Cybercrime – Bail Denied – Elderly Victims – Digital Arrest – Accused impersonated Cyber Police officials and placed 84-year-old couple under illegal 'digital arrest' – Extorted ₹2.02 crore between 30.04.2025 and 08.05.2025 – Petitioners received ₹45 lakh – Bail applications rejected due to gravity and corroborated financial trail – Court finds petitioners’ claims false and unsupported [Paras 1–8].

Cybercrime Investigation – Structural Weakness in Policing – Court criticises inadequate cyber investigation skills among police – Investigating Officers lack technical training and fail to track layered money trail and crypto transfers – Recommends specialized cybercrime units and IT-qualified Inspectors [Paras 9–17.1].

Judicial Directions – Institutional Reforms – Court orders creation of Rajasthan Cyber Crime Control Centre (R4C) akin to I4C – Directs recruitment of IT Inspectors with technical qualifications – Mandates establishment of accredited digital forensic labs and regular audits of digital transactions in government departments [Paras 26–30].

Public Policy – Regulation of Digital Infrastructure – Court issues 31-point action plan addressing cybercrime across banks, SIM issuance, BPOs, e-commerce platforms, gig economy workers, social media users and children’s phone usage – Emphasises mandatory registration, KYC, AI tools, verification, and accountability to combat digital fraud [Paras 27–38].

Digital Threat – National Challenge – Highlights exponential increase in cyber complaints (from 26,000 in 2019 to over 20 lakh in 2024) with poor FIR conversion – Recognises MHA and I4C’s efforts but urges Rajasthan to build its own cyber defence infrastructure independent of Centre’s support [Paras 17.2–24].

Decision: Bail applications dismissed – Petitioners to remain in judicial custody – Court directs urgent, multi-level reform across Rajasthan’s investigative, prosecutorial, financial, and social sectors to address growing threat of cybercrime and ensure digital safety

Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Reconstruction Of Record - Non-Availability Of Trial Court Record - Effect On Appeal - Held: The destruction of the Trial Court's record does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the appeal or affirmation of the Trial Court's decree. Where reconstruction is not fully possible due to non-cooperation of respondents, the Appellate Court can proceed based on available documents, pleadings, and the judgment under challenge. A party cannot take advantage of their own wrong in failing to cooperate with reconstruction.

Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 16 - Undue Influence - Fiduciary Relationship - Burden Of Proof - Held: A fiduciary relationship exists between an elder brother and a younger brother where the latter reposes confidence in the former. Where a transaction (Relinquishment Deed) appears unconscionable and is between parties in a fiduciary relationship, the burden of proof shifts to the beneficiary (dominant party) to prove the transaction was not induced by undue influence. Inducing a younger brother to execute a deed to "save family honor" against a sister's partition suit constitutes undue influence.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 92 - Parol Evidence - Sham Documents - Held: The bar under Section 92 (excluding oral evidence to contradict written terms) does not apply when a party pleads that the document was a "sham" and was never intended to be acted upon. Oral evidence is admissible to prove that a transaction recorded in a document was a paper transaction meant to serve a collateral purpose (frustrating a third party's suit) and was not intended to be enforced between the signatories.

Muslim Law - Relinquishment Of Share - Spes Successionis - Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 - Section 6(A) - Held: A "Dastbardari" (Relinquishment Deed) cannot be valid if the beneficiary (transferee) denies the title/share of the transferor in the first place. One cannot relinquish a right that is not admitted to exist. Furthermore, under Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act and Muslim Law, the transfer of spes successionis (chance of succession) is void ab initio. A renunciation of a chance of succession is not valid.

Estoppel - Validity Of Sham Document - Held: A document obtained through undue influence and proven to be a sham (executed solely to defeat a sister's claim in a separate suit) creates no estoppel against the executor. Such a document, which was never acted upon or produced in the relevant partition suit for decades, cannot be enforced.

Decision: Appeal allowed. Judgment and Decree dated 6-1-1973 set aside. The "Dastbardari" dated 23-2-1966 is declared null and void. Parties held entitled to shares as per the preliminary decree in the connected partition suit (2/5th share each to brothers).

