Motor Accident – Compensation Claim – Minor Child – Negligent Driving – Tribunal dismissed claim citing lack of evidence of rash driving by respondent – High Court finds findings perverse and based on misappreciation of evidence – Testimony of eye-witness mother (PW-2) consistent and unimpeached – Another eye-witness (PW-3) corroborated material facts – FIR was delayed due to police inaction and social constraints, but registered with Human Rights Commission's intervention – Held: Delay not fatal, claimants’ evidence established rash and negligent act of respondent No.1 – Dismissal by Tribunal erroneous [Paras 10–13, 20].

Motor Accident – Effect of Criminal Acquittal – Acquittal of driver in criminal case not binding on MACT – Standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities – Tribunal erred in relying on criminal acquittal and inferring collusion between claimants and driver – Held: Findings of collusion were speculative and not proved by insurer – Tribunal misapplied legal principles [Paras 14–17].

Motor Accident – Minor Victim – Determination of Income – Future Prospects – Compensation – Minor aged 11 years treated as skilled worker – Notional income taken as ₹4,375 per month as per minimum wages – Future prospects @ 40% applied – Deduction of 50% for personal expenses – Multiplier of 18 applied – Held: Just and fair compensation includes future potential and not limited to current earnings of child [Paras 26–29].

Compensation – Filial Consortium – Parents' Right – Compensation of ₹48,400 each awarded to both parents under head of parental consortium – Loss of estate and funeral expenses also awarded with 10% escalation as per Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance principles – Interest @ 9% p.a. awarded from date of claim petition till realization [Paras 24, 30–32].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Tribunal’s dismissal of claim set aside – Appellants awarded compensation of ₹7,94,492 with 9% interest per annum from date of claim petition till realization – Respondent No.4-Insurance Company directed to deposit amount within 2 months for disbursal by Tribunal [Paras 30–32].

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR and Charge-Sheet – Scope of Inherent Jurisdiction – FIR lodged alleging ridicule, abuse and intimidation – Charge-sheet filed for minor offences – Allegations against present petitioner vague and omnibus – No specific overt act attributed – Held: Continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process of Court – FIR and charge-sheet quashed [Paras 8–14].

Inherent Powers – Sections 482 CrPC / 528 BNSS – Maintainability After Charge-Sheet – Charge-sheet filed but materials do not disclose ingredients of alleged offences – Held: High Court retains power to quash proceedings where allegations even if taken at face value do not constitute offence – Cognizance stage not a bar to exercise of inherent jurisdiction to prevent injustice [Paras 10–12].

Indian Penal Code – Sections 341, 323, 506, 34 – Essential Ingredients – No allegation of wrongful restraint, physical assault or criminal intimidation against petitioner – No medical evidence or injury report – Police itself dropped Section 323 at charge-sheet stage – Held: Basic ingredients of alleged offences absent [Paras 3, 8–9].

Abuse of Criminal Process – Malicious Prosecution – Name of petitioner dragged without material basis – Career and reputation of petitioner affected – Held: Criminal law cannot be used as a weapon for personal vendetta – Proceedings liable to be quashed to secure ends of justice [Paras 4, 13].

Judicial Precedents – Applicability – Reliance on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal – Categories for quashing reiterated – Allegations fall within parameters warranting exercise of inherent power – Decision in Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra distinguished on facts and procedural posture [Paras 5, 9–11].

Decision: Criminal Revisional Application allowed – FIR No. 344 of 2021 and consequential charge-sheet quashed – All connected applications disposed of.

Civil Law – Order 7 Rule 11 CPC – Scope – Rejection of Plaint – At the stage of deciding application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only averments contained in the plaint are to be considered – Defence of the defendant or disputed questions of fact cannot be examined – Issues requiring evidence cannot be decided summarily [Paras 6–7].

Rent Control – Ejectment Petition – Alleged Prior Vacation of Premises – Tenant pleaded that premises were vacated prior to filing of ejectment petition – Landlord denied said assertion – Held: Whether tenant had vacated premises is a pure question of fact requiring evidence – Cannot be a ground for rejection of rent petition under Order VII Rule 11 CPC [Paras 2, 6].

