Criminal Law – Kidnapping for Ransom – Murder – Acquittal – Circumstantial Evidence – Incomplete Chain – Appellant not named in FIR – Prosecution rested entirely on circumstantial evidence including recovery of kurta of deceased, pistol, ransom money and identification parade – Held: Chain of circumstances far from complete in absence of recorded disclosure statement for recovery of kurta, failure to link recovered currency notes to ransom, inconclusive FSL report, non-examination of independent witnesses to recovery and vitiated identification parade – Conviction unsustainable – Appellant acquitted [Paras 12, 21-22].

Criminal Law – Section 27 Evidence Act – Disclosure Statement – Mandatory Requirement – Recovery of kurta of deceased relied upon as key link – No disclosure statement of appellant recorded before such recovery – Held: Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, only specific information given by an accused that leads directly to the discovery of a fact is admissible – Without a recorded statement proving that appellant actually provided information leading to discovery, recovery becomes a simple recovery and is highly doubtful – Following Subramanya v. State of Karnataka and Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor [Paras 14-15].

Criminal Law – FSL Report – Inconclusive Expert Opinion – Burden of Proof – Pistol recovered from appellant but FSL reports could not positively match pellets found in deceased's body to recovered pistol – Expert stated it was only "possible" that pellets were from the recovered pistol – Held: Vague or non-definite expert opinion cannot link the weapon to the murder and benefit of doubt must go to accused – Following Mahmood v. State of U.P. – Non-examination of independent witnesses to recovery (Anil Kumar Gupta and Jitendra Kumar Gupta) named in recovery memo created further doubt [Para 16].

Criminal Law – Recovery of Currency Notes – Proof of Nexus with Crime – Rs.40,000/- recovered from appellant claimed to be ransom money – Currency notes are unidentifiable articles of common use – Prosecution did not prove that specific notes carried unique identification marks such as recorded serial numbers or distinctive stains matching the description of the ransom – Held: Recovery of unidentified currency notes without establishing nexus to the crime cannot be held to be ransom money [Para 17].

Criminal Law – Test Identification Parade – Vitiation – Accused Not Kept Veiled – Identification parade conducted but Investigating Officer (PW-7) completely failed to state that appellant was kept veiled (baparda) when taken on remand or while at police station – Prosecution failed to establish that witnesses had not seen accused before formal TIP – Held: Where accused shown to witnesses before identification parade, TIP evidence not admissible as valid evidence – TIP is not substantive evidence but only corroborative – Identification in court also becomes meaningless if TIP is conducted after witnesses see accused – Following Mulla v. State of U.P. and Gireesan Nair v. State of Kerala [Paras 18-20].

Decision: Criminal appeal allowed – Judgment and order dated 28.02.2008 of Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court No.2, Pilibhit, convicting appellant under Sections 364-A, 302 and 201 IPC and Section 25 Arms Act set aside – Appellant Ajai Pal acquitted of all charges – Bail bond discharged – Amicus Curiae Sri Abhishek Kumar Jaiswal entitled to professional fee of Rs.15,000/-.

Civil Law – Restitution – Section 144 CPC – Ex Parte Decree Set Aside – Entitlement of Defendant to Restoration of Possession – Plaintiff filed suit for eviction (O.S.No.683 of 2018) – Defendant set ex parte – Ex parte decree executed and possession delivered to plaintiff on 03.02.2021 under delivery warrant through court bailiff in E.P.No.8 of 2021 – Ex parte decree subsequently set aside on 23.07.2021 in I.A.No.52 of 2021 – Defendant filed restitution application under Section 144 CPC for restoration of possession – Trial court dismissed petition holding no consensus ad idem between parties as plaint schedule property and restitution petition schedule property are different – Held: If an ex parte decree is set aside, the defendant is entitled to file a petition under Section 144 CPC for restitution of possession – Court is empowered to reverse actions taken during execution and restore the party to their original position – Trial court erred in dismissing the petition without considering the delivery warrant, bailiff's report and panchanama recorded at time of delivery, which would have aided identification of property to be restored – Matter remitted [Paras 8, 14-15].

