Companies Act – Appointment of Woman Director – Section 149 – Compliance – Triable Issue – Petitioner company alleged to have violated Section 149 of the Companies Act, 2013 by failing to appoint a woman director within the prescribed period ending 31st March, 2015 – Petitioners claimed appointment of Ms. Kirti Sanghavi as woman director by Board resolution dated 3rd January, 2015, but Form DIR-12 uploaded before the Registrar of Companies only on 6th October, 2015 upon payment of penalty – Petitioners failed to disclose when DIN was applied for and allotted to the newly appointed director – No reply to show cause notice produced – Held: Whether the appointment was actually made within the statutory timeframe is a triable issue requiring evidence by parties and cannot be adjudicated in revisional jurisdiction – Revision dismissed [Paras 6–11].

Quashing of Proceedings – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Scope – Petitioners contended that the complaint was an abuse of process of law as they had complied with the statutory requirement and also paid the prescribed penalty – Held: In the absence of satisfactory material before this Court establishing compliance within time, the revisional application is not entertainable and the matter is to be decided by the trial court after leading of evidence – Application dismissed [Paras 3–4, 10–11].

Decision: Criminal Revisional application dismissed – Proceeding before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore to continue – Interim order, if any, vacated.

Service Law – Pension – Counting of Past Service – Rule 26, M.P. Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 – Petitioner initially appointed with MPEB in 1981, subsequently appointed as Sub-Inspector in Police Department in 1988 after obtaining NOC from MPEB – Retired as Inspector in 2017 – Claim for counting past service with MPEB towards pension declined by District Pension Officer on the ground that Rule 26 does not cover service rendered with MPEB as it is not State Government service – Held: Service conditions of MPEB employees were determined by the State Government since the Board was constituted and its members appointed by the State Government under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and MPEB had power to frame service regulations – Objection of District Pension Officer overruled – Petitioner entitled to count service from 21/06/1981 to 15/01/1988 towards qualifying service – Petition allowed [Paras 9-19, 24].

Qualifying Service – Rule 3(p) – Scope and Construction – Rule 3(p) defines qualifying service as service under the State Government but its latter part extends it to service qualifying under any other order or rule in force – Cumulative reading makes clear that service rendered under any pensionable arrangement, including one governed by rules other than the 1976 Rules, qualifies – When pension rules are capable of more than one interpretation, courts must lean in favour of the employee [Paras 11-13, 17].

Prior Permission – NOC from Earlier Employer – Objection that petitioner did not take up subsequent appointment with prior permission of earlier employer – Rejected – NOC granted by MPEB on 13/11/1987 specifically stated no objection to petitioner's selection as Sub-Inspector – Application also forwarded through Board's authority – Petitioner served for about 30 years before retirement – Raising objection of absence of prior permission at this stage not permissible – Prior permission to be presumed unless State establishes contrary [Paras 20-23].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Objection raised by District Pension Officer overruled – Respondents including District Pension Officer, Shivpuri, directed to process petitioner's claim for counting service from 21/06/1981 to 15/01/1988 in pursuance of order dated 15/05/2018 [Para 24].

Election Law – Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC – Rejection of Election Petition – Cause of Action – Scope – Application for rejection of election petition filed by returned candidate on the ground that the petition discloses no cause of action – Held: For deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC, the court must examine the averments in the plaint read in conjunction with documents relied upon, taken as a whole without addition or subtraction, without going into the defence of the defendant – Pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement or in the application for rejection are wholly irrelevant at this stage – If allegations in the petition prima facie show cause of action, court cannot embark upon an inquiry whether the allegations are true – Power under Order 7 Rule 11(a) is drastic and conditions must be strictly adhered to [Paras 20-23].

Non-Disclosure of Criminal Antecedents – Form 26 – Nomination Paper – Returned candidate mentioned "Not Applicable" in paragraphs relating to criminal antecedents despite nine criminal cases having been registered against him in the past – Petitioner obtained list of criminal cases under RTI and filed the same along with petition – Respondent's claim of acquittal in all nine cases is a matter of defence to be tested at trial – Document in the form of RTI information fortifies the allegation and prima facie discloses cause of action – Voters have a fundamental right flowing from Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution to know the antecedents of the candidate [Paras 25-30].

Suppression of Financial Liability – ICICI Bank Loan – Bank issued copy of loan account statement showing Mr. Abhay Mishra as borrower with outstanding amount of Rs. 50,87,672/- – Respondent's defence that loan was obtained by partnership firm and that he retired from the firm in 2008 constitutes a triable issue – Defence of the respondent cannot be considered at the stage of Order 7 Rule 11(a) – Prima facie allegation of suppression constitutes cause of action [Para 30].

