Criminal Law – Rape – Appeal against conviction – Delay in FIR and Unexplained Silence – Conviction Set Aside – The prosecutrix reported repeated sexual assault months after the alleged incidents, only after pregnancy was discovered – No complaint made earlier despite residing with family – Held: Unexplained delay in filing complaint and absence of disclosure affects prosecution's credibility [Paras 27–29, 36–37].

Consent and Relationship – Affection and Voluntary Visits Undermine Coercion – Prosecutrix admitted to continued visits and developing feelings for appellant – First mention of threats came during deposition, absent in FIR and Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement – Held: Improvements in testimony and lack of contemporaneous fear suggest possibility of consensual relationship [Paras 13–15, 31–34].

Medical and Forensic Evidence – Paternity Established but Not Rape – DNA proved appellant was father of child but did not establish non-consensual intercourse – No signs of force or injury found – Held: Proof of intercourse without proving lack of consent insufficient for conviction under Section 376 IPC [Paras 35, 38].

Criminal Intimidation – Section 506 IPC – No Allegation in Initial Statements – Threats alleged for first time at trial – Held: Uncorroborated improved statements lacking contemporaneous evidence not sufficient for conviction – Section 506 charge unsustainable [Paras 40–43].

Decision: Appeal – Standard of Proof – Conviction Not Sustainable – Cumulative inconsistencies, unexplained delay, and absence of corroborative medical or forensic evidence raised serious doubts – Held: Prosecution failed to prove charges beyond reasonable doubt – Trial Court erred in convicting the appellant – Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence set aside – Appellant acquitted of all charges [Paras 44–48].
 

RERA Jurisdiction – Complaint maintainability against unregistered projects – Jurisdiction of RERA upheld - Petitioners contended that in the absence of registration under Section 3 of the RERA Act, the authority could not entertain complaints – Held that Section 31 vests jurisdiction in RERA to entertain complaints even against promoters of unregistered projects – Further held that registration is not a condition precedent for RERA's jurisdiction, especially when the statutory duties under Section 31, read with the definition of “promoter” under Section 2(zk), are wide enough to cover such promoters – Petition dismissed [Paras 2-28].

Alternative Remedy – Availability of Statutory Appeal under Section 43(5) of RERA Act – Writ Petition Not Maintainable - Court held that the proper remedy available to the petitioners was to file a statutory appeal against the impugned order before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 43(5) – Writ jurisdiction refused, as statutory appeal is the efficacious remedy [Paras 24-28].

Promoter Definition – Government Bodies and Statutory Authorities are also Promoters under RERA – Provisions Explained - The Court clarified that State Government agencies like Improvement Trusts, Development Authorities (HSVP, GMADA, PUDA) are deemed promoters under Section 2(zk)(iii) of the Act – Therefore, complaints against such authorities are maintainable before RERA [Paras 6-10].

Retroactivity of RERA – Applicability to ongoing projects - Supreme Court in “Newtech Promoters” approved retroactive application - Held that projects without completion certificate prior to RERA enforcement are subject to the Act – Ongoing projects covered under RERA even if commenced before the Act [Paras 12].

Final Decision – Writ Petition Dismissed - The Court rejected the petition challenging RERA’s jurisdiction – Petitioners given liberty to prefer statutory appeal under Section 43(5) with possible benefit under Section 14 of Limitation Act for exclusion of time spent in writ proceedings [Paras 28-29].
 

SARFAESI Act – Jurisdiction of Cooperative Court – Dispute Filed After Action Initiated by Secured Creditor – Held Not Maintainable – The sugar factory’s property was taken over by Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank under the SARFAESI Act and sold to Astoria, later purchased by the petitioner – Depositors filed disputes in Cooperative Court without impleading the Bank or Astoria – Held: In view of Sections 34 and 35 of the SARFAESI Act, Cooperative Court had no jurisdiction – Dispute and execution proceedings were not maintainable [Paras 14–19]. 
 
