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by sayum
06 November 2026 3:50 PM
"In the present case, there is no material on record that petitioners before approaching this Court has approached either District Legal Services Authority or State Human Rights Commission, so, in view of the law laid down by this Court in Yashpal (supra), the protection petition is not maintainable." Punjab and Haryana High Court, in a significant ruling dated September 24, 2026, held that a writ petition seeking police protection filed by a couple in a live-in relationship—where one partner is legally married to another individual—is not maintainable unless the petitioners have first approached the District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) or the State Human Rights Commission (SHRC).
A single bench of Justice Virinder Aggarwal observed that while such couples are entitled to the preservation of life and liberty, "mechanisms other than the live-in couple accessing the writ Courts, but are required to be devised, as therebys there would be some ebbing of the flood of litigations appertaining to the above genre of live-in relationships."
The petitioners, an unmarried major male and a married woman with a living child residing with her husband, moved the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking protection against alleged threats from private respondents. Petitioner No. 2 had been married since 2019, and upon commencing a live-in relationship with Petitioner No. 1, the couple allegedly faced threats of dire consequences to their life and personal liberty.
The primary question before the court was whether a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for life and liberty protection is directly maintainable by live-in partners, one of whom is legally married, without first exhausting alternative grievance-redressal forums such as the District Legal Services Authority or the State Human Rights Commission.
Protection Entitlement Recognized Irrespective Of Socio-Moral Fabric
Examining the maintainability of the petition, Justice Virinder Aggarwal relied extensively on the binding Division Bench verdict of the High Court in Yashpal and others v. State of Punjab (CRWP-4660-2021). The bench recalled that sexual privacy is a natural right fundamental to liberty and dignity, rendering protection against tangible threats an inviolable constitutional guarantee regardless of social disapproval or the subsistence of a prior marriage.
The court noted that when one of the partners is married, the autonomy of expression and bodily integrity cannot be permitted to become a casualty of societal moral vigilantism. The bench reiterated that "the preemptions of apposite assaults of any nature, befalling the live-in couple concerned, is the cornerstone of the structure laid by the Apex Court, wherebys, self autonomy in its various dynamic forms has been endowed upon the live-in couple, even if one of them is married, and, even if therebys thus decriminalized adultery does erupt."
Parental Obligations Towards Minor Children Remain Paramount
Addressing the domestic repercussions of such relationships, the court reiterated the Division Bench's directives concerning the welfare of minor children born out of lawful wedlocks. The bench emphasized that the conferment of protection by courts acting as parens patriae is intrinsically tied to the safeguarding of child welfare, making it clear that entering into a new relationship does not absolve a parent of caretaking and maintenance duties.
The court reiterated that though civil remedies exist for maintenance, they cannot substitute the foundational necessity of parental affection. As held in Yashpal, granting protection to a live-in couple where one partner has minor children "may be conditioned upon the well being, best care takings, and, nourishing of the personality of the minor child being undertaken to be purveyed by the parent concerned," rather than leaving dependent children neglected.
Overburdened Police Force Requires Exhaustion Of Alternative Mechanisms
Addressing procedural accessibility, the High Court underlined that routine invocation of extraordinary writ jurisdiction in such disputes places an unwarranted strain on public administration and policing resources. The deployment of continuous police escorts in response to generalized perceived threats causes an unsustainable encumbrance upon an already overburdened police infrastructure.
To avert a spate of unnecessary writ litigation, the court emphasized the mandatory recourse to institutional alternatives created for dispute conciliation and protection. Couples facing intimidation are required at first instance to access the jurisdictional District Legal Services Authority so that "the thereins array of para legal volunteers or the array of counsellors become deployed to counsel both the live-in couple as well as the persons or agencies concerned, wherefrom whom threats emanate."
Direct Writ Petitions Barred Unless Alternative Remedies Completely Fail
The court underscored that the State Human Rights Commission serves as another designated forum that must be approached by live-in couples to de-escalate hostility stemming from relatives or moral vigilantes. Under the governing framework, such institutional interventions facilitate counseling while ensuring that the lawful spouse outside the live-in relationship is also heard and the interests of dependent minor children are comprehensively shielded.
The High Court reaffirmed the settled principle that extraordinary constitutional remedies cannot serve as a shortcut. As held in the precedent, "the live-in couples may not access the writ Courts, unless the mechanisms (supra), as become employed are evidently rather a complete failure."
Petition Dismissed Due To Lack Of Prior Institutional Recourse
Applying these established legal principles to the facts of the case, the bench found an absence of any factual foundation demonstrating that the petitioners had pursued remedy before the local statutory bodies prior to invoking constitutional jurisdiction. There was no material on record indicating that either the District Legal Services Authority or the State Human Rights Commission had been approached.
Consequently, Justice Aggarwal held that the protection petition was premature and not maintainable before the High Court. The bench dismissed the petition while explicitly granting liberty to the petitioners to seek appropriate protective and counseling remedies before the competent District Legal Services Authority or the State Human Rights Commission in accordance with law.
The High Court's ruling firmly reinforces the procedural threshold governing Article 226 protection petitions filed by married persons in live-in unions. By mandating prior recourse to DLSAs and State Human Rights Commissions, the decision prevents circumvention of alternative dispute mechanisms while ensuring institutional safeguarding of vulnerable family members before writ jurisdiction is engaged.
Date of Decision: 24 September 2026