Writ Law - Limitation - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Condonation of delay in administrative appeals - Petitioners sought transfer of ownership of shops in Palika Bazar Panipat under government policies - Applications were rejected by the Commissioner Municipal Corporation Panipat as the building was declared unsafe for human habitation and condemned - Appeals were preferred before the Director General Urban Local Bodies Haryana beyond the thirty-day limit prescribed under Clause 8(b) of the 2021 Policy - Lead petitioner Arik Dua filed appeal with a delay of 265 days seeking condonation on various grounds including technical errors in the web portal - Appellate Authority dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the prescribed period - Petitioners challenged this dismissal before the High Court - Held - The Appellate Authority under the 2021 Policy is a persona designata and not a Court - Provisions of the Limitation Act 1963 apply only to proceedings in Courts and not to administrative or quasi-judicial authorities unless specifically empowered by statute - Clause 8(b) of the Policy contains no provision for extension of time or condonation of delay - Writ petitions dismissed - [Paras 1-14].

Writ Law - Persona Designata - Limitation Act 1963 - Section 5 - Applicability to statutory authorities - It is a settled position of law that the Limitation Act 1963 governs proceedings in Courts and not appeals or applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or executing authorities - The Appellate Authority being a creature of the Policy acts as a persona designata and must function within the powers expressly vested in it under said Policy - Since the Policy does not confer power to condone delay the authority cannot entertain applications under Section 5 - Held - Rejection of time-barred appeals by the Appellate Authority was legally correct - [Paras 8-8.4].

Writ Law - Policy Interpretation - Policy for Sale of Shops/Houses by Municipal Bodies 2021 - Clause 12 - Relaxation of provisions - Petitioners contended that the State Government could accord relaxations to condone delay in filing appeals - Court observed that Clause 12 refers to relaxations concerning categories of persons or properties and cannot be stretched to override the specific procedural limitation of one month provided in Clause 8(b) - General relaxation clauses in a policy cannot be invoked to circumvent specific limitation periods for filing appeals - Held - Contention for relaxation of limitation period rejected - [Paras 10-10.2].

Decision: All 28 writ petitions are dismissed – The dismissal of appeals on the grounds of limitation by the Appellate Authority is upheld.

Property Law — Deemed Conveyance — MOFA — Section 11(1) — Scope of 'Appurtenant Area' — Petitioner cooperative housing society sought deemed conveyance of its building in a multi-building layout in Bhayandar — Competent Authority, on remand, rejected the application — Petitioner claimed conveyance of 3987.16 sq.m. (plinth and appurtenant) plus 703.62 sq.m. in Recreational Ground — Respondent-developer's architect certified plinth area as 1151.56 sq.m. and appurtenant area as 1050.00 sq.m. based on sanctioned plan dated 29.03.2019 — Held: MOFA is a welfare legislation enacted to protect flat purchasers against withholding of title by promoters — Section 11(1) uses the wide expression "right, title and interest in land and building" which cannot be reduced to transfer of the superstructure alone — Conveyance must include all land appurtenant, necessary, or incidental to the beneficial enjoyment of the building — The promoter cannot convey only the building footprint and retain mandatory open spaces required by planning law, since it is those very spaces that enable grant of occupation certificate — Where setbacks, access widths, or ventilation distances were necessary to sanction the building, such spaces cannot be retained by the promoter — Writ petition partly allowed [Paras 22–31, 67].

Appurtenant Area — Meaning and Limits — Functional Dependence Test — Not Confined to Minimum Statutory Setback — 'Appurtenant area' denotes land attached to, belonging to, or necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the main property — Test is functional dependence and not mere proximity — Appurtenant area in housing layouts may include compulsory marginal open spaces, access roads, passages, fire tender movement areas, common utility strips, earmarked parking areas, and other areas which by regulation are intended for occupants of that building — Planning regulations prescribe front, side, rear margins, distance between buildings, and fire access — These areas are intended for use and occupation of the building and cannot be retained by the promoter — However, not every surrounding land becomes appurtenant — Land reserved for independent commercial use, separate towers, or unrelated activity in the layout does not become appurtenant to one building by mere proximity — Size of appurtenant area alone is not conclusive as a tower may require more open margins and fire access under regulations than its plinth area [Paras 26–45].