Criminal Writ - Habeas Corpus - Preventive Detention – Right to Representation – Failure to Inform – Violation of Article 22(5) – Context of detention order passed by District Magistrate under NSA – Held: Article 22(5) of the Constitution confers two distinct rights: the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order. This right extends to making a representation specifically to the Detaining Authority (here, the District Magistrate) as long as the authority retains the power to revoke the order (within 12 days under NSA). In this case, the grounds of detention only informed the petitioner of his right to represent to the State Government, Central Government, and the Advisory Board, conspicuously omitting the Detaining Authority. This failure to inform the detenue of his right to represent to the authority that passed the order renders the detention illegal and vitiates the order. [Para 34]

Preventive Detention – Delay in Disposal of Representation – Unexplained Delay – Fatal to Detention – Context of 12 days delay by District Magistrate in forwarding representation to State Government – Held: The personal liberty of a citizen is paramount, and authorities are constitutionally mandated to deal with representations against preventive detention with a sense of urgency. The record showed that the petitioner submitted his representation on 23.09.2025, but the District Magistrate only forwarded it to the State Government on 05.10.2025. The affidavit filed by the authorities failed to provide any explanation whatsoever for this 12-day delay. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that such unexplained delay in processing the representation violates the constitutional safeguards under Article 22(5) and is fatal to the continued detention of the petitioner. [Paras 35, 39]

Decision: Writ Petition allowed. Detention order set aside. Detenue directed to be set at liberty. [Para 41]

Service Law – Seniority – Determination of Inter-se Seniority – Direct Recruits vs. Promotees – Recruitment Year vs. Date of Appointment – Held: Seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of vacancy or initiation of recruitment process unless expressly provided by rules – It must be reckoned from the date of substantive appointment/entry into the cadre – The judgment in K. Meghachandra Singh (2020), which overruled N.R. Parmar (2012), is binding – Direct recruits appointed later cannot claim seniority over promotees appointed earlier, even if the vacancies pertained to an earlier year. [Paras 12, 18-19]

Precedent – Binding Nature – Reference to Larger Bench – Held: The fact that the decision in K. Meghachandra Singh has been referred to a larger bench in Hariharan (2022) does not stay its operation or dilute its binding nature – Subordinate courts and Tribunals must follow the existing law declared by the Supreme Court until it is overruled – Administration of justice cannot be put on hold awaiting a larger bench decision. [Para 20]

Seniority – Retrospective Application – Held: An employee not borne in the cadre cannot be given seniority retrospectively to affect those validly appointed in the meantime – Petitioners (Direct Recruits) appointed in 2017 cannot claim seniority over Promotees appointed in 2016, despite vacancies relating to 2015/2016. [Para 19]

Decision: Writ Petitions dismissed. Tribunal order upholding the seniority list based on K. Meghachandra Singh affirmed.

Rent Control Law – Estoppel of Tenant – Challenge to Derivative Title – Context of tenant challenging the title of the landlord who claimed ownership via a Will – Held: Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates a statutory estoppel preventing a tenant from challenging the title of the landlord during the continuance of the tenancy. The petitioner-bank argued that the respondent was merely an executor of the Will and not the owner, thereby lacking locus standi. However, the Court observed that the tenant had voluntarily tendered rent to the respondent after verifying the Will, thereby creating a valid attornment. Once attornment is established and the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted through the payment of rent, the tenant is legally precluded from questioning the validity of the landlord's derivative title or the nature of his ownership (executor vs. owner). [Paras 12, 15]

Rent Control Law – Scope of Eviction Proceedings – Title Dispute – Jurisdiction of Rent Controller – Context of tenant raising complex issues regarding the validity of the Will and probate proceedings – Held: The Rent Controller constitutes a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and does not possess the authority of a Civil Court to adjudicate complex questions of title. In an eviction suit, the landlord is only required to plead and prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and a statutory ground for eviction. If the landlord proves the relationship, the suit must succeed or fail based on the grounds for eviction, regardless of any dispute over the landlord's title. In this case, the concurrent findings of the courts below regarding bona fide requirement and material impairment of the property were upheld, and the title dispute was deemed irrelevant to the eviction outcome. [Paras 11.2, 11.3, 14]

Decision: Petition dismissed. Eviction order upheld. [Para 17]

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 – Section 3 – Reproductive Autonomy and Consent – Held: The right to make reproductive choices is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. The consent of the pregnant person is paramount in decisions regarding termination of pregnancy. Under Section 3(4)(b), no pregnancy shall be terminated except with the consent of the pregnant woman. Even in cases of minors, where guardian consent is required, the opinion of the minor must be considered. The State or the Court cannot interfere with the personal choice of a pregnant person to continue the pregnancy. [Paras 6-9]

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) – Applicability in Absence of Consent – Held: The SOP laid down by the Division Bench (in WP No. 5184/2025), which mandates forwarding the victim to the District Court/Medical Board and subsequently to the High Court for pregnancies exceeding 24 weeks, is not required to be carried out in cases where the prosecutrix/victim does not give consent for the same. No direction for medical termination can be issued against the victim's will. [Paras 3, 10]

