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by sayum
06 November 2026 3:50 PM
"The pleas of want of notice, of a proceeding against a person already dead, and of a fabricated sale deed go to the root of the proceedings of respondent No.4, and a revisional authority could not have disposed of the revision without examining them, by merely holding that it was filed late." Telangana High Court, in a significant ruling delivered on October 12, 2026, held that a revision petition filed under Section 9 of the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 cannot be dismissed solely on the ground of delay where specific allegations of fraud, collusion, and lack of statutory notice are pleaded.
Setting aside an order of the Nagarkurnool Special Tribunal, a single bench of Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy observed that when mutation proceedings are not communicated to an affected party, "the period for questioning them runs from the date of knowledge and not from the date of the proceedings."
The petitioner, Smt. Eshwaramma, claimed ownership and possession over ancestral agricultural land measuring Ac.1-23 guntas in Sy.No.360/AA of Sripuram Village following the death of her father in November 1995, pursuant to which her name was mutated and a pattadar passbook was issued in January 1996. After her marriage, she temporarily left the village for her livelihood, during which respondent No.5 allegedly procured revenue mutations behind her back in 1996 based on an unregistered, nominally stamped 1979 simple sale deed said to have been executed by her deceased father. Upon learning of the adverse mutation in 2018 when denied a new e-passbook, the petitioner preferred a revision under Section 9 of the ROR Act, 1971, which was transferred under the Telangana ROR Act, 2020 to the Special Tribunal, Nagarkurnool; the Tribunal dismissed her revision solely on the ground of an unexplained 16-year delay.
The primary question before the High Court was whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against an order of the Special Tribunal notwithstanding the statutory finality clause enacted under Section 16(2) of the ROR Act, 2020. The bench was also called upon to determine whether the dismissal of a revision petition on the ground of limitation without adjudicating upon allegations of fraud and lack of notice is sustainable in law, and what appropriate forum should reconsider the matter given the subsequent repeal of the 2020 Act by the Telangana Bhu Bharati Act, 2025.
Statutory Finality Clause Cannot Curtail Article 226 Judicial Review
Addressing the maintainability of the writ petition, the High Court rejected the preliminary objection raised by the contesting respondent that Section 16(2) of the ROR Act, 2020 confers absolute finality on Tribunal orders. The court underlined that while a statutory finality clause bars further administrative or statutory appeals and revisions, it can never take away or dilute the plenary constitutional power of judicial review vested in High Courts.
Relying on the landmark Constitution Bench ruling in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, Justice Reddy held that judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 forms an inviolable part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The court clarified that the availability of a civil suit to determine title does not preclude writ courts from examining whether a quasi-judicial revisional authority arbitrarily refused to exercise its jurisdiction or dismissed a revision petition on grounds unsustainable in law.
Revisional Delay Must Be Judged From Date Of Knowledge Where Fraud Is Alleged
Scrutinizing the merits of the Special Tribunal's summary dismissal, the High Court observed that the Tribunal's finding of a 16-year delay was founded on an assumed mutation date of 2004 that found no support whatsoever in the record, as the rival mutation proceedings were initiated in 1996. The court noted that computing delay without reference to traceable record dates constitutes patent non-application of mind.
The bench stressed that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed for invoking revisional jurisdiction under Section 9 of the ROR Act, 1971. While such revisional powers must indeed be exercised within a reasonable time, what constitutes reasonable time depends squarely upon the facts of each case, particularly where fraud, official collusion, or complete lack of notice is alleged.
Citing the Supreme Court's declaration in State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma, the court reiterated that lapse of time can never serve as a shield for fraud:
"Does it lie in the mouth of the party to the fraud to plead limitation to get away with the order? Does lapse of time an excuse to refrain from exercising the revisional power to unravel fraud and to set it right? The answers would be no."
Absence Of Notice And Proceedings Against Dead Person Go To Root Of Jurisdiction
The court underscored that when adverse mutation proceedings are conducted without serving mandatory statutory notices to the recorded pattadar or legal heir, time begins to run solely from the date of actual knowledge. The petitioner had specifically pleaded that she acquired knowledge only in 2018 when the revenue department declined to issue her a new digital e-passbook, yet the Tribunal mechanically dismissed the matter without evaluating whether this explained the intervening lapse of time.
Invoking the Andhra Pradesh High Court precedent in Susheela Bai v. Joint Collector, Adilabad District, the bench emphasized that the right to property remains a recognized constitutional safeguard under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Revenue authorities exercising powers under Section 5-A of the ROR Act, 1971 and Rule 22 of the 1989 Rules cannot validate unregistered transfers against a dead person or without issuing notice to legal heirs merely because the legal heirs reside outside the village.
The High Court ruled that a revisional authority abdicates its statutory duty when it refuses to entertain a challenge at the threshold by simply relegating the aggrieved party to civil remedies without probing into procedural nullities and fraudulent usurpation of records.
Remit To District Collector As Special Tribunal Abolished Under Bhu Bharati Act
On the question of appropriate relief, the bench observed that disputed factual issues—including the authenticity of the 1979 sale deed, possession, and the circumstances surrounding parallel 1996 files—cannot be decided for the first time in writ proceedings on conflicting affidavits. Following Kasu Rayapa Reddy v. State of A.P. and Gunda Saralamma v. State of Telangana, the High Court held that the correct procedural course is to remit the dispute for a de novo enquiry.
Taking judicial notice of subsequent legislative developments, the court observed that the ROR Act, 2020 stood repealed by Section 23 of the Telangana Bhu Bharati (Record of Rights in Land) Act, 2025, thereby dissolving the Special Tribunals constituted under G.O.Ms.No.4. Distinguishing the Division Bench ruling in Bhimanaveni Srinivas v. State of Telangana, the court ruled that since the revision had already been instituted under the 1971 Act, it revived upon the quashing of the Tribunal's order.
The High Court held that because the District Collector was a constituent member of the erstwhile Special Tribunal and exercises statutory powers under the Bhu Bharati Act, 2025, the matter was rightly remitted to the District Collector, Nagarkurnool, to conduct a comprehensive enquiry after summoning the original records and extending fair hearing to all parties within four months.
Allowing the writ petition in part, the High Court set aside the Special Tribunal's cryptic dismissal order and directed the District Collector to adjudicate the revision petition on merits, including the questions of fraud, notice, and date of knowledge. The court further injuncted the private respondent from alienating or creating any third-party encumbrances over the subject land pending final determination by the Collector.
Date of Decision: October 12, 2026