Service Law – Pensionary Benefits – Redeployment Service – Physically Disabled Employee – Petitioner, a retired Junior Superintendent with above 55% physical disability, was redeployed with the defunct Calicut Development Authority from 10.02.1999 to 29.06.2002 during the commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of Indian Independence – After subsequently joining the Women and Child Development Department and retiring therefrom, the petitioner sought reckoning of his CDA service period as qualifying service for pension – The representation was rejected by the 5th respondent and the same was not challenged – Tribunal dismissed the original application – Held: No ground to interfere under Article 227; impugned order does not suffer from perversity or patent illegality [Paras 3, 4, 17].

Constitutional Law – Article 227 – Supervisory Jurisdiction – Scope and Limits – High Court cannot sit in appeal over findings of a tribunal acting within its jurisdiction – Interference is warranted only in cases of grave dereliction of duty, flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, manifest error, palpably perverse or patently unreasonable reasoning, or direct conflict with settled principles of law – Held: The Tribunal's order does not attract any of the above grounds and the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be invoked to substitute the Court's own judgment [Paras 9-15].

Service Law – Applicability of Precedent – Distinguishable Facts – Petitioner relied on Maya P.C. v. State of Kerala [2025 (3) KLT 558] – Held: The said judgment is inapplicable as it concerned a challenge to a Government order restricting declaration of probation, inclusion in the combined seniority list and consideration for promotion of temporarily reappointed employees; the issue in the present case is entirely different [Para 16].

Decision: Original petition dismissed – No interference warranted under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Income Tax – Section 131(1A) – Summons for Investigation – Challenge on Ground of Malafide – Not Established – Petitioner challenged summons issued by the Income Tax Officer (Investigation) on 14.11.2025 requiring production of books of account, bank statements and property details, alleging it was issued at the instance of the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax who is remotely related to defendants in a pending civil suit – Held: None of the respondents are parties to the civil suit; petitioner himself is not a party; the Tax Evasion Petition was received on 12.11.2025 and summons issued following Standard Operating Procedure; interim injunction in the civil suit was passed in April 2025, months before the summons; plea of malafide raised only in the writ petition and not in replies before the income tax authorities; plea based on Chartered Accountant's affidavit which was introduced after the summons and is afterthought – Malafide in fact not proved [Paras 24, 34].

Income Tax – Malice in Law – Legal Malafide – Distinction – Malafide in fact requires direct proof of ill will or improper motive; malice in law is an act done without lawful excuse or for purposes foreign to those for which power is vested – Where the statutory authority has acted on an anonymous Tax Evasion Petition following the prescribed SOP, allotting Unique Identification Number and obtaining approval of the competent authority before issuing summons, there is no question of malice in law or colourable exercise of power – Burden of establishing malafide is very heavy on the person who alleges it [Paras 26-35].

Income Tax – Section 131(1A) – Jurisdiction of Income Tax Officer (Investigation) – Not Raised in Writ Petition – Reading Section 131(1A) with Section 132(1), the Income Tax Officer is included as an authorized officer to issue summons on being authorized by the competent superior authority – Additionally, the ground of want of jurisdiction was never raised in the writ petition or in the petitioner's replies before the income tax authorities and was raised orally for the first time at arguments, which is impermissible – Held: No jurisdictional infirmity made out [Paras 40-42].

Income Tax – Section 131(1A) – Stage of Investigation – Confidentiality – At the stage of summons under Section 131(1A), the income tax authority is not required to disclose the reasons, source of information, line of inquiry or scope of ongoing investigation; details of such investigation are confidential and even exempt from disclosure under Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act – Disclosure would defeat the purpose of investigation [Para 6].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Summons under Section 131(1A) held legal and not suffering from any infirmity – IA No. 4 of 2026 rejected – IA No. 3 of 2026 and all pending miscellaneous petitions closed.

