SARFAESI Act – E-Auction Purchaser – FIR – Quashing – Petitioner purchased mortgaged property in e-auction conducted by Union Bank of India as the highest bidder — FIR lodged alleging collusion with bank officials in undervaluation of the property — valuation of property challenged before DRT, Ranchi in S.A. No. 88 of 2024, which affirmed the valuation and dismissed the informant's application — order of DRT attained finality — FIR against bank officials already quashed by coordinate bench — held: no offence of fraud, forgery or criminal breach of trust made out against the petitioner who is a bona fide auction purchaser — FIR quashed — writ petition allowed [Paras 8–11].

"Quashing of FIR – Exceptional Jurisdiction – When Criminal Law is Set in Motion Against a Bona Fide Auction Purchaser"

Quashing of FIR in writ jurisdiction is done only in exceptional cases when the FIR itself does not disclose any offence against the petitioner — principal charge of undervaluation in the FIR is not directed against the auction purchaser since valuation was done before he participated in the e-auction — allegation of criminal conspiracy confined to the claim that he colluded with bank officials in undervaluation — when DRT has affirmed the valuation and such order has attained finality, permitting continuation of FIR against the auction purchaser would be a misuse of the process of court — auction has not been set aside by any competent court [Paras 9–10].

"DRT Order Attaining Finality – Effect on Criminal Proceedings"

Informant's challenge to the e-auction before this Court resulted in direction to pursue remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before DRT, Ranchi — DRT, after hearing parties, dismissed S.A. No. 88 of 2024 affirming valuation of the property — said order attained finality having not been challenged before any higher forum — co-ordinate bench of this Court had already quashed the FIR against two bank officials in W.P. (Cr.) Nos. 158 and 159 of 2025 — in such circumstances, continuance of FIR against the auction purchaser on identical allegations cannot be sustained [Paras 5–10].

Decision: Writ petition allowed — FIR in Argora P.S. Case No. 24 of 2025 quashed qua the petitioner — pending interlocutory application, if any, disposed of [Para 11].

Defamation – Section 500 IPC – Online Publication – Redisplay of Defamatory Social Media Post – Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash defamation proceedings – Accused Nos. 2 to 4 (a film-sector publication and its editorial staff) redisplayed on their website highly derogatory statements originally posted by Accused No.1 on a Facebook group against the complainant, a film actor-director, in the context of a controversy over a prominent actor's arrest for rape – Held: Section 499 IPC draws no distinction between an original defamatory publication and a redisplay of such material already in the public domain – Content published on the website was prima facie defamatory – Petition dismissed [Paras 8, 10, 11].

"Redisplay of Defamatory Content — No Absolution Merely Because Material Was Already in Public Domain"

Defamation – Redisplay – Public Domain – Section 499 IPC – The petitioners contended that their act of redisplaying the post made by the first accused in another social media platform would not attract Section 500 IPC since the imputation had already reached the public through that platform – Held: The contention cannot be accepted – Section 499 IPC makes no distinction between a defamatory publication made for the first time and a redisplay of defamatory material already in another media – The prior publication does not absolve the criminal liability of those who ventured to republish the derogatory words – Unless the act falls within any of the seven exceptions under Section 499 IPC, criminal liability persists [Para 8].

"Nature of Content — Words Lowering Moral and Intellectual Character Prima Facie Defamatory"

Defamation – Prima Facie Case – Nature of Imputations – Section 499 IPC – The contents published by the petitioners in their website contained imputations that the complainant begged for film roles from an accused rapist, stole a credit card while working in America, was a cheap fourth-rate person of perverted mind, and other highly derogatory remarks – These words were of such a nature as to lower the moral and intellectual character of the complainant in the estimation of others – Sworn statement of the complainant confirmed that his friends and well-wishers formed a negative impression of his character upon reading the said publication – Held: The matter published in the website was prima facie highly defamatory [Paras 10, 11].