Commercial Courts Act – Section 6 – Applicability – Eviction Proceedings – Dispute arising out of landlord-tenant relationship, even relating to commercial premises, does not fall within definition of “commercial dispute” under Section 2(1)(c) of Commercial Courts Act – Eviction proceedings under Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act not barred or transferred to Commercial Courts [Paras 3, 8].

Jurisdiction – Rent Controller – Exclusive Jurisdiction – Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 is a special statute creating exclusive forum – Rent Controller has jurisdiction to entertain eviction petition irrespective of residential or commercial use of premises [Para 8].

Supervisory Jurisdiction – Article 227 – Limited Interference – High Court will not interfere with interlocutory orders unless patent illegality or perversity shown – Application under Order VII Rule 11 found to be filed only to delay proceedings – No ground made out for interference [Paras 6, 9].

Decision: Civil Revision Petition Dismissed – Order dated 19.11.2025 dismissing application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC upheld – Rent proceedings to continue in accordance with law – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 9–10].

Real Estate – RERA Registration – Ongoing vs. Completed Project – Completion Certificate Issued Pre-RERA – Appellant’s project had received a valid completion certificate on 17 March 2015 – Tribunal wrongly held project as ongoing due to absence of fire safety certificate – Held: Under Regulation 67 of BDA Regulations, fire NOC suffices at completion stage – Completion certificate valid – Project not registrable under RERA [Paras 10–19]

Statutory Interpretation – Completion Certificate vs. Occupancy Certificate – Occupancy certificate (Sec. 2(zf)) and completion certificate (Sec. 2(q)) have distinct legal purposes – RERA registration depends on completion certificate – Absence of occupancy certificate does not render a project ongoing under the Act [Paras 12–13]

Fire Safety – Compliance Requirements – Regulation 67 of BDA Regulations requires fire NOC, not fire safety certificate, for completion – Fire safety certificate required only at occupancy stage – Tribunal’s reliance on fire safety certificate to invalidate completion certificate is legally incorrect – Project completed before Fire Safety Rules came into force [Paras 14–19]

Binding Effect of BDA Determination – BDA’s 2022 order confirming no need for fresh completion certificate after revised plan was final – Not challenged – Tribunal erred in disregarding binding decision of competent authority under Section 2(p) RERA – Project to be treated as complete [Paras 18–19]

Applicability of RERA – Retroactivity – Supreme Court in Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. clarified that RERA applies only to ongoing and future projects – Project completed before 1 May 2017 falls outside the purview of the Act – Tribunal misapplied settled law [Paras 10, 14, 20]

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of the OREAT dated 27 September 2024 in Appeal Nos. 96 and 97 of 2023 and review orders dated 13 November 2024 in Review Petition Nos. 15 and 16 of 2024 are set aside – Project held to be completed prior to commencement of RERA – Complaints held non-maintainable – No order as to costs.

Election Law – Panchayat Elections – Corrupt Practice – Disqualification – Declaration of Returned Candidate as Void – Declaration of Another Candidate as Elected – Non-disclosure of criminal antecedents by returned candidate amounts to corrupt practice and election liable to be declared void – However, declaration of an unelected candidate as elected can be made only if statutory conditions are fulfilled – In absence of allegation or finding that but for corrupt votes the election petitioner would have secured majority of valid votes, declaration of another candidate as elected is impermissible – Tribunal erred in law in declaring respondent No.4 as elected [Paras 11–13].

Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 – Sections 89 and 90 – Distinction Between Disqualification and Corrupt Practice – Section 89(1)(a) relates to disqualification existing on date of election – Section 89(1)(b) concerns corrupt practices affecting election – In cases of disqualification, votes polled by disqualified candidate cannot automatically be treated as “thrown away” – Law does not permit presumption as to voting pattern had the disqualified candidate not contested – Ratio reiterated from Supreme Court precedents [Paras 10–12].

Election Tribunal – Procedural Lapses – Mandatory Duty to Follow CPC Procedure – Election petition decided without framing issues, without calling for written response and without recording evidence – Tribunal devised its own procedure ignoring mandatory statutory framework – Election petitions are akin to civil trials and strict adherence to procedure under CPC is mandatory – Failure to frame issues and conduct trial vitiates entire proceedings [Paras 14–15].