Non-Joinder of Necessary Parties – Bank and Purchaser Not Impleaded – Decree Passed in Their Absence – Decree Held to Be Nullity – The factory had disclosed in its reply that the property was already in possession of the Bank, but the depositors failed to implead the Bank or Astoria – Held: Non-joinder of necessary parties vitiated the Cooperative Court’s judgment – Appellate Court erred in not considering this [Paras 16, 18]. 
 
Special Law vs. General Law – SARFAESI Act Prevails Over MCS Act – Central Law Overrides State Enactment – The Court reiterated that once action is taken under SARFAESI Act, its provisions override those of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act – Civil Courts or Cooperative Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with such proceedings [Paras 15, 17]. 
 
Successor-in-Interest – Right to Challenge Proceedings – Petitioner Recognized as Successor of Astoria – Entitled to Challenge Decree – The petitioner, having purchased the property from Astoria, was recognized by earlier orders of the Court as having a right to contest proceedings – Held: Petitioner’s appeals should have been considered on merits by Appellate Court [Paras 9, 19]. 
 
Judgment – Writ Petitions Allowed – Orders of Cooperative Appellate Court Set Aside – High Court held that the Cooperative Court lacked jurisdiction due to prior SARFAESI action and the nonjoinder of necessary parties – Appeals allowed, and execution proceedings quashed [Paras 20]. 
 

Service Law – Public Recruitment – Technical Defect in Caste Certificate – Candidature Wrongly Rejected – Petitioner’s Scheduled Caste certificate was found valid but rejected for lacking registration number and date – The certificate had been issued before the cut-off date and the petitioner qualified through all stages – Held: A technical defect in a valid caste certificate beyond the candidate’s control cannot justify rejection – Such irregularities are procedural and not substantive [Paras 6-9].

Substantial Justice vs. Procedural Rigidity – Rule of Law with Equity – Court stressed that when procedural lapses and substantial rights conflict, justice must prevail – Reiterated that the role of courts is to ensure fairness, not let technicalities frustrate rightful claims – Held: Possession of eligibility is material, not mere technical form of proof [Paras 9-10].

Scope of Judicial Review – Recruitment Process – Power under Article 226 – The High Court held that in writ jurisdiction, the Court has the duty to intervene where rejection is arbitrary or unjustified – Reiterated that procedural norms must not override the objectives of equity and justice [Para 7].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Rejection of petitioner’s candidature by HPSC quashed – Direction issued to consider her result and appointment on merits subject to final selection process – Delay in document rectification due to technical reasons held insufficient to deny legitimate consideration [Final Relief Paragraph].

Anticipatory Bail – Allegation of Forged Certificates – Parity with Co-Accused – Bail Granted till Police Report – The applicants were accused of submitting forged documents for pharmacist registration – Held: Since co-accused similarly placed had been granted anticipatory bail and no distinguishing factor emerged, applicants are entitled to same protection – Bail granted until submission of police report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. [Paras 5, 8–10].

Prolonged Investigation – Applicants Cooperating – No Custodial Interrogation Needed – Investigation pending for over 3 years and applicants had cooperated – Held: Arrest not warranted in absence of necessity for custodial interrogation; protection from arrest justified [Paras 6, 9].

Judicial Discretion – Limited Protection under Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Supreme Court Guidelines Followed – Court relied on Nathu Singh v. State of U.P., 2021(6) SCC 64 – Held: Interim protection till filing of charge sheet permissible under settled law [Para 9].

Judgment – Anticipatory Bail Granted with Conditions – Application disposed of – Court directed that in case of arrest before filing of charge sheet, applicants be released on bail on furnishing bonds and sureties – Conditions imposed regarding cooperation, non-inducement of witnesses, and travel restrictions [Paras 10–11].

Regularization of Special Assistant Public Prosecutors – No Vested Right to Permanent Appointment – The petitioners, engaged under Section 25(3) of CrPC, sought regularization on the ground that they performed the same functions as A.P.Ps. under Section 25(1) – The Court held that their appointments were contractual and not against sanctioned posts – Held: Regularization cannot be claimed as a matter of right unless the appointment follows statutory rules and is against a permanent vacancy [Paras 20-23].