"Editorial Liability — Automatic Presumption Against Editors Inapplicable Where Specific Allegations Exist"

Editorial Liability – Defamation – Specific Allegations Required – Jaideep Bose v. M/s. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers Pvt. Ltd. – The petitioners relied on the Supreme Court's dictum that Editorial Directors are not automatically presumed liable for defamation unless specific allegations of direct involvement are made – Held: That dictum, rendered in the context of Sections 5 and 7 of the Registration of Books Act, 1867, is inapplicable to the present case, where specific allegations have been made against each petitioner regarding their role in publishing the derogatory content on their website with the intent to denigrate the complainant [Para 11].

Decision: Petition dismissed — Proceedings in CC No. 825/2018 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-V, Thiruvananthapuram for offence under Section 500 IPC to continue [Para 11].

Civil Law – Permanent Injunction – Proof of Possession – Second Appeal – Plaintiffs' suit for permanent injunction dismissed by trial Court for failure to prove lawful possession – First appellate Court reversed, erroneously relying on recitals in an earlier suit (O.S.No.678/1988) and drawing perverse inferences from revenue records – High Court held that the first appellate Court's findings were contrary to evidence and pleadings – Oral and documentary evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3 wholly insufficient to establish possession as on the date of filing of the suit – Second appeal allowed – Judgment of first appellate Court set aside – Trial Court's dismissal of suit restored [Paras 19, 25, 29, 30, 31].

"Suit for Bare Injunction — Plaintiff Must Prove Physical Exclusive Possession as on Date of Suit"

Permanent Injunction – Proof of Possession – Bare Injunction Suit – In a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter, the plaintiff must establish that as on the date of filing the suit, he was in lawful and physical exclusive possession of the suit property and that the defendant attempted to disturb such possession – The plaintiffs failed to produce any documentary evidence to prove possession over the plaint schedule property – P.W.1 (plaintiff No.2) had no personal knowledge about the alleged Nazarana payment or the alleged partition between Mukkaiah and Bheemaiah, being only 10 years old at the time of Mukkaiah's death – P.W.2 and P.W.3 also failed to speak to possession – No patta, no revenue records bearing the suit survey number, and no credible witness examined to prove the alleged oral partition [Paras 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 28].

"Tax Receipts Not Conclusive Proof of Possession — Revenue Records Must Specifically Reference Suit Survey Number"

Evidence – Tax Receipts – Revenue Records – Proof of Possession – The plaintiffs relied on tax receipts (Ex.A-4, Ex.A-10) to prove possession, but the suit schedule survey number and extent were not mentioned in those receipts – Held: Payment of tax receipts is not a conclusive proof of possession of property — Tax receipts show only that a person paid land revenue and not that he was in actual physical possession of the specific suit property — In the absence of any document linking the plaintiffs to R.S.No.394 specifically, the receipts are of no evidentiary value for the purpose of the suit [Para 24].

"Recitals in Earlier Suit Not an Admission of Plaintiffs' Possession — First Appellate Court Drew Perverse Inferences"

Evidence – Admissions – Prior Suit Proceedings – Perverse Findings – The first appellate Court drew the erroneous conclusion that since the defendants in an earlier suit (O.S.No.678/1988) claimed possession of only Ac.16.00 cents against third parties, they were impliedly admitting the plaintiffs' possession over the remaining Ac.16.00 cents – Held: The recital in that earlier plaint that the Revenue Authorities had by mistake recorded only Ac.16.00 cents against the defendants and the remaining Ac.16.00 cents as in the name of Bheemaiah cannot be construed as an admission of Bheemaiah's possession — Findings of the first appellate Court on this point were perverse — Ex.A-1 to Ex.A-3 are of no use to prove plaintiffs' possession [Paras 22, 23, 26].

