Prevention of Corruption Act – Demand and Acceptance of Illegal Gratification – Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) PC Act – Accused Police Constable posted at Aya Nagar Check Post demanded and accepted Rs. 1,000/- as illegal gratification from the informant Narender Kumar for returning his identity card confiscated during a police checking on the intervening night of 26.07.1994-27.07.1994 – Trap was successfully laid on 30.07.1994 – Tainted currency recovered from the left pocket of the accused – Left hand wash and pocket wash tested positive – Accused convicted by trial court and sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment on each count with sentences running concurrently – On appeal, accused deceased during pendency – Legal heirs not coming forward – Appeal considered on merits following the dictum in Bani Singh vs. State of U.P., (1996) 4 SCC 720 – Held: Conviction upheld – Appeal dismissed [Paras 2, 9-10, 26-27].

Non-Examination of Informant – Does Not Abate Prosecution – PC Act Cases – Informant Narender Kumar remained untraceable despite repeated summons and was not examined before the trial court – Held: In cases where the complainant/informant is unavailable, dead or turns hostile, the demand of illegal gratification can still be proved through testimony of other witnesses, documentary evidence or circumstantial evidence – The case does not abate nor does it automatically result in acquittal merely because the informant was not examined – Demand proved through the testimony of the panch witness PW5 [Paras 15, 21].

Panch Witness – Sole Testimony – Sufficiency – PW5 (panch witness) who accompanied the informant throughout the trap proceedings fully stood by the prosecution case and was not discredited in cross-examination – No material was shown to suggest he was an interested or partisan witness – Held: Evidence is to be weighed and not counted – Conviction can be based on the testimony of a single witness if found wholly reliable – Testimony of PW5 coupled with recovery of tainted currency from the accused's possession sufficiently establishes both demand and acceptance [Para 22].

Statutory Presumption – Section 20 PC Act – Once Foundational Facts Proved, Burden Shifts to Accused – Section 20 PC Act mandates a statutory presumption in favour of the prosecution, but such presumption is not automatic and can only be invoked after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of demand and acceptance – Held: Once demand and acceptance stood proved from the testimony of PW5 and recovery of tainted currency, the presumption under Section 20 stands invoked – The accused failed to discharge the burden by adducing any cogent or credible evidence to rebut the presumption [Paras 23-24].

Sanction for Prosecution – Section 19(1)(c) PC Act – Competent Authority – Validity – Sanction for prosecution accorded by Vivek Gogia, IPS, Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police – Accused contended that since he was appointed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, the sanctioning authority was incompetent – Held: Under Sections 12 and 21 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, the Additional DCP is expressly empowered to appoint and remove officers of subordinate rank including constables – The test under Section 19(1)(c) PC Act is whether the sanctioning authority is competent to remove the accused from office – Since that power expressly vests in the Addl. DCP, the sanction is valid [Para 25].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 upheld – One year rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each count, sentences running concurrently, confirmed.

Service Law – Army – Back Wages – General Court Martial – Conviction – Commutation of Sentence – "No Work No Pay" – Petitioner commissioned in the Indian Army in 1984 was tried by a General Court Martial, found guilty and sentenced to cashiering and one year rigorous imprisonment – Punishment of cashiering took effect from 04.12.2001 – Petitioner's statutory petition under Section 164(2) of the Army Act was rejected – In an earlier round of litigation, AFT interfered only with the quantum of sentence and remitted the matter for reconsideration, leaving the conviction undisturbed – Central Government thereafter commuted the sentence under Section 163(2) read with Section 179 of the Army Act and directed reinstatement by corrigendum dated 15.02.2013, but denied back wages on the principle of "no work no pay" – Petitioner claimed back wages for the period 04.12.2001 to 04.03.2013 – Held: Conviction having attained finality and never having been set aside, and the period out of service being a direct consequence of a valid conviction, the petitioner is not entitled to back wages – Petition dismissed [Paras 15-21].

Commutation of Sentence – Army Act – Section 163(2) read with Section 179 – Does Not Relate Back – Petitioner contended that commutation of sentence would relate back to the date of imposition of punishment, obliterating its consequences and entitling him to be treated as having continued in service without interruption – Held: The power exercised by the Central Government under Section 163(2) read with Section 179 of the Army Act is one of alteration or commutation of sentence and does not amount to a declaration that the original punishment was void ab initio – Commutation is a modification of punishment and does not result in setting aside the conviction or underlying proceedings – The petitioner cannot be deemed to have been in continuous service for the intervening period [Paras 17-18].

