Election Law – Election Petition – Rejection Application – Material Facts – Pleading Standard – Petitioner challenged the election of Respondent No. 1 returned from Chandivali Assembly Constituency by a margin of 20,625 votes on grounds of corrupt practice, violation of Model Code of Conduct, defective Form 26 Affidavit, and apprehended EVM tampering – Respondent No. 1 filed application for rejection under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the Petition did not disclose a cause of action for want of material facts – Held: The Election Petition is liable to be dismissed for failure to plead material facts as mandated under Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Rejection Application allowed and Petition dismissed [Paras 1–80].

"Material Facts" – Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Mandatory Pleading Requirement

Election Petition – Pleading – Section 83 – An election petition must contain a concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies and, in respect of corrupt practice, full particulars including the names of parties, and the date and place of commission – Omission of even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and entitles the returned candidate to seek rejection under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC – The distinction between facta probanda (material facts to be pleaded) and facta probantia (evidence to be proved at trial) must be maintained – Material facts are those primary and basic facts which constitute the complete cause of action and without which the petition is not maintainable [Paras 32–35, 63–66].

"Undue Influence vs. Influence" – Section 123(2) – Corrupt Practice – Road Show During Silent Period

Corrupt Practice – Undue Influence – Section 123(2) – Star campaigner and then Chief Minister visited the Constituency on the polling day at 3:08 PM and allegedly conducted a road show near five polling stations within the prohibited 48-hour period in violation of Section 126 – Petitioner alleged this constituted corrupt practice of undue influence under Section 123(2) to attract Section 100(1)(b) – Held: Mere canvassing and soliciting votes, even by a star campaigner during prohibited hours, does not per se constitute "undue influence" within the meaning of Section 123(2) unless it is shown that such conduct interfered with the free exercise of electoral will of the electorate by way of threat, coercion, inducement, or misrepresentation – Rallying loyal supporters constitutes "influence" and not "undue influence" – Petition contained no whisper of threat, coercion, inducement or fraud – The pleadings stop short of indicating how such influence was undue – The distinction between "influence" and "undue influence" is critical and the Petition failed to bridge it [Paras 38–47].

"Violation of Section 126 vs. Corrupt Practice" – Independent Sanction – Section 100(1)(d)(iv)

Electoral Offence – Prohibition of Campaign During Silent Period – Section 126 – A campaign during the 48-hour prohibited period constitutes a violation of Section 126 attracting its own criminal sanction of imprisonment up to two years or fine or both – However, a violation of Section 126 does not automatically constitute a "corrupt practice" under Section 123 and thereby cannot ipso facto attract Section 100(1)(b) – For Section 100(1)(d)(iv), the petitioner must further plead and prove that the non-compliance materially affected the electoral result insofar as it concerned the returned candidate – Mere bald averment that "but for the visit the Petitioner would have won" is insufficient – There must be some rational basis in the pleadings to indicate materiality of impact to enable the returned candidate to meet the allegation [Paras 48–70].

"Form 26 Affidavit – Excessive Disclosure – Non-Disclosure of Asset" – Sections 100(1)(b) and 100(1)(d)(iv)

Form 26 Affidavit – Defective Disclosure – Returned candidate disclosed civil cases along with criminal cases in the Form 26 Affidavit, allegedly misleading voters into perceiving more civil than criminal exposure – Also alleged non-disclosure of residential premises occupied by the returned candidate as an asset – Held: There is no prohibition on a candidate voluntarily disclosing more than the statutory minimum – There is no pleading of how excessive disclosure of civil cases constituted undue influence within Section 123(2) or materially affected the electoral result – As regards undisclosed residential premises, there is not even an averment that title is in the name of the returned candidate – Relying on Mangani Lal Mandal and Karim Uddin Barbhuiya: material facts as to how defects in the Form 26 Affidavit materially affected the electoral result are entirely absent – Petition fails on this ground too [Paras 71–76].