"When Title is Disputed, Suit for Bare Injunction Without Seeking Declaration is Not Maintainable"

Suit for Injunction – Title in Dispute – Declaration Required – The defendants disputed the title of the plaintiffs in the written statement, denying that the alleged partition between Mukkaiah and Bheemaiah ever took place — Held: Where the title of the plaintiff is in dispute or under a cloud and the defendant asserts title, the plaintiff is required to file a suit for declaration of title along with the consequential relief of injunction — A suit for bare injunction simpliciter will not lie in such circumstances — The plaintiffs neither sought declaration of title nor amended the relief clause during pendency of the suit — Ananthula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. applied [Para 27].

Decision: Second appeal allowed — Judgment and decree dated 27.02.2006 in A.S.No.25 of 1999 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur, set aside — Judgment and decree of the trial Court (I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kovvur) dismissing the suit restored — Each party to bear their own costs [Para 31].

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Mental Cruelty – Unsubstantiated Allegations in Written Statement – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Appellant-husband sought divorce on ground of mental cruelty – Trial Court dismissed the suit – On appeal, held: allegations levelled by the respondent-wife in her written statement, including attempt to kill their second daughter, illicit affair of the husband with another lady, and incitement of third parties to make immoral proposals to the wife, were wholly unsubstantiated – Allegation of attempt to kill daughter on February 15, 2019 demolished by wife's own admission in cross-examination that she had not returned to her matrimonial home after December 15, 2018, three months prior to such alleged incident – No corroborative evidence, oral or documentary, adduced for the alleged illicit affair – Testimony of wife (DW-1) and her mother (DW-2) stood in stark contradiction to each other – Reckless, defamatory and unsubstantiated allegations in pleadings against the spouse and his family, including jeopardising the husband's service in the CISF (a disciplined force), constitute mental cruelty – Trial Court erred in not taking this component of cruelty into account – Appellant entitled to decree of divorce on this ground alone [Paras 27–36].

Mental Cruelty – Plaint Allegations by Husband – Not Substantiated – Adverse Inference – Allegations by the appellant-husband of the wife refusing to do household work, ill-behaving with in-laws and perpetrating cruelty during her stay at the matrimonial home were vague and unaccompanied by specific dates or instances – PW-2, an acquaintance of the husband, admitted he learnt of the facts the day before deposing, relegating his testimony to hearsay – None of the family members of the husband, who would have been the best witnesses, were produced, warranting adverse inference against the appellant on the plaint case of cruelty during cohabitation – Trial Court justified in rejecting plaint allegations for want of independent corroboration [Paras 24–26].

Restitution of Conjugal Rights – Not a Prerequisite for Divorce – The learned Trial Judge erred in holding that non-filing of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was indicative of lack of bona fides on the part of the husband – Held: there is no requirement in law that a party must initiate restitution proceedings as a precondition for seeking divorce – No evidence of animus revertendi on the part of the respondent-wife during the entire period of separation since December 15, 2018 [Para 38].

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Independent Ground for Divorce – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Parties had been separated for over eight years since December 2018 – Both parties stated during arguments that they did not wish to resume conjugal life – No attempt made by either party to unite during this period – Held: a marital relationship that has only become bitter and acrimonious over the years inflicts cruelty on both sides; keeping the facade of such a broken marriage alive does injustice to both parties – Irretrievable breakdown of marriage itself spells cruelty to both parties and is a ground for dissolution under Section 13(1)(ia) – Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433, followed [Paras 39–41].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree dated December 6, 2023 of the Additional District Judge, Khatra, in Matrimonial Suit No. 07 of 2020 set aside – Suit decreed – Marriage between the parties dissolved by divorce – No order as to costs.