Appurtenant Area v. Common Area — Distinction — Appurtenant area is building-specific, comprises mandatory marginal open spaces around a building, is necessary for functional requirements of that building including light, air, access, ventilation and fire safety, cannot be enclosed or built upon, and is intended to serve that particular building and its occupants — In contrast, common areas such as Recreational Ground, gardens, gymnasia, club-houses, swimming pools, and playgrounds are shared by all owners in the layout, vest proportionately in all societies, are governed by DCPR Clause 27(1)(g)(ii)(a) and UDCPR Clause 3.4.7(iv), and are intended to serve the community as a whole — Ownership of common area structures and appurtenant users vests in all owners on account of whose cumulative holdings the layout open space is required to be maintained [Paras 44–46].

Proportionate Share Formula — TDR-Loaded Layout — Plinth Area v. Proportionate Land Share — Government Resolution dated 22 June 2018, Clause (iv)(2), specifically uses the expressions 'plinth area' and 'appurtenant area' separately — Both components must visibly appear in the Architect's Certificate — A certificate which merely assigns a proportionate land share by ratio of built-up areas does not satisfy this requirement — 'Plinth area' in planning law means the area covered by the building at its ground level, i.e., its sanctioned footprint — It does not mean percentage share in the entire larger plot — Petitioner's figure of 3987.16 sq.m. is derived by the formula (6888.60/34459.18 × 19945.19) and represents proportionate entitlement in net plot area, not actual plinth — Respondent's certificate, which is derived from sanctioned plan No. MB/MNP/NR/7498/2018-19, identifies plinth as 1151.56 sq.m. and appurtenant area as 1050.00 sq.m. — Where a figure is linked to sanctioned municipal plans, it receives greater reliability — Plinth area accepted as 1151.56 sq.m. and appurtenant area as 1050.00 sq.m. — Total exclusive conveyable area: 2201.56 sq.m. [Paras 48–61].

Recreational Ground — Common Amenity — Proportionate Undivided Share — Petitioner's architect certificate computes total RG area as 3519.74 sq.m. and assigns proportionate share of 703.62 sq.m. based on 19.99% participation — Respondents have not produced any contrary RG computation — RG is a common amenity and petitioner cannot receive exclusive possession of any demarcated portion — However, as a society forming part of the sanctioned layout, petitioner is entitled to an undivided proportionate beneficial right in the common RG — RG share determined as 703.62 sq.m. as undivided proportionate right [Paras 62–63].

Promoter's Obligation — Duty to Execute Conveyance — Cannot Be Deferred Till Entire Layout Is Exhausted — Section 11 MOFA does not permit promoter to postpone statutory transfer of conveyance until every inch of land in the layout is utilised or all future development is exhausted — Once conditions are fulfilled, promoter cannot withhold conveyance on ground of proposed additional construction, possible redevelopment, or internal disputes regarding layout potential — In the absence of informed consent from purchasers, the duty under Section 11 remains enforceable — Otherwise, the promoter would continue as owner while purchasers remain perpetual consumers, which is contrary to the legislative scheme — Respondent No.3 also obtained revised sanctioned plans during 2018–2019 without obtaining prior consent of two-thirds of allottees as mandated by Section 14 of MahaRERA [Paras 24–25, 7].

Decision: Writ petition partly allowed — Impugned order of Competent Authority dated 08.07.2025 quashed and set aside — Petitioner society declared entitled to deemed conveyance under Section 11 MOFA read with Government Resolution dated 22.06.2018 — Exclusive conveyable area: 2201.56 sq.m. (plinth 1151.56 sq.m. + appurtenant 1050.00 sq.m.) — Undivided proportionate RG share: 703.62 sq.m. — Competent Authority directed to issue fresh certificate of deemed conveyance within eight weeks — Respondent Nos. 3 to 7 directed to extend full cooperation within two weeks — In case of non-cooperation, Competent Authority to proceed without their consent — No order as to costs.