POCSO – Penetrative Sexual Assault – Conviction Upheld – Victim's Testimony – Section 4 POCSO Act – Appellant convicted by Trial Court for sexually penetrating the anus of a minor boy and for showing pornographic material to a minor – Sentenced to simple imprisonment of seven years under Section 4 POCSO Act and one year under Section 293 IPC – On appeal, victim's testimony found natural and creditworthy – Absence of anal injury not fatal as Medical Officer found discomfort and slight pain during digital examination and opined possibility of penetration could not be ruled out – Corroboration not a sine qua non for conviction in sexual offences – Appeal dismissed [Paras 12–14, 25, 39–43].

Delay in FIR – Sexual Offences – Delay Not Fatal – Incident occurred on 02.09.2013; FIR lodged on 03.09.2013 – Victim's father was absent from home; victim and mother cannot be faulted – Delay in lodging FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard prosecution case, especially in sexual offences; court only examines whether satisfactory explanation has been offered [Para 17].

Witness Testimony – Contradictions – Discrepancies Not Going to Core – Discrepancies between victim's statement and his mother's statement regarding number of surrounding houses and whether victim attended school next day – Statements recorded more than six months after incident – Held: Minor discrepancies bound to arise with passage of time and do not shake the core of the prosecution case; each person reacts to a traumatic event in his own way and non-disclosure to neighbours or classmates cannot discredit the victim [Paras 22, 23].

Evidence – Cross-Examination – Failure to Challenge Witness – Recovery of Mobile Phone – Witness (PW4) who proved recovery of mobile phone containing memory card was not cross-examined – Held: Where testimony of a witness is not challenged in cross-examination, the same cannot be challenged during arguments; the recovery of the mobile phone with the memory card and pornographic clip must be accepted as proved, corroborating the victim's version [Para 26].

Evidence – Contradiction of Witness – Section 145 Evidence Act – Previous Statement – Victim's credit cannot be impeached on the ground that showing of pornographic clip was not mentioned in the FIR, as the victim's attention was not drawn to his previous statement in the manner prescribed under Section 145 of the Evidence Act; courts cannot suo motu take cognisance of contradictions not brought on record as per law [Paras 29–32].

Presumption – POCSO Act – Sections 29 and 30 – Foundational Facts – Burden on Accused – Statutory presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act is activated only after the prosecution establishes foundational facts, namely: (i) victim is a child; (ii) alleged incident has occurred; (iii) accused committed the offence; and (iv) supporting medical evidence where physical injury is caused – Once foundational facts are proved, burden shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption on a preponderance of probabilities – In the present case, victim's testimony was sufficient to prove foundational facts and the accused failed to lead any rebuttal evidence [Paras 34–39].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 293 IPC upheld – Sentence of seven years simple imprisonment under Section 4 POCSO Act and one year under Section 293 IPC confirmed [Paras 42, 43].

Mining Lease – Lapse of Rights – Cut-off Date under Section 10A(2)(c) – Effect of Non-execution of Lease Deed – Petitioners granted mining lease on 08.01.2017 but lease deed not executed before statutory deadline of 11.01.2017 – Authorities held application became ineligible – High Court examined whether delay attributable to State/Union and non-decision on forest clearance affected petitioner’s rights – Held: Inaction of authorities, particularly failure to decide application dated 20.08.2011 as directed by Supreme Court, materially impacted petitioner’s ability to comply – Matter required reconsideration in light of statutory scheme and administrative lapses [Paras 40–41, 48–49].

Statutory Interpretation – “Grant” of Mining Lease – Section 10A(2)(c) MMDR Act and Rule 8(4) of 2016 Rules – Whether grant is complete upon issuance of letter of intent/order or only upon execution and registration of lease deed – Held: Scheme indicates that mere grant order does not confer vested right unless conditions including execution are fulfilled, however such requirement cannot operate harshly where delay is attributable to State authorities [Paras 28, 45–47].

Forest Clearance – Requirement under Forest (Conservation) Act – Deleted Forest Land – Supreme Court directions dated 08.09.2016 mandating determination of nature of land and decision on approval application – No decision taken by MoEF&CC despite binding directions – Held: Authorities cannot rely on absence of clearance when they themselves failed to decide application within stipulated time [Paras 41, 33–37].

