Appellate Tribunal Under Benami Act Has Inherent Power To Review Decisions Where Liberty To Re-agitate Was Expressly Granted: Punjab & Haryana High Court

"The Appellate Tribunal, while disposing of the matter in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. (supra), extended liberty to the parties to apply for appropriate measures, including review, in the event the previous judgment of the Court was reviewed by the Supreme Court." Punjab and Haryana High Court, in a ruling dated August 26, 2026, held that the Appellate Tribunal under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, is not strictly tethered to the constraints of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) when it has expressly reserved liberty for parties to seek review contingent upon the outcome of pending Supreme Court proceedings.

A bench comprising the Acting Chief Justice Ashwani Kumar Mishra and Justice Rohit Kapoor observed that where an order granting such liberty has attained finality, the principles of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC cannot be invoked to defeat a review application filed in compliance with that specific judicial directive.

The petitioners had approached the High Court challenging an order of the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA, which had condoned a delay and restored appeals for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal had originally disposed of these appeals by setting aside proceedings under the Benami Act, relying on the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd.. Crucially, the Tribunal had, at that time, explicitly granted liberty to the respondent-Department to seek a review if the Apex Court were to recall or review its decision in Ganpati Dealcom. When the Supreme Court subsequently allowed the review of Ganpati Dealcom and explicitly granted liberty to aggrieved parties to seek review of cases decided based on the earlier judgment, the Tribunal restored the respondents' matters.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the Appellate Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a review application on the grounds of a subsequent Supreme Court order, and whether the strict limitations on review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, as interpreted in K. L. Rathi Steels Limited and A. R. Antulay, barred the Tribunal’s action. Additionally, the court examined the scope of the Tribunal's procedural autonomy under Section 40 of the Benami Act.

Tribunal’s Procedural Autonomy Under Section 40

The High Court clarified that the procedural rigidity of the CPC does not strictly limit the appellate powers of the Tribunal under the Benami Act. Referencing Section 40 of the Act, the bench noted that the Tribunal is primarily guided by the principles of natural justice and is empowered to regulate its own procedure. The court held that the power to review its own decisions is inherently subsumed within the Tribunal's functions under Section 40(2), which grants it powers vested in a Civil Court under the CPC while trying a suit.

Acquiescence To Conditional Orders

The bench underscored that the petitioners had never challenged the Tribunal's initial order which granted liberty to the respondents to seek review upon the outcome of the Supreme Court's review proceedings. By failing to challenge that order, the petitioners had effectively acquiesced to the condition. The court held that once a judicial order granting such liberty attains finality, the parties are bound by its terms, and the Tribunal acts within its jurisdiction when it invokes that specific authority to ensure procedural fairness.

Supreme Court’s Directive As A Catalyst

The High Court observed that the Supreme Court, while allowing the review in Ganpati Dealcom, specifically granted liberty to parties to seek review of proceedings disposed of in reliance on the recalled judgment. This directive, read in conjunction with the Tribunal’s own earlier reservation of rights, created a valid legal pathway for the respondents. The court clarified that while a mere subsequent change in law usually does not justify a review under Order XLVII CPC, this case involved a specific "liberty to apply" which acted as a foundational premise for the restoration of the appeals.

Court Explains The Limits Of Extraordinary Jurisdiction

Rejecting the petitioners' reliance on the strict standards of review, the court concluded that the Tribunal acted in furtherance of its own unchallenged order and in consonance with the Apex Court’s specific directions. Consequently, the High Court found no occasion to interfere with the Tribunal’s decision to restore the appeals for fresh adjudication, thereby dismissing the writ petitions and holding that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 could not be used to bypass a procedure to which the petitioners had previously submitted.

Date of Decision: 26 August 2026