Right to Information Act, 2005 — Section 20(1) — Penalty Proceedings — Right of Appellant to be Heard — Petitioner filed RTI application seeking information regarding exclusion of her Form-6 application under Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 from Revenue Adalat — SPIO failed to reply within 30 days — State Information Commission issued show cause notice to SPIO — SPIO's explanation accepted and penalty proceedings dropped — Petitioner challenged the order contending she was not furnished copy of SPIO's explanation and was not afforded opportunity to rebut — Held: The first proviso to Section 20(1) mandates only that the SPIO be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before penalty is imposed — RTI Act does not provide for hearing the appellant in proceedings under Section 20 — Penalty proceedings under Section 20 are purely a matter between the Commission and the SPIO — Penalty goes to the State exchequer and not to the complainant — Appellant has no right to be heard in penalty proceedings under Section 20(1) unless permitted by the Commission — Commission's finding that SPIO's explanation was satisfactory cannot be termed erroneous or perverse — Writ petition dismissed [Paras 7, 8].

RTI Act — Section 20(1) — Nature of Penalty Proceedings — Distinguished from Compensation under Section 19(8)(b) — Unlike proceedings for compensation under Section 19(8)(b) which require adjudication of the complainant's loss and thereby necessitate presence of appellant, penalty proceedings under Section 20 do not require the appellant's participation — The show cause notice issued by the Commission is only prima facie in nature — If the Commission finds the SPIO's explanation satisfactory, penalty proceedings can be dropped — Appearance of appellant before State Information Commission is optional as per Rule 7 of the Kerala State Information Commission (Procedure for Appeal) Rules, 2006 [Paras 7, 8].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed.

Illegal Sand Mining – Pre-Arrest Bail – Dual Prosecution – BNS and Kerala Sand Act – Sections 303(2)/305(e) BNS and Sections 20, 23 of Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001 – Batch of pre-arrest bail applications filed by accused persons charged with illegally transporting Government-owned river sand – Central question being whether theft offence under BNS can be simultaneously invoked alongside Sand Act offence – Held: Prosecution under both enactments is permissible as the offences are distinct – Prior decisions holding to the contrary are per incuriam – Six bail applications allowed; three dismissed [Paras 1, 13, 15].

"Special Law vs. General Law — Concurrent Prosecution Permissible When Offences Are Distinct"

Special Statute – General Statute – Applicability of BNS – Section 22 of Sand Act – Section 26 of General Clauses Act, 1897 – The applicants contended that since the Sand Act is a special statute governing removal of river sand, prosecution under the general criminal law (BNS) is excluded – Held: This contention has no force – Section 22 of the Sand Act expressly permits prosecution under any other law for any act or omission made punishable under it – Section 26 of the General Clauses Act permits prosecution and punishment under any one of two or more enactments for the same set of facts, subject only to a bar against double punishment – A comparison of Section 23 r/w Section 20 of the Sand Act with Section 303(2)/305(e) of the BNS shows that the ingredients are entirely different and they are not the same offence – Concurrent prosecution is therefore permissible [Paras 7, 8, 9].

"Per Incuriam — Earlier View in Mohammed Noufal Overruled for Ignoring Binding Precedents"

Per Incuriam – Earlier Decision Overruled – Mohammed Noufal v. State of Kerala, 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 5858 – The earlier decisions in Mohammed Noufal (supra), followed in Mohammed Salih (BA No.7522/2024) and Sirajudheen K.K. (BA No.6548/2025), which held that Section 379 IPC/BNS theft provision would not apply in cases of river sand theft when the Sand Act is in force, were rendered without noticing Section 22 of the Sand Act, Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, and binding Supreme Court precedents – A decision rendered in ignorance of a binding precedent or relevant statutory provision is per incuriam and has no binding force – The same Single Judge is justified in differing from such an earlier view without reference to a Division Bench – Accordingly, Mohammed Noufal (supra) and the two orders following it are declared per incuriam and overruled [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13].

"Judicial Integrity — Duty to Correct Error Overrides Judicial Inertia"

Judicial Discipline – Duty to Correct Error – The Court observed that to persist with an error is not virtuous and that the strength of a Judge lies not in a claim of infallibility but in the courage to admit error and the humility to correct it when conscience and law reveal a truer course – When a Single Judge renders a judgment without noticing binding precedent and relevant statutory provisions, the same Judge is justified in differing from that earlier view [Para 12].

