POCSO Act – Serious Nature of Allegations – Bail Rejected – The petitioner was accused of multiple offenses under the IPC and POCSO Act, including sexual assault, conspiracy, and intimidation – The prosecution argued that the victim had committed suicide under mysterious circumstances, further complicating the case – Held: Given the gravity of allegations and potential impact on trial proceedings, bail was denied [Paras 1-6].

Prior Criminal History – Impact on Bail Consideration – The petitioner was previously involved in multiple criminal cases, including cases registered under Sections 120B, 406, 420, and 498A IPC – The Court considered the petitioner’s past record as a relevant factor in denying bail – Held: Repeat involvement in serious offenses diminishes the credibility of the bail plea [Paras 7-9].

Supreme Court Precedents – Bail Not to be Granted Mid-Trial – The Court relied on X v. State of Rajasthan, SLP (Criminal) No. 13378/2024, where the Supreme Court emphasized that bail should not ordinarily be granted in serious offenses once trial has commenced – Held: Since trial was underway and prosecution witnesses were being examined, bail was not justified [Paras 10-12].

Bail Application Rejected – No Infringement of Speedy Trial Rights – The petitioner argued that he had been incarcerated since 15.06.2024, but the Court noted that trial was proceeding and had not been unduly delayed – Held: The right to a speedy trial had not been violated, and bail was denied at this stage [Paras 13-15].
 

Quashing of FIR – Prima Facie Case Made Out – Petition Dismissed – The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR registered under Sections 354D, 509, 504, and 506(2) IPC, alleging that the complaint was a counterblast to an earlier case filed by him – The Court observed that the FIR detailed specific allegations, including stalking, obscene gestures, and threats of revenge using occult practices – Held: Since the FIR disclosed a cognizable offense, the Court refused to interfere at this stage and dismissed the petition [Paras 5.1-5.5].

Plea of Counterblast FIR – No Merit – The petitioner contended that the FIR was a retaliatory action due to an earlier complaint filed by him – The Court held that even if there were previous disputes, the allegations in the present case had to be independently examined – Held: Mere existence of prior litigation does not automatically render a subsequent FIR false [Paras 5.2-5.3].

Judicial Precedents on Quashing – FIR Cannot Be Quashed Based on Disputed Facts – The Court referred to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, which establish that quashing of FIRs should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases – Held: Since the allegations in the FIR prima facie disclosed a cognizable offense, the Court could not quash it at this stage [Paras 5.5-5.6].

Stage of Criminal Proceedings – Court Cannot Interfere Before Trial – The investigation had already resulted in the filing of a charge sheet, and trial proceedings were at an advanced stage – The Court reiterated that interference at this stage would be inappropriate – Held: Petitioner should contest the charges in trial; quashing petition dismissed [Para 6].
Decision: Petition dismissed – The Court refused to quash the FIR, holding that a prima facie case existed, and the petitioner should contest the allegations during trial – No interim relief granted.
 

Defamation – False and Malicious Publication – Freedom of Press Not Absolute – The plaintiff alleged that two articles published in Junior Vikatan falsely accused him of misusing public funds in the Sethusamudram Project and making derogatory remarks about a senior political leader – The Court held that while the press has freedom under Article 19(1)(a), it is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) – Held: The article published on 22.12.2013 was defamatory, as it falsely attributed statements to the plaintiff without verification, damaging his reputation [Paras 16-19].

Limitation in Defamation Suits – Time-Bound Filing – The defendants contended that the suit regarding the 28.03.2012 article was barred by limitation under the one-year limitation period for defamation suits – The Court upheld this contention, holding that the suit was filed in 2014, beyond the permissible time limit – Held: The defamation claim regarding the 28.03.2012 article was dismissed on limitation grounds [Para 15].

Journalistic Responsibility – Verification of Facts Before Publication – The defendants failed to verify the authenticity of the statements attributed to the plaintiff in the 22.12.2013 article, falsely claiming that he referred to a senior political leader as a "small boy" – Held: Press freedom does not extend to publishing unverified allegations or fabricated statements, and defamatory reporting cannot be shielded under the right to free speech [Paras 16-18].

Right to Privacy and Reputation – Constitutional Safeguards – The plaintiff invoked Article 21, arguing that the defamatory publications violated his right to dignity and privacy – The Court held that even public figures have a right to reputation, and defamatory articles intended to tarnish one's public image without factual basis are actionable – Held: The publication caused mental distress and reputational harm, entitling the plaintiff to damages [Para 19].

Permanent Injunction Against Future Publications – Denied – The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from publishing any future defamatory content – The Court rejected this request, ruling that future publications must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and a blanket injunction would violate press freedom – Held: Damages granted, but no preemptive restriction on future publications [Para 20].

Decision: Suit Partly Allowed – Damages – Compensation Awarded for Reputational Harm – The defamatory article dated 22.12.2013 was found to have tarnished the plaintiff’s public image and caused mental distress – The Court held that defendants had acted irresponsibly by publishing unverified and defamatory content – Held: Plaintiff awarded Rs. 25,00,000 as compensation for reputational damage, to be paid within one month [Para 20].

