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by sayum
21 September 2026 8:24 AM
"The provision does not contemplate that the period for filing the charge sheet is to be determined merely with reference to the sections expressly mentioned in the FIR. The sections mentioned in the FIR, therefore, cannot be treated as conclusive or binding upon the Court." Madhya Pradesh High Court, in a significant ruling, held that for the purpose of computing the statutory period for filing a charge-sheet under Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), courts must look at the substance of the allegations in the FIR rather than relying solely on the penal sections initially invoked.
A single bench of Justice Dwarka Dhish Bansal observed that if the foundational allegations in an FIR inherently disclose a graver offence, the subsequent formal addition of such a section does not constitute an attempt to defeat the accused’s right to default bail.
The petitioner was arrested on April 15, 2026, in connection with a fraud case originally registered under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC. While the investigation was ongoing, Section 409 of the IPC was added. The petitioner contended that as the FIR was initially registered under a provision carrying a maximum punishment of seven years, the 60-day period for filing a charge-sheet applied, and since the police failed to file the report within this timeframe, he was entitled to default bail.
The core legal questions before the court were whether the addition of Section 409 IPC, which carries a maximum punishment of life imprisonment, retrospectively extended the investigation period from 60 to 90 days under Section 187(3) BNSS, and whether the prosecution added this section merely as a subterfuge to defeat the petitioner's indefeasible right to default bail.
Statutory Periods
The court emphasized that the expression "investigation relates to an offence" in Section 187 BNSS requires the court to examine the actual allegations. Justice Bansal noted that if the FIR's narrative already contains the ingredients of a graver offence, an initial clerical or procedural omission in citing the correct section in the FIR cannot be weaponized by the accused to claim a shorter investigation period.
Court Clarifies Scope of Judicial Review in Default Bail
The bench clarified that the court is not a silent spectator to the labels applied by the investigating agency. It held that the judiciary has the power to examine whether an additional charge was added in good faith based on evidence or if it was a mala fide attempt to prolong detention. The court must look into the totality of facts and the material collected during the investigation to determine the applicable statutory period.
"The court is required to consider the allegations contained in the FIR, and thereafter determine the applicable statutory period. It cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that the Magistrate is bound by, or must mechanically accept, the sections mentioned in the FIR."
Distinguishing Mala Fide Additions
The court laid down a two-fold test for such situations. First, if the FIR discloses a graver offence but the section was omitted by inadvertence, the accused cannot claim a default bail benefit. Second, if the FIR does not disclose such an offence and the section is added later without any supporting evidence, the court should intervene to protect the accused's liberty. In this case, the court found that the allegations of misappropriation were present from the inception, justifying the application of the 90-day period.
"The subsequent addition of a graver offence cannot be used merely as a device to extend the statutory period available for completion of investigation and filing of the charge sheet."
The court concluded that because the allegations of criminal breach of trust were apparent from the initial complaint, the mention of Section 409 IPC in the charge-sheet did not constitute a "wholly new offence" introduced solely to defeat the bail claim. Consequently, the plea for default bail was rejected as the charge-sheet was filed within the 90-day window permitted for the more serious offence.
Date of Decision: 10 September 2026