Parity in Pay Scale – No Equal Pay for Equal Work Between Contractual and Regular Employees – The petitioners argued that they should receive the same pay and benefits as regular A.P.Ps. since their duties were identical – The Court rejected this claim, emphasizing that employment under Section 25(3) CrPC was temporary and lacked service conditions akin to regular government employees – Held: Mere similarity in work does not entitle contractual employees to equal pay with regular employees [Paras 22-23].

Government Policy – Appointment of Special A.P.Ps. is Temporary and Contingent on Exigencies – The government, in response to the Supreme Court’s directives in S.B. Shahane v. State of Maharashtra, created temporary posts of Spl. A.P.Ps. to meet workload demands – The Court ruled that temporary engagements cannot evolve into a permanent cadre unless expressly provided by law – Held: The Government has the discretion to determine recruitment policies, and ad hoc appointments cannot seek tenure benefits [Paras 19, 25-26].

Judicial Precedents – No Automatic Regularization Without Statutory Backing – The Court relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, which held that irregular appointments cannot be regularized without adherence to statutory procedures – Held: Petitioners’ claim for permanent absorption is untenable in the absence of a recruitment process through MPSC [Para 26].

Decision: Writ petitions dismissed. Petitioners were not entitled to regularization or parity in service benefits. The government’s recruitment policies and service classification were upheld.
 

Civil Law - Validity of Sale Deeds – Protection of Rustic Village Widows – Application of Legal Test – The appellant, an illiterate widow, alleged that the respondents fraudulently obtained four sale deeds from her under the pretext of executing a power of attorney – The trial court declared the sale deeds void due to misrepresentation, but the first appellate court reversed this decision based solely on the Sub-Registrar’s endorsement – Held: Courts must apply the legal test laid down in Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai, which requires proving that an illiterate woman understood the nature of the transaction – The first appellate court erred in failing to apply this test and blindly relying on the Sub-Registrar’s endorsement [Paras 21-23, 35].

Burden of Proof – Onus on Beneficiary of Transaction with Illiterate Woman – The Supreme Court and Privy Council have consistently held that in transactions involving illiterate women, the burden lies on the party benefiting from the document to prove it was executed with full knowledge and free consent – The respondents failed to produce material witnesses, including the deed writer and attesting witnesses – Held: As per Hemchandra Roy Chowdhury v. Suradhoni Chowdhurani and Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai, mere registration of a document does not establish its validity if the executant is an illiterate, rustic widow – The failure of the respondents to discharge this burden strengthens the appellant’s claim [Paras 24-26, 31-33].

Counterclaim – Procedural Deficiency and Lack of Court Fee Payment – The respondents filed a counterclaim seeking recovery of possession but failed to pay the requisite court fees, and the appellant was not given an opportunity to file a written statement – The first appellate court erroneously granted relief based on this procedurally defective counterclaim – Held: As per Order VIII Rule 6(A) CPC, a counterclaim must be treated as a plaint, and failure to comply with procedural requirements renders it unsustainable [Paras 12-14].

Presumption of Title – Record of Rights Does Not Confer Ownership – The first appellate court granted title to the respondents based on entries in the Record of Rights – The High Court held that such entries are only prima facie evidence of possession and do not establish ownership – Held: The first appellate court’s reliance on revenue records to determine ownership was legally flawed [Paras 19, 35].

Decision: Second appeal allowed. The judgment of the first appellate court was set aside, and the trial court’s decree declaring the sale deeds void was restored.

Framing of Charge under Section 324 IPC – Justified under Section 216 CrPC – The appellant Ram Kailash Singh was charged under Section 324 IPC on the day of judgment. The Court held that Section 216 CrPC permits such alteration if no prejudice is caused – Held: Since full cross-examination had occurred and no objection was raised, framing of charge immediately prior to judgment was legally permissible and caused no prejudice [Paras 19-22].

Conviction under Section 324 IPC – Injury to Eye Witness Corroborated by Medical Evidence – Injured victim PW13 deposed that he was assaulted by Ram Kailash Singh with a rod, sustaining head and facial injuries – Testimony corroborated by PW20 (doctor) who treated him and found cut injuries requiring stitches – Held: Ocular and medical evidence established the offence under Section 324 IPC beyond doubt [Paras 26-28, 33-35].