Administrative Inaction – Effect on Statutory Rights – Petitioner's inability to execute lease deed linked to pending approvals and lack of response from authorities – Held: State cannot take advantage of its own delay to defeat accrued rights under saving clause of Section 10A(2)(c) [Paras 26–27, 48].

Vested Rights – Letter of Intent and Grant Order – Whether enforceable right accrues prior to execution – Held: No absolute vested right arises merely on issuance of LOI or grant order, but rights crystallize where petitioner has complied and delay is not attributable to it [Paras 45–46].

Decision: Writ petition partly allowed – Impugned communication dated 17.11.2017 and consequential actions subject to reconsideration – Authorities directed to re-examine petitioner’s claim in light of Supreme Court directions and administrative lapses, including failure to decide forest clearance application – Appropriate decision to be taken in accordance with law.

Civil Law – Amendment of Pleadings – Order VI Rule 17 CPC – Liberal Approach – Delay Not a Bar – Petitioner, an uneducated and underprivileged widow who worked as a domestic help, filed suit challenging a Deed of Gift procured by her employer through fraud and forgery – During cross-examination of DW1, it was noticed that the Deed of Revocation executed on 13.02.2013 had not been incorporated in the plaint due to bona fide mistake and inadvertence – Amendment sought to incorporate facts of revocation and an additional prayer – Trial court rejected the application on the ground that the Deed of Revocation was itself invalid under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act and was irrelevant since the Deed of Gift was challenged as a forged document – Held: Delay is no ground for refusal of amendment; amendment does not change the nature and character of the suit; defendants can be compensated with costs; trial court erred in rejecting the application [Paras 11-14].

Civil Procedure – Amendment of Pleadings – Merits of Amendment Not to be Examined – Court considering an application for amendment of pleadings cannot go into the merits or validity of the amendment; the only question is whether the amendment is necessary for determination of the real question in controversy between the parties – Trial court erred in holding that the Deed of Revocation was invalid under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act at the stage of considering the amendment application – Legal consequences of the revocation are to be decided at the final stage – Held: Merits of the amendment should not have been examined [Para 13].

Civil Procedure – Amendment of Pleadings – Proviso to Order VI Rule 17 – Not an Absolute Bar – The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 was incorporated to curtail inordinate delay but does not operate as an absolute bar to amendment after commencement of trial – Where the petitioner is an uneducated widow who had to rely on her advocates and the omission was due to bona fide mistake, the amendment deserves to be allowed upon payment of costs – Amendment will not alter the cause of action or deprive defendants of any valid defence [Paras 11, 14].

Decision: Revisional application disposed of – Impugned order set aside – Amendment allowed subject to payment of cost of Rs. 15,000/- in favour of the defendants within four weeks – Amended plaint to be filed within four weeks; defendants at liberty to file additional written statement.

Muslim Personal Law – Testamentary Capacity – Bequest to Heirs – Consent Requirement – Wills Invalid Without Consent of Other Heirs – Appellants, who are sons and legal heirs of deceased Mohd. Anas and Mohd. Iliyas, claimed ownership of disputed property on the basis of Wills dated 16.08.2015 and 07.01.2016 respectively – Defendants denied execution of Wills and alleged them to be forged and fabricated – Held: Under Hanafi (Sunni Muslim) law, a bequest in favour of an heir is not valid unless the other heirs expressly consent to the bequest after the death of the testator – The rule of one-third applies only to bequests in favour of strangers and not heirs – Without express consent of all legal heirs, the alleged Wills remained inoperative and conferred no right, title or interest on the plaintiffs [Paras 60-68].