"Pre-Arrest Bail — Merits — Lorry Owners Absent at Scene Entitled to Bail; Drivers with Antecedents Denied"

Pre-Arrest Bail – Individual Applications – Merits – In BA Nos. 14647/2025, 14273/2025, 14165/2025, 14503/2025, 567/2026 and 757/2026, the applicants were the owners of the lorries involved and none of them was present in the lorries at the time of seizure – Investigation was almost over and lorries had been recovered – Custodial interrogation deemed unnecessary – Bail allowed subject to conditions – In BA No.14502/2025, the applicant was driving the lorry, escaped from the police at the time of interception, had criminal antecedents and was involved in four other similar cases – Investigation at preliminary stage – Bail refused – In BA Nos. 14311/2025 and 14315/2025, the lorry was driven towards a police officer attempting to stop it, prima facie disclosing a premeditated act – Applicants had criminal antecedents – Bail refused [Paras 14(i)–14(v)].

Decision: BA Nos. 14647/2025, 14273/2025, 14165/2025, 14503/2025, 567/2026 and 757/2026 — Allowed — Applicants to be released on bail upon arrest on executing a bond of Rs.1,00,000/- each with two solvent sureties, subject to conditions including weekly reporting, non-commission of like offences, no witness tampering, and no departure from State of Kerala without Court's permission –

BA Nos. 14502/2025, 14311/2025 and 14315/2025 — Dismissed [Para 15].

Criminal Law – Human Trafficking – Immoral Traffic – Quashing of Charge – Sections 370, 370-A(2) IPC and Sections 3, 4, 5, 7 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 – Petitioner, owner-cum-manager of a Spa at Mapusa, sought quashing of order framing charges arising from a police trap operation in which a decoy customer paid marked currency notes for massage services, a victim girl accepted additional payment for extra/special massage, and marked notes were recovered both from the victim and the cash counter held by the Petitioner – Co-accused (customers and other named accused) had earlier been discharged by the Court – Held: Sufficient prima facie material exists on record to frame charge against the Petitioner and the challenge to the order framing charge fails – Petition dismissed [Paras 1, 20, 21].

"Owner-Cum-Manager Personally Implicated — Decoy Statement Establishes Direct Role"

Framing of Charge – Prima Facie Material – Role of Petitioner – The statement of the decoy customer disclosed that the Petitioner, seated at the counter, personally informed him of the massage charges, assured provision of female masseurs in closed-door rooms, received payment of Rs.1,500/- in marked currency, and arranged a victim girl for massage – Marked notes of Rs.1,500/- were recovered from the cash counter in the Petitioner's possession during the raid – Prima facie material clearly implicates the Petitioner in active management and facilitation of the alleged activities [Paras 10, 15].

"Victim Statements Alone Not Determinative — Context of Trap Raid Governs at Charge Stage"

Victim Statements – Stereotypical Nature – Insufficient to Negate Charge – The statements of the rescued victim girls were stereotypical, denying forced exploitation, but when read conjunctively with the complaint, decoy statement and scene of offence panchanama, prima facie material emerged showing one victim accepted Rs.500/- for extra/special/hand massage, which sum was recovered from her personal search – A packet of condoms was also recovered from the same room – The nature of the extra massage is a matter to be determined upon trial, not at the charge stage [Paras 12, 14, 15].

"Definition of 'Exploitation' Under Section 370 IPC is Inclusive, Not Exhaustive"

Trafficking Offence – Exploitation – Consent Immaterial – Section 370 IPC defines exploitation inclusively to cover any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery – Second Explanation to Section 370 renders the consent of the victim immaterial in determining the offence of trafficking – Whether a particular act constitutes exploitation depends upon the facts of each case and is a matter for trial [Paras 12, 13, 14].

