Tender Conditions – Judicial Review – Turnover Criteria – Challenge to Clause 5.2 of the tender document prescribing a minimum annual turnover of ₹9 crores for eligibility and awarding marks based on turnover brackets – Petitioner alleged the clause to be arbitrary, vague, and designed to favour a specific class of bidders – Held: Tender inviting authority justified the clause based on the scale of operations (1134-bedded hospital) and need for financial capacity to provide seamless service for 2–3 months without payment – Clause not found to be arbitrary or violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), or 21 – No interference warranted under Article 226 [Paras 1–2.2, 5–6, 13–15]

Level Playing Field – Discrimination and Arbitrary Conditions – Court reaffirmed that while State action in contractual matters is subject to judicial review, interference is limited to cases of manifest arbitrariness, mala fides, or absence of nexus with the object of the tender – Test of arbitrariness lies in whether the impugned condition furthers the objective sought or unfairly restricts competition – In present case, requirement of high turnover held to have rational nexus with the hospital's operational needs [Paras 6, 13–15]

Scope of Judicial Review – Tender and Contractual Matters – Courts cautioned against substituting administrative decisions made by expert bodies unless the action is arbitrary, biased, or lacks justification – Reliance placed on principles from Michigan Rubber, Master Marine Services, Balaji Ventures, and Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour – Procedural fairness ensured via pre-bid consultation – Petitioner’s objections duly considered [Paras 9–12.1]

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Turnover clause upheld – No costs [Paras 16–17]

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – ECIR – Quashing – Maintainability – An ECIR is an internal administrative document, not equivalent to an FIR, and its quashing is generally declined in writ jurisdiction unless there are clear jurisdictional defects, such as the absence of a scheduled offence or violation of statutory safeguards – The ECIR in this case, based on multiple FIRs including some with scheduled offences, cannot be quashed in its entirety at the nascent stage of investigation – The Court declined to quash the ECIR entirely but suspended investigative measures related to the consolidated FIRs whose proceedings were stayed – The ECIR remains valid for independent Mist Avenue FIRs which contain scheduled offences and are not subject to the Supreme Court's consolidation order or any stay – The Court held that complete quashment would necessitate re-registration and create procedural inefficiency [Paras 59, 108, 109, 113, 170, 171].

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Predicate Offence – Effect of Stay – Section 3 PMLA – The offence of money laundering is derivative and contingent upon the existence of a scheduled offence – While a stay order does not extinguish an FIR, it suspends the judicial operability of the predicate offence – Investigative measures by the ED qua consolidated FIRs, whose predicate proceedings are stayed by a competent court, must also be stayed to prevent circumvention of judicial orders and uphold judicial discipline – The Court held that the ED cannot proceed with investigation into proceeds of crime when the very question of whether a predicate offence was committed remains judicially suspended – The Court distinguished between a stay (suspension) and quashing (extinguishment) of proceedings – The Court directed a stay on ED's investigative measures related to the consolidated Grand Venice FIRs until the final adjudication of the Criminal Misc. Application No. 25724/2022 or framing of charges in Case No. 1559/2019, or any final order by the competent court – The Court relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (Supra) and Mantri Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement [Paras 24, 25, 26, 53, 61, 62, 63, 64, 91, 112, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 157, 158, 160, 162, 164, 165, 167, 169].

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Non-Bailable Warrants (NBWs) – Issuance during Investigation – NBWs are coercive measures to secure an accused's presence, not for punishment, and should not be issued mechanically without clear evidence of evasion or likelihood of abscondence – The petitioner's consistent cooperation, including appearances and document submissions, and the prolonged nature of the investigation (over four years without a prosecution complaint), rendered the NBWs unjustified – The ED's allegations of evasion were not sufficiently substantiated by documentary evidence – The Court held that the NBWs issued on 11.04.2025 were inconsistent with procedural safeguards at the pre-complaint stage under PMLA and were hereby cancelled – The Court relied on Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttarakhand and Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI [Paras 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193].

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Search and Seizure – Section 17 PMLA – Challenge to search and seizure proceedings on grounds of "no reason to believe" is premature as the petitioner has an efficacious alternate statutory remedy before the Adjudicating Authority under PMLA – Allegations of misconduct during search involve disputed questions of fact not amenable to writ jurisdiction – The Court declined to interfere with the search and seizure proceedings [Paras 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 74, 75, 76, 115, 116, 117].