Specific Performance – Time as Essence of Contract – Relief Denied – The suit agreement stipulated payment of the balance consideration by 31-10-1994 – The plaintiff failed to pay within the stipulated period and did not issue any notice expressing readiness and willingness – The trial court overlooked material evidence demonstrating the plaintiff’s inaction – Held: Time was of the essence of the contract, and the plaintiff’s failure to act diligently disentitled him to specific performance [Paras 16-19, 34].

Readiness and Willingness – Plaintiff’s Failure to Perform Obligations – Contract Terminated – Readiness requires financial capacity, and willingness requires consistent action – The plaintiff neither paid the balance amount nor took steps to finalize the transaction – The defendant’s legal notice dated 26-10-1994 demanding payment was ignored – Held: Plaintiff failed to establish continuous readiness and willingness, warranting dismissal of the suit for specific performance [Paras 20-22, 36].

Discretionary Relief in Specific Performance – Courts Must Consider Delay and Conduct – Relief in specific performance is discretionary, and courts must examine whether the plaintiff unreasonably delayed seeking enforcement – The plaintiff initiated legal proceedings years after the contractual deadline without justification – Held: Mere filing of a suit within the limitation period does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to relief – Courts must scrutinize laches and inequitable conduct [Paras 17, 31, 33].

Alternative Relief – Refund of Advance Consideration with Interest Ordered – The agreement was admitted, and the defendant received Rs.2,50,000/- as advance – Though the plaintiff did not seek a refund, courts can grant such relief under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act – Held: Defendant directed to refund Rs.2,50,000/- with 12% interest from 01-11-1994 till payment to ensure equitable relief [Paras 38-40].

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the trial court decreeing specific performance is set aside. The plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance of the agreement dated 30-05-1994. However, in the interest of justice, the first defendant is directed to refund Rs.2,50,000/- to the plaintiff along with 12% per annum interest from 01-11-1994 until payment. Each party shall bear their own costs.

Property Law – Co-Sharer’s Rights – Mutation Does Not Confer Title – Held: Mutation No. 2116 Declared Illegal – Plaintiffs sought declaration of ownership and possession over 16 Kanals of land – Defendants claimed rights through Mutation No. 2116, which was based on a 1977 sale deed – Court held that mutation entries do not create or extinguish title and cannot grant ownership of specific Khasra Numbers without partition – Defendants had no valid claim [Paras 3-5, 13].

Co-Sharers – Alienation of Specific Khasra Numbers – Not Permissible Without Partition – Held: A co-sharer cannot alienate specific Khasra Numbers without partition – Sale by Ajaib Singh, a co-sharer, in 1977 did not grant exclusive rights to the defendants – Defendants' claim was contrary to settled law – Sale deed did not specify particular land parcels, and mutation based on such a sale is invalid [Paras 10-12].

Civil Procedure – Permanent Injunction – Protection of Possession of Co-Sharers – Held: Plaintiffs Entitled to Injunction – Defendants never took possession even after the 1977 sale deed – Trial Court found plaintiffs in settled possession – Admission by DW-1 Balbir Singh confirmed that defendants were never in possession – Court rightly restrained defendants from interfering with plaintiffs' possession [Paras 12, 13].

Decision – Second Appeal Dismissed – No Substantial Question of Law – Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the findings of the lower courts were correct and based on settled legal principles – No substantial question of law was involved – Appeal dismissed [Paras 12-13].

Labour Law – Right to Legal Representation in Domestic Enquiry – Permissibility under Standing Orders – Clause 25(4) of the Model Standing Orders does not provide for engagement of an Advocate as a defence representative – Held: Legal representation is permissible only if the employer is represented by a legally trained mind – Industrial Court’s order allowing an Advocate for the employee without evidence of the employer’s representative being legally trained is erroneous – Order set aside [Paras 14-16, 33-34].

Principles of Natural Justice – Right to Fair Representation – Legally Trained Mind Concept – Precedents establish that an employee can seek legal representation when pitted against a legally trained mind – Held: Mere post-graduate degree in Human Resource Management does not make an employer’s representative a legally trained mind – No pleadings or evidence established that the employer’s representative had legal expertise or handled multiple domestic enquiries – Order granting an Advocate to represent the employee is unsustainable [Paras 17-19, 32-33].

Enquiry Officer’s Legal Background – Whether Sufficient for Granting Legal Representation – Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra v. Delhi University held that a legally trained Enquiry Officer does not automatically entitle an employee to legal representation – Held: Enquiry Officer's legal background alone does not justify permitting an Advocate for the employee – Industrial Court’s reasoning is contrary to settled law [Paras 16-18, 27].

Employer’s Representative – Qualification and Experience – Legal Training Not Established – Industrial Court assumed that the employer’s representative was legally trained without factual basis – Held: Absence of pleadings proving that the management representative had legal expertise or had conducted multiple domestic enquiries – Granting an Advocate to the employee was improper and against judicial precedents [Paras 19-22, 33].

