Court not barred – Power under Section 482 can be exercised to prevent abuse of process and to promote peace and harmony where dispute is predominantly private in nature [Paras 8–12].

Offences against Society – Test of Public Interest – FIR involved offences under Sections 307 and 326 IPC but appellants already acquitted of those charges – Remaining offences under Sections 324/148/149 IPC arose from village dispute – Held: Incident did not affect public peace, moral turpitude or public policy – Continuation of proceedings would serve no fruitful purpose [Paras 7–8, 16].

Settlement – Post-Conviction Stage – Pendency of Appeals – Compromise permissible even after conviction where offence is non-heinous and private in nature – Object of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory and to restore peace – Rejection of compromise may perpetuate hostility [Paras 7, 14–16].

Effect of Death of Accused – Abatement – One appellant (Gurpreet Singh @ Gopi) expired during pendency of appeals – Appeal abated qua deceased accused – Remaining appellants entitled to benefit of compromise [Para 5, 18].

Decision: Appeals by accused allowed – Conviction and sentence set aside – Appellant-convicts acquitted – Appeal filed by State dismissed in view of compromise – Proceedings abated qua deceased accused – Bail bonds discharged – All pending applications closed [Paras 17–18].

Criminal Law – Dishonour of Cheque – Directors’ Liability – Quashing of Complaint – Petitioners sought quashing of criminal proceedings initiated under Sections 138/141 of the NI Act on ground that no specific role was attributed to them in the complaint – Held: Mere reproduction of statutory language not sufficient – Complaint must aver how each director was in charge of or responsible for the conduct of business at the relevant time – Failure to do so is fatal – Petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 had resigned prior to the alleged offence and such resignation was accepted as per Form-32 – Continuation of proceedings against them is an abuse of process [Paras 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18]

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Reason for Dishonour – ‘Other Reasons’ – Held: Dishonour for “other reasons” does not constitute an offence under Section 138 NI Act, which requires dishonour for insufficiency of funds or exceeding arrangement – Complaint unsustainable on this ground alone [Para 10]

Company Law – Winding Up Order – Effect – Company under liquidation – Order for winding up passed prior to the institution of the complaint – Held: No proceedings can be continued against company once Official Liquidator is appointed – Complaint against company and its directors not maintainable in such scenario [Para 16]

Vicarious Liability – Directors – Specific Averments Mandatory – Multiple Supreme Court precedents reiterated that vicarious liability of directors under Section 141 NI Act cannot arise without clear and specific averments about their role – A director is not deemed liable solely because of designation – Liability must be based on factual assertions [Paras 11–14]

Decision: CRR allowed – Complaint Case No. C-824 of 2011 pending before the Learned 4th Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta is quashed – Proceedings against petitioners under Sections 138/141 NI Act set aside [Paras 20–21]

Election Law – Panchayat Elections – Corrupt Practice – Disqualification – Declaration of Returned Candidate as Void – Declaration of Another Candidate as Elected – Non-disclosure of criminal antecedents by returned candidate amounts to corrupt practice and election liable to be declared void – However, declaration of an unelected candidate as elected can be made only if statutory conditions are fulfilled – In absence of allegation or finding that but for corrupt votes the election petitioner would have secured majority of valid votes, declaration of another candidate as elected is impermissible – Tribunal erred in law in declaring respondent No.4 as elected [Paras 11–13].

Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 – Sections 89 and 90 – Distinction Between Disqualification and Corrupt Practice – Section 89(1)(a) relates to disqualification existing on date of election – Section 89(1)(b) concerns corrupt practices affecting election – In cases of disqualification, votes polled by disqualified candidate cannot automatically be treated as “thrown away” – Law does not permit presumption as to voting pattern had the disqualified candidate not contested – Ratio reiterated from Supreme Court precedents [Paras 10–12].

Election Tribunal – Procedural Lapses – Mandatory Duty to Follow CPC Procedure – Election petition decided without framing issues, without calling for written response and without recording evidence – Tribunal devised its own procedure ignoring mandatory statutory framework – Election petitions are akin to civil trials and strict adherence to procedure under CPC is mandatory – Failure to frame issues and conduct trial vitiates entire proceedings [Paras 14–15].

Framing of Issues – Importance – Democratic Rights at Stake – Settlement of issues is foundational stage of election trial – Issues determine scope of evidence and adjudication – Tribunal’s casual approach in deciding election petition without issues reflects non-application of mind – Election disputes affect fate of constituency and democratic process, hence require strict procedural compliance [Paras 14–15].

Supervisory and Appellate Interference – Election Matters – High Court justified in setting aside Tribunal’s order where it suffers from patent illegality and procedural impropriety – Tribunal’s order held unsustainable both in law and procedure – Matter remanded for fresh adjudication in accordance with law [Paras 15–16].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 06.03.2025 passed by Election Tribunal, Sri Muktsar Sahib set aside – Matter remanded to Tribunal for fresh decision after framing issues and recording evidence – Tribunal directed to decide election petition expeditiously, preferably on or before 30.06.2026.

Land Acquisition – LDP Act – Application of LA Act and 2013 Act – Proceedings under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 are not governed by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the 2013 Act – Held: Acquisition under the LDP Act is a self-contained code – Section 11-A of the LA Act and Section 24 of the 2013 Act not applicable – Repeal of LA Act by 2013 Act does not affect incorporated provisions in LDP Act [Paras 45–50, 62–68, 96].

Possession and Vesting – Validity of Acquisition – Possession of land taken in 1950 under urgency clause of Section 8 of LDP Act – Held: Once possession is taken, land vests absolutely in the State – Subsequent declarations or delays in compensation do not vitiate vesting – Subsequent acts by the State cannot divest land once vested – Acquisition process deemed complete [Paras 70–82].

Waiver – Estoppel against Challenge to Acquisition – Predecessor-in-interest accepted 80% ad hoc compensation in 1956 and consistently sought balance compensation – Held: Such conduct amounts to waiver of right to challenge acquisition – Petitioners cannot now seek to invalidate the process or claim lapse [Paras 83–88].

Compensation – Modality of Determination – Compensation to be determined under Section 8 of the LDP Act by applying Section 23(1) of LA Act – Date of valuation fixed as the date of notification (May 19, 1950) – Additional compensation at 15% under Section 23(2) of LA Act applicable as per LDP Act amendment of 1978 – Interest at 6% per annum awarded from December 1950 till date of award for equity – Section 23(1A) or amended Section 23(2) (30%) of LA Act not applicable [Paras 93–101].

Relief – Fresh acquisition denied – Only relief granted is declaration of award under LDP Act and payment of balance compensation with interest – High Court cannot notionally shift notification date to apply current market value – Article 142 invoked in Bernard Vaz not available to High Court [Paras 92–104].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of Single Judge set aside – Writ petition partly allowed – Fresh acquisition denied – Collector directed to compute compensation and declare award under Section 8 of LDP Act read with Sections 11 and 23 of LA Act (as incorporated) – Interest at 6% p.a. granted from December 1950 till award date – To be completed preferably by April 30, 2026 [Paras 93–105].