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – ECIR – Addendums and Clubbing of FIRs – An ECIR, being an internal document, can be supplemented or updated via addendums as investigation progresses and new facts or scheduled offences emerge – The Supreme Court's consolidation of FIRs for police investigation (Grand Venice Project) does not extinguish the statutory character of individual FIRs for PMLA purposes, nor does it bar ED from investigating proceeds of crime from other distinct projects (Mist Avenue Project) which contain scheduled offences – The Court held that the inclusion of Mist Avenue FIRs through addendums was lawful and justified, as PMLA jurisdiction is transaction-based, not FIR-based – The Court relied on Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI and Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan [Paras 28, 29, 47, 48, 49, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 102, 103, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 161, 166].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – NBWs issued on 11.04.2025 are cancelled – ED directed to refrain from investigative measures qua consolidated Grand Venice FIRs until final adjudication of Criminal Misc. Application No. 25724/2022 or framing of charges in Case No. 1559/2019, or any final order by the competent court – ECIR not quashed in its entirety, remains operative for independent Mist Avenue FIRs – Petitioner directed to cooperate with ED upon prior written intimation [Paras 193, 199, 200].

Prevention of Corruption Act – Illegal Gratification – Proof of Demand and Acceptance Mandatory – Appellant, a police officer, was convicted under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act for allegedly accepting ₹10,000 as bribe to avoid arresting the complainant’s relative – Complainant (PW-7) turned hostile and denied having any direct interaction with the appellant – Panch witness (PW-8) gave contradictory testimony regarding raid and was unaware of crucial facts – Complainant’s friend (PW-11) also did not support the prosecution version – Held: Demand and acceptance not proved beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction unsustainable. Acquittal [Paras 5–16].

Criminal Trial – Hostile Witnesses – Effect – Complainant and other key witnesses failed to support the prosecution case – Their testimonies inconsistent and materially contradictory – Panch witness admitted he was unaware of facts and signed blank papers – Court held that prosecution failed to prove factum of demand and acceptance of gratification, which is a sine qua non for conviction under PC Act [Paras 5–15].

Burden of Proof – Demand and Acceptance – Standard Reiterated – Citing B. Jayaraj and Neeraj Dutta, Supreme Court decisions – Court reaffirmed that proof of both demand and acceptance is essential for conviction under Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act – Mere recovery or possession of money is insufficient – Even circumstantial evidence must unerringly establish demand and acceptance [Paras 10–12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence set aside – Bail bond cancelled and surety discharged [Paras 17–19].

Criminal Law - Excise Offences – Illegal Possession and Transport of Liquor – Acquittal – Appellant convicted for transporting illicit liquor containing ethyl alcohol unfit for human consumption – Trial Court convicted under Sections 32 and 34 of Karnataka Excise Act – High Court finds prosecution failed to comply with mandatory provisions of Sections 53 and 54 of the Act and Section 102 CrPC – No search warrant, no timely production of seizure report or witness statements – Held: Violation of statutory safeguards renders search and seizure illegal – Conviction unsustainable [Paras 13-20].

Criminal Procedure – Seizure and FIR – Prosecution failed to submit seizure mahazar along with FIR or show compliance with Section 102 CrPC – Delay in submission of witness statements and non-production of search report before Magistrate undermines prosecution case – Trial court failed to consider these procedural lapses [Paras 17-18].

Evidence – Hostile Witness – Independent panch witness (PW4) turned hostile and denied signing seizure mahazar at the spot – Official witnesses’ testimony not corroborated by any independent witness – Held: Conviction cannot rest solely on interested testimony of official witnesses in absence of reliable independent corroboration [Paras 15, 19-20].

Precedent – Reliance on Apex Court Ruling – Court followed K.L. Subbaiah v. State of Karnataka, (1979) 2 SCC 115 – Held: Non-compliance of Section 54 of Karnataka Excise Act renders search without jurisdiction – Acquittal justified [Para 13].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence set aside – Accused acquitted of offences under Sections 32 and 34 of Karnataka Excise Act – Fine, if paid, to be refunded [Para 21].

Revenue Law – Private Lease under Section 94 – Locus Standi – Petition Dismissed – Petitioner, who was a rival applicant for IOCL dealership, challenged a private lease deed executed under Section 94 by alleging it was contrary to permitted use under the Code – Held: Petitioner is neither lessor nor lessee, nor owner or co-sharer of the land, and thus has no locus standi to seek cancellation of the lease – Mere participation in dealership process does not confer enforceable legal interest in the land [Paras 3, 9–11, 15].

UP Revenue Code – Section 94 – Scope and Applicability – Lease for IOCL Outlet – Lease executed for retail outlet held to be a private lease under Section 94 – Court rejected contention that such lease was void under Section 104 – Held: Section 105(e) specifically excludes leases under Section 94 from consequences of void transfer – Sections 104, 105 and Rule 103 apply only to transfers in violation of Code by bhumidhar involving State land, not private leases [Paras 4–5, 10].