"Principle of Parity Not Applicable — Role of Petitioner Distinct from Discharged Co-Accused"

Parity – Discharge of Co-Accused – Inapplicability – Accused Nos. 7, 8 and 9 were discharged as no role was attributed to them in the complaint or charge-sheet – Accused Nos. 2 to 6 were discharged as they were merely customers of the Spa – The Petitioner, being the licensee and owner-cum-manager who personally received payment and facilitated the alleged prostitution, stands on an entirely different footing – Principle of parity cannot be invoked in favour of the Petitioner [Paras 4, 17].

"Standard at Charge Stage — Court Not to Weigh Pros and Cons but Only Assess Prima Facie Grounds"

Framing of Charge – Standard of Scrutiny – At the stage of framing charge, the Court is only required to sift the evidence to determine whether sufficient grounds exist to proceed against the accused – The Court must assume the prosecution material to be true and assess whether the ingredients of the offence are prima facie disclosed – It is not the function of the Court at this stage to weigh the pros and cons of the evidence, which is the function reserved for the trial [Para 18].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Order dated 17.01.2024 of the Sessions Judge, North Goa, directing framing of charges against the Petitioner under Sections 370 and 370-A(2) IPC and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 upheld – Rule discharged [Para 21].

Criminal Law – Bail – UAPA and Explosive Substances Act – Dismissal – Appellant along with co-accused Lovepreet Singh alias Labha arrested on 08.02.2025 on the basis of mobile tower dump analysis, CCTV footage and secret informers — accused allegedly threw an explosive substance on the building of Police Post, Fatehgarh Churrian Road, Amritsar on 03.02.2025 — appellant received Rs. 50,000 for committing the act — disclosure statements revealed concealment of AK-56 rifle, country-made pistol and Glock pistol supplied through drone — Glock Pistol 30 bore with cartridges recovered at the instance of appellant — appellant had criminal antecedents in FIR No. 4 dated 10.02.2025 under Arms Act and BNS — custody of approximately one year held not to be prolonged — Held: No case on merits made out for bail — appeal dismissed [Paras 1–10].

"Conspiracy to Cause Explosion – Evidence of Involvement – Role of Appellant"

Bail – Explosive Substances Act – UAPA – Role of Appellant – Co-accused Lovepreet Singh alias Labha in his disclosure statement revealed that he and the appellant were induced by Harpreet Singh alias Happy Pashian and Buta Singh alias Joban to throw a grenade/explosive substance on Police Post Fatehgarh Churrian Road for payment of Rs. 7 lakh — appellant received Rs. 50,000 for participation — subsequent disclosure statements corrected that an explosive substance wrapped in packet (not grenade) was thrown — hotel shelter provided to accused before and after the explosion by co-accused Amritpal Singh alias Amrit — call detail records and mobile tower locations of phones recovered from co-accused corroborated their constant association and presence at the place of occurrence [Paras 6–8].

"Recovery of Weapons – Disclosure Statement – Arms Supplied Through Drone"

Arms Act – Recovery – Weapons Concealed and Recovered – Appellant and co-accused disclosed in separate statements dated 09.02.2025 that a sack containing AK-56 rifle, country-made pistol and Glock pistol was concealed by burying in a plot at Loharka Road, Amritsar — weapons were supplied through drone by co-accused Harpreet Singh alias Happy Pashian — Glock Pistol 30 bore with 4 cartridges recovered at the instance of the appellant — recoveries corroborated by Recovery Memos dated 09.02.2025 [Para 7, Point 8].

"Custody Period – Not Prolonged – Bail Not Maintainable on Merits"

Bail – Period of Custody – Intent to Affect Sovereignty and Integrity of India – Appellant in custody since 08.02.2025 — State opposed bail on ground that intent was to cause massive destruction to life and property affecting sovereignty and integrity of India — Court noted that custody of approximately one year cannot be stated to be prolonged in cases of this nature — no case on merits made out for grant of bail — Held: Appeal dismissed [Paras 4, 8–10].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Bail application rejected — All pending applications disposed of.