Civil Procedure – Restitution – Property Description – Discrepancy Between Plaint Schedule and Restitution Petition Schedule – Proper Approach – Plaint schedule and restitution petition schedule described properties with different boundaries and measurements – Trial court dismissed application finding no consensus ad idem – Held: Where property was delivered to decree holder pursuant to ex parte decree through bailiff under delivery warrant, the appropriate course is to restore possession of the property actually delivered to the decree holder as identified from the warrant, bailiff's report and panchanama – Trial court's approach of dismissing petition on ground of difference in property description without examining delivery documents was erroneous – Fresh orders to be passed after taking into consideration delivery warrant, bailiff's report and panchanama and if necessary, permitting parties to lead evidence [Paras 13-15].

Decision: Civil Revision Petition allowed – Order dated 23.11.2024 in I.A.No.476 of 2022 in O.S.No.683 of 2018 set aside – Matter remitted to trial court for passing fresh orders after considering delivery warrant, bailiff's report and panchanama in E.P.No.8 of 2021 – Trial court directed to put petitioner back into possession of property from which he was dispossessed by bailiff on 03.02.2021 – No order as to costs – Pending miscellaneous petitions closed.

Service Law – Termination – Forged Educational Certificates – No Departmental Inquiry Required – Appellants were appointed as Excise Constables upon submission of certificates of 'Adhikari Pariksha' (High School) – 2008 issued by Gurukul Vishwavidyalaya, Vrindavan – Inquiry revealed that no academic activities or examinations were conducted by the University during the relevant period, no Registrar was appointed, and the documents produced were not issued by the University – Held: Appointment obtained on the basis of forged and fabricated documents is no appointment in law; termination without holding a full-fledged departmental inquiry is valid and justified [Paras 14–19, 22].

Fraud – Appointment – Article 311 of the Constitution – Not Attracted – Where appointment to a civil post is procured by fraud, forgery, or deceit, Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted and the protection thereunder cannot be claimed – The very entry into civil service being vitiated by fraud bars the cloak of constitutional protection – Relied upon: R. Vishwantha Pillai v. State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 105 [Paras 22–23].

Fraud – Settled Principle – Fraud Vitiates Everything – Fraudulently obtained orders of appointment are voidable at the option of the employer and can be recalled – Continued service on the basis of fraudulently obtained employment creates no equity in favour of the employee and raises no estoppel against the employer – Relied upon: Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 748 [Para 21].

Forged Document – Selection Process – Intention Irrelevant – Production of a fake document in a selection process is sufficient to invoke action against the candidate, notwithstanding the intention of the applicant – Relied upon: Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Rajendra D. Harmalkar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 486 [Para 23].

Equivalence of Qualification – Becomes Irrelevant – Once appointment is found to have been secured on forged and fabricated certificates, the question of equivalence of 'Adhikari Pariksha' with High School examination of the U.P. Board of Secondary Education becomes irrelevant and need not be gone into [Para 25].

Decision: All three special appeals dismissed – Orders of the learned Single Judge in Writ A Nos. 54819/2013, 54821/2013, and 3689/2014 upheld – Termination of services of appellants confirmed.

Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 363 377 and 506 - POCSO Act 2012 - Section 4 - Kidnapping and Unnatural Sex - Identification of Accused - Victim admitted it was dark at the time of the incident and he did not know the accused from before - No Test Identification Parade was conducted - Held - Prosecution failed to explain how the accused was named in the FIR when the victim had no opportunity to identify him in the dark - Dock identification after one year is unreliable and case is bad from the inception - [Paras 23-27 33-36]

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 313 - Evidence - FSL Report - DNA Analysis - Accused was not confronted with the conclusions of the FSL report regarding matching DNA during his examination under Section 313 CrPC - Held - Conclusions of an FSL report cannot be relied upon for conviction if they are not presented to the accused for an explanation - [Paras 28 37]

POCSO Act 2012 - Section 4 - Medical Evidence - Chain of Custody - Accused alleged police obtained semen samples through custodial coercion and physical force - Medical report showed accused had bathed and changed clothes yet semen was allegedly found on his underwear - Held - Prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the underwear worn at the time of the incident - FSL report dated 15-11-2018 cannot be read against the accused - [Paras 21 37]

Decision: Appeal allowed - Judgment and order of the Trial Court dated 13-01-2020 is set aside - Appellant acquitted of all charges - Direction for immediate release upon furnishing personal bond and sureties under Section 437A CrPC.