Declaratory Relief – Section 144 of U.P. Revenue Code – Interpretation – Court held that only persons claiming to be bhumidhar or asami can file declaratory suits, including suits seeking cancellation of lease – Petitioner having no right, title or interest in the land cannot invoke Section 144 or challenge the lease instrument [Paras 6, 12].

Interpretation of Statutes – Harmonious Reading – Sections 94, 104, 105 and Rule 103 – Court harmoniously construed that lease under Section 94 is governed solely by terms agreed between lessor and lessee – Rule 103 procedures for void transfers not applicable due to statutory exclusion under Section 105(e) [Paras 5, 10].

Procedural Law – Rule 186 – Inapplicability without Locus – Court held that invocation of Rule 186 (regarding non-application of Civil Procedure Code) is irrelevant when the petitioner lacks locus to maintain proceedings against a private lease [Para 16].

Alternative Remedy – Challenge to IOCL Dealership – Court clarified that the petitioner is not without remedy – Any grievance regarding dealership allotment, including lease legality, can be raised before competent forum in IOCL process – But such remedy does not justify locus to cancel private lease deed [Para 14].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Impugned orders of Sub-Divisional Officer and Revisional Court upheld – Petitioner found to lack locus standi to challenge private lease deed under Section 94 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 [Paras 17–18].

Arbitration – Execution of Interim Order – Scope of Executing Court – Executing Court enforced an arbitral direction requiring the Appellant (a non-signatory to arbitration) to issue Consent of Affiliation (CoA) for 150 MBBS seats at HIMSR – Tribunal’s order only directed support “within the confines of law” – Held: Executing Court exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the withdrawal of CoA as unlawful and compelling positive action not contained in the interim arbitral direction [Paras 24-28, 34-35].

Civil Procedure – Order XXI Rule 32 CPC – Applicability – Application under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC sought coercive enforcement of cooperation clause in arbitral order – Arbitral direction was not an injunction or decree for specific performance – Held: Order XXI Rule 32 CPC not applicable – Application dismissed as not maintainable [Paras 27, 35.1].

Third-Party Rights – Maintainability of Appeal – Appellant was not a signatory to arbitration agreement and was not a party before Arbitral Tribunal – Held: Appeal maintainable under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act read with CPC – Amazon.com judgment does not bar appeal by third party affected by enforcement order – Matter left open by Supreme Court in Amazon.com [Paras 18-23].

Administrative Law – Regulatory Compliance – UGC and NMC Framework – UGC Regulations prohibit deemed universities from affiliating external institutions – NMC had denied HIMSR renewal of MBBS seats – Held: Executing Court could not pre-empt or bypass statutory and appellate remedies by enforcing support directions beyond scope of arbitral order – Regulatory questions to be decided by competent statutory forums [Paras 28-30, 35.3].

Family Settlement – Enforcement and Regulatory Consequences – Dispute arose from Family Settlement Deed (FSD) allocating control over HIMSR and Jamia Hamdard – Execution of Tribunal’s order without resolving pending arbitral appeals and regulatory concerns undermines balance under FSD – Held: Execution proceedings cannot be used to indirectly adjudicate such unresolved issues [Paras 31, 35.4].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 08.12.2025 set aside – Application under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC dismissed – Executing Court's findings on legality of CoA withdrawal set aside – Appellant’s obligation, if any, remains subject to legality and regulatory directions – No finding on merits of regulatory or arbitral disputes [Paras 35-36].

Partition Suit – Interim Injunction – Family Property – Plaintiff (Appellant) challenged modification of earlier ex-parte injunction restricting alienation of entire suit property – Learned Single Judge (LSJ) limited restraint only to unalienated 25% share based on plaintiff’s own pleadings – Held: Injunction rightly confined to maximum possible claimable share by plaintiff; no prima facie case made for remaining 75% which had already been alienated [Paras 8, 13, 16–17, 22] –

Doctrine of lis pendens – Section 52 TPA – Plaintiff’s interests adequately protected under doctrine of lis pendens – Any alienation during pendency of suit remains subject to final outcome – No irreparable loss shown – Wider injunction not justified [Paras 15, 18] –

Equitable Discretion – Appellate interference with interim discretionary orders permissible only if shown to be arbitrary or perverse – In present case, exercise of discretion by LSJ found balanced, lawful and in line with settled principles – No reason to interfere [Paras 12, 25–27] –

Third Party Rights – Bonafide Purchaser – Defendant No.4 purchased portion of suit property in 2019 before current suit – Plaintiff failed to demonstrate her involvement in alleged fraud – No injunction warranted against completed sale to bona fide third party [Paras 21, 24] –

