Recognition Of Trade Unions Is Not A Fundamental Right: Calcutta High Court Rejects Writ Seeking Bargaining Status Without Approaching Registrar

“No Writ Of Mandamus Can Lie Unless There Is An Enforceable Legal Right”— Calcutta High Court clarifying that recognition of a trade union and disputes regarding rival registrations are entirely governed by statutory provisions under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 and the Trade Unions (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1983. Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) dismissed the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, holding that such matters are not amenable to writ jurisdiction unless statutory remedies are first exhausted.

The High Court decisively ruled that “recognition of trade unions as bargaining agents is not a fundamental or legal right enforceable by writ,” and that the petitioner-union’s failure to approach the appropriate statutory authority—the Registrar of Trade Unions—rendered the writ petition not maintainable.

"When A Statutory Framework Exists, High Court Cannot Be Approached In The First Instance": Court Emphasises Doctrine Of Exhaustion Of Remedies

The petitioner, Ruchi Soya Industries Limited Contractor’s Workers’ Union, Durgachak, registered in 2015 and affiliated to INTUC in 2020, approached the High Court seeking two primary reliefs: first, a direction to be recognized as a constituent of the joint bargaining council at Ruchi Soya Industries Limited (now Patanjali Foods Ltd.), and second, a declaration that a rival union (respondent no. 4) was illegally registered under a name deceptively similar to the petitioner’s, in contravention of Section 7(2) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926.

The petitioner alleged that the employers and contractors had colluded with a rival union and settled the workers’ demands without involving the petitioner, despite its active representation of 1500 workers. The petitioner further claimed exploitation of workers, violation of wage notifications, and illegal tactics used to avoid negotiation with the petitioner union.

However, the petitioner directly moved the High Court under Article 226 without first seeking remedy from the Registrar of Trade Unions under Sections 28A and 28B of the West Bengal Amendment Act, 1983.

The employer (respondent no. 3), Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd., opposed the writ petition, arguing that it is a private entity not performing any public duty and that no enforceable legal right exists in favour of the petitioner to warrant a writ of mandamus. It also pointed out that the petition bypassed the statutory forum and that any recognition-related dispute must be addressed under the Trade Unions Act and its West Bengal amendment.

Article 226 Not a Substitute for Statutory Mechanisms

Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) undertook a detailed statutory analysis of Sections 7, 28A, and 28B of the Trade Unions Act and its West Bengal Amendment, and observed:

“Admittedly, the petitioner/union has not taken recourse to the above provision of the Act of 1983.” [Para 21]

The Court held that Section 28A provides a detailed mechanism for any registered trade union to seek recognition as a bargaining agent before the Registrar of Trade Unions. Hence, a constitutional writ under Article 226 cannot be entertained at the