Specific Performance – Maintainability of Suit – Unilateral Termination of Agreement to Sale – Declaratory Relief – Where Agreement Contains No Termination Clause – Where a vendor unilaterally cancels an Agreement to Sale (ATS) without any contractual right to do so, such termination amounts to a repudiatory breach, and the vendee is entitled to directly seek specific performance without first obtaining a declaratory relief that the termination was bad in law – The ATS in question contained no clause permitting the vendor to cancel it or forfeit earnest money; Clause 8 expressly conferred upon the vendee the right to sue for specific performance even if the vendor refused to execute the sale deed – Held: In the absence of a termination clause, unilateral cancellation by the vendor is a breach of contract, not a valid termination, and no declaratory relief is a precondition to the suit for specific performance [Paras 7.7 to 7.13].

Time – Essence of Contract – Sale of Immovable Property – Mere Stipulation of Time Period Insufficient – In contracts for sale of immovable property, there is a well-settled presumption that time is not the essence of the contract – A mere six-month time limit in Clause 6 of the ATS does not, by itself, render time the essence of the contract – The intention to make time the essence must be expressed in unequivocal language and must be gathered from the express terms, nature of property, and surrounding circumstances – In the present case, no clause provided for termination or rescission upon non-adherence to the time limit, and Clause 7 required government permissions which themselves could cause delay – Held: Time was not the essence of the contract [Paras 7.22 to 7.24].

Readiness and Willingness – Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Conduct of Plaintiff – Continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract is a condition precedent to the grant of specific performance and must be proved throughout the period from the date of the contract till the date of the decree – In the present case, the plaintiff paid Rs. 2,000/- as earnest money at execution and thereafter paid a further Rs. 6,000/- as evidenced by an entry in defendant no. 1's own handwriting in the plaintiff's diary (Exh. 108) – The plaintiff consistently asserted readiness to execute the sale-deed and promptly replied to the vendor's cancellation notice – The vendor, on the other hand, made inconsistent statements and changed his version repeatedly – Held: Plaintiff proved continuous readiness and willingness; the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform [Paras 7.14 to 7.21].

Bona Fide Purchaser – Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Sections 41 and 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Constructive Notice – Good Faith – A subsequent purchaser who fails to make reasonable inquiries into the title of the property before purchase cannot claim the protection of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice – Defendant No. 2 admitted that no public notice was published and no title clearance certificate was obtained prior to purchase – The vendor (Defendant No. 1) had sold the property in violation of a subsisting injunction order – The doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act binds subsequent purchasers irrespective of actual notice of the injunction – Held: Defendant No. 2 failed to prove good faith and absence of notice; he is bound by the decree for specific performance [Paras 7.25 to 7.29].

Decision: Both appeals dismissed – Judgment and decree of the City Civil Court in Civil Suit No. 4584 of 1986 confirmed and approved – Decree for specific performance upheld, sale-deed executed by Defendant No. 1 in favour of Defendant No. 2 declared illegal, null and void – Costs awarded in favour of the plaintiff – Operation of the judgment stayed for two weeks on the request of appellants' counsel.

Co-operative Law – Inquiry under Section 51 – Scope – District Bank employees – Fake loans – Primary Agricultural Co-operative Societies affiliated to the Guntur District Co-operative Central Bank found to have admitted fake members, disbursed loans without verification, and ignored circulars – Inquiry conducted under Section 51 of the AP Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 – Inquiry Officer recommended civil, criminal and disciplinary action against employees of both the Primary Societies and the District Bank – Appellants, being District Bank employees deputed to oversee loan disbursement, challenged the inquiry reports and consequential proceedings – Held: Inquiry under Section 51 is a general inquiry into the affairs of the society and there is no restriction on examining the role of outsiders whose actions may have affected the society – Contention that inquiry cannot extend to non-employees rejected [Paras 13, 19].

Surcharge Proceedings – Section 60 – Applicability – Employees of District Bank not amenable – Section 60 permits surcharge proceedings only against past or present officers or servants of the society or persons entrusted with its organisation, affairs or management – Appellants being employees of the District Bank and not employees or members of the Primary Societies subjected to inquiry – No material placed that appellants were entrusted with the organisation or management of the Primary Societies – Held: Surcharge proceedings under Section 60 cannot be initiated against the appellants – Affirmed: K. Satyanarayana and Ors. v. A.P. Co-operative Tribunal, Visakhapatnam [Paras 15, 16, 17].