Framing of Issues – Importance – Democratic Rights at Stake – Settlement of issues is foundational stage of election trial – Issues determine scope of evidence and adjudication – Tribunal’s casual approach in deciding election petition without issues reflects non-application of mind – Election disputes affect fate of constituency and democratic process, hence require strict procedural compliance [Paras 14–15].

Supervisory and Appellate Interference – Election Matters – High Court justified in setting aside Tribunal’s order where it suffers from patent illegality and procedural impropriety – Tribunal’s order held unsustainable both in law and procedure – Matter remanded for fresh adjudication in accordance with law [Paras 15–16].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 06.03.2025 passed by Election Tribunal, Sri Muktsar Sahib set aside – Matter remanded to Tribunal for fresh decision after framing issues and recording evidence – Tribunal directed to decide election petition expeditiously, preferably on or before 30.06.2026.

Criminal Law – Compromise after Conviction – Non-Compoundable Offences – Sections 324, 148, 149 IPC – Accused convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment up to two years – During pendency of appeal parties entered into voluntary compromise – Trial Court verified compromise and reported it to be genuine and without coercion – Held: High Court can quash proceedings and set aside conviction in exercise of inherent powers to secure ends of justice even in non-compoundable offences [Paras 4–8, 14–17].

Criminal Procedure – Section 482 CrPC – Scope – Distinction between Compounding and Quashing – Though offences are not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC, inherent jurisdiction of High Court not barred – Power under Section 482 can be exercised to prevent abuse of process and to promote peace and harmony where dispute is predominantly private in nature [Paras 8–12].

Offences against Society – Test of Public Interest – FIR involved offences under Sections 307 and 326 IPC but appellants already acquitted of those charges – Remaining offences under Sections 324/148/149 IPC arose from village dispute – Held: Incident did not affect public peace, moral turpitude or public policy – Continuation of proceedings would serve no fruitful purpose [Paras 7–8, 16].

Settlement – Post-Conviction Stage – Pendency of Appeals – Compromise permissible even after conviction where offence is non-heinous and private in nature – Object of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory and to restore peace – Rejection of compromise may perpetuate hostility [Paras 7, 14–16].

Effect of Death of Accused – Abatement – One appellant (Gurpreet Singh @ Gopi) expired during pendency of appeals – Appeal abated qua deceased accused – Remaining appellants entitled to benefit of compromise [Para 5, 18].

Decision: Appeals by accused allowed – Conviction and sentence set aside – Appellant-convicts acquitted – Appeal filed by State dismissed in view of compromise – Proceedings abated qua deceased accused – Bail bonds discharged – All pending applications closed [Paras 17–18].

Arbitration – Jurisdiction – Statutory Arbitration – National Highways Act – Section 3-G(5), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 42 – Petitioner NHAI contended that Section 34 petition filed by landowners challenging award of arbitrator should lie before District Judge, Mandi, as arbitrator was Divisional Commissioner, Mandi – Held: Notification under Section 3-G(5) merely specifies territorial jurisdiction of arbitrator and does not designate “seat” of arbitration – Office location or venue of hearings at Mandi does not ipso facto constitute seat of arbitration – Neither parties nor arbitrator fixed seat – In absence of designated seat, court where first application under Part I was filed (Bilaspur) would have exclusive jurisdiction under Section 42 – District Judge Bilaspur rightly retained jurisdiction [Paras 11–16, 22–23].

Arbitration – Seat vs Venue – Interpretation of “Place” under Section 20 – Juridical Seat – Mandi not fixed as seat – Mere fact that arbitrator holds office or conducts hearings in Mandi does not confer status of “seat” – Reference made to Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium and BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC – Held: Seat of arbitration is the legal anchor of arbitration, and once chosen, confers exclusive jurisdiction – In present case, no agreement or determination regarding seat made – Thus, “Mandi” was only the venue and not the seat of arbitration [Paras 12–16].

Arbitration – Section 42 – First Application Rule – Exclusive Jurisdiction – Where Section 34 petition filed first – Respondents (landowners) filed Section 34 petitions before District Judge, Bilaspur prior in time to petitions filed by NHAI before District Judge, Mandi – As per Section 42, once an application is made in a “court” under Part I of the Act, that court alone has jurisdiction for all subsequent applications – Held: Bilaspur court has exclusive jurisdiction – Petitions by NHAI seeking transfer to Mandi court are devoid of merit [Paras 17–23].

