Constitutional Law - Writ Petition under Articles 226, 227 – Challenge to Appellate Authority Order – Petitioner challenged the order of the Commissioner, Gurugram, which directed payment of additional stamp duty on the deed of assignment. High Court exercised its jurisdiction to interpret relevant provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Held that the order of the Commissioner was incorrect – Writ petition allowed and the impugned order set aside. [Paras 1-26]

Stamp Duty on Deed of Assignment - Interpretation of Conveyance – Analysis – Held that a deed of assignment transferring the right to recover debts falls within the definition of 'conveyance' under Section 2(10) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The duty is determined by the amount of consideration paid for the assignment, not the total recoverable debt – Court directed that stamp duty should be calculated based on the consideration amount of Rs.3,04,00,000/- instead of the total recoverable debt of Rs.84,49,38,818/-. [Paras 8-13]

Decision – Quashing of Appellate Authority’s Order – Court quashed the order requiring additional stamp duty payment based on the total recoverable debt, directing that the matter be treated as closed with the excess amount paid to be treated as a penalty. No further recalculation or refund directed. [Paras 25-26]

Constitutional Law – Equality Before Law – Petition challenging the ten-year limit for considering sports achievements for government job eligibility under the sports quota – Petitioner’s earlier sports achievements excluded by the impugned Government Order – High Court finds the ten-year restriction arbitrary, lacking rational basis, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution – Impugned Government Order quashed – Held that the petitioner’s sports achievements must be considered without reference to their date of attainment – [Paras 1-23].

Administrative Law – Government Policy – Impugned Government Order issued as part of sports recruitment policy, intending to ensure representation by appointed sportspersons in respective departments for at least five years – Court rules that restricting sports achievement consideration to ten years does not logically support the intended policy outcome, thereby failing the rational nexus test – [Paras 14-20].

Judicial Review – Scope and Limitations – While courts typically do not interfere with executive policy, exceptions apply when a policy is shown to be arbitrary, irrational, or manifestly unjust – High Court exercises judicial review over the impugned Government Order due to its failure to satisfy the rational nexus test under Article 14 – [Paras 20-22].

DECISION: The petition is allowed – Government Order No. 8, dated 23.11.2020, is quashed with respect to the challenged provisions – Respondents directed to consider the petitioner’s sports performance without regard to the date of achievements – No order as to costs – All pending miscellaneous applications closed.

Administrative Law – Delay and Laches – Constructive Res Judicata – Writ petition challenging the cancellation of allotment and eviction orders dated 28.02.1996 and 17.05.1999, respectively, and the appellate order dated 15.05.2003. The petitioners approached the court in 2023, with an unreasonable delay in invoking writ jurisdiction. Held, the writ petition suffers from laches and undue delay, which disentitles the petitioners from discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, the doctrine of constructive res judicata applies, precluding the writ court from examining issues substantially decided in previous civil suits. Petition dismissed. [Paras 8, 14]

Equity – Delay in Legal Recourse – The petitioners' gross delay and indolence in invoking writ jurisdiction were not explained, rendering their approach to the court inequitable. Held, equitable relief cannot be granted to parties approaching the court after an inexplicably long delay. [Para 8]

Decision:

Petition dismissed. The court found no merit in the writ petition due to the unexplained delay and the principle of constructive res judicata. The orders of cancellation and eviction by the respondents were upheld. [Paras 14-15]

Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - constructive res judicata - Earlier petition dismissed but petitioner or their predecessor not impleaded - Causes of action, reliefs, and khasra numbers in the earlier petition similar to present petition - Doctrine of res judicata not applicable - Impugned orders suffer from a vice of breach to the principle of constructive res judicata - Multiplicity of proceedings - Menace of recurrence of proceedings - Statutory bar of estoppel operating against the Gram Panchayat concerned and authorities who drew the impugned annexures - Impugned annexures declared to be stained - Petition allowed.

Criminal Law – Circumstantial Evidence – Acquittal – Appeal by the State against the acquittal of the respondent for murder charges under IPC. The prosecution’s case was based on weak circumstantial evidence, unsubstantiated recovery claims, and inconsistencies in witness testimonies. Held, the circumstantial evidence presented failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyonda reasonable doubt. No valid recovery was made pursuant to disclosure statements barred by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Contradictions in witness testimonies and lack of forensic links between the accused and the crime scene led to the acquittal being upheld. [Paras 1-47]

Evidence Law – Disclosure Statements – Recovery – The disclosure statements made by the accused did not result in any valid recovery and were thus inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Held, without corroborative evidence or valid recoveries, the statements cannot be relied upon for conviction. [Para 22]

Last Seen Evidence – Contradictions – The prosecution’s theory of last seen was contradicted by the FIR and appeared to involve a witness introduced later in the investigation. Held, the last seen evidence was unreliable and insufficient to establish the accused’s presence with the deceased at the time of the crime. [Paras 23-26]