Disciplinary and Criminal Proceedings – Permissible – While surcharge proceedings under Section 60 are impermissible against District Bank employees, disciplinary and criminal proceedings based on information in the inquiry report remain open – Inquiry report is not a settled finding of fact – Authorities may proceed on the basis of information available in the report – Appellants entitled to rebut allegations in such proceedings [Paras 18, 19, 20].

Decision: Writ Appeals partly allowed – Respondents restrained from taking further steps under Section 60 of the Act against the appellants – Liberty reserved to respondents to initiate disciplinary or criminal proceedings as thought fit – All questions of fact left open – Neither this order nor the Single Judge's judgment to be treated as a finding of fact.

Criminal Law – NDPS Act – Regular Bail – Third Attempt – Implication Solely on Co-Accused Disclosure Statement – Petitioner arrested on 10.08.2025 in FIR No.176 dated 03.07.2025 for offences under Sections 21, 29, 27-A NDPS Act and Section 25 Arms Act – Recovery of 1.40 kg heroin, two pistols and live cartridges effected from co-accused's premises; further 573 grams heroin and drug money of ₹28,000 recovered from Ludhiana flat – Petitioner nominated as accused on 14.07.2025 solely on basis of disclosure statements of co-accused Ayush Mishra alias Brahmin and Mehak alias Seerat – No recovery from petitioner's possession; petitioner not present at spot – Challan presented on 24.12.2025; 34 prosecution witnesses cited; none examined – Petitioner in custody for over 8 months and 4 days; not involved in any other FIR – First and second bail pleas dismissed as withdrawn – Held: Disclosure statement of co-accused is a weak piece of evidence and cannot be sole basis for implicating accused; trial procrastinating without fault of petitioner; prolonged incarceration militates against Article 21; rigour of Section 37 NDPS Act diluted in light of fundamental right to speedy trial; bail granted [Paras 2–6.4].

NDPS Act – Disclosure Statement of Co-Accused – Evidentiary Value – A confession or disclosure statement made by a co-accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is inherently a weak piece of evidence – Such statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction or implication of an accused and must be scrutinised with utmost caution in conjunction with other substantive evidence – Final evidentiary value and admissibility thereof falls within the domain of the trial Court – Courts adjudicating bail must nevertheless examine the nature and quality of linking evidence to prevent misuse of the process of law – Relied upon: Anshul Sardana v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-65094-2024 (2025:PHHC:004198) [Para 6, 6.1].

Constitutional Law – Right to Speedy Trial – Article 21 – Prolonged Incarceration – Dilution of Section 37 NDSS Act – Right to speedy trial is an essential component of the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 – This right operates from the stage of arrest through investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision – Pre-trial detention of an accused, presumed innocent, must not be permitted to transform into punitive imprisonment due to delays not attributable to the accused – Where trial fails to conclude within reasonable time, the rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act stand diluted and conditional liberty may be granted – Courts cannot be complicit in violation of fundamental rights notwithstanding statutory embargo – Relied upon: Kulwinder v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695) [Paras 6.2, 6.3].

Bail – Second/Successive Bail Petitions – Maintainability and Principles – A second or successive regular bail petition is maintainable in law and cannot be rejected solely on grounds of maintainability – Such petition is maintainable whether earlier was dismissed on merits or as withdrawn – For a successive bail petition to succeed, petitioner must show substantial change in circumstances; superficial or ostensible change does not suffice – No exhaustive guidelines can be laid down as to what constitutes substantial change; it is best left to judicial wisdom and discretion – Cogent reasons must be recorded where Court grants successive bail plea – Relied upon: Rafiq Khan v. State of Haryana and Another, CRA-S-2332-2023 [Para 6.4].

Decision: Petition allowed – Petitioner ordered to be released on regular bail subject to furnishing bail/surety bonds and standard conditions including non-tampering with evidence, non-absence during trial, deposit of passport, monthly affidavit of non-involvement in offences, and provision of cellphone number to Investigating Officer.

Land Acquisition – National Highways Act, 1956 – Interest on Enhanced Compensation – Applicability of Section 72 of the 2013 Act – Petitioners' land measuring 284.98 Marlas acquired for Delhi-Amritsar-Katra National Highway vide Notifications under Sections 3-A and 3-D of the 1956 Act – CALA Award at Rs. 5,363/- per Marla – Arbitrator enhanced market value to Rs. 15,00,000/- per acre with 100% solatium and 12% additional interest from date of Section 3-A notification to first Award – However, Arbitrator awarded interest at flat 9% on enhanced amount from date of filing of application till deposit under Section 3-H(5) of 1956 Act, instead of 9% for the first year and 15% per annum thereafter from date of possession as mandated by Section 72 of the 2013 Act – Held: Arbitrator manifestly erred in law – Petitioners entitled to interest in terms of Section 72 of the 2013 Act [Paras 1–5, 8, 18].