Arbitration – Court under Section 2(1)(e) – Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction – Applicability of Section 42 – District Judge, Bilaspur is a “court” under Section 2(1)(e) – Once Section 34 application was validly filed there, no subsequent application could be filed before Mandi court – Petitioner’s Section 34 application before Mandi filed after respondents’ application in Bilaspur – Held: District Judge Bilaspur had valid and exclusive jurisdiction [Paras 21–23].

National Highways Act – Section 3-G Arbitration – Applicability of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 3-G(6) expressly applies Arbitration Act, 1996 to arbitrations under National Highways Act – Section 2(4) of Arbitration Act also deems statutory arbitrations under any enactment, including National Highways Act, to be governed by Part I of the Arbitration Act – Hence, Section 34 and Section 42 apply in full to such statutory arbitrations [Paras 2–7].

Decision: All petitions dismissed – Impugned order dated 28.06.2025 passed by District Judge, Bilaspur upheld – District Judge, Bilaspur has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide all applications arising out of the arbitral proceedings – Mandi court has no jurisdiction in view of first application rule under Section 42 – Miscellaneous applications also dismissed. [Para 24]

Territorial Jurisdiction – Writ Petition under Article 226 – Challenge to Final Findings by Designated Authority recommending anti-dumping duty – Petitioner, a Kuwaiti exporter, claimed apprehended loss of business in Kolkata as part of cause of action – Held: Mere apprehension of injury to business or presence of customers in Kolkata is not sufficient to establish part of cause of action – The bundle of facts forming cause of action must have nexus to the lis involved, i.e., violation of procedural rights by Designated Authority – Petitioner’s claim of harm within West Bengal irrelevant to challenge based on procedural lapses – No integral or essential part of cause of action shown to arise in West Bengal – Writ not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction [Paras 54–74]

Anti-Dumping Investigation – Principles of Natural Justice – Allegation of non-disclosure of essential facts and methodology by Designated Authority under Rule 16 of Anti-Dumping Rules – Petitioner claimed denial of right to fair hearing – Court refrained from examining due to lack of territorial jurisdiction – Observed that such questions may be appropriately addressed by CESTAT under statutory remedy [Paras 25–33, 73]

Alternative Remedy – Maintainability of Writ – Though questions of natural justice and procedural fairness raised, Court declined to adjudicate due to lack of territorial jurisdiction – Availability of statutory appeal under Section 9C also noted – Issue of maintainability on grounds of alternative remedy left open [Paras 25, 73]

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Court held it lacked territorial jurisdiction as no part of cause of action arose within West Bengal – No costs.

Criminal Law – Dishonour of Cheque – Directors’ Liability – Quashing of Complaint – Petitioners sought quashing of criminal proceedings initiated under Sections 138/141 of the NI Act on ground that no specific role was attributed to them in the complaint – Held: Mere reproduction of statutory language not sufficient – Complaint must aver how each director was in charge of or responsible for the conduct of business at the relevant time – Failure to do so is fatal – Petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 had resigned prior to the alleged offence and such resignation was accepted as per Form-32 – Continuation of proceedings against them is an abuse of process [Paras 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18]

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Reason for Dishonour – ‘Other Reasons’ – Held: Dishonour for “other reasons” does not constitute an offence under Section 138 NI Act, which requires dishonour for insufficiency of funds or exceeding arrangement – Complaint unsustainable on this ground alone [Para 10]

Company Law – Winding Up Order – Effect – Company under liquidation – Order for winding up passed prior to the institution of the complaint – Held: No proceedings can be continued against company once Official Liquidator is appointed – Complaint against company and its directors not maintainable in such scenario [Para 16]

Vicarious Liability – Directors – Specific Averments Mandatory – Multiple Supreme Court precedents reiterated that vicarious liability of directors under Section 141 NI Act cannot arise without clear and specific averments about their role – A director is not deemed liable solely because of designation – Liability must be based on factual assertions [Paras 11–14]

Decision: CRR allowed – Complaint Case No. C-824 of 2011 pending before the Learned 4th Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta is quashed – Proceedings against petitioners under Sections 138/141 NI Act set aside [Paras 20–21]