"EVM Tampering – Bare Apprehension – No Causal Link" – Section 100

Electronic Voting Machines – Apprehended Tampering – Petitioner availed of the right to get 20 EVM sets verified by paying prescribed fees in accordance with the Supreme Court guidelines in Association for Democratic Reforms – Held: Availing of the right to test EVMs does not by itself constitute pleading of material facts sufficient to invoke Section 100 – There is no pleading linking the EVMs identified to Shinde's visit or to any other cause reasonably giving rise to an apprehension of tampering – The right to seek a verification check and the existence of a cause of action under Section 100 to declare the election void are entirely different – Pleadings on EVMs do not disclose a cause of action [Paras 77–78].

Decision: Rejection Application (Application in Election Petition No. 26 of 2025) allowed – Election Petition No. 9 of 2025 dismissed – No costs – Application in EP (L) No. 26326 of 2025 disposed of in consequence – Random check of EVMs already permitted shall be carried out unhindered by this judgment – Nothing in this judgment pronounces upon the merits of any criminal proceedings arising from the alleged violation of Section 126 of the Act [Paras 79–83].

Service Law – Equal Pay for Equal Work – Contractual employees – Drivers and Conductors engaged by PUNBUS – Petitioners claimed parity with regular Drivers/Conductors of Punjab Roadways – Evidence showed identical duties, qualifications, operational risks, working hours, routes and supervisory control – Held: When contractual employees perform the same work of equal value as regular employees, they are entitled to wages at least at the minimum of the regular pay scale with Dearness Allowance [Paras 21–25, 30].

Equal Pay Principle – Distinction between establishments – PUNBUS vs Punjab Roadways – Respondents contended that both are separate establishments – Court found unified administrative control as Director State Transport simultaneously acts as Managing Director of PUNBUS – Disciplinary and operational control common – Held: Difference is only in nomenclature and not functional separation – Denial of pay parity arbitrary [Paras 22–25].

Service Law – Sanctioned Posts – Relevance for pay parity – State argued that petitioners were not appointed against sanctioned posts – Held: Absence of sanctioned posts cannot defeat claim for equal pay where employees perform identical duties – Government cannot exploit workers by extracting work at lesser wages [Paras 26–28].

Equal Pay Doctrine – Application to temporary employees – Supreme Court precedent in Jagjit Singh reiterated – Temporary, contractual or daily wage employees performing the same work as regular employees are entitled to minimum of regular pay scale [Paras 19–20].

Administrative Law – Failure of authority to undertake parity analysis – Impugned speaking order rejected claim without comparing qualifications, duties and responsibilities – Held: Authorities must conduct detailed exercise to identify functional parity and intelligible differentia – Failure renders decision arbitrary [Paras 30–31].

Service Jurisprudence – Prolonged contractual engagement – Petitioners worked continuously for more than a decade – Practice of retaining employees on temporary basis for perennial work amounts to unfair labour practice and violates constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 16 and 21 [Paras 34–36].

Regularisation – Long continuous service – Employees who have rendered more than ten years of service entitled to consideration for regularisation – State being a model employer cannot exploit long-term contractual workers [Paras 36–37].

Judgment in Rem – Service benefits – Court held that benefit of the judgment shall extend to all similarly situated employees of PUNBUS and not merely the petitioners [Paras 40–41].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned orders dated 02.07.2019 and 13.09.2024 quashed. - Petitioners entitled to minimum of the regular pay scale with Dearness Allowance at par with regular Drivers/Conductors of Punjab Roadways w.e.f. 01.04.2026 - Respondents directed to consider petitioners for regularisation under the Punjab Ad hoc, Contractual, Daily Wage, Temporary, Work Charged and Outsourced Employees’ Welfare Act, 2016 - Employees with more than ten years of service to be considered for regularisation - Judgment declared in rem and applicable to all similarly situated PUNBUS employees.