Unlawful Assembly and Common Object – Conviction under Sections 307/149 IPC Sustainable – Although no charge under Sections 307/149 IPC was framed, the Court held that conviction was valid under Section 222(3) CrPC as an attempt to commit an offence is included within the substantive offence – Held: Accused formed unlawful assembly, hurled bombs at the victim Dukhiram intending to cause death – Conviction under Section 307/149 IPC upheld [Paras 40-44, 52-55].

Absence of Convincing Link to Section 302 IPC – Conversion to Attempt to Murder – Victim Dukhiram died two days after the bomb attack. Though injuries were serious and homicidal, there was insufficient evidence to prove that the death was directly due to the bombing – Held: Trial court rightly convicted the accused under Section 307/149 IPC instead of Section 302 IPC [Paras 60-62].

Direct Participation of Musafir Rai – Eyewitnesses Credible and Consistent – Multiple witnesses (PW3, PW4, PW5) consistently named Musafir Rai as one of the attackers who hurled bombs at the victim – Their testimonies were corroborated by medical and forensic evidence (PW20, PW21) and confirmed by chemical reports (Exhibit 7) – Held: Conviction of Musafir Rai is based on credible and consistent evidence [Paras 47-55].

Explosive Material Evidence – Scientific Corroboration through Forensic Reports – Seizure of bomb remnants and chemical examination confirmed use of arsenic and potassium chlorate, substances banned under the Explosives Act – Held: Forensic evidence strongly supported prosecution’s case of bomb use in the attack [Paras 53-55].

Decision: Appeals dismissed. Conviction of Ram Kailash Singh under Sections 324, 148, and 307/149 IPC and of Musafir Rai under Sections 148 and 307/149 IPC upheld. Appellants directed to surrender within two weeks or face arrest.

Taxation Law - Exemption Under Sections 11 and 12 – Investment in Subsidiary Not a Violation of Section 13(1)(d) – The Revenue contended that the respondent violated Section 13(1)(d) by investing in equity shares of BARC, thereby making it ineligible for exemption under Sections 11 and 12 – The respondent argued that the funds were deployed pursuant to a government policy directive and not as an investment for profit – Held: Since the deployment of funds was mandated by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB) for creating a transparent television rating system, it did not constitute an “investment” under Section 13(1)(d), and the respondent was entitled to exemption [Paras 24-26, 45-46].

Definition of ‘Investment’ – Absence of Profit Motive and Statutory Compliance – The Court examined the definition of ‘investment’ under various legal sources, including CIT v. Sir Sobha Singh Public Charitable Trust, (2001) 250 ITR 475 (Delhi) and Director of Income-tax (Exemption) v. Alarippu, (2000) 244 ITR 358 – Held: The essence of an investment lies in the intention to generate income, profit, or returns – Since BARC was a not-for-profit entity prohibited from distributing dividends, the respondent’s fund deployment was an application of income rather than an investment violating Section 13(1)(d) [Paras 37-39, 43-44].

Government Policy and Compliance – No Discretionary Investment Decision by Assessee – The formation of BARC was based on TRAI’s 2008 recommendations and MIB directives, requiring the respondent to retain a 60% shareholding – The Revenue’s contention that this constituted an investment for financial gain was rejected – Held: When fund deployment is dictated by government policy and regulatory mandates, it cannot be classified as an investment in the traditional sense [Paras 27-30].

Judicial Precedents on Investments by Charitable Institutions – Consistent Approach – The Court referred to CIT v. Dr. Vikhe Patil Foundation, [2014] 42 taxmann.com 190, where a charitable trust’s purchase of cooperative bank shares was deemed a regulatory requirement rather than an investment – Held: The rationale applies to the present case, as the respondent’s fund deployment was a legal obligation rather than a voluntary financial decision [Paras 42-44].

Decision: Appeal dismissed. The ITAT’s decision granting exemption under Sections 11 and 12 was upheld, and the questions of law were answered in favor of the respondent.