No Work No Pay – Exception – Not Available Where Conviction Subsists – The principle of "no work no pay" holds that salary is payable only for the period during which an employee has actually discharged duties – Exceptions are recognised in cases where an employee is wrongfully prevented from discharging duties on account of an illegal or unjustified act of the employer – Held: Such exception has no application where the employee was kept out of service on account of a conviction that has attained finality – The present case cannot be equated with a case of illegal termination or acquittal – The distinction between exoneration/acquittal and modification of sentence is well recognised in service jurisprudence, with materially different consequences [Paras 19-21].

Scope of Judicial Review – AFT – Writ Jurisdiction – Articles 226 and 227 – Held: The scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction with an order of the AFT is limited – The Court does not sit in appeal over AFT decisions and will interfere only where the order suffers from patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error – Reappreciation of evidence or substitution of a plausible view is not warranted [Para 14].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Impugned order of the Armed Forces Tribunal affirmed – Denial of back wages for the period 04.12.2001 to 04.03.2013 upheld – Principle of "no work no pay" held applicable.

Cyber Crime – Bank Account Freezing – Educational Institution – Disproportionate Action – Sections 41A CrPC, 420 IPC, 66(D) IT Act – Writ Petition Allowed – Petitioner-school's entire bank account frozen by respondent-bank acting on notice issued by Cyber Crime Police, Varanasi, in Crime No.50/2024, on the ground that a parent of a student was allegedly involved in cyber offences and had remitted school fees of Rs.5,00,000/- as part of alleged crime proceeds – School had, upon receipt of Section 41A notice, promptly and bona fide reversed the said amount to the source account – Held: Freezing of the entire account of an educational institution solely because it received a legitimate fee payment from an allegedly accused parent constitutes a wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and disproportionate measure – Petitioner cannot be penalised for receiving bona fide fee payments in the ordinary course of its functioning – Notice dated 11.03.2026 quashed – Bank directed to mark lien to the extent of Rs.5,00,000/- only, subject to outcome of Crime No.50/2024, while permitting the institution to freely operate the account for amounts exceeding Rs.5,00,000/- [Paras 4–9].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Notice dated 11.03.2026 quashed – First respondent-bank directed to mark lien on petitioner's account to the extent of Rs.5,00,000/- only – Petitioner permitted to operate account freely for amounts exceeding Rs.5,00,000/- – Lien subject to outcome of proceedings in Crime No.50/2024.

Taxation Law - Income Tax — Dividend Distribution Tax — India–UK DTAA — Refund of Excess DDT — Reference to Larger Bench — Assessee, an Indian company engaged in manufacture of foundry chemicals, distributed dividends to its UK-based parent shareholders and paid DDT under Section 115-O at 16.994% for Assessment Years 2014–15 to 2020–21 — Assessee claimed that since the beneficial owners of dividends were UK residents, the rate ought to have been capped at 15% (later claimed at 10%) under Article 11 of the India–UK DTAA and accordingly filed refund applications under Section 237 — Revenue and the Tribunal rejected the claim following the Special Bench decision in Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. Total Oil India Pvt. Ltd. holding that DDT is an additional income tax on the company and not a tax on shareholders, thereby excluding DTAA applicability — Assessee relied on the Division Bench decision in M/s. Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Goa (2025 SCC OnLine Bom 5983) which held to the contrary — Revenue contended that Colorcon (supra) is per incuriam, being contrary to the Division Bench decision in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. DCIT (2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1174) as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. DCIT (2017) 7 SCC 421, and to Small Industries Development Bank of India v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 14048 — Held: A clear cleavage of opinion exists between the Division Bench in Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. and the Division Benches in Godrej & Boyce and SIDBI (supra), necessitating reference to a Larger Bench — Appeals admitted on the questions of law framed — Registry directed to place proceedings before the Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench [Paras 16–41].