Habeas Corpus – Child Custody – International Parental Relocation – Minor's welfare paramount – Petitioner-father sought a writ of habeas corpus directing return of minor son 'N' to the UK pursuant to orders of the High Court of Justice, Family Division, England, which had declared 'N' a ward of that Court and directed Respondent No.2-mother to return him to the jurisdiction of England and Wales – Respondent No.2 had left UK in July 2023 after her visa was revoked by the UK Home Office following the Petitioner's intimation of marital separation – Court interviewed the minor on 08.04.2026 in chambers without parties or counsel present and found the child desirous of continuing to stay in India with his mother – Held: Custody of a minor child with his biological mother is presumed lawful; in the absence of exceptional circumstances, a writ of habeas corpus will not lie to transfer such custody – Petition dismissed [Paras 2, 4, 19, 31, 38].

Best Interest of Child – Foreign Court Orders – Comity of Courts – Limits of Enforcement – Orders of the UK Family Court directing return of 'N' did not render his custody with the Respondent No.2-mother unlawful per se – The Court distinguished the facts of cited Supreme Court precedents wherein return to the country of citizenship was directed because both parents could independently reside there; in the present case, neither parent holds employment or residency entitlement in USA (country of the child's citizenship), and the Respondent No.2 had no assured legal right of residence in UK without the Petitioner's active cooperation – Sending 'N' to UK would, in all probability, result in the child being separated from his mother for an indefinite period, which would not serve his best interest – Petitioner's ability to visit India and maintain contact was noted as a viable alternative [Paras 24, 29, 30, 31, 33].

Conduct of Petitioner – Non-Cooperation in Passport Renewal – NOC for USA Passport – Petitioner's refusal to grant NOC for renewal of minor 'N's USA passport, thereby creating legal hurdles in obtaining OCI Card and regularising the child's stay in India, was held to be conduct demonstrating that the Petitioner was not acting in the child's best interest – Such conduct furnished an additional reason for declining the writ [Para 32].

Parental Alienation Syndrome – Child's Preference – Limited Weight – Court acknowledged the submission that the child's stated preference for staying with the mother may be influenced by parental alienation, having regard to the principle in Vivek Singh – However, the Court found it necessary to interact with the child to at least elicit his desire, and took his wish as one of the relevant factors alongside the practical difficulties faced by the Respondent No.2 [Paras 27, 28].

Remedy – Family Court Proceedings – Parties Directed to Family Court – Respondent No.2 had filed a petition for divorce, maintenance and custody before the Family Court at Bandra, Mumbai – Held: The Family Court is the appropriate forum where both parties have equal opportunity to lead evidence; questions of access, interim custody and visitation shall be decided by the Family Court in accordance with law, without being influenced by observations in the present order [Paras 36, 37].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Custody of minor 'N' with Respondent No.2-mother upheld – Petitioner directed to participate in Family Court proceedings – Family Court to decide custody, access and maintenance in accordance with law.

Property Law — Deemed Conveyance — MOFA — Section 11(1) — Scope of 'Appurtenant Area' — Petitioner cooperative housing society sought deemed conveyance of its building in a multi-building layout in Bhayandar — Competent Authority, on remand, rejected the application — Petitioner claimed conveyance of 3987.16 sq.m. (plinth and appurtenant) plus 703.62 sq.m. in Recreational Ground — Respondent-developer's architect certified plinth area as 1151.56 sq.m. and appurtenant area as 1050.00 sq.m. based on sanctioned plan dated 29.03.2019 — Held: MOFA is a welfare legislation enacted to protect flat purchasers against withholding of title by promoters — Section 11(1) uses the wide expression "right, title and interest in land and building" which cannot be reduced to transfer of the superstructure alone — Conveyance must include all land appurtenant, necessary, or incidental to the beneficial enjoyment of the building — The promoter cannot convey only the building footprint and retain mandatory open spaces required by planning law, since it is those very spaces that enable grant of occupation certificate — Where setbacks, access widths, or ventilation distances were necessary to sanction the building, such spaces cannot be retained by the promoter — Writ petition partly allowed [Paras 22–31, 67].

Appurtenant Area — Meaning and Limits — Functional Dependence Test — Not Confined to Minimum Statutory Setback — 'Appurtenant area' denotes land attached to, belonging to, or necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the main property — Test is functional dependence and not mere proximity — Appurtenant area in housing layouts may include compulsory marginal open spaces, access roads, passages, fire tender movement areas, common utility strips, earmarked parking areas, and other areas which by regulation are intended for occupants of that building — Planning regulations prescribe front, side, rear margins, distance between buildings, and fire access — These areas are intended for use and occupation of the building and cannot be retained by the promoter — However, not every surrounding land becomes appurtenant — Land reserved for independent commercial use, separate towers, or unrelated activity in the layout does not become appurtenant to one building by mere proximity — Size of appurtenant area alone is not conclusive as a tower may require more open margins and fire access under regulations than its plinth area [Paras 26–45].