Applicability of 2013 Act to Acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 – Section 105 of the 2013 Act – Ministry of Rural Development Gazette Notification dated 28.08.2015 – Schedules I, II and III of the 2013 Act made expressly applicable to acquisitions under enactments in the Fourth Schedule including the 1956 Act – Interest being an integral component of just compensation, the beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act including higher interest rates prevail over Section 3-H(5) of the 1956 Act – Restriction of interest to Section 3-H(5) would result in impermissible discrimination between similarly situated landowners in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution – Held: Interest at 9% and 15% under Section 72 of the 2013 Act applies to acquisitions under the 1956 Act [Paras 9, 9.1, 9.2, 9.4].

Interest on Original Compensation – Section 80 of the 2013 Act – Section 3-H(5) of the 1956 Act provides for interest only on excess amount determined by the Arbitrator and contains no provision for interest where compensation is not paid or deposited before taking possession – Section 80 of the 2013 Act, being a more beneficial provision and forming part of compensation, applicable to acquisitions under the 1956 Act – Held: Petitioners entitled to interest on compensation originally determined by CALA also in terms of Section 80 of the 2013 Act [Para 9.3].

Parity Among Similarly Situated Landowners – Article 14 – Arbitrator relied upon earlier awards of the same village Tibber (dated 07.12.2023 and 28.08.2024) which had granted interest at 9% and 15% and had been acted upon by NHAI – Despite taking parity in market value from these awards, Arbitrator denied parity in interest without cogent justification – Such differential treatment of identically situated landowners is arbitrary and strikes at the mandate of Article 14 – Held: Arbitrator's failure to extend identical treatment constitutes a manifest error [Para 10].

Writ Jurisdiction – Maintainability – Alternative Remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Remedy under Section 34 limited to setting aside the award; no power of modification – Relegation to Section 34 would be wholly inefficacious when the controversy is narrow and identically placed landowners have already obtained the same relief – Statutory arbitration under the 1956 Act involves arbitrators appointed by the Central Government, unlike consensual arbitration, warranting broader supervisory scrutiny – Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 being plenary, exercise thereof justified to remedy manifest arbitrariness and ensure just compensation – Rule of exhaustion of alternative remedies is one of convenience and discretion, not of law, and does not oust the Court's jurisdiction – Held: Writ petition maintainable [Paras 11–17].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – Award dated 27.10.2025 modified to the extent that petitioners are entitled to interest at 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum thereafter on the enhanced amount from the date of possession in terms of Section 72 of the 2013 Act – Petitioners also entitled to interest on the amount originally determined by CALA in terms of Section 80 of the 2013 Act [Para 18].

Domestic Violence – Interim Custody of Minor Child – Tender Age – Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Section 23(1) – Respondent-wife filed application under Section 12 of the DV Act alleging cruelty, taunting for dowry, and threats to separate her from her minor son aged 8-10 months – Trial Court granted interim custody of minor child to respondent-mother and directed petitioner No. 1 to pay interim maintenance of Rs. 3,500/- (Rs. 2,000/- to wife and Rs. 1,500/- to child) with visitation rights to father on Sundays – First appellate court affirmed – Held: Minor child of tender age of 8-10 months rightly placed in custody of mother; no error or infirmity in the orders of the Courts below; interim maintenance of Rs. 3,500/- is reasonable and sustainable at this stage; merits of the case to be determined by the trial court upon evidence [Paras 11–13].

Supervisory Jurisdiction – Article 227 of the Constitution of India – Scope and Limits – High Court under Article 227 does not act as a court of first appeal and cannot reappreciate or reweigh evidence – Power is exercisable sparingly only in cases of grave injustice, flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law, assumption or non-exercise of jurisdiction, or where the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person could arrive at the same – High Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the subordinate court merely to correct an error not apparent on the face of the record – Held: No occasion to exercise supervisory jurisdiction as the orders passed by the Courts below are legal, valid and sustainable [Paras 14–16].