Civil Law – Permanent Injunction – Religious Shrine – Concurrent Findings – Appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining respondents from interfering with their possession over agricultural land measuring 8B-0B, including 0B-2B bearing Khasra No. 28//22/2 where a Guga Mari is situated – Trial Court partly decreed the suit but dismissed the claim over 0B-2B where the Guga Mari exists – First Appellate Court upheld the dismissal – High Court finds no substantial question of law – Held: RSA dismissed in limine [Paras 1, 5, 9].

Possession – Proof of Exclusive Possession – Simpliciter Suit for Injunction – Burden of Proof – In a suit for permanent injunction, the plaintiff is required to prove exclusive possession over the suit land – Appellants failed to lead any cogent or reliable evidence to establish exclusive possession over the 0B-2B land where the Guga Mari is situated – Both courts concurrently found that the land was being used for worship by the villagers since time immemorial – No evidence, even remotely, pointed to exclusive possession of appellants [Paras 8, 9].

Compromise – Evidentiary Value – Failure to Rebut – Defendant-respondents relied upon compromise document Ex.D1 purportedly signed by Plaintiff-Appellant No. 2 (Goverdhan Singh @ Gordhan Singh), whereby the appellants' family relinquished any right or concern over the Guga Mari land in consideration of Rs. 1,50,000/- paid by the villagers – Plaintiff-Appellant No. 2 chose not to enter the witness box – No handwriting expert was examined to dispute the signatures/thumb-impressions on Ex.D1 – Held: Compromise remained unrebutted and operates against the appellants [Para 8].

Substantial Question of Law – Second Appeal – Scope – High Court in Regular Second Appeal is competent to interfere only when a substantial question of law arises – Where both Trial Court and First Appellate Court have returned concurrent findings of fact based on evidence on record, and no substantial question of law is demonstrated, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed – Held: No question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arises in the present case [Para 9].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Concurrent judgments and decrees of the Trial Court dated 29.07.2015 and the First Appellate Court dated 18.11.2017 upheld – Pending applications, if any, disposed of.

NDPS Act – Cultivation of Cannabis – Proof of Possession and Control – Appellant convicted for cultivating cannabis plants on agricultural land jointly owned by multiple persons – No evidence to establish that appellant alone was in possession or actively cultivating the land – Failure of prosecution to prove foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction set aside and appellant acquitted [Paras 32, 35, 46].

Criminal Law – Burden of Proof – Reasonable Doubt – Prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and cannot shift burden on accused to prove non-involvement – Mere presence or admission before police insufficient – Held: Absence of clear evidence linking accused to cultivation creates reasonable doubt [Paras 44–45].

NDPS Act – Concept of “Cultivation” – Requires conscious act of planting, nurturing or tending cannabis plants – No material showing active involvement of appellant in cultivation – Held: Essential ingredient of offence not established [Paras 34–35].

Evidence – Joint Ownership of Land – 7/12 extract showed multiple co-owners – Investigating agency failed to ascertain who was actually cultivating specific portion – Non-examination of relevant witnesses and lack of verification fatal to prosecution case [Paras 25–26, 31].

Confession – Statement before Police – Alleged admission by accused pointing out spot cannot be sole basis of conviction without corroboration and compliance with legal procedure – Held: Such statement insufficient to establish guilt [Para 44].

Presumption under NDPS Act – Section 54 – Can arise only after prosecution proves foundational facts such as possession and control – In absence thereof, presumption not applicable [Para 44].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence set aside – Appellant acquitted of offence under Section 20(a)(i) NDPS Act – Directed to be released forthwith – Fine, if paid, to be refunded.

Service Law – DLR Employee – Regularisation vs Work-Charged Establishment – Petitioner engaged as Daily Labour Roll (DLR) Watchman in 1984 – Despite availability of regular posts and long service, authorities brought him over to Work-Charged Establishment in 2012 – Petitioner retired in 2015 without pensionary benefits – Held: When employee served continuously for over three decades and similarly situated employees were regularised, action of authorities in denying regular establishment benefits is arbitrary – Authorities directed to consider bringing petitioner to Regular/Pensionable Establishment notionally to enable pensionary benefits [Paras 5, 9-10].