Appurtenant Area v. Common Area — Distinction — Appurtenant area is building-specific, comprises mandatory marginal open spaces around a building, is necessary for functional requirements of that building including light, air, access, ventilation and fire safety, cannot be enclosed or built upon, and is intended to serve that particular building and its occupants — In contrast, common areas such as Recreational Ground, gardens, gymnasia, club-houses, swimming pools, and playgrounds are shared by all owners in the layout, vest proportionately in all societies, are governed by DCPR Clause 27(1)(g)(ii)(a) and UDCPR Clause 3.4.7(iv), and are intended to serve the community as a whole — Ownership of common area structures and appurtenant users vests in all owners on account of whose cumulative holdings the layout open space is required to be maintained [Paras 44–46].

Proportionate Share Formula — TDR-Loaded Layout — Plinth Area v. Proportionate Land Share — Government Resolution dated 22 June 2018, Clause (iv)(2), specifically uses the expressions 'plinth area' and 'appurtenant area' separately — Both components must visibly appear in the Architect's Certificate — A certificate which merely assigns a proportionate land share by ratio of built-up areas does not satisfy this requirement — 'Plinth area' in planning law means the area covered by the building at its ground level, i.e., its sanctioned footprint — It does not mean percentage share in the entire larger plot — Petitioner's figure of 3987.16 sq.m. is derived by the formula (6888.60/34459.18 × 19945.19) and represents proportionate entitlement in net plot area, not actual plinth — Respondent's certificate, which is derived from sanctioned plan No. MB/MNP/NR/7498/2018-19, identifies plinth as 1151.56 sq.m. and appurtenant area as 1050.00 sq.m. — Where a figure is linked to sanctioned municipal plans, it receives greater reliability — Plinth area accepted as 1151.56 sq.m. and appurtenant area as 1050.00 sq.m. — Total exclusive conveyable area: 2201.56 sq.m. [Paras 48–61].

Recreational Ground — Common Amenity — Proportionate Undivided Share — Petitioner's architect certificate computes total RG area as 3519.74 sq.m. and assigns proportionate share of 703.62 sq.m. based on 19.99% participation — Respondents have not produced any contrary RG computation — RG is a common amenity and petitioner cannot receive exclusive possession of any demarcated portion — However, as a society forming part of the sanctioned layout, petitioner is entitled to an undivided proportionate beneficial right in the common RG — RG share determined as 703.62 sq.m. as undivided proportionate right [Paras 62–63].

Promoter's Obligation — Duty to Execute Conveyance — Cannot Be Deferred Till Entire Layout Is Exhausted — Section 11 MOFA does not permit promoter to postpone statutory transfer of conveyance until every inch of land in the layout is utilised or all future development is exhausted — Once conditions are fulfilled, promoter cannot withhold conveyance on ground of proposed additional construction, possible redevelopment, or internal disputes regarding layout potential — In the absence of informed consent from purchasers, the duty under Section 11 remains enforceable — Otherwise, the promoter would continue as owner while purchasers remain perpetual consumers, which is contrary to the legislative scheme — Respondent No.3 also obtained revised sanctioned plans during 2018–2019 without obtaining prior consent of two-thirds of allottees as mandated by Section 14 of MahaRERA [Paras 24–25, 7].

Decision: Writ petition partly allowed — Impugned order of Competent Authority dated 08.07.2025 quashed and set aside — Petitioner society declared entitled to deemed conveyance under Section 11 MOFA read with Government Resolution dated 22.06.2018 — Exclusive conveyable area: 2201.56 sq.m. (plinth 1151.56 sq.m. + appurtenant 1050.00 sq.m.) — Undivided proportionate RG share: 703.62 sq.m. — Competent Authority directed to issue fresh certificate of deemed conveyance within eight weeks — Respondent Nos. 3 to 7 directed to extend full cooperation within two weeks — In case of non-cooperation, Competent Authority to proceed without their consent — No order as to costs.