Matrimonial Law  – Maintenance – Section 125 CrPC – Ex Parte Order – Revision Not Maintainable – Statutory Remedy of Recall Available – Family Court passed ex parte maintenance order awarding Rs.3,000/- per month to wife and Rs.1,000/- each to four minor children after petitioner/husband was proceeded ex parte on 27.01.2025 – Petitioner filed criminal revision before High Court contending there was a prior compromise and that the ex parte order was liable to be set aside – Held: Against an ex parte order under Section 125 CrPC, a specific statutory remedy is available under Section 126(2) CrPC / Section 145(2) BNSS for recalling the order before the trial court itself by showing sufficient cause – Criminal revision before High Court directly challenging the ex parte maintenance order is not maintainable – Petitioner directed to file application under Section 126(2) CrPC / Section 145(2) BNSS within 10 days – Following Vanita v. Manakchandra (1984 MPWN 113) and Anup Kumar v. Pratibha Kushwaha (2026 SCC OnLine All 1423) [Paras 5-9].

Criminal Procedure – Maintenance – Imprisonment for Non-Payment – Interim Direction – Petitioner was regularly being sent to imprisonment for non-payment of monthly maintenance and was in imprisonment at time of hearing – Held: If petitioner files application under Section 126(2) CrPC / Section 145(2) BNSS within 10 days (on or before 08.05.2026), he shall be released immediately (if not required in any other case) and shall not be sent again to imprisonment till decision of said application – Recovery of maintenance amount can be made from immovable property of petitioner/husband if any – Direction regarding release not to be treated as a precedent [Paras 14-15].

Decision: Criminal Revision dismissed as not maintainable – Liberty reserved with petitioner to file application under Section 126(2) CrPC / Section 145(2) BNSS for setting aside the ex parte order – No opinion expressed on merits – If application filed within 10 days, petitioner to be released from imprisonment and not sent again to imprisonment till decision on the application – Pending applications disposed of.

Service Law — Grant-in-Aid Institution — Claim for Salary — Illegal Appointment — Minor Appointed to Public Post — Void Ab Initio — Petitioners claimed to be appointed as Peon and Clerk respectively in a junior high school on 01.07.1980 and sought salary from the State exchequer after the institution was brought on the grant-in-aid list — Director of Education (Basic) passed impugned order denying salary upon finding appointments illegal and managerial return rejected — Petitioner No. 2's date of birth recorded as 08.06.1967, making him approximately 13 years of age on the alleged date of appointment — Held: Appointment of a minor to a public post is per se illegal, void, and non est in the eyes of law — No right, equitable or legal, can flow from an appointment void ab initio — Claim for salary from the State exchequer on the basis of such appointment is wholly untenable — Impugned order upheld — Writ petition dismissed [Paras 31–34, 42–44, 52–54, 62–63].

Statutory Recruitment Rules — Mandatory Procedure — Non-Compliance — Void Appointment — Appointments to posts of Peon and Clerk in recognized basic schools are governed by mandatory procedural requirements under Rules of 1978 and 1984, including issuance of proper advertisement, constitution of a duly constituted selection committee, participation of nominee of competent authority, and grant of approval — No document on record establishes compliance with any such requirement — Appointments made dehors the statutory procedure are illegal, void, and unenforceable — No legal right can be claimed on the basis thereof [Paras 35–36, 49, 55–57].

Writ Jurisdiction — Suppression of Material Facts — Inconsistent Pleadings — Fraud on Court — Petitioners initially asserted in earlier writ proceedings (Writ Petition No. 25487 of 2008) that petitioner No. 2 joined in 1977 at age approximately 10 years — In the present proceedings, date of appointment was sought to be shifted to 01.07.1980 — Such shifting of stand constitutes calculated misrepresentation of material facts — Litigant invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 must disclose full, true, and correct facts — Suppression or distortion of material particulars disentitles a party from seeking discretionary relief — Conduct of petitioners amounts to playing fraud upon the Court [Paras 51, 58, 61].