Decision:

Appeal dismissed. The acquittal of Vinod was upheld due to the prosecution’s failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt through credible circumstantial evidence. [Para 47]

Village Common Lands – Eviction Petition – Ownership and Control – Writ petition against eviction orders under Sections 4 and 5 of the Punjab Public Premises Act, 1973. The Gram Panchayat sought eviction of the petitioners from the land described as "Gair Mumkin Abadi." The petitioners contended that the land, recorded as "JumlaMushtarka Malkan" in ownership and "Maqbuja Malkan" in possession, did not vest in the Gram Panchayat but in the village proprietary body, hence the Panchayat could not initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands Act, 1961. Held, the Gram Panchayat has management and control over such lands, not ownership, making the eviction petition under the Act of 1973 valid. Petition dismissed. [Paras 1-14]

Revenue Records – Land Classification – Abadi Deh vs. Gair Mumkin Abadi – The petitioners argued the land fell under "abadi deh" and thus outside "shamlat deh." Held, the land was recorded as "Gair Mumkin Abadi," not "abadi deh," and the Gram Panchayat did not hold absolute ownership. Therefore, proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1973 were appropriate. [Paras 6-10]

Estoppel – Challenge to Consolidation Scheme – Petitioners are estopped from challenging the designations made in the consolidation scheme since they challenged the orders only on maintainability grounds. Held, any dispute regarding land designated during consolidation should have been raised at that stage, not through the current proceedings. [Para 12]

Decision:

Petition dismissed. The institution of the eviction petition under Sections 4 and 5 of the Punjab Public Premises Act, 1973, is valid as the Gram Panchayat has management and control rights over the land, though not ownership. The land's classification as "Gair Mumkin Abadi" stands, and the petitioners are estopped from challenging the consolidation designations. [Para 14]

Doctrine of lis pendens – Collusive decree – Validity – Land dispute – Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaration that order passed by High Court was collusive and not binding on their ownership rights – Plaintiffs claimed to have purchased the land in question through sale deeds – Defendants denied allegations and raised legal objections – Trial court decreed suit in favor of plaintiffs – Defendants appealed – District Judge upheld trial court’s decision – Regular Second Appeal filed before High Court – Concurrent findings in favor of plaintiffs – Held, no reason to overturn lower court’s judgments – Doctrine of lis pendens not applicable as proceedings were collusive – Appeal dismissed.

Relevant Paragraphs: 11, 12, 13, 14.

Service Law – Assured Career Progression (ACP) – Regular Satisfactory Service – Writ petition seeking modification of the date of grant of first ACP from March 1, 2019, to June 25, 2016. The petitioner contended that he completed eight years of regular satisfactory service in 2016 and was entitled to the ACP from that date. Held, imposition of fines as punishments does not constitute a blot on the petitioner’s career that would deny him the ACP. Furthermore, most of the penalties were imposed after the petitioner completed the requisite eight years of service. The petitioner is entitled to the ACP from June 25, 2016. [Paras 1-9]

Interpretation – Regular Satisfactory Service – The term "regular satisfactory service" means continuous service counting towards seniority, commencing from the date of joining after regular recruitment. Punishments imposed by fines should not deny eligibility for ACP if they do not significantly impact the service record. Held, fines imposed on the petitioner do not justify denial of ACP. [Paras 5-8]

Decision: Writ petition disposed of. Respondents are directed to consider the petitioner's case for the first ACP grade from June 25, 2016, subject to fulfilling other conditions laid down in the 2008 Rules. The consideration should be completed within four months, and consequential benefits should be paid within two months thereafter, with interest at 6% per annum for any delay. [Paras 9-10]

Administrative Law – Recruitment Process – Cut-off Dates – Writ petition filed by the petitioner to allow submission of an application form under the BC-B Ex-servicemen (ESM) category after the cut-off date for submission had passed. The petitioner acquired the required certificate after the cut-off date. Held, cut-off dates in the recruitment process are sacrosanct and must be followed without exception. The certificate obtained after the cut-off date cannot be considered. Petition dismissed. [Paras 1-9]

Recruitment – Eligibility Certificate – Timeliness – The petitioner, though qualified in the written examination, sought to submit an eligibility certificate acquired after the declared cut-off date. Held, the petitioner failed to provide evidence of possessing the eligibility certificate by the specified cut-off date. The Supreme Court’s judgment in Dolly Chhanda’s case underscores that eligibility must be met by the last date specified, barring any explicit provisions to the contrary. [Para 8]

Decision:

Petition dismissed. The Court found no merit in the petitioner’s case, emphasizing the adherence to the fixed cut-off date for submission of required documents. [Para 9]