Service Law — Grant-in-Aid Institution — Claim for Salary — Illegal Appointment — Minor Appointed to Public Post — Void Ab Initio — Petitioners claimed to be appointed as Peon and Clerk respectively in a junior high school on 01.07.1980 and sought salary from the State exchequer after the institution was brought on the grant-in-aid list — Director of Education (Basic) passed impugned order denying salary upon finding appointments illegal and managerial return rejected — Petitioner No. 2's date of birth recorded as 08.06.1967, making him approximately 13 years of age on the alleged date of appointment — Held: Appointment of a minor to a public post is per se illegal, void, and non est in the eyes of law — No right, equitable or legal, can flow from an appointment void ab initio — Claim for salary from the State exchequer on the basis of such appointment is wholly untenable — Impugned order upheld — Writ petition dismissed [Paras 31–34, 42–44, 52–54, 62–63].

Statutory Recruitment Rules — Mandatory Procedure — Non-Compliance — Void Appointment — Appointments to posts of Peon and Clerk in recognized basic schools are governed by mandatory procedural requirements under Rules of 1978 and 1984, including issuance of proper advertisement, constitution of a duly constituted selection committee, participation of nominee of competent authority, and grant of approval — No document on record establishes compliance with any such requirement — Appointments made dehors the statutory procedure are illegal, void, and unenforceable — No legal right can be claimed on the basis thereof [Paras 35–36, 49, 55–57].

Writ Jurisdiction — Suppression of Material Facts — Inconsistent Pleadings — Fraud on Court — Petitioners initially asserted in earlier writ proceedings (Writ Petition No. 25487 of 2008) that petitioner No. 2 joined in 1977 at age approximately 10 years — In the present proceedings, date of appointment was sought to be shifted to 01.07.1980 — Such shifting of stand constitutes calculated misrepresentation of material facts — Litigant invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 must disclose full, true, and correct facts — Suppression or distortion of material particulars disentitles a party from seeking discretionary relief — Conduct of petitioners amounts to playing fraud upon the Court [Paras 51, 58, 61].

Fabricated Documents — Conflicting Records Bearing Identical Reference Numbers — Document dated 21.07.2005 relied upon by petitioners found to contain the same reference number as another document with materially divergent particulars — Such discrepancy gives rise to serious doubt as to authenticity and suggests interpolation — Allegations by respondents that records were manipulated by the then Manager to displace petitioners and accommodate his nominees could not be established — Fresh inquiry report dated 05.12.2016 recorded that petitioners were not found working in the institution and their names were absent from the attendance register for the period July–December 2016 — Resignations of petitioners were also placed on record [Paras 23–28, 58].

Salary from State Exchequer — No Right Without Lawful Approval — It is well settled that no claim for salary can be sustained against the State exchequer unless the appointment is lawful and duly approved by the competent authority — Managerial return forwarded by the Manager for financial approval was rejected by the District Level Committee — No financial sanction was ever accorded — In such circumstances, claim for salary and arrears is wholly misconceived [Paras 59–60].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — Impugned order of Director of Education (Basic), U.P. dated 20.12.2014 upheld — Petitioners held not entitled to salary or arrears from the State exchequer.

Civil Law — Amendment of Written Statement — Order 6 Rule 17 CPC — Post-Trial Commencement Amendment — Inconsistent Plea — Due Diligence — Petitioner/defendant, against whom a suit for possession, recovery of rent and damages was filed in 2017 in respect of a ground floor property in Sunder Nagri, Delhi, sought in 2022 to amend his written statement after conclusion of plaintiff's evidence — Original written statement denied any landlord-tenant relationship and asserted the suit property was DDA-acquired land — Proposed amendment sought to introduce a new and inconsistent plea that the defendant/his predecessor had purchased the property from one Noor Biwi on 07.05.1985 and constructed the shop — Held: Amendment rightly refused — Facts sought to be introduced were within petitioner's knowledge at the time of filing the written statement — An earlier application under Order VIII Rule 1A to bring the same documents on record had been dismissed in 2018, yet the petitioner waited four more years to file the amendment application — Amendment sought after commencement of trial requires showing that due diligence was exercised and the matter could not have been raised earlier — No such case made out — Proposed amendment also totally inconsistent with the original plea and would cause prejudice to the respondent — Impugned order upheld — Petition dismissed [Paras 7–10].

Decision: Petition dismissed — Impugned order dated 22nd March, 2023 upheld — Pending applications disposed of.