Service Jurisprudence – Long Continuous Service of Casual/NMR/DLR Employees – Obligation of State as Model Employer – Courts emphasised that State cannot exploit employees by extracting service for decades while denying regular benefits – Employees engaged prior to cut-off date and continuously serving are entitled to sympathetic consideration for regularisation and pensionary benefits [Paras 6.3, 6.4, 6.11].

Regularisation – Finance Department Resolution dated 15.05.1997 – Scheme for absorption of NMR/DLR employees – Resolution does not mandate that such employees must first be brought to Work-Charged Establishment before regularisation – Failure of authorities to undertake exercise of regularisation despite long service contrary to scheme and judicial pronouncements [Paras 6.2].

Equality – Article 14 of the Constitution – Discriminatory treatment – Similarly situated employees in other divisions were regularised while petitioner was denied the same benefit – State cannot adopt different standards for employees similarly placed – Principle of parity and consistency applicable [Paras 7.4, 7.11].

Work-Charged Employees – Pensionary Benefits – Courts have repeatedly directed notional absorption in Regular Establishment even by creation of supernumerary post to ensure pensionary benefits to long-serving employees – Denial of pension after decades of service amounts to exploitation by State [Paras 6.7, 7.7, 9.2].

Pension – Social Security Measure – Employee served for about 31 years from 1984 till retirement – State cannot deny pension after extracting long years of service – Welfare State must ensure social security to such employees [Paras 8, 9.1].

Decision: Writ Petition disposed of – Opposite parties directed to consider bringing the petitioner to the Regular/Pensionable Establishment notionally for the period necessary to qualify for pension and extend all consequential benefits including pensionary benefits – Exercise to be completed within three months.

Foreigners Act – Citizenship – Foreigners Tribunal – Writ petition challenging opinion declaring petitioner a foreigner – Petitioner failed to prove lineage with grandfather through contemporaneous records – Key documents including Kabin Nama, school certificate, and Gaon Panchayat certificate not proved by issuing authorities – DW-2 introduced new facts beyond pleadings regarding father’s residence in Cooch Bihar – Discrepancies in names across electoral rolls not explained – Burden of proof under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act not discharged – Held: No infirmity in Tribunal’s decision – Writ petition dismissed.

Foreigners Act – Foreigners Tribunal – Declaration as Foreigner – Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 – Petitioner declared a foreigner by the Foreigners Tribunal No. 9, Dhubri in F.T. Case No. FT-9/79/GKJ/2015 – Petitioner claimed to be an Indian citizen and that the letter ‘D’ was erroneously inserted against her name in the electoral roll – Petitioner attempted to establish lineage with her grandfather Sahar Uddin whose name appeared in the voters’ lists of 1966 and 1970 – However, failed to prove any linkage between herself and her grandfather through contemporaneous records – Registered Sale Deed of 1994 not accepted as a linking document due to overwriting on the purchaser’s name without explanation – Held: Petitioner failed to discharge her onus under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 [Paras 2, 9, 24, 25].

Evidence – Proof of Documents – Documentary Evidence Not Proved Through Contemporaneous Records – Petitioner relied on Kabin Nama, school certificate, and Gaon Panchayat certificate to establish lineage with her parents and grandparents – However, the Qazi who registered the marriage was not examined – The Secretary of the Gaon Panchayat who issued the certificate was not produced as a witness – The Headmaster who issued the school certificate was also not examined – The Member of the Tribunal did not sign the school certificate (Ext-1) – Held: Documents and their contents were not proved as the issuing authorities were not produced as witnesses and contents were not established through contemporaneous records – A document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge alone [Paras 7, 14, 15, 16].