Pleadings – Plaintiff bound by own averments – Having pleaded that 25% share of property remains unalienated, cannot now seek restraint over entire property – Court cannot grant relief beyond pleadings [Para 22] –

Conduct – Delay and Knowledge – Plaintiff had knowledge of prior suit and settlement but failed to appear or challenge in time – His conduct relevant while deciding equitable relief – Dispute over 2012 notice and reply to be decided at trial stage, not interim stage [Paras 19–20] –

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Impugned order upheld – Injunction rightly limited to 25% of unalienated property – Plaintiff’s interest adequately secured – No interference warranted at interlocutory stage [Paras 25–27] –

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B(1) – Waiver of One-Year Separation Period – The statutory period of one year separation prescribed under Section 13B(1) of the HMA as a pre-requisite for presenting the first motion can be waived by applying the proviso to Section 14(1) of the HMA – It is legally permissible for a court to entertain a first motion even prior to the expiry of the one-year separation period, provided the court is satisfied that circumstances of "exceptional hardship to the petitioner" and/or "exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent" exist, and the case is tested on the anvil of considerations set out in Pooja Gupta – This view overrules previous Single Bench decisions holding Section 13B to be a complete code and Section 14(1) proviso inapplicable [Paras 24, 25, 27, 28, 38.1, 38.2, 57.1, 57.4].

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B(2) – Waiver of Six-Month Cooling-Off Period – The waiver of the one-year separation period under Section 13B(1) does not preclude the waiver of the six-month cooling-off period for filing the second motion under Section 13B(2) – The one-year and six-month periods are to be considered independently – The court has discretion to waive the six-month period based on factors like genuine settlement, no possibility of reconciliation, and to prevent prolonged agony, as established in Amardeep Singh and Amit Kumar – This discretion can be exercised by both the Family Court and the High Court [Paras 22.4, 22.5, 38.3, 42, 43, 57.2, 57.5].

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B(1) & (2) – Divorce Decree Effective Forthwith – Where the court is satisfied that both the one-year separation period under Section 13B(1) and the six-month cooling-off period under Section 13B(2) deserve to be waived, the court is not legally mandated to defer the date from which the divorce decree would take effect, and such decree may be made effective forthwith – The legislative intent behind the proviso to Section 14(1) allows for deferral only in cases of misrepresentation or concealment, not as a general rule for all early divorces [Paras 35, 50, 51, 52, 53, 57.3, 57.6].

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B – Interpretation – The opening words "Subject to the provisions of this Act" in Section 13B(1) mean that its provisions are subject to other provisions of the HMA, including the proviso to Section 14(1) – The essential ingredient of Section 13B is the 'consent of parties', not the timelines, which are procedural and can be relaxed in exceptional circumstances to prevent undue psychological and emotional distress and uphold decisional autonomy under Article 21 of the Constitution [Paras 30, 32, 37, 40, 45, 54, 55, 56].

Decision: Reference answered accordingly.

Criminal Law – Inherent Powers of High Court – Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of Interlocutory Order – Petition filed seeking quashing of trial court order rejecting application under Section 311 CrPC for summoning record of another complaint case – Held: No perversity or illegality found in the impugned order warranting interference under inherent jurisdiction [Paras 1, 12–13].

Criminal Trial – Power to Summon or Recall Witness – Scope of Section 311 CrPC – Discretionary Power – Petitioner sought summoning of record of an entirely different complaint case to rely on alleged admissions – Trial court found that petitioner had ample opportunity earlier and application was filed at belated stage – Held: Power under Section 311 CrPC is to be exercised sparingly, with caution and only when evidence is essential for just decision of the case [Paras 8–10].

Stage of Trial – Final Arguments – Belated Application – Delay as Relevant Consideration – Complaint under Section 138 NI Act pending since 2017 – Defence evidence stage since 2019 – Application under Section 311 CrPC moved only at fag end of trial – Held: Unexplained delay militates against grant of relief and supports inference of attempt to delay proceedings [Paras 11–12].

Evidence – Summoning of Records of Another Case – Relevance and Necessity – Alleged testimony of power of attorney holder in separate proceedings – Trial court noted contradictions between application and submissions and absence of examination of such witness in the other case – Held: Summoning of such record not essential for just decision of present case [Paras 7, 11].

Abuse of Process – Section 311 CrPC – Safeguard Against Misuse – Court reiterated that provision cannot be used to derail proceedings or cause prejudice to opposite party – Held: Application rightly rejected to prevent miscarriage of justice [Paras 10, 13].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Impugned order dated 07.02.2025 upheld – Pending applications also dismissed [Para 14].