Trade Marks – Refurbishment of End-of-Life HDDs – Infringement – Passing Off – Reverse Passing Off – Appellants manufactured Hard Disk Drives sold to OEMs abroad; HDDs on reaching 'end-of-life' stage extracted, imported into India, and sold to respondent-refurbishers – Respondents effaced appellants' registered marks, refurbished HDDs, affixed their own marks/Serial numbers/Model numbers, and sold HDDs with full disclosure – Appellants alleged infringement under Sections 29, 30(3) and 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act, as well as passing off and 'reverse passing off' – Single Judge dismissed interlocutory injunction applications and permitted respondents to sell refurbished HDDs with disclosure conditions – Division Bench upheld dismissal – Held: (i) 'reverse passing off' is not an actionable tort in Indian trade mark jurisprudence; (ii) ingredients of passing off absent; (iii) no infringement under Section 29 as respondents do not use appellants' registered marks or any deceptively similar mark; (iv) Section 30(3) does not create a new species of infringement; (v) assuming Section 30(3) applicable, its conditions satisfied; (vi) Section 30(4) not applicable as no impairment of HDDs and no legitimate reason for appellants to oppose further dealings; (vii) principle of international exhaustion of rights confirmed – Appeals dismissed [Paras 1–149, 156–168].

"Reverse Passing Off – Not an Actionable Tort in Indian Trade Mark Law"

Reverse passing off, Sections 27(2), 134(1)(c), 135(1) – Appellants alleged that respondents misrepresented the appellants' HDDs as their own by effacing appellants' marks and affixing their own, constituting 'reverse passing off' – Held: The tort of 'reverse passing off' is foreign to Indian trade mark jurisprudence – Section 27(2) saves only the right of action against a person for passing off his goods as those of another, not the reverse scenario – Supreme Court in Kaviraj Pt Durga Dutt Sharma and Satyam Infoway Ltd confirmed that 'passing off' involves misrepresentation by a defendant of his own goods as those of the plaintiff – Section 134(1)(c) envisages a suit only where the defendant uses a mark deceptively similar to the plaintiff's, not where the defendant passes off the plaintiff's goods as his own – No right to sue or obtain injunction on the ground of reverse passing off is available in trade mark law – All contentions of appellants predicated on 'reverse passing off' rejected [Paras 83–94].

"Passing Off – Ingredients Absent – No Misappropriation of Goodwill"

Passing off, goodwill, misrepresentation, damage – Even assuming 'reverse passing off' were actionable, its ingredients were absent: (i) for reverse passing off, consumer must be able to identify the goods as the plaintiff's at the initial interest stage (point of initial sale), which was not established; (ii) ability to trace the original manufacturer only by using a technical tool (Crystal Disk Info) does not suffice; (iii) no misappropriation of appellants' goodwill by respondents; (iv) no damage or prejudice to goodwill demonstrated – HDDs sold by respondents not under appellants' marks – Appellants had no concern with HDDs once they reached end-of-life stage and warranty stood extinguished – No prima facie case of passing off or reverse passing off established [Paras 95–109].

"Section 29 – Infringement – Use of Registered Mark – No Infringement Where Respondents Efface Mark"

Section 29, Trade Marks Act, 1999 – infringement – use of registered mark – Held: Section 29 constitutes a complete and self-contained code with respect to infringement – Infringement under Section 29 requires the infringer to use the registered trade mark, or a deceptively similar mark, in the course of trade – Before selling the HDDs, respondents efface the appellants' trade marks and affix their own marks – Respondents thus do not use the appellants' registered marks or any deceptively similar mark – No case of infringement under Section 29 is made out – Consequently, no occasion arises to invoke Section 30(3) or 30(4) at all [Paras 110–115].