Fabricated Documents — Conflicting Records Bearing Identical Reference Numbers — Document dated 21.07.2005 relied upon by petitioners found to contain the same reference number as another document with materially divergent particulars — Such discrepancy gives rise to serious doubt as to authenticity and suggests interpolation — Allegations by respondents that records were manipulated by the then Manager to displace petitioners and accommodate his nominees could not be established — Fresh inquiry report dated 05.12.2016 recorded that petitioners were not found working in the institution and their names were absent from the attendance register for the period July–December 2016 — Resignations of petitioners were also placed on record [Paras 23–28, 58].

Salary from State Exchequer — No Right Without Lawful Approval — It is well settled that no claim for salary can be sustained against the State exchequer unless the appointment is lawful and duly approved by the competent authority — Managerial return forwarded by the Manager for financial approval was rejected by the District Level Committee — No financial sanction was ever accorded — In such circumstances, claim for salary and arrears is wholly misconceived [Paras 59–60].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — Impugned order of Director of Education (Basic), U.P. dated 20.12.2014 upheld — Petitioners held not entitled to salary or arrears from the State exchequer.

Civil Law — Amendment of Written Statement — Order 6 Rule 17 CPC — Post-Trial Commencement Amendment — Inconsistent Plea — Due Diligence — Petitioner/defendant, against whom a suit for possession, recovery of rent and damages was filed in 2017 in respect of a ground floor property in Sunder Nagri, Delhi, sought in 2022 to amend his written statement after conclusion of plaintiff's evidence — Original written statement denied any landlord-tenant relationship and asserted the suit property was DDA-acquired land — Proposed amendment sought to introduce a new and inconsistent plea that the defendant/his predecessor had purchased the property from one Noor Biwi on 07.05.1985 and constructed the shop — Held: Amendment rightly refused — Facts sought to be introduced were within petitioner's knowledge at the time of filing the written statement — An earlier application under Order VIII Rule 1A to bring the same documents on record had been dismissed in 2018, yet the petitioner waited four more years to file the amendment application — Amendment sought after commencement of trial requires showing that due diligence was exercised and the matter could not have been raised earlier — No such case made out — Proposed amendment also totally inconsistent with the original plea and would cause prejudice to the respondent — Impugned order upheld — Petition dismissed [Paras 7–10].

Decision: Petition dismissed — Impugned order dated 22nd March, 2023 upheld — Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law — Default Bail — NDPS Act — Extension of Remand — Accused Not Present — Gross Illegality — Article 21 — Petitioner/Accused No. 2 was in custody in Crime No. 65 of 2024 under the NDPS Act — Extension of time for remand was granted by I Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge for NDPS offences, Rajamahendravaram, vide order dated 06.02.2026 — Extension granted in the absence of the accused, neither physically nor virtually — No charge sheet filed within the statutory period — Assistant Public Prosecutor fairly conceded the absence of the accused at the time of extension — Held: Failure to procure the presence of the accused either physically or virtually before the court, and failure to inform him that the application of the Prosecutor for extension of time is being considered, is not a mere procedural irregularity but a gross illegality violating the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution — Impugned order set aside — Petitioner enlarged on default bail subject to conditions [Paras 3–7] — Relied upon: Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of Gujarat, 2022 Supreme (SC) 973.

Decision: Criminal revision allowed — Order dated 06.02.2026 in Crl.M.P. No. 95 of 2026 set aside — Petitioner/Accused No. 2 enlarged on bail on execution of personal bond of ₹20,000 with two sureties for like sum each — Conditions imposed: weekly appearance before SHO on Sundays between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. till cognizance is taken; non-commission of offences; cooperation with the investigating officer; no inducement or threat to witnesses; surrender of passport or affidavit of non-possession.

