Commercial Petrol Pump With Pucca Structure Not 'Thika Tenancy', Civil Court Has Eviction Jurisdiction: Calcutta High Court

August 21, 2026, High Court at Calcutta, in a significant ruling, held that a commercial petrol pump operating on leased land with pre-existing pucca structures does not qualify as a thika tenancy, and affirmed the civil court's jurisdiction to order the eviction of a public sector oil corporation upon the expiry of its lease.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya rejected the plea of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 21 of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Requisition) Act, 2001, observing that the jurisdictional bar does not trigger when the dispute raised is "a sham and illusory one."

The primary questions before the High Court were whether the learned Trial Judge acted beyond jurisdiction in deciding the eviction suit to be maintainable in the teeth of the statutory bar under Section 21 of the 2001 Act, and whether HPCL is a thika tenant in respect of the commercial suit property.

Pucca Structures Prior To 2010 Must Satisfy Strict Baseline Criteria Under 1949 Act

The Division Bench observed that the legal position concerning pucca structures and thika tenancy has been comprehensively settled by the Supreme Court in Nemai Chandra Kumar v. Mani Square Limited (2024), which approved the Calcutta High Court's Full Bench decision in Lakshmimoni Das v. State of West Bengal (1987). The court underscored that only lands comprising kutcha structures or pucca structures erected strictly for residential purposes with the prior permission of the Controller under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 vested under the 1981 Act.

"Acquisition of land comprising thika tenancy with even erection or acquisition of pucca structure by the thika tenant came to be provided in specific terms by the Legislature only from November 1, 2010, when the 2010 Amendment was effected to the 2001 Act, and not before."

Petrol Pumps For Commercial Use Excluded From Thika Tenancy Fold

The Bench noted that under Section 10A of the 1949 Act, three mandatory preconditions had to be satisfied for a pucca structure to qualify as a thika property: the land must have been held for residential use, the pucca structure must have been erected for residential purposes, and such construction must have been undertaken with the previous permission of the Controller. Examining the undisputed facts, the court found that the suit property was indisputably utilized throughout as a commercial petrol pump with permanent structures, without any prior sanction from the Controller.

"The view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Jatadhari Daw and reiterated by the Three-Judge Bench in Lakshmimoni Das, as to a petrol pump falling outside the purview of thika tenancy, has been affirmed in Mani Square Limited, thus leaving no manner of doubt that the present suit property, which is admittedly a petrol pump, fell outside the purview of thika tenancy."

"A purposive interpretation of Section 5(3) and Sections 8(2) and 8(3) would clearly indicate that the 'question' and/or 'dispute' contemplated under the said provisions have to be bona fide questions or disputes. In the present case... no real dispute or question regarding thika tenancy remained to be decided. Hence, the 'dispute' / 'question' now sought to be raised by the appellant in that regard is a sham and illusory one."

Consent Decree Created Landlord-Tenant Relationship; Tenant Barred By Estoppel

The court analyzed the 1978 consent decree and held that by entering into a formal lessor-lessee arrangement governed by the original 1955 lease conditions when the 1949 Act was fully operative, HPCL had categorically admitted the private landlord-tenant relationship and waived any claim of thika tenancy under the State. The Bench highlighted that whether a property is a thika tenancy is a mixed question of fact and law that demands proof of baseline statutory criteria, thereby rendering the doctrine of estoppel fully applicable against the appellant corporation.

"Although there cannot be any Estoppel against the law, the questions as to whether a person is a thika tenant or not or a property is a thika tenancy or not are mixed questions of fact and law, which require the foundational criteria of a thika tenancy to be fulfilled... Since the appellant, by entering into the lease embodied in the consent decree of 1978, gave out and admitted that it is a lessee under the plaintiffs/respondents... the appellant is now barred by Estoppel from doing a volte face and claiming thika tenancy under the State."

Statutory Bar Under Section 21 Not Attracted When Dispute Is Illusory

Interpreting the scope of Section 21, Section 5(3), and Section 8 of the 2001 Act, the High Court held that the civil court's jurisdiction is ousted only when there is a genuine, bona fide dispute required to be determined by the Thika Controller. Since HPCL failed to demonstrate even the foundational threshold under the 1949 or 1981 enactments, the jurisdictional bar could not be invoked to defeat an eviction decree based on the expiry of a registered contractual lease.

"Section 21 of the 2001 Act debars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court only in respect of matters which are required to be dealt with or decided or determined by the Controller or the authorities provided under the said Act. In the absence of any further requirement being there for the issue to be determined/decided, nothing remained to be adjudicated by the Thika Controller."

Affirming the decree of eviction passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Alipore, the High Court dismissed HPCL's first appeal, holding that the extended lease had expired by efflux of time and the Civil Court had complete jurisdiction to decree eviction. The Bench also refused HPCL's post-judgment prayer for a stay of operation, taking note that the corporation had already been dispossessed from the suit premises pursuant to the execution of the trial court decree.

Date of Decision: August 21, 2026