Interim Maintenance – Mental Incapacity Plea – Husband's Contention – Petitioner No. 1 contended that his mental state was not sound and, therefore, interim maintenance ought not to have been fastened upon him – Held: Petitioner No. 1 himself preferred appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge and signed the present petition before the High Court; plea of mental incapacity is therefore not sustainable; the merits of the case shall be decided by the trial court upon the parties adducing evidence [Para 13].

Decision: Petition dismissed — Orders of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kullu dated 28.04.2023 and Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu dated 16.10.2024 affirmed — Parties to bear their own costs — Observations not to be treated as expression of opinion on merits of the main case.

Criminal Law – Proclaimed Offender – Quashing of Proclamation – Non-Compliance with Section 82 Cr.P.C. – Petitioner released on bail in 1981 and migrated to Canada in May 1981, as evidenced by Immigration Certificate showing original entry date of 09.05.1981 – Only summons and non-bailable warrants issued; mandatory 30-day period not afforded – Report dated 06.12.1983 stating petitioner refused summons contradicted by Immigration Certificate establishing petitioner's absence from India – Co-accused acquitted vide judgment dated 23.11.1987 – Petitioner granted Canadian citizenship in 1990 and came to know of proceedings only in February 2024 – Pursuant to this Court's order dated 17.03.2026, petitioner appeared before Court below and was released on interim bail vide order dated 25.03.2026 – Held: Impugned order dated 10.12.1983 is in clear contravention of Section 82 Cr.P.C.; Court below failed to record requisite judicial satisfaction regarding absconding or concealment; proclamation issued in mechanical and perfunctory manner; order quashed – All consequential proceedings arising therefrom also quashed [Paras 1–11].

Proclamation – Mandatory Requirements – Section 82 Cr.P.C. – Essential Conditions – Prior issuance of warrant is a sine qua non for proclamation – Court must record satisfaction on material on record that accused has absconded or is concealing himself so that warrant cannot be executed – Proclamation must specify date and place of appearance not less than 30 clear days from date of publication – Publication must be effected in all three modes under Section 82(2)(i) conjunctively, namely: public reading at conspicuous place of ordinary residence, affixation at house or conspicuous place of town/village, and affixation at courthouse – Statement of serving officer as to date and mode of publication must be recorded – Court must make written statement that proclamation was duly published – Non-compliance with any of these requirements renders the proclamation and subsequent proceedings a nullity – Provisions cannot be invoked in a casual or cavalier manner given serious civil and criminal ramifications on liberty of the accused [Paras 5–9].

Inherent Powers – Section 528 BNSS / Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Exercise of Jurisdiction – Where proclamation proceedings are found to be illegal and procedurally flawed, continuation of criminal proceedings founded thereon amounts to abuse of process of law – Inherent jurisdiction exercisable to secure ends of justice and prevent such abuse – Petitioner's bona fide conduct established by voluntary appearance before Court below upon direction of this Court [Para 10].

Decision: Petition allowed – Impugned order dated 10.12.1983 declaring petitioner a proclaimed offender quashed – All consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioner.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 12(5) — Ineligibility of Arbitrator — Seventh Schedule — Unilateral Appointment — Arbitration clause provided for disputes to be referred to Sole Arbitration of Chairman and Managing Director of HPCL with additional power to appoint any other person as Arbitrator — Post-amendment (w.e.f. 23.10.2015), Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporation fell within categories enumerated in Seventh Schedule and became ineligible by operation of law to act as Arbitrator — Once ineligible, Chairman and Managing Director could not appoint any other person as Arbitrator either — Appointment of Sole Arbitrator by such person was squarely hit by decisions in TRF Ltd. and Core-II — Such Arbitrator lacked inherent jurisdiction — Award made by him rendered invalid — Held: Appointment of Sole Arbitrator was in violation of Section 12(5) and principles of equal treatment — Award set aside [Paras 75–77, 90–91].

Section 12(5) Proviso — Express Waiver in Writing — What Constitutes — Consent vs. Waiver — Distinction — Corporation by letter dated 24.01.2018 sought appellant's written consent for appointment of its serving officer as Sole Arbitrator — Appellant by letter dated 15.02.2018 appointed his own Arbitrator (counter offer) — Corporation turned down counter offer — Appellant by letter dated 07.03.2018 gave consent for Corporation to appoint an Arbitrator — Held: Letter dated 07.03.2018 at best amounts to consent for appointment of an Arbitrator (including a retired officer) and not an express written waiver of right to object under Section 12(5) — No consensus ad idem between parties on waiver — Waiver requires conscious, unequivocal, written expression of intent to relinquish the right — Participation in arbitral proceedings or mere consent to appointment does not constitute valid waiver under Section 12(5) proviso — Bhadra International relied upon [Paras 77–85].