Foreigners Tribunal – Pleadings – Evidence Beyond Written Statement – DW-2 (petitioner’s brother) introduced new facts through his evidence-in-chief that their father was a voter of Tufanganj Constituency in Cooch Bihar prior to 1990 – This fact was never mentioned by the petitioner in her written statement or evidence – DW-1 never submitted that her father was a resident of Cooch Bihar – Dissimilarities surfaced between the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 – Evidence recorded and exhibited in a haphazard manner with overlapping markings – Held: A party cannot traverse beyond the pleadings made in the written statement – Written statement is the basic statement of defence of a proceedee before the Foreigners Tribunal [Paras 12, 13, 17, 19, 21].

Foreigners Act – Burden of Proof – Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 read with Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Burden of proving citizenship lies upon the person who asserts to be a citizen – Facts relating to date of birth, place of birth, parentage, and their citizenship are within the personal knowledge of the person concerned – Petitioner failed to establish that her father Sakir Hossain was the son of Sohar Uddin – Not a single document was proved to establish that the petitioner’s father was a voter or an Indian citizen – Discrepancies in names of father and grandfather across voters’ lists of different years and constituencies were not properly explained [Paras 20, 22, 23, 25, 26].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – No infirmity found in the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunal No. 9, Dhubri – Petitioner held to be a foreigner of post-25.03.1971 stream – Consequences of the impugned order to follow – Bail order dated 09.02.2017 stands vacated – No order as to costs [Paras 26, 27, 28].

Election Law – Rejection of Election Petition – Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Returned candidate sought rejection of election petition on ground that pleadings lacked material facts necessary to sustain allegations of corrupt practice and invalid election – Court held that an election petition must disclose a complete cause of action through clear pleadings of material facts and failure to do so renders the petition liable to rejection.

Representation of the People Act – Section 83 – Requirement of Material Facts – An election petition must contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies – Material facts constitute the fundamental facts necessary to establish the grounds under Section 100 or corrupt practices under Section 123 – Absence of such foundational facts is fatal to the maintainability of the petition.

Election Petition – Distinction between Material Facts and Particulars – Material facts are the primary facts which constitute the cause of action, whereas particulars are the details that support those facts – Failure to plead material facts cannot be cured by amendment, while deficiency in particulars may be remedied if foundational facts are already pleaded.

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Scope of Examination – While deciding an application for rejection of pleadings, the Court must consider only the averments contained in the election petition and assume them to be true – If the pleadings, even when taken at face value, do not disclose a cause of action under the Representation of the People Act, the petition must be rejected at the threshold.

Election Disputes – Strict Statutory Compliance – Election petitions are purely statutory proceedings and must strictly comply with requirements of the Representation of the People Act – Courts must ensure that election results are not lightly unsettled in the absence of clear and specific pleadings supported by material facts.

Decision: Application seeking rejection of the election petition examined in light of statutory requirements relating to pleading of material facts under the Representation of the People Act and principles governing rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

Gratuity claim – Limitation – Interest – Definition of wages – Employees filed applications for gratuity after several years – Employer contested on grounds of limitation and exclusion of special allowance from wages – Held: Where employer fails to issue notice under Section 7(2), limitation under Rule 10 does not apply – Employer liable to pay interest under Section 7(3A) on unpaid amounts – Matter remanded to determine whether special allowance constitutes dearness allowance under Section 2(s) – Petitions partly allowed.

