Postal Tracking Report Showing 'Refusal' Not Conclusive Proof Of Service If Denied On Oath: Delhi High Court

"Once the proof of service is rebutted, the burden of proof shifts on the other party to prove the said proof of service with cogent reasons by adducing evidence." Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling, held that a postal endorsement of "refusal" on a summons tracking report does not constitute absolute proof of service if the defendant denies such service on oath.

A bench of Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Renu Bhatnagar observed that once a defendant provides a credible rebuttal through a sworn affidavit, the onus shifts to the plaintiff to establish due service by leading cogent evidence, such as examining the concerned postal official.

The dispute arose from a commercial suit involving a hotel lease arrangement filed by M/s Aneja Realty Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent). The Trial Court proceeded ex-parte against Manogya Agarwal (Appellant) on January 17, 2025, based on a postal tracking report indicating "refusal" of summons, subsequently passing an ex-parte decree on March 22, 2025. The Appellant challenged the dismissal of his Order IX Rule 13 CPC application, asserting he only learned of the decree via WhatsApp and was never served.

The primary question before the court was whether the service of summons upon the Appellant was sufficient in law based solely on a vague tracking report of "refusal." The court was also called upon to determine the nature of the burden of proof required to rebut the presumption of service under registered post.

Court Explains Presumption Of Service Under Section 27 General Clauses Act

The High Court began by examining the legal framework governing the service of summons through registered post. It noted that while Section 114 Illustration (f) of the Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act create a presumption that a letter sent by registered post reaches the addressee, this presumption is not irrebuttable.

The bench relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Parimal v. Veena, emphasizing that a party can rebut the presumption by showing that the postal authorities never tendered the letter or that there was no occasion to refuse it. The court noted that the burden to rebut lies on the party challenging the service, but once that burden is discharged through a sworn denial, the dynamic of the evidence changes.

"Presumption of service by registered post is rebuttable on a consideration of evidence of impeccable character."

Vague 'Refusal' Endorsement Insufficient Without Corroborating Evidence

Addressing the specifics of the tracking report, the court found the postal endorsement of "refusal" to be wholly inadequate in the face of a specific denial. The bench observed that the report was vague and deficient as it failed to specify the identity of the person to whom the summons were allegedly tendered or who exactly refused the delivery.

The court highlighted that the Appellant had stated on affidavit that no summons were ever tendered to him. The bench remarked that such a "sworn and specific denial constitutes a credible rebuttal and cannot be brushed aside lightly," especially when the tracking report does not even bear the name of the recipient who allegedly refused the service.

"The report of the postal official is wholly vague and deficient, as it merely records the word 'refusal' without specifying the identity of the person to whom the summons were allegedly tendered."

Onus Shifts To Respondent To Examine Postal Official Upon Denial

The High Court laid down that once the defendant denies service on oath, the Respondent must do more than simply rely on a tracking report. The bench noted that in this case, the Respondent made no effort to examine the concerned postal official or produce material to prove actual tender.

The absence of such evidence was deemed fatal to the Respondent’s case. The court held that the failure to examine the postman, particularly when service is specifically disputed on oath, renders the Trial Court's finding of "due service" legally unsustainable and procedurally flawed.

"Once such a denial is made, the burden shifts upon the Respondent to establish due service by leading cogent evidence demonstrating actual tender of summons to the Appellant."

Inconsistency In Trial Court's Findings On Limitation And Service

The bench pointed out a significant logical contradiction in the Trial Court's Impugned Order. The Trial Court had condoned the delay in filing the recall application by accepting the Appellant’s claim that he only acquired knowledge of the proceedings on April 11, 2025.

The High Court observed that by accepting this date for limitation purposes, the Trial Court effectively acknowledged that the Appellant did not have prior notice of the proceedings. The bench held that the Trial Court could not simultaneously hold that the Appellant had "prior due service" while accepting a later date of knowledge, as these two findings are "mutually destructive."

"Once the learned Trial Court accepted 11.04.2025 as the date of knowledge for the purposes of limitation, it could not, without cogent reconciliation, simultaneously hold that the Appellant had prior due service."

The High Court concluded that the Trial Court erred in refusing to set aside the ex-parte decree despite the clear rebuttal of service. The bench set aside the order dated November 18, 2025, and the ex-parte decree dated March 22, 2025, restoring the suit to its original position. The ruling reinforces that the "deemed service" rule is a rule of convenience that cannot override the fundamental right of a party to be heard when service is credibly disputed.

Date of Decision: 07 May 2026