Section 12(5) — De Jure Ineligibility — Nature and Effect — Ineligibility under Section 12(5) read with Seventh Schedule strikes at the root of appointment — Upon incurring such ineligibility, mandate of Arbitrator automatically terminates under Section 14(1)(a) — Party may approach Court directly under Section 14 without first invoking challenge procedure under Section 13 — Award passed by an ineligible Arbitrator is non-est and carries no enforceability in law — Distinction between Fifth Schedule (justifiable doubts — challenge under Sections 13 and 34) and Seventh Schedule (de jure ineligibility — termination under Section 14) explained [Paras 52–59, 86].

Section 37 Appeal — Challenge to Ineligibility of Arbitrator — At Any Stage — Objection to inherent lack of jurisdiction of Arbitrator can be raised at any stage of proceedings including for the first time in appeal under Section 37 — An award passed by an ineligible Arbitrator being non-est, there is no question of the objection being time-barred or precluded — Even where specific ground was not very precisely raised in Section 34 petition, if the ground was dealt with and is raised in memo of appeal, the appellant cannot be non-suited — Bhadra International followed [Paras 86–88].

Equal Treatment of Parties — Section 18 — Unilateral Appointment — Constitutional Validity — Principle of equal treatment of parties applies at all stages of arbitration including the stage of appointment of Arbitrators — Clause allowing one party to unilaterally appoint Sole Arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to independence and impartiality — In a three-member tribunal, mandating other party to select Arbitrator from panel curated by one party is against principle of equal treatment — Unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts violative of Article 14 of the Constitution — Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) (Core-II) followed [Paras 65, 90].

Arbitrator's Duty — Disclosure — Section 12(1) read with Sixth Schedule — Sole Arbitrator did not furnish the mandatory declaration as required under Section 12(1) read with the Fifth and Sixth Schedules at the time of appointment — Such non-disclosure assumes additional significance in the absence of a valid express waiver [Para 77].

Second Ground — Natural Justice — Not Adjudicated — Since appointment of Arbitrator was found to be without jurisdiction and the award was set aside on that ground, Court found it unnecessary to examine the second ground of challenge regarding alleged violation of principles of natural justice and procedural infractions during arbitral proceedings [Para 88].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Judgment and order dated 19.04.2023 of Commercial Court-II, Lucknow in Arbitration Case No. 766 of 2019 set aside — Arbitral award dated 26.04.2019 set aside — Parties at liberty to get fresh Arbitrator appointed in accordance with law — No order as to costs.

NDPS Act – Bail – Parity – Section 20(b)(ii)(B) – Cannabis – Accused No.2 alleged to have supplied cannabis to Accused No.1 and to have been found in possession of 1.590 kg of cannabis recovered pursuant to disclosure by Accused No.1 – Accused No.2 in custody since 15.06.2025 – Accused No.1, found with higher quantity of 4.725 kg, already enlarged on bail by Special Court – Chargesheet filed and investigation complete – 21 witnesses yet to be examined and trial likely to take time – Held: Accused No.2 entitled to bail on parity with Accused No.1 subject to conditions [Paras 2, 5].

Bail Conditions – Personal Bond – Rs.1,00,000/- with two sureties – Regular appearance before trial court – No tampering with prosecution witnesses – No commission of future offences – No departure from jurisdiction without court permission [Para 2, Order].

Decision: Petition allowed – Petitioner/Accused No.2 directed to be enlarged on bail in Special Case No.193/2025 pending before Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chamarajanagara, subject to conditions.

Trade Mark Infringement – House Mark vs. Trade Mark – Sections 28 and 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 – "No Distinction Between House Mark and Trade Mark Under the Act" – Plaintiff registered proprietor of device mark 'SUN' since 1983 and word marks 'SUN PHARMA'/'SUNPHARMA' since 2007, with user claim from 1978 and 1993 respectively, in Class 5 for medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations – Defendant used house marks/trade names 'ABSUN'/'ABSUN PHARMA' on its pharmaceutical products from 2007 – Defendant contended that its marks were mere house marks and not trade marks, and that Sections 29(1), (2) and (4) did not apply – Held: The Trade Marks Act makes no distinction between a trade mark and a house mark; a mark qualifies as a trade mark the moment it is capable of distinguishing one person's goods from another's – Defendant's own witness admitted claiming monopoly over 'ABSUN PHARMA' and using it as a logo – Section 29(5) squarely attracted as the plaintiff's registered marks 'SUN'/'SUN PHARMA' are subsumed within the defendant's marks, with mere prefixing of alphabets 'AB' – Sections 29(6) and (7) also attracted as defendant affixed marks on packaging and exported goods thereunder – Issue No. 1 decided in favour of plaintiff [Paras 14–38].