Non-Disclosure of Source of Income – Disqualification – Returned candidate disclosed salary from Private Limited Companies as source of income but did not disclose names of such companies – Allegation of disqualification on account of subsisting contract with PWD/Road Development Corporation also raised – Respondent's defence of resignation from Directorship constitutes a matter for trial – Prima facie disclosures prima facie disclose triable issues and cause of action [Paras 31-33].

Material Facts – Section 83(1)(a) RP Act – Election petition contains concise statement of material facts regarding suppression of criminal antecedents, financial liability and sources of income, supported by affidavit in Form 25 under Rule 94(A) of Rules 1961 – Petition is not vexatious and discloses cause of action – Not a fit case for exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC [Para 32-33].

Decision: I.A. No. 22204/2024 filed under Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC for rejection of election petition dismissed – Election petition found to disclose cause of action – Respondent granted four weeks to file written statement [Paras 33-35].

Rape – Consensual Relationship – Section 375 IPC – FIR Quashed – Petitioner, a skating coach, allegedly developed physical relations with the prosecutrix, wife of the complainant, over a prolonged period – FIR lodged by the husband on the ground that the petitioner had forcibly committed rape and blackmailed the prosecutrix – Prosecutrix, a qualified dentist aged about 34 years with two children, did not disclose the alleged relationship until confronted by her husband with the threat of divorce – Hotel room was booked jointly and entry was in the prosecutrix's own handwriting – No audio, video, or digital evidence of blackmailing found during investigation – Prosecutrix refused internal medical examination – Held: Where a fully grown, educated woman engages in a prolonged physical relationship, it constitutes an act of promiscuity and not an act induced by misconception of fact – Ingredients of Section 375 IPC not established – FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed [Paras 7–11].

Consent – Misconception of Fact – Section 90 IPC – Section 375 IPC – Distinction between False Promise and Breach of Promise – Court reiterated that consent under Section 375 IPC requires active and reasoned deliberation – A consent vitiated by misconception of fact must be traceable directly to a false promise made with no intention of fulfilment from the very beginning – Where physical relationship is maintained over a prolonged period by a consenting adult woman, it cannot be said that the relationship was purely the result of deception or false promise – No nexus between any alleged promise and the sustained physical relationship established – Held: Consent not vitiated under Section 90 IPC [Paras 8–10].

Decision: Petition allowed – FIR No. 48 dated 02.03.2020 under Section 376(2) IPC registered at Police Station Sector 36, Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings quashed qua the petitioner.

Recruitment – DSSSB – Rejection of candidature – Non-submission of e-dossier – Effective communication – Requirement of SMS/email along with website notice – Mere uploading on website not sufficient where scheme mandates dual communication – burden on authority to prove intimation – failure vitiates rejection [Paras 21–29, 33–37]

Legitimate Expectation – Recruitment process – Assurance of communication through SMS/email – Candidates entitled to rely on such representation – authority cannot rely solely on website notice – violation renders action arbitrary [Paras 31–34]

Public Employment – Procedural timelines – Balance with fairness – Strict adherence to cut-off dates subject to effective communication – rejection at final stage must satisfy fairness test – Courts to balance administrative efficiency with equity [Paras 38–41]

Proof of Communication – Electronic records – OARS portal showing dispatch of SMS/email – where contact details undisputed, presumption of due service arises – rejection upheld in such cases [Paras 43–46]

Delayed Intimation – Truncated opportunity – Late communication reducing available time – unequal treatment vis-à-vis other candidates – rejection unsustainable [Paras 47–48, 68–70]

Defective Communication – Erroneous result notice / lack of clarity on timing – benefit of doubt to candidate – candidature cannot be cancelled where confusion attributable to authority [Paras 49–51, 55–56]

No Proof of Intimation – Absence of documentary evidence of SMS/email – adverse inference against recruiting authority – rejection invalid [Paras 57–62, 64–66, 71–74]

Equitable Considerations – Special circumstances such as disability, pregnancy, higher merit – leniency justified where communication deficient – procedural lapses not to defeat substantive rights [Paras 6, 8, 73]

Change in Procedure – Shift from offline submission to e-dossier – obligation to clearly notify candidates – failure to communicate procedural change invalidates strict enforcement [Paras 23–26]

Decision: W.P.(C) 938/2026, W.P.(C) 14309/2025, W.P.(C) 506/2023 and W.P.(C) 12996/2024 allowed – remaining connected petitions dismissed – Tribunal orders partly upheld and partly set aside depending on proof of effective communication – pending applications disposed of.