Suspicious Circumstances – Proof of Will – Multiple Infirmities – Wills Disbelieved – The alleged Will of Mohd. Iliyas (executed 07.01.2016) incorrectly mentioned Mohd. Anas as the owner of half share, whereas Mohd. Anas had already died on 12.10.2015, a fact that Mohd. Iliyas, being his close friend and business partner, could not have been unaware of – The alleged Wills included properties in which the testators were not the sole or exclusive owners (Standard Cold Storage, Standard Handloom Store, MM Textiles, and a jointly-owned house) – The propounder of the Will of Mohd. Anas, i.e., plaintiff no. 1 Mohd. Mubin, did not enter the witness box – Attesting witnesses gave contradictory testimonies regarding the place of execution of the Wills – Held: Suspicious circumstances were not dispelled; trial court rightly disbelieved the Wills [Paras 74-85].

Non-Joinder of Necessary Parties – Suit Bad for Non-Joinder – The plaintiffs failed to implead the wife, nine daughters and one son of deceased Mohd. Iliyas as defendants, whose consent was indispensable for the Wills to be operative – Under Mohammedan law, consent of heirs must be express and cannot be implied from silence or non-participation – Held: Suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties [Para 69].

Cancellation of Sale Deed – Suit Not Maintainable – The defendants of the second set, being legal heirs of the deceased, had inherited a share in the disputed property and were entitled to execute the sale deed in favour of the defendants of the first set – Plaintiffs neither denied that defendants of the second set were legal heirs nor claimed partition – Held: Sale deed could not be declared void ab initio on the basis of inoperative Wills [Para 86].

Permanent Injunction – Barred Under Section 41(h), Specific Relief Act – Equally Efficacious Remedy Available – Plaintiffs, having failed to establish title on the basis of alleged Wills and having not claimed partition, were not entitled to permanent injunction against the true owners of the disputed property – Held: Suit for permanent injunction not maintainable against true owners; equally efficacious remedy of partition was available but not pursued; suit also barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Paras 88-91].

Decision: Appeal dismissed at the admission stage under Order 41 Rule 11 CPC – Impugned judgment and decree dated 20.01.2026 affirmed.

Civil Law – Joint and Unpartitioned Property – Co-sharer – Passage – Declaration of Specific Portion Not Sustainable – Land measuring 4 Bigha in Khasra No. 141 jointly owned by Ram Singh, Mukhtiar Singh, Nirmal Singh and their mother Smt. Basant Kaur – Mukhtiar Singh, Nirmal Singh and Basant Kaur sold portions of land to plaintiffs through sale deeds executed in 1984 leaving 4 Biswa 11 Biswansi as access passage – Subsequently, Mukhtiar Singh and Nirmal Singh executed sale deed dated 29.09.1988 in favour of co-sharer Ram Singh regarding the said passage – Courts below declared the passage and held the sale deed void – Held: So long as the property remains joint and unpartitioned, declaration of a specific portion as an exclusive passage binding on a non-consenting co-sharer is not legally sustainable; sale deed executed by one co-sharer transferring undivided share to another co-sharer cannot be declared void [Paras 14-19].

Co-sharer's Rights – Transfer of Undivided Share – A co-sharer in joint property is entitled to transfer his undivided share and the transferee steps into the shoes of the vendor as a co-sharer – However, no co-sharer can claim exclusive ownership of or earmark a specific portion of joint land unless and until partition is effected by metes and bounds – Disputes regarding specific portions of joint property are ordinarily required to be resolved through partition proceedings [Paras 16-17, 22].

Possession and Access – Protection Pending Partition – Although exclusive declaration of passage over joint land is set aside, plaintiffs' possession over land purchased through registered sale deeds deserves protection – Each co-sharer is deemed to be in possession of every inch of joint holding and is entitled to make reasonable use without excluding other co-sharers – Existing user of the disputed strip as means of access to the purchased plots shall continue pending partition – Rights including access to be finally determined in partition proceedings [Paras 20-21, 25-29].

Substantial Question of Law: Whether the courts below were justified in declaring a specific portion of joint and unpartitioned land as a passage and in holding the sale deed dated 29.09.1988 executed in favour of defendant Ram Singh to be null and void, despite the admitted position that the land comprised in Khasra No. 141 remained joint and unpartitioned and that Ram Singh was a co-sharer therein.