Deceptive Similarity – Pharmaceutical Preparations – Stricter Test Applied – "Mere Prefixing of 'AB' Cannot Distinguish the Marks" – Court applied the test of a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection – Marks 'ABSUN'/'ABSUN PHARMA' found visually, phonetically and structurally close to 'SUN'/'SUN PHARMA', the registered marks being entirely subsumed in the defendant's marks – Held: Stricter approach warranted in cases involving medicinal and pharmaceutical products given the risk of confusion adversely affecting consumers/patients – Honest adoption held irrelevant once infringement is established – Defendant's failure to conduct any search of the trade marks register prior to adoption of its marks, despite admittedly knowing of the plaintiff since 1995, indicative of dishonest adoption [Paras 30–35].

Export of Goods – Section 56, Trade Marks Act, 1999 – "Applying a Mark in India to Goods for Export Constitutes Use Under the Act" – Defendant claimed no liability as all its products were exported to African countries and not sold in India – Held: Section 56 deems application of a trade mark in India to goods intended for export as use of the mark for all purposes under the Act, including infringement and passing off – Defence of export-only sales rejected [Paras 36–37].

Late-Stage Change of Trading Name – Rejected as Tactic – "Honest Men Do Not Attempt to Sail Near the Wind" – Defendant sought to tender an affidavit at final hearing claiming change of trading name from 'ABSUN PHARMA' to 'ABSUN REMEDIES' w.e.f. October 2025 – Affidavit not taken on record – Held: After completion of pleadings, evidence and arguments, a party cannot be permitted to file such an affidavit to defeat the trial; such attempt fortifies the finding of dishonest adoption [Para 38].

Passing Off – Goodwill – Proof in Commercial Suits – "Failure to Deny Documents in Commercial Suit Amounts to Admission" – Plaintiff relied on Chartered Accountant certificates of sales and promotional expenses to prove goodwill – Defendant challenged admissibility on ground that authors of certificates were not examined – Held: In commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, Order VIII Rules 3 and 5 and Order XI Rule 4 of CPC require specific admission/denial of documents including their contents; defendant neither denied the certificates in the written statement nor cross-examined plaintiff's witness on them, nor filed a statement of admission and denial despite opportunity; all documents stood admitted as to existence and contents – Goodwill proved [Paras 39–42].

Passing Off – Misrepresentation and Damages – Decree for Rendition of Accounts Refused – Plaintiff proved misrepresentation through similarity of marks and overlap of goods – Specific damages of Rs. 10 lakhs not proved; plaintiff's witness stated figure was approximate and no supporting documents were produced – Held: Plaintiff made out case of passing off; however, no issue of rendition of accounts was framed and no specific evidence led in that regard, hence prayer for rendition of accounts declined – Issue No. 2 decided in favour of plaintiff [Paras 43–46].

"SUN" Not Common to Trade – Issue No. 5 – Burden on defendant to prove that the mark 'SUN' had become generic through substantial and extensive use by third parties – Defendant placed no evidence of sales figures or usage data of third parties on record; mere oral claim at final hearing insufficient – Issue decided against defendant [Paras 48–49].

Acquiescence – Issue No. 6 – Defendant's sole witness, when cross-examined, admitted there was no document showing plaintiff's awareness of the defendant prior to December 2012 and further stated he did not know the meaning of the term 'acquiescence' – Issue decided against defendant [Para 50].

Costs – First-Time Knowing Infringer – Partial Costs Awarded – Court applying the principle that a first-time knowing infringer may be awarded injunction with partial costs – Defendant's witness admitted awareness of plaintiff's company since 1995 – Plaintiff's marks in public domain since 1983 – Held: Defendant is a first-time knowing infringer; costs of Rs. 10 lakhs awarded to plaintiff [Paras 51–55].

Decision: Suit decreed – Defendant permanently restrained from using marks 'ABSUN'/'ABSUN PHARMA' and 'E-MIST' or any deceptively similar marks – Decree passed in terms of prayer clauses (a) to (e) – Defendant directed to pay costs of Rs. 10 lakhs to the plaintiff [Paras 54–55].