"Section 30(3) – Not a New Species of Infringement – Principle of International Exhaustion Confirmed"

Section 30(3), Trade Marks Act, 1999 – limits on effect of registered trade mark – international exhaustion – lawful acquisition – Section 30(3) does not create a new species of infringement; it merely limits the right to allege infringement in respect of goods bearing a registered mark that have been lawfully acquired – The 'market' in Section 30(3) is the international market, confirming India's adoption of the principle of international exhaustion of rights (Kapil Wadhwa approved) – Even after effacing the appellants' marks and substituting the respondents' own marks, the further sale of the goods constitutes 'sale of the goods in the market' within Section 30(3); the learned Single Judge erred in reading the words 'as such' into the sub-section – Assuming Section 30(3) applicable, all its conditions were satisfied: (i) no proscription on OEMs reselling end-of-life HDDs; (ii) no illegality in import; (iii) HDDs purchased against commercial invoices with GST paid; (iv) appellants themselves placed goods on the market [Paras 20–45, 116–127].

"Section 30(4) – 'Changed or Impaired' – Noscitur a Sociis – No Legitimate Reason to Oppose"

Section 30(4), Trade Marks Act, 1999 – changed or impaired – noscitur a sociis – legitimate reasons – Section 30(4) excepts the protection of Section 30(3) where the condition of the goods has been changed or impaired, or other legitimate reasons exist to oppose further dealings – Held: The word 'changed' in Section 30(4) must be read noscitur a sociis with the word 'impaired'; 'change' must partake of a negative character – The respondents' acts of erasing appellants' marks, loading new software, and assigning new Serial/Model numbers did not constitute 'change or impairment' in this sense – Once HDDs reached end-of-life stage and appellants' warranty was extinguished, the umbilical cord was severed and appellants had no further legitimate concern – No material demonstrating prejudice to the appellants' reputation or goodwill – Accordingly, Section 30(4) does not apply [Paras 39–45, 128–137].

"Importer of HDDs Bearing Registered Mark – Section 29(6)(c) – Import as 'Use' – Section 30(3) Protects"

Section 29(6)(c), Section 30(3), Trade Marks Act, 1999 – import bearing registered mark – use in course of trade – FAO(OS)(COMM) 104/2025 – respondent Hansraj Dugar himself imported HDDs from Hong Kong and Korea bearing the appellants' registered trade marks without having refurbished them first – Import of goods bearing a registered trade mark amounts to 'use' of the mark within Section 29(6)(c) and constitutes infringement where the importer is neither the registered proprietor nor permissive user – Unlike the refurbisher-respondents in the companion appeals, Section 30(3) is directly applicable here to examine whether the respondent can escape infringement – Held: Section 30(3) protects the respondent; no proscription on OEMs reselling end-of-life HDDs; import not illegal; goods seized in Customs area showed no change or impairment; Section 30(4) inapplicable – Appeal dismissed [Paras 150–168].

"Kapil Wadhwa – Approved with Qualification – 'Legitimate Reasons' Under Section 30(4)"

Section 30(4) – legitimate reasons – Kapil Wadhwa v. Samsung Electronics – Division Bench decision in Kapil Wadhwa v. Samsung Electronics, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 5172, approved in so far as: (i) 'lawful acquisition' connotes lawful acquisition as per the laws of the country of acquisition; (ii) India adopts the principle of international exhaustion; (iii) the 'market' in Section 30(3) is the international market – However, the identification of specific 'species' of legitimate reasons in para 68 of Kapil Wadhwa (difference in services/warranties, advertising, packaging, quality control, language of literature) not treated as absolute grounds; such circumstances must reduce the quality or value of the goods or impair the goodwill of the registered proprietor to constitute 'legitimate reasons' under Section 30(4) – Determination of whether legitimate reasons exist is primarily a question of fact [Paras 46–52].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Interlocutory injunction applications of appellants under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC found to be without prima facie merit on infringement, passing off, and reverse passing off – Operative directions of the learned Single Judge permitting respondents to sell refurbished HDDs subject to disclosure conditions maintained – Observations and findings in the judgment held to be prima facie and shall not inhibit the Commercial Court on the merits of the substantive suits [Paras 145–149, 166–168].