Criminal Law - Quashing of proceedings - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 - Sections 189(3) 223 126(2) and 293 - Petitioners assembled with flags to celebrate the 100th anniversary of their association and Vijayadasami festival - Prosecution alleged gathering caused public hindrance and transport disturbance - Charge sheet filed within nine days of complaint by Village Administrative Officer - Prosecution cited only government officials as witnesses with no independent eye witnesses examined - No evidence produced regarding the existence or communication of any prohibitory orders - Petitioners contended the gathering was a peaceful exercise of fundamental rights and no public person was affected - Court found the allegations were general and the assembly was for a peaceful celebration - Held - Mere assembly without specific allegations of commission of an offense or disobedience of a communicated order is wholly unsustainable - continuation of trial constitutes an abuse of the process of law - proceedings quashed - [Paras 1-10].

Criminal Law - Fundamental Right to Protest and Assemble - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 - Section 189(3) - Right to Dissent - Petitioners held a protest and gathering under the guise of the Constitution - Prosecution failed to demonstrate any actual trouble or failure to follow guidelines issued in Jeevanandham and others vs State - Held - Right to protest must be safeguarded and not termed a criminal offense - assembly for peaceful purposes does not amount to the commission of an offense in the absence of specific illegal acts or violence - [Paras 7-9].

Decision: Petition allowed – Proceedings in STC No. 282 of 2026 on the file of the Learned Additional District Munsif Cum Judicial Magistrate Ambur are quashed – Connected miscellaneous petitions closed.

Land Acquisition — Requisition — Service of Order — Section 3(2) of West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 — Mandatory or Directory — Binding Precedent — Petitioners challenged acquisition of 0.06 acres of plot no. 2454/2759 under LA Case LA-II/2 of 1993-94 on the sole ground that the order of requisition under Section 3(1) was never served upon their predecessor-in-interest, rendering all subsequent acquisition steps non-est — Held: The question stands concluded by the binding Division Bench decision in Madhurina Mitra v. State of West Bengal (2026 SCC OnLine Cal 817), which held that the proposition in Sailendra Nath Pal v. State of West Bengal (2010) 2 CHN (Cal) 315 — treating Section 3(2) as mandatory — is per incuriam, being contrary to the earlier Division Bench in Mihir Kumar Sarkar v. State of West Bengal AIR 1972 Cal 8, and impliedly overruled by May George v. Special Tahsildar (2010) 13 SCC 98 — Non-service of order under Section 3(2) does not vitiate the requisition or subsequent acquisition proceeding — Purpose of Section 3(2) notice is only to notify the person concerned that possession would be taken, and no sanction is provided in the statute for non-observance thereof [Paras 22, 85-90].

Mandatory vs. Directory Provisions — Tests — Scheme of the 1948 Act — Court surveyed the well-settled tests for determining whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory: (i) public duties are generally directory, private rights mandatory; (ii) intent of the legislature is to be gathered from nature, design and consequences of construing it one way or the other, not merely from the word "shall"; (iii) absence of consequences for non-compliance is a factor tending towards directory construction but is not conclusive; (iv) if non-compliance would not render the entire proceedings invalid, it leans directory — Section 3(2) uses the word "shall", but the statute prescribes no consequence for non-service, and the purpose of service is merely to notify the person for compliance; taking possession without service does not amount to trespass rendering the requisition void, since Section 3(3) provides an execution mechanism only upon failure to comply after service — Held: Provisions of Section 3(2) are directory and not mandatory [Paras 23-85].

Laches — Delay — Acquisition Since 1976-77 and 1993-94 — Challenge After 26 Years — Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was recorded as an awardee in the award under LA/II/105 of 1976-77 in respect of the self-same plot no. 2759, and notice under Section 4(1a) for the subsequent acquisition of 0.06 acres was published in the Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary dated 13.10.1995 — Petitioners offered no acceptable explanation for the delay of over 26 years in approaching Court — Held: Writ petition is hopelessly belated; doctrine of laches applies to negate the challenge to the acquisition — Sinister silence maintained by the predecessor-in-interest despite awareness of proceedings disentitles petitioners to any relief [Paras 103-110].