Municipal/Planning Law – Unauthorised Construction – Demolition Order – Applicable Law – Jurisdiction – Petitioner constructed a dwelling house on a leasehold plot within the BDA planning area pursuant to development permission granted by the Burdwan Development Authority subject to compliance with the LUDCP – Sub-Divisional Officer directed demolition under Section 23(5) of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 – Held: Once the plot falls within the BDA planning area and development permission is granted under the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979, the provisions of Section 23 of the Panchayat Act cease to apply – Alleged contravention of LUDCP must be dealt with exclusively under Sections 52 and 53 of the Act of 1979 – Impugned demolition orders are without jurisdiction and unsustainable [Paras 6–11].

Overriding Effect – West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979 – Section 137 – Section 137 of the Act of 1979 gives overriding effect to its provisions over any inconsistent law – Development carried out in contravention of LUDCP conditions attracts penal provisions under Section 52 read with mandatory notice procedure under Section 53 – No notice under Section 53 was served upon the petitioner before passing the demolition orders – Orders therefore do not conform to the mandatory procedural requirements of law [Paras 8–11].

Mandatory Notice – Section 53 of the Act of 1979 – Prerequisite to Demolition – Before directing demolition or alteration of any building on the ground of deviation from LUDCP, the Planning Authority or Development Authority is mandatorily required to serve a notice under Section 53 upon the owner specifying the steps to be taken within one month – Non-compliance with this mandatory requirement vitiates the demolition orders [Paras 9–11].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Orders dated 6th October, 2023 and 15th October, 2025 set aside – BDA directed to deal with the issue in accordance with Sections 52 and 53 of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979 – No order as to costs.

UAPA – Section 43-D(5) – Bail – Prima Facie Standard – Prolonged Incarceration – Article 21 – Appellants arrested between 21-22.10.2021 and in custody for over four years – Charged as OGWs and hybrid cadres for TRF, alleged to have shared extremist content, propagated IS ideology and attended radicalising lectures – Trial Court rejected bail in March 2023 – Charges framed in July 2024 under Sections 120B, 121A IPC and Section 18 UAPA; discharged of Sections 20, 38, 39 and 40 UAPA – Prosecution proposes to examine 359 witnesses, only 12 examined – Trial likely to take decades at present pace – Held: Appellants have met the test for bail as laid down in Gulfisha Fatima – Role attributed predominantly digital and non-violent – No allegation of creating groups or independently sharing content – Key prosecution witness X-8 failed to identify accused no. 14 before Trial Court – Continued detention disproportionate given the limited role attributed – Appeals allowed – Bail granted subject to stringent conditions [Paras 49-59].

Section 43-D(5) UAPA – Scope of Inquiry – Structured Test – The expression "prima facie true" mandates a threshold judicial inquiry, neither perfunctory nor adjudicatory – Inquiry is accused-specific and directed to individual role and attribution – Bail stage is not a forum for evaluating defences or conducting a mini-trial – Court must examine: (i) whether prosecution material discloses a prima facie case satisfying statutory ingredients; (ii) whether role attributed reflects a real and meaningful nexus to unlawful/terrorist activity as distinct from mere association or peripheral presence; and (iii) whether the statutory threshold is crossed qua the individual accused – Where requirements are not met, the embargo on bail stands lifted [Para 45].

Article 21 – Prolonged Pre-Trial Detention – Differentiated Inquiry – All accused cannot be treated identically irrespective of their roles – Conspiracy law explaining joint liability does not answer the separate question of how long each individual's liberty may be restrained before guilt is proved – Bail adjudication requires consideration of what is attributed to each accused, how that fits within statutory ingredients, and whether continued detention serves a legitimate purpose – Differentiation is not an exception to conspiracy law but a constitutional discipline imposed upon bail jurisdiction – Where prolonged custody disproportionately burdens those with limited roles, the balance between individual liberty and collective security may call for conditional release [Para 47].

Terrorist Activity – Ideological Alignment vs. Operational Participation – Possession of Extremist Digital Content – Sympathy for a cause or possession of literature and digital content associated with a banned organisation does not by itself constitute membership of such organisation or active participation in its terrorist activities, absent a demonstrated nexus to actual terrorist acts – Distinction between ideological alignment and operational participation is constitutionally significant – Material found on digital devices propagating anti-national content may not justify continuation of prolonged detention at trial stage where appellants are not alleged to be creators of such content or to have independently disseminated it [Para 53].

Bail Conditions – UAPA Matters – Bail granted subject to: personal bond of Rs. 50,000 with two sureties; no travel abroad without permission; surrender of passports; weekly attendance before SHO; no contact with witnesses; no joining of social media groups circulating anti-national material; no dissemination of such material; full cooperation with trial; no media comments – Health condition of appellant Haris Nisar Langoo (cervical spondylosis) noted as additional relevant factor though not independently decisive [Paras 56, 60].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned order of Special Court (NIA) dated 03.03.2023 set aside – Appellants directed to be released on bail subject to conditions specified – Observations not to be construed as expression on merits of the case [Paras 59-64].