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Decree of courts below modified – Declaration of suit property as an exclusive passage set aside – Sale deed dated 29.09.1988 in favour of Ram Singh not treated as void – Possession of plaintiffs over purchased land protected – Parties at liberty to seek partition; rights including access to be determined at partition.

Education Law – Year Down Categorisation – Attendance Shortfall – Unit Test Absence – Validity of YD Classification – Petitioner's attendance during Third Semester fell below 30% against the prescribed minimum of 75% under Clause 3.6.1 (Criteria 1) of the Student Handbook – Petitioner also remained absent in both Unit Tests in violation of Clause 3.6.2 (Criteria 2) – University issued communication dated 30.01.2026 placing petitioner in "YD" category without declaring end-semester examination result – Held: YD classification is a lawful and necessary consequence of failure to satisfy Criteria 1 and Criteria 2; petition dismissed [Paras 12-16].

Academic Progression – YD Rule – Independent Bar – End-Semester Result Irrelevant – Petitioner contended that YD status could not be invoked without first declaring end-semester examination result – Held: Failure to fulfill attendance (Criteria 1) and Unit Test requirements (Criteria 2) operates as a distinct and independent bar to academic progression, irrespective of the outcome of the end-semester examination – Plain reading of Clause 3.6 of Student Handbook leaves no ambiguity in this regard [Para 14].

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Promissory Estoppel – Interim Judicial Direction – No Waiver of Academic Deficiency – Petitioner argued that the University's proposal permitting him to appear in the Third Semester examination, acted upon pursuant to order dated 14.12.2025 in W.P. No. 46548/2025, created an estoppel against imposition of YD – Held: An interim or ad-hoc arrangement permitting a student to merely appear in an examination cannot operate to waive substantive statutory academic deficiencies; mandate of the Rule remains undisturbed [Para 15].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – YD categorisation upheld – No interference warranted under Article 226 – No order as to costs.

Service Law – Examination Cancellation – Paper Leak – Assistant Professor Recruitment – Validity of Cancellation of Written Examination Result – Petitioners challenged the cancellation of result of written examination held on 16th/17th April 2025 for 910 posts of Assistant Professors in aided non-Government Post Graduate Colleges – Two FIRs were lodged immediately after examination alleging that question papers were sold to candidates for money – STF investigation identified 21 suspicious mobile numbers linked to accused; 19 candidates found to have passed the examination were connected to these numbers – Result declared on 04.09.2025 was cancelled vide notice dated 20.01.2026 – Held: Cancellation of result is valid and justified; petitions disposed of [Paras 3-4, 6, 27-28].

Systematic Irregularities – Standard of Proof – Probability Test – State not required to prove paper leak beyond reasonable doubt to cancel examination result – Two charge sheets filed on 08.06.2025 against four accused under Sections 112, 308(5) and 318(4) BNS for petty organised crime, extortion and cheating – STF report established prima facie that at least 19 candidates were benefited and papers of at least five subjects were leaked – Possibility of wider leakage not ruled out – Held: Decision passes the probability test; systemic irregularity established on available material [Paras 19-23].

Segregation of Tainted Candidates – When Entire Result Can Be Cancelled – Question of whether individual candidates could be segregated from tainted ones considered – Examination was limited in scope: 910 posts, 33 subjects, 52 centres, six districts, 224 petitioners before Court – Unlike Pan-India examinations, even limited irregularities in a narrow-campus examination justify cancellation of entire result when segregation of beneficiaries is not fully possible – Petitioners have no indefeasible right to be selected or compel continuation of a tainted process – Fresh examination schedule already published; petitioners may participate [Paras 14, 18, 24-27].

Candidate's Right – No Vested Right in Tainted Process – Selection process was not concluded; interview stage had not commenced – Petitioners cannot claim to be finally selected as they had yet to face interview – A candidate has no indefeasible right to force the State to conclude an examination process whose integrity has been compromised – Fairness of examination is paramount and cannot be permitted to be compromised under any circumstance [Paras 25-26].

Decision: Writ petitions disposed of – Impugned decision to cancel the result of written examination upheld – Petitioners at liberty to participate in fresh written examination for which schedule has been published.