Prevention of Corruption — Trap Case — Demand and Acceptance of Bribe — Acquittal — Appellant, a Desk Officer in the Department of Industrial Development, was alleged to have demanded ₹50,000/- from PW2, Director of M/s. Aries Granites, for securing a 100% EOU licence and to have acted through co-accused A2 (a retired government officer) who received ₹10,000/- from PW2 in a trap laid by the CBI on 06.06.1989 — Trial court convicted both accused for offence under Section 120B IPC and convicted A1 additionally under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act — Sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of five years each with fine — On appeal, held: Evidence unsatisfactory — Prosecution failed to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt — Appellant acquitted [Paras 14–34].

Inconsistencies in Prosecution Evidence — Testimony of Complainant (PW2) — PW2's account of the initial demand inconsistent — complaint stated demand of ₹50,000/- whereas in the box he deposed that demand was ₹80,000/- reduced to ₹30,000/- — PW2 stated on 06.06.1989 he did not contact anyone before reaching the CBI office at 11:00 AM, yet the FIR was registered at 10:30 AM — No clarification sought by the prosecutor in re-examination — How the meeting at Hotel Marina was fixed in the forenoon of 06.06.1989 remains unexplained — PW2's claim that both panch witnesses were present at Hotel Marina contradicted by PW4, who deposed that he had not accompanied the team to Hotel Marina and that PW2 and the TLO had already left and returned before he reached — Source of the ₹10,000/- trap currency also disputed — These inconsistencies raise serious doubt on the prosecution case [Paras 21–22, 26].

Audio Recordings — Admissibility and Evidentiary Value — Two audio cassettes were relied upon by the prosecution — Trial court rejected the first cassette (conversation between PW2 and A1) due to poor audio quality and inaudibility — Trial court relied on the second cassette (conversation between PW2 and A2) — Held: Same infirmities applied to the second cassette as several portions were also inaudible — No court order was obtained before breaking the seal and preparing the transcripts — Transcripts prepared 20 days after the raid — No sample voice of either A1 or A2 was obtained and no forensic voice comparison conducted — Identification of voices made solely by interested witness PW2 — Chain of custody compromised — Second audio cassette cannot form a reliable basis for conviction [Para 23].

Non-Examination of Key Panch Witness — Adverse Inference — One of the two panch witnesses (Amarnath), who was the shadow witness and recovery witness, was not examined despite being present on several hearing dates before the trial court — No coercive steps taken to secure his presence after he reportedly settled abroad — His evidence would have been directly relevant to the trap proceedings and recovery — Non-examination adversely affects the prosecution case, particularly in the light of other infirmities [Para 24].

Disclosure Statement — Admissibility under Section 27, Indian Evidence Act — A2's alleged disclosure statement stating that bribe money would be collected by A1 at the former's residence was admitted by the trial court under Section 27 of the Evidence Act — Held: Finding perverse — Section 27 permits only that portion of information which distinctly relates to a fact discovered, i.e., the place from which an object is produced and the accused's knowledge thereof — The disclosure in question did not lead to recovery of any physical object — Mere discovery of A1 present at A2's residence does not constitute a "fact discovered" within the meaning of Section 27 — Disclosure statement inadmissible and cannot be used against A1 — Ratio in Pulikuri Kottaya (AIR 1947 PC 676), K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. (AIR 1962 SC 1788), Bodh Raj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45 and Babu Saheba Goudar Radragoudar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2024 SC 2252 applied [Paras 29–33].

Improper Marking of Section 161 CrPC Statements — Trial Court Irregularity — Statements of prosecution witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC were marked as exhibits wholesale by the trial court — This is contrary to the scheme of Sections 161 and 162 CrPC and Section 145 of the Evidence Act — Such statements can only be used to contradict a witness in the manner contemplated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act and for no other purpose — Wholesale marking deprecated — Ratio in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR 1959 SC 1012) and Delhi Administration v. Lakshman Kumar, (1985) 4 SCC 476 followed [Para 28].

Money Possibly Paid as Consultancy Charges — PW2 himself admitted in cross-examination that A2 discussed consultancy charges for preparing a fresh representation, stated charges ranging from ₹30,000/- to ₹50,000/-, and that it was in the context of such discussions that ₹10,000/- was paid — No re-examination to dispel this version — Doubt arises whether the amount was bribe or consultancy fees — Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof [Para 25].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Conviction and sentence of appellant/A1 under Section 120B IPC and Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act set aside — Appellant acquitted under Section 248(1) CrPC — Bail bond cancelled — Pending applications disposed of.