Service Law – Departmental Proceedings – Acquittal in Criminal Trial – Plea of Alibi Established – Dismissal Based on No Evidence – The respondent-constable was dismissed from service vide order dated 05.07.2022 by the Superintendent of Police, Kandhamal following departmental inquiry into alleged involvement in narcotic trafficking under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C)/29 of the NDPS Act, arising out of Kandhamal Sadar P.S. Case No.68/2015 – The criminal trial before the Addl. Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Phulbani concluded in acquittal vide judgment dated 26.11.2018 under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C., with the court categorically holding that the respondent had successfully established his plea of alibi through training records and supporting testimony showing his presence at an official training programme from 25.05.2015 to 30.05.2015 – The departmental inquiry was founded on the same factual matrix and the same set of witnesses whose testimony was discarded by the criminal court – Held: Where the plea of alibi is established and believed by the criminal court and has attained finality, the entire genesis of the departmental case is washed away on facts and the departmental proceedings and their conclusion must be treated as based on "no evidence" – Dismissal order unsustainable [Paras 17–20].

Criminal Proceedings vs. Departmental Proceedings – Identity of Witnesses and Evidence – Effect of Acquittal – The inquiry officer examined ASI-A.K. Behera, ASI-J.K. Digal, S.I.-B.P. Rout, Havildar-K.C. Nayak, Havildar-P. Malik and Havildar-T.R. Naik, who were the same witnesses examined as P.Ws.2, 3, 4, 10, 13 and 14 respectively before the trial court – The versions of these witnesses before the inquiry officer and the trial court showed no variation – Despite such identity, the trial court discarded their testimony and returned a finding of acquittal based on the alibi plea – Held: Where there is complete identity of the evidence base and the criminal court has judicially discarded the same evidence, departmental findings founded on such evidence cannot be sustained – The acquittal in this case was not merely technical but based on failure of the prosecution to establish involvement [Paras 17–20].

Scope of Judicial Review – Writ Jurisdiction – Limitation – Perversity – The State urged that the Single Judge exceeded the permissible limits of writ jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence and substituting findings of the disciplinary authority – Held: Interference by the High Court in writ jurisdiction is warranted where findings are based on no evidence, are perverse or where natural justice is violated – In the present case, since the departmental action rested on the same discarded evidence with no independent material, the Single Judge's intervention was within the proper bounds of judicial review and not an impermissible appellate exercise [Paras 13–14, 20].

Decision: Writ appeal dismissed – Judgment of the Single Judge affirmed – Respondent entitled to reinstatement with all consequential service and financial benefits.

Civil Law – Oral Partition – Burden of Proof – Revenue Record – Plaintiffs claimed oral family partition of June 1968 between Bhagat Singh and Tehal Singh in presence of village respectables, allotting 25 Kanal 19 Marla Barani and 17 Kanal 5 Marla Chahi land to Bhagat Singh, and 45 Kanal 6 Marla Barani land to Tehal Singh – Said partition never reflected in revenue record – Suit for declaration and possession dismissed by Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently – Held: Oral partition is legally permissible and non-entry in revenue record is not conclusive, but burden to prove such partition lies squarely on the party asserting it – Plaintiffs failed to discharge this burden – Oral evidence found unreliable and witnesses introduced inconsistencies regarding nature of partition – Non-entry in revenue record, when coupled with absence of reliable evidence and inconsistent conduct of parties, is a relevant circumstance – Concurrent findings based on holistic appreciation of entire evidence, not merely on absence of revenue entries [Paras 11-14].

Bona Fide Purchaser – Notice of Unrecorded Arrangement – Defendant No. 1 Harnam Singh purchased half share of suit land from Darshan Singh, a recorded co-sharer, vide sale deed dated 22.12.1980 – He was duly entered as co-sharer in revenue record and obtained possession through partition proceedings conducted by competent authority – Plaintiff's assertion that defendant had prior knowledge of oral partition by virtue of residing in same village, held unsubstantiated – Mere residence in same village cannot lead to inference of notice of a private and unrecorded arrangement – Defendant No. 1 rightly held to be bona fide purchaser [Para 15].

Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – Scope of Interference – Concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with unless shown to be perverse or based on misreading of evidence – No perversity or illegality demonstrated in present case – Findings of Courts below well reasoned and supported by evidence – Once plea of oral partition fails, entire foundation of plaintiffs' case collapses and challenge to sale deed executed by co-sharer cannot be sustained [Paras 16-17].

Decision: Substantial questions of law answered against appellants – Regular Second Appeal dismissed as devoid of merit [Para 18].