Vesting of Acquired Land — Absolute Title in State — Free from All Encumbrances — With publication of notice under Section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act, the requisitioned land vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances on and from the date of publication — Held: Once land vests absolutely in the State, it cannot be divested — entries in the records of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation or record of rights cannot confer title upon the petitioners — No person can claim equitable title by remaining in possession after absolute vesting — Plot no. 2454/2759 measuring 0.88 acres in totality vested with the State Government free from all encumbrances — No scope for release of the property or any portion thereof [Paras 111-124].

Property — Deed of Conveyance — Structures — Petitioners contended that their predecessor-in-interest purchased a portion of the plot fully covered by structure — Court found that the registered deed of conveyance dated 30.04.1968 described the subject property as a paddy land with no mention of any existing structure — No material produced to show when structures were constructed subsequent to purchase — Held: Contention that the entire plot was covered by structures is not acceptable; no exemption from acquisition can be claimed on this basis [Paras 92-98].

Right to Property — Article 300A — Constitutional and Human Right — Court noted that even after the 44th Constitutional Amendment, the right to property is a constitutional and human right under Article 300A — Deprivation of property must be in accordance with law and cannot take place by executive fiat or administrative caprice — However, on the facts of this case, acquisition was carried out in accordance with law and compensation was awarded and deposited — Proposition in Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah (2024) 10 SCC 533 and Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram (2025) 1 SCC 798 held distinguishable on facts [Paras 58-66, 125-127].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — No order as to costs.

Service Law – Army – Back Wages – General Court Martial – Conviction – Commutation of Sentence – "No Work No Pay" – Petitioner commissioned in the Indian Army in 1984 was tried by a General Court Martial, found guilty and sentenced to cashiering and one year rigorous imprisonment – Punishment of cashiering took effect from 04.12.2001 – Petitioner's statutory petition under Section 164(2) of the Army Act was rejected – In an earlier round of litigation, AFT interfered only with the quantum of sentence and remitted the matter for reconsideration, leaving the conviction undisturbed – Central Government thereafter commuted the sentence under Section 163(2) read with Section 179 of the Army Act and directed reinstatement by corrigendum dated 15.02.2013, but denied back wages on the principle of "no work no pay" – Petitioner claimed back wages for the period 04.12.2001 to 04.03.2013 – Held: Conviction having attained finality and never having been set aside, and the period out of service being a direct consequence of a valid conviction, the petitioner is not entitled to back wages – Petition dismissed [Paras 15-21].

Commutation of Sentence – Army Act – Section 163(2) read with Section 179 – Does Not Relate Back – Petitioner contended that commutation of sentence would relate back to the date of imposition of punishment, obliterating its consequences and entitling him to be treated as having continued in service without interruption – Held: The power exercised by the Central Government under Section 163(2) read with Section 179 of the Army Act is one of alteration or commutation of sentence and does not amount to a declaration that the original punishment was void ab initio – Commutation is a modification of punishment and does not result in setting aside the conviction or underlying proceedings – The petitioner cannot be deemed to have been in continuous service for the intervening period [Paras 17-18].

No Work No Pay – Exception – Not Available Where Conviction Subsists – The principle of "no work no pay" holds that salary is payable only for the period during which an employee has actually discharged duties – Exceptions are recognised in cases where an employee is wrongfully prevented from discharging duties on account of an illegal or unjustified act of the employer – Held: Such exception has no application where the employee was kept out of service on account of a conviction that has attained finality – The present case cannot be equated with a case of illegal termination or acquittal – The distinction between exoneration/acquittal and modification of sentence is well recognised in service jurisprudence, with materially different consequences [Paras 19-21].

Scope of Judicial Review – AFT – Writ Jurisdiction – Articles 226 and 227 – Held: The scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction with an order of the AFT is limited – The Court does not sit in appeal over AFT decisions and will interfere only where the order suffers from patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error – Reappreciation of evidence or substitution of a plausible view is not warranted [Para 14].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Impugned order of the Armed Forces Tribunal affirmed – Denial of back wages for the period 04.12.2001 to 04.03.2013 upheld – Principle of "no work no pay" held applicable.