Serious Allegations Like HIV/AIDS Imputations Require Corroboration, Cannot Rest Solely On Unsubstantiated Testimony: Karnataka High Court

"Acceptance of such allegations in the absence of any supporting material would render the adjudicatory process vulnerable to subjective satisfaction rather than objective judicial determination," High Court of Karnataka at Kalaburagi, in a significant judgment, has held that serious and stigmatic allegations of mental cruelty, such as imputing that a spouse is suffering from HIV/AIDS, cannot be accepted by a court based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the other spouse.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Suraj Govindaraj and Dr. Justice Chillakur Sumalatha observed that the judicial process mandates a uniform application of evidentiary standards to both parties in matrimonial disputes.

The marriage between the parties was solemnized in 2002, and they were blessed with two sons. The respondent-husband moved for divorce in 2009, alleging that the wife had deserted him and subjected him to mental cruelty by making false accusations about his health and character. The Principal Senior Civil Judge and CJM at Bidar granted the divorce in 2016, a decision which the wife subsequently challenged before the High Court.

The primary questions before the court were whether an allegation of cruelty could be accepted without independent evidence and whether a finding of desertion is sustainable when a spouse is allegedly cohabiting with another person. The court was also called upon to determine if the Family Court's decree suffered from legal infirmity due to inconsistent application of evidentiary standards.

Serious Allegations Demand Higher Degree of Proof

The court noted that while matrimonial proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the preponderance of probabilities, serious allegations like the imputation of a grave illness require some degree of corroboration. The bench emphasized that the husband had produced no documentary evidence or independent witnesses to prove that the wife had used vulgar language or made defamatory statements regarding his HIV status.

The bench observed that the finding of cruelty rested solely on the "uncorroborated and interested testimony" of the husband. It held that where the allegation is of a serious and stigmatic nature, the court must seek supporting circumstances before recording a finding. The judges noted that the absence of contemporaneous material like complaints or testimony from neighbors rendered the Family Court’s finding unsustainable.

"Where the allegation is of a serious nature, such as imputing a grave illness or engaging in abusive conduct, the Court must seek some degree of corroboration or supporting circumstances before recording a finding of cruelty."

Consistency in Applying Evidentiary Standards

The High Court pointed out a glaring inconsistency in the Family Court’s approach, where it rejected the wife’s allegations of the husband's ill-treatment for lack of evidence but accepted the husband’s allegations of cruelty on his bare assertion. The bench held that the judicial process does not permit a differential standard where one party's uncorroborated testimony is accepted while the other’s is rejected for the same reason.

The court further held that the burden of establishing cruelty lay squarely upon the husband as the petitioner. In the absence of cogent and reliable material, this burden could not be said to have been discharged. The bench remarked that recording a finding of cruelty on such slender material constituted a clear error in the appreciation of evidence.

"The judicial process mandates uniform application of evidentiary standards to both parties. A finding cannot be sustained where one party’s uncorroborated testimony is accepted, while the other’s is rejected for want of corroboration."

Desertion Must Be Evaluated Against 'Reasonable Cause'

Regarding the finding of desertion, the court reiterated that desertion is a composite concept requiring both the factum of separation and the "animus deserendi" or the intention to permanently end cohabitation. The law requires that such separation must be without reasonable cause. The bench noted that the wife had consistently pleaded that her separate residence was compelled by the husband’s alleged relationship with another woman.

The court observed that if a husband is maintaining a relationship with another woman during the subsistence of the marriage, the wife’s refusal to join him is justified. Such conduct by the husband would negate any inference of an intention to desert on the part of the wife. The bench stressed that the law does not require a spouse to remain in a relationship that is "unreasonable, unsafe, or undignified."

"A spouse cannot be compelled, either in law or in equity, to cohabit with a partner who is simultaneously maintaining a relationship with another person."

Admissibility of Additional Evidence at Appellate Stage

The wife had filed an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to produce additional documents, including an admission abstract of a child allegedly fathered by the husband with another woman. The court noted that these documents, if proved, would indicate the husband was cohabiting with another woman during the period he claimed the wife had deserted him.

While the court did not record a conclusive finding on these documents, it held that the principles of natural justice require the husband be afforded an opportunity to contest this material. Consequently, the court found it necessary to remand the matter to the Family Court to allow for a proper evidentiary inquiry into these fresh allegations which go to the root of the case.

The High Court concluded that the cumulative effect of the errors in evidence appreciation and legal principles rendered the original divorce decree unsustainable. It set aside the judgment dated December 5, 2016, and remitted the matter to the Family Court for fresh consideration. The Family Court has been directed to dispose of the matter expeditiously, preferably within six months.

Date of Decision: 28 April 2026