Decision: PUD (Paper Under Disposal) disposed of. Copy of order sent to the concerned trial court. [Paras 11-12]

Civil Law – Remand of Case – Order 41 Rule 23A CPC – Failure to Appreciate Evidence Independently – Context of Trial Court decreeing a suit for possession solely based on a previous judgment (Ex. PX) without independent findings on title – Held: The Trial Court committed a material procedural error by failing to record independent findings on the core issue of title (Issue No. 1). Instead of discussing the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the Trial Court relied exclusively on a previous judgment (Ex. PX) concerning the same land. Since Ex. PX was subsequently set aside by the Appellate Court, the entire foundation of the Trial Court's decree collapsed. The Lower Appellate Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to set aside the decree and remand the matter for a fresh decision, as the Trial Court had effectively failed to apply its judicial mind to the pleadings and evidence on record. A wholesale remand is permissible and necessary when the Trial Court has not decided material issues on their own merits. [Paras 14-15]

Decision: Appeal dismissed. Case remanded to Trial Court. [Para 16]

Criminal Law - CrPC – MPDVPK Act – Jurisdiction – Cognizance – Magistrate's power under Section 156(3) CrPC – Offences under Section 394 IPC and Sections 11/13 MPDVPK Act being “specified offences” – Only Special Court competent to take cognizance under Section 8 of MPDVPK Act – Magistrate not empowered to direct registration of FIR for specified offences – FIR and Magistrate’s order quashed – Petition allowed [Paras 10–15].

Criminal Procedure – Section 156(3) CrPC – Stage of Investigation – Distinction between ordering investigation and taking cognizance – Held: Direction under Section 156(3) CrPC is not itself cognizance; however, only a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 CrPC can issue such direction – Since MPDVPK Act excludes Magistrate’s power to take cognizance regarding specified offences, Section 156(3) order also cannot be invoked for such offences [Paras 10, 13].

Special Courts – MPDVPK Act – Sections 6 & 8 – Exclusive jurisdiction – Specified offences – Section 394 IPC expressly included in “specified offence” under Section 2(f)(2)(iii) – Only Special Court can take cognizance of such offences – Magistrate lacks jurisdiction even at pre-cognizance stage for directing registration of FIR in respect of specified offences – Order of Magistrate invalid [Paras 11–14].

Interpretation – Section 2(b) & 2(f) MPDVPK Act – Definition of “dacoit” and “specified offence” – Offences committed in notified dacoity-affected areas fall exclusively within Special Court jurisdiction – Magistrate cannot assume competence merely because investigation is at initial stage [Para 14].

Quashing of Proceedings – Section 482 CrPC – Magistrate’s order directing registration of FIR for offences under Section 394 IPC and Sections 11/13 of MPDVPK Act set aside – FIR registered pursuant thereto also quashed as being without jurisdiction – Petition allowed [Para 15].

Religious Institution – Classification under Endowments Act – Notification – Appellants challenged inclusion of Yogananda Ashramam as a public religious institution under Section 6(c)(ii) of A.P. Endowments Act – Evidence showed that Ashramam was established and maintained by founders' family without any public endowment, offerings, or public access – Court found that management was always with the family and public participation was minimal and not as of right – Held: Ashramam not a public religious institution within meaning of Section 2(23) – Notification quashed [Paras 10–22, 26–28]

Natural Justice – Publication under Section 6(c)(ii) – Procedure – Court held that no notice was given to appellants before notification enlisting Ashramam as public religious institution – Violation of principles of natural justice – Held: Notification issued without following Sections 43, 44, and income assessment under Section 65 – Procedurally flawed and legally unsustainable – [Paras 23–25, 28]

Specific Endowment – No Dedication of Property – Settlement deed did not indicate any dedication of property or income for public religious or charitable use – No evidence of specific endowment as per Section 2(25) – Held: Absence of endowment defeats classification as religious institution or temple – [Paras 21–22]

Legal Precedents – Private Religious Institutions – Followed precedents in VVVRK Yechendra v. State of A.P. and Miryala Narayana v. State of A.P. – High Court reiterated that publication under Section 6 must follow registration and hearing of affected parties – Held: Classification made in violation of binding procedural requirements and liable to be struck down – [Paras 23–25]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Gazette Notification under Section 6(c)(ii) dated 13.07.2000 quashed – Order of Deputy Commissioner dated 25.08.2009 in O.A. No. 42 of 2001 set aside – Ashramam held to be a private institution – No order as to costs – Pending miscellaneous petitions closed.