Precedents Relied Upon – Applicability and Interpretation – Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Nadkarni and J.K. Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corp. held that denial of legal representation violates natural justice when an employer’s representative is legally trained – Held: These cases do not apply where no evidence shows that the management representative was legally trained – Industrial Court erred in its application of these judgments [Paras 26-30].

Decision – Writ Petition Allowed – Industrial Court’s Order Set Aside – Industrial Court’s decision permitting legal representation for the employee is unsustainable – Held: Employee can nominate a defence representative as per Clause 25(4) of the Model Standing Orders – Petition allowed and rule made absolute [Paras 34-35].

Bail - NDPS Act – Prolonged Incarceration – Right to Speedy Trial – Bail Granted Despite Section 37 Bar – Petitioner was in custody for 1 year and 6 months – Trial Court reported that the case would take another six months for completion – Held: Prolonged incarceration without trial violates Article 21 of the Constitution – Supreme Court precedents establish that when trial delay is attributable to prosecution, statutory restrictions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be relaxed – Bail granted with conditions [Paras 8-9].

Bail Jurisprudence – Bail is the Rule, Jail is the Exception – Constitutional Considerations – Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement and Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India emphasized that bail should not be withheld as punishment – Held: Courts should not mechanically reject bail under stringent laws – Bail must be considered if statutory conditions are met – Denial of bail in deserving cases violates Article 21 – Petitioner entitled to bail [Paras 10-11].

Order of Sessions Court – Trial Delays Justify Bail – Balancing Liberty and Public Interest – Trial Court stated that framing of charges was completed on 26.12.2024, but 38 witnesses were yet to be examined – Case disposal expected to take six more months – Held: Delay not attributable to petitioner – Supreme Court has held that liberty under Article 21 overrides statutory bar in cases of unreasonable trial delays – Bail granted with strict conditions [Paras 7-9].

Decision: Bail application allowed – Petitioner released on bail with strict conditions ensuring trial participation and non-interference with witnesses

Adverse Possession – Khatedari Rights over SC/ST Land – Section 42(b), Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 – Claim Rejected – The petitioners sought declaration of khatedari rights based on adverse possession over land purchased from a Scheduled Caste person in 1965 – The sale was in violation of Section 42(b) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, which prohibits transfer of land belonging to SC/ST to a non-SC/ST person – Held: A person who purchases land in contravention of Section 42 cannot claim khatedari rights through adverse possession, as the prohibition under the Act is absolute – Petition dismissed [Paras 5, 9, 10].

Res Judicata – Applicability in Proceedings under Section 183B, Rajasthan Tenancy Act – Not Applicable – The petitioners contended that findings in the ejectment proceedings under Section 183B, recognizing their adverse possession, had attained finality and thus should operate as res judicata – Held: The principle of res judicata does not apply as the subject matter in the proceedings under Section 183B (ejectment of trespassers) and the suit for declaration of khatedari rights were distinct and independent – Petition dismissed [Paras 7, 8].

Void Sale – Consequences of Violation of Section 42(b), Rajasthan Tenancy Act – Legal Effect – The land was recorded in the name of the seller’s son, and the sale in 1965 was against the provisions of Section 42(b) – Held: The sale transaction was void ab initio, and no legal right, title, or interest could be conferred upon the petitioners – The concurrent findings of the revenue authorities were upheld – Petition dismissed [Paras 6, 9, 10].

Writ Jurisdiction – Challenge to Concurrent Findings – No Legal or Factual Error – The petitioners failed to establish any legal infirmity in the findings of the revenue authorities and the Board of Revenue – Held: There was no factual or legal error in the impugned orders – Petition dismissed [Para 10].
 

Civil Law - Summary Suit – Unconditional Leave to Defend Required When Defence is Plausible – The High Court ruled that under Order 37 CPC, if the defendant raises a triable issue or plausible defence, unconditional leave must be granted – The trial court erred in holding the defence plausible but improbable while imposing a 50% bank guarantee requirement, contrary to Supreme Court precedent [Paras 9-10].

Legal Principles – Failure to Follow Supreme Court Guidelines on Leave to Defend – The trial court ignored the well-settled law laid down in Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation, (1976) 4 SCC 687, which categorically states that conditions of security can only be imposed if the defence is sham or illusory – The Court reiterated this principle, emphasizing that once a plausible defence is shown, the defendant must be granted unconditional leave [Paras 8-9].

Misapplication of Law – Conditional Leave with Bank Guarantee Held Invalid – The Court found that the trial court misapplied the law by requiring the defendant to furnish a 50% bank guarantee, despite accepting that the defence was plausible – Such a condition was arbitrary and legally unsustainable, leading to a failure of justice [Paras 10-11].

Supervisory Jurisdiction – Petition Treated Under Article 227 – Since the trial court’s order resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to correct the error – The respondent’s preliminary objection on maintainability was rejected [Para 10].

Decision – Conditional Leave Set Aside – Defendant Granted Unconditional Leave to Defend – The High Court quashed the trial court’s condition requiring a bank guarantee and granted the defendant unconditional leave to defend the suit – Trial court directed to proceed further in accordance with law [Paras 11-12].