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 7(1), Section 7(2) – Limitation – Employer's Obligation – Employees claimed gratuity after gap of several years without filing Form "I" within prescribed time – Employer contended claim barred by limitation – Held: Section 7(2) casts clear obligation on employer to determine gratuity and issue notice whether or not application is made by employee – Second proviso to Rule 10 provides that where employer fails to issue notice under Section 7(2) read with Rule 8, limitation shall not apply – Employer cannot defeat claim by taking advantage of delay when delay contributed to by employer's inaction – Objection on ground of limitation rejected [Paras 18-25]

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 7(3), Section 7(3A) – Interest on Delayed Payment – Employer deposited admitted amount before Controlling Authority but disputed balance – Employee entitled to interest on unpaid portion – Held: Section 7(3A) provides for simple interest where gratuity not paid within thirty days – Proviso creates exception only where delay attributable to employee and employer obtains written permission from Controlling Authority – No such permission obtained – Interest not payable on admitted amount from date of deposit – Interest payable on remaining balance from date specified until actual payment [Paras 26-36]

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 2(s) – Definition of Wages – Special Allowance – Whether special allowance forms part of wages for gratuity calculation – Employer contended special allowance is consolidated component of incentives, not dearness allowance – Held: Character of salary component cannot be determined merely by nomenclature – Depends on purpose of payment, manner of calculation, whether linked to cost of living – Appellate Authority failed to examine whether special allowance is in reality dearness allowance – Matter remanded for fresh consideration on this limited issue [Paras 37-45]

Evidence – Photocopied Documents – Evidentiary Value – Employee relied on photocopied document showing restructuring of perks – Authorities below did not examine original document or record finding about authenticity – Held: When documents produced in photocopy form, authority must examine whether they can be relied upon as secondary evidence – Exercise not carried out – Matter remanded for proper evaluation [Paras 40-41, 43-44]

Decision: Writ petitions partly allowed – Judgments of Appellate Authority dated 19.10.2024 and Controlling Authority dated 09.11.2023 affirmed except as modified – Matter remitted to Appellate Authority for fresh consideration on question whether special allowance constitutes dearness allowance under Section 2(s) and whether documents establish entitlement to gratuity at rate of 26 days – Appellate Authority to decide within eight weeks – No order as to costs.

Hindu Law – Coparcenary Property – Burden of Proof – Declaration Suit – Appellants filed a suit for declaration claiming the suit land to be joint Hindu family coparcenary property and challenging the sale deed dated 23.05.2014 executed by defendant-respondent No. 1 (father/Karta) in favour of defendant-respondent No. 4 for Rs. 7,50,000/- over 6 Kanal of land – Trial Court dismissed the suit on 06.03.2019 – First Appellate Court affirmed dismissal on 10.03.2025 – High Court finds no substantial question of law – Held: RSA dismissed [Paras 1, 4, 8].

Ancestral Property – Four-Generation Rule – Proof Required – To establish the ancestral and coparcenary nature of property, the plaintiff is required to prove that the suit property was inherited through at least four male lineal descendants by way of survivorship – Appellants relied solely on oral testimony and Jamabandis (Ex.PW4/1 to Ex.PW4/10) – Revenue records showed property originally owned by Dyal Singh (father of defendant No. 1) who had four sons and two daughters – After his death, estate was inherited by all legal heirs – Held: Appellants proved ancestral nature only to the extent of two generations and failed to establish four-generation coparcenary lineage [Para 7].

Hindu Succession Act – Section 8 – Self-Acquired Property – Property Devolving by Succession – Where coparcenary or joint Hindu family property succeeds on the death of a common ancestor under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act by way of intestate succession and not by survivorship, such property received under intestate succession must be treated as self-acquired property and not coparcenary property – Relied upon: Maan Jain vs. Suraj Parkash Jain, 2018(3) RCR (Civil) 759 – Appellants also failed to prove whether defendant-respondent No. 1 inherited the property by survivorship or by succession under Section 8 [Para 7].

Substantial Question of Law – Second Appeal – Concurrent Findings – Scope of Interference – Where both Trial Court and First Appellate Court have returned concurrent findings of fact based on evidence on record and no cogent documentary evidence was produced by the appellants to demonstrate ancestral nature of suit property, no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arises warranting interference in RSA [Para 8].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 06.03.2019 and First Appellate Court dated 10.03.2025 upheld – Pending applications, if any, disposed of.