Nature of DDT — Tax on Company or Shareholder — Section 115-O — Prima Facie View — The Court noted on a plain reading of Section 115-O that the provision, beginning with a non-obstante clause, imposes additional income tax on the domestic company on profits declared, distributed or paid as dividends — Sub-sections (4) and (5) make clear that the DDT so paid is the final payment of tax and neither the company nor any shareholder can claim further credit or deduction — Once DDT is paid, dividends become exempt in the hands of shareholders under Section 10(34) — Prima facie, DDT is a tax on the company and not on the shareholder, and the DTAA provisions under Article 11 relating to tax on dividend income of shareholders do not appear to apply to the operation of Section 115-O [Paras 19–22].

Conflict of Coordinate Bench Decisions — Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. v. Total Oil India — Godrej & Boyce — The Division Bench in Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held that DDT is in substance a tax on dividend income of shareholders, the incidence being shifted to the company merely for administrative convenience, and accordingly held that the India–UK DTAA's Article 11 beneficial rate applies — This view appears contrary to the consistent position in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra) (as upheld by the Supreme Court) and SIDBI (supra), both of which held that DDT is a charge on the profits of the company and not a tax on dividend income in the hands of shareholders — The Special Bench of the Tribunal in Total Oil India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) had also concluded that DTAA protection is available to domestic companies paying DDT only where the contracting states have specifically so provided in the treaty, as in the India–Hungary DTAA — No such provision exists in the India–UK DTAA [Paras 28–39].

Questions of Law Referred to Larger Bench — (i) Whether the decision of the Division Bench in M/s. Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 5/2024, decided 28 November 2025) lays down the correct position in law when it holds that DDT is a tax paid by the company on dividend income of the shareholder, entitling the shareholder to the benefit of the India–UK DTAA? — (ii) Whether, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra), the decision in Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is per incuriam? [Para 40].

Decision: Appeals admitted on the questions of law framed in paragraph 2 — Registry directed to place proceedings before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench to answer the aforesaid questions.

Forest Law – Confiscation of Vehicle – Nature of Confiscation under Section 49 vis-à-vis Section 51, Assam Forest Regulation, 1891 – Petitioner's truck bearing No. AS-17B-9317 was intercepted on 12.08.2018 while transporting teak logs from Mizoram with discrepancies in transit pass and logs found unmarked – Vehicle seized and administratively confiscated vide order dated 17.01.2020 by Authorised Officer (DFO Cachar) under Section 49(4) of the Regulation – Confiscation upheld in appeal before Additional District Judge, Cachar, in revision before this Court, and SLP before the Supreme Court dismissed on 07.11.2023 – Held: Confiscation under Section 49(4) is administrative in nature and constitutes only a temporary measure; final and irrevocable confiscation can be ordered only by a Criminal Court under Section 51 upon conviction of the accused for a forest offence; the word "confiscation" in Section 49 is a misnomer as Section 49 provides for a stage prior to actual confiscation [Paras 17–22, 28].

Forest Law – Two Parallel Processes of Confiscation – Mutually Exclusive or Dependent – Sections 49 and 51, Assam Forest Regulation, 1891 – Forest Department contended that administrative confiscation under Section 49(4) and judicial confiscation under Section 51 are independent and mutually exclusive processes – Held: Coordinate Benches of this Court in Jogeshwar Borah v. State of Assam, Jaminur Rahman v. State of Assam and Sambhu Saha v. State of Assam have consistently held that confiscation under Section 49 is of temporary nature and final confiscation under Section 51 can only occur upon conviction – Decisions of Supreme Court pertaining to Forest Laws of Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, which hold the two processes to be independent, do not govern in view of binding coordinate Bench decisions of this Court on the Assam Forest Regulation [Paras 19–26].

Criminal Law – Right to Speedy Investigation – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Section 528 BNSS – Criminal investigation into the forest offence initiated in 2018 remained pending and incomplete for more than seven years without any explanation from the department – No charge-sheet filed, no final report submitted – Held: Right to speedy investigation is a facet of Article 21; if investigation continues for an unduly long period without adequate justification, the accused is at liberty to invoke Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC; delay in completion of investigation functions as one of the grounds for quashing, and the Court must also consider other attendant circumstances – Criminal proceedings quashed [Paras 27–33].

Forest Offence – Compoundability – Withdrawal of Similar Cases – Section 62, Assam Forest Regulation, 1891 – Forest offences under the Regulation are compoundable at the instance of the Forest Authority – Government of Assam had issued Notifications dated 21.10.2022 and 20.09.2024 for withdrawal of petty/minor criminal cases; forest offences are not excluded from the said scheme – A similar forest offence case (CR Case No. 4/2019) involving confiscation by DFO Cachar was withdrawn and vehicle directed to be released in Criminal Petition No. 572 of 2025 – Held: Quashing of criminal proceedings would not prejudice the department especially when petitioner has been deprived of his vehicle for seven years; criminal proceedings quashed and DFO directed to release the vehicle [Paras 29–34].

Decision: Criminal Petition allowed — Criminal proceedings in Offence Report No. OR No. DH/6 of 2018-19, DVL/65 of 2019-20 quashed — Authorised Officer/DFO, Cachar Division, directed to release truck bearing registration No. AS-17B-9317 to the petitioner upon verification and usual formalities.

Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Compromise – Non-Compoundable Offences – Corporate Accused – Petitioner/A9, Mahindra World City Developers Limited, faced trial before the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Chengalpet in C.C. No. 251 of 2020 for offences under Sections 120(b), 465, 468 and 471 IPC, being the end-purchaser in an alleged chain of forged title documents in respect of a five-cent plot in Survey No. 118/4C at Veerapuram, Madura Malaiyambakkam – De facto complainant Raji died on 17.09.2019 and his legal heirs (R2 to R8) were impleaded – The parties arrived at a settlement whereby the legal heirs agreed to accept three alternate properties in lieu of the disputed property, documents for which were submitted for registration before the Joint Registrar-II, Chengalpet on 08.04.2026 – Identities of R2 to R8 confirmed before Court by the Special Sub Inspector of Police; all confirmed the settlement – Held: Even though the offences are non-compoundable, no useful purpose would be served in keeping the proceedings alive; quashment ordered against the petitioner and all co-accused similarly placed [Paras 9–15].

Impleadment of Legal Heirs – Death of De Facto Complainant – Legal heirs of the deceased de facto complainant filed impleading petition in Crl.M.P. No. 7429 of 2026 and were impleaded as Respondent Nos. 2 to 8 by order of the Court [Para 2].

Exercise of Inherent Jurisdiction – Guidelines – Non-Compoundable Offences – Court invoked its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) guided by the Supreme Court's principles on quashing proceedings in non-compoundable cases, exercising due caution as directed, while giving effect to the genuine settlement arrived at between the parties [Para 14].

Decision: Criminal Original Petition allowed – Proceedings in C.C. No. 251 of 2020 pending before the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Chengalpet quashed against the petitioner and all co-accused similarly placed – Connected Crl.M.P. Nos. 6354 and 6355 of 2026 closed.

Service Law – Salary – Right to Receive Pay for Work Done – Stoppage Without Notice – Article 300-A of the Constitution of India – Petitioners, employed as Assistant Teachers, Junior Clerks and Peons in aided private primary schools in Nagpur Division, had their salaries stopped since March 2025 and Shalarth IDs/approval orders cancelled without any show cause notice or enquiry – The petitioners had been in continuous service for 10 to 15 years, their appointments duly approved by the Education Officer (Primary), ZP Nagpur, and Shalarth IDs issued pursuant to the State Government scheme dated 07/11/2012 – Held: Salary is "property" within the meaning of Article 300-A and cannot be withheld without authority of law – An employee who has rendered service cannot be deprived of salary – Denial of pay amounts to forced labour which is impermissible [Paras 3, 5, 9, 9.7].

Natural Justice – Cancellation of Approval Orders – Principles of Natural Justice – Show Cause Notices – Vagueness – The respondent-authorities issued purported show cause notices which did not specify any particular charge, fraud, misrepresentation or specific illegality against individual employees – Near about 150 teachers were called on one day, directed to fill up a form on 22 points and their approvals cancelled without personal hearing – In several cases, petitioners who were present were shown as absent – Held: A vague and unintelligible show cause notice is not a proper opportunity of hearing – Post-decisional opportunity does not subserve rules of natural justice – Impugned show cause notices and cancellation orders are unsustainable [Paras 5, 10.1, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5].

Approval Orders – Cancellation – Fraud or Misrepresentation – Requirement – The respondents sought to cancel approvals on the ground of alleged irregularities in Shalarth IDs – Held: Approval orders duly granted by the Education Officer after verification of documents cannot be cancelled unless fraud or misrepresentation by the employee is specifically established – Irregularities, if any, attributable to the officials of the Education Department or to the Management cannot be visited upon the individual employees who have been serving for more than a decade – Erring officers are liable to make the loss good [Paras 10.2, 10.3, 10.5, 11].

Shalarth ID – Role of Employee – The petitioners-employees had no role in the issuance of Shalarth IDs except supplying information – Responsibility for verification of documents and allotment of Shalarth IDs rested with the respondent-authorities – Systemic flaws including non-functioning of the Pavitra Portal and non-updation of UDISE+ cannot be attributed to the employees [Paras 5, 10.5].

Enquiry – Procedural Defects – Non-Compliance with GR dated 10/06/2022 – Clause 3.1 of the GR dated 10/06/2022 specifically required that before cancellation of approval, the concerned employee, Management, educational institution and the officer who issued the approval all be noticed and heard, and a detailed reasoned order be passed – In the present matters, the then Education Officer who issued the original approval orders was absent from the enquiry – No proper personal hearing was granted – Held: Enquiry not conducted as per the prescribed GR is in complete violation of the prescribed procedure and is unsustainable [Paras 10.4, 10.5].

Decision: Writ petitions partly allowed – Impugned purported show cause notices and cancellation orders/communications dated 18/03/2025, 02/05/2025, 02-03/05/2025 and 29/04/2025 quashed and set aside – Approval orders and Shalarth IDs of the petitioners-employees restored – Respondents directed to release salary withheld since March 2025 and continue payment – Respondents at liberty to issue fresh, specific show cause notices if desired, mentioning specific charges of fraud or misrepresentation only – No costs – Request by learned AGP to keep judgment in abeyance declined.

Criminal Law – Attempt to Murder – Section 307 IPC – Acquittal – Appellant Keshav Singh @ Kallu convicted by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri for firing a gunshot at informant Rajendra Singh on 04.12.1980, which caused gun shot injuries to Shiv Kumar Singh who was standing nearby – Role of exhortation attributed to deceased co-accused Brijbasi Lal – Sentence of 3 years rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 5,000/- fine imposed – On appeal, High Court finds the testimonies of the three witnesses of fact (PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3) to be mutually inconsistent and in material conflict with each other and with the site plan – Prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction and sentence set aside – Appellant acquitted [Paras 3, 27-31].

Chance Witnesses – PW-2 (Shiv Kumar Singh, Injured) and PW-3 (Sughar Singh) – Reliability – Inconsistent and Conflicting Statements – Both witnesses were residents of villages other than the place of occurrence and were chance witnesses whose presence at the scene was not satisfactorily explained by the prosecution – Testimony of PW-2 found entirely in contrast with PW-1 on material aspects including the time of the incident, the person levelling the disputed foundation, the role of exhortation, and whether one or two shots were fired – PW-2 exaggerated his role as the primary target of the assault, which was inconsistent with the FIR and PW-1's deposition – Testimony of PW-3 also at variance with PW-1 on the target of exhortation – Held: Evidence of a chance witness requires very cautious and close scrutiny; if presence at the place of occurrence remains doubtful, the testimony must be discarded [Paras 17-20].

Site Plan – Inconsistency with Oral Evidence – The site plan prepared by the Investigating Officer (PW-7) showed the disputed foundation to the east of the informant's house with no wall between the two houses, whereas PW-1 stated that firing took place behind a wall – The site plan showed Mulaim Singh at a distance of 40 paces from the informant and injured, whereas witnesses stated he was sitting adjacent to them – Two separate firing positions were shown in the site plan, inconsistent with witnesses' accounts – These contradictions between ocular evidence and the site plan undermined the prosecution's version [Paras 20-21].

Faulty Investigation – Non-Recovery of Weapon, Blood-Stained Material and Ballistic Report – The licensed gun allegedly used by the appellant was not seized and no FSL or ballistic report was obtained – Blood-stained earth, clothes and mattress used to transport the injured were not recovered – Injury report of Mulaim Singh was not placed on record and he was not produced as a witness despite allegedly suffering gunshot injuries – Statement of PW-2 was not recorded by the Investigating Officer during investigation – Held: While faulty investigation does not by itself entitle an accused to acquittal, the cumulative effect of multiple investigative lapses, coupled with inconsistent and unreliable eye-witness testimony, creates reasonable doubt that must benefit the accused [Paras 24-26].

Appellate Court – Power to Interfere with Conviction – Benefit of Doubt – Held: An appellate court should be slow to interfere with conviction recorded by the trial court, but where evidence on record indicates that prosecution has failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and a plausible different view can be taken, the appellate court should not shy away from giving benefit of doubt to the accused [Para 28].

Decision: Criminal appeal allowed – Judgment of conviction and sentence dated 26.06.1987 passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri in Sessions Trial No. 165 of 1986 under Section 307 IPC set aside – Appellant Keshav Singh @ Kallu acquitted – Bail bonds discharged – Criminal appeal against appellant no. 1 Brijbasi Lal abated on account of his death during pendency of appeal.

Tender — Cancellation — Judicial Review — Scope and Limits — Petitioner, declared L-1 bidder in NIT bearing Tender Ref. JAPIT/HIGHCOURT-DMS/01/2025 for supply and installation of server systems at Jharkhand High Court Data Center at a quoted price of Rs. 30.52 crores, was issued a computer-generated Letter of Intent and directed to submit a performance bank guarantee of Rs. 1.52 crores — Thereafter, respondents called petitioner to negotiate and reduce bid to Rs. 22.86 crores owing to budgetary constraints of Jharkhand High Court (Rs. 22-23 crores) — Petitioner refused to negotiate even after three extensions and scaled-down specifications — JAP-IT, after obtaining approval of the High Court's Computer and Digitization Committee, cancelled the entire tender process on 21.08.2025 — Held: Cancellation was not unreasoned, arbitrary or mala fide; decision-making process was transparent; budgetary constraints of the requiring body constitute cogent and valid reasons for cancellation — No case for interference under Article 226 [Paras 37-38, 52-56, 66-68].

Letter of Intent — Not a Concluded Contract — Specific Performance — Relief Not Maintainable — Petitioner contended that issuance of LOI and submission of performance bank guarantee constituted a concluded contract incapable of arbitrary termination — Held: A Letter of Intent merely indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract in future and is not a binding legal relationship — No work order or formal agreement was executed between the parties — Relief of direction to execute a contract is in the nature of specific performance, ordinarily not entertainable in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, and would require adjudication of disputed questions of fact — Prayer rejected [Paras 43, 48-51].

Judicial Review — Tender — Decision-Making Process — Merits vs. Legality — The scope of judicial review in tender matters is confined to examining the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision — Courts may interfere only where there is illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety, or where mala fides or extraneous considerations vitiate the process — Mere disagreement with the decision or a faulty approach is insufficient — Constitutional Courts must exercise utmost restraint in interfering with tender processes — No allegations of mala fides, nepotism or extraneous considerations were made in the present case — Held: No ground for interference [Paras 44-47, 56, 64-67].

Right to Reject Tender — Government as Guardian of State Finances — Even the lowest bidder has no vested right to insist that its offer must be accepted under all circumstances — Government retains the right to refuse any or all tenders, including the lowest — Where the lowest bid far exceeds the available budgetary provision, and where the bidder refuses to negotiate even after scaled-down specifications are offered, cancellation of the tender process and invitation of a fresh tender is reasonable and lawful — Held: Free play in the joints must be accorded to the respondents provided the decision-making process is transparent [Paras 44, 54-55, 67].

Acquiescence — Suppression of Material Facts — Equitable Relief — Petitioner accepted refund of EMD amounting to Rs. 60 lakhs on 22.08.2025 without protest, one day after tender cancellation, and filed the writ petition on 06.09.2025 without disclosing such acceptance — Court held that while this constituted acquiescence and suppression of material facts disentitling petitioner to equitable relief, it declined to non-suit the petitioner solely on these grounds as these issues were not raised in counter-affidavits and petitioner had no adequate opportunity to respond — Petition examined on merits and dismissed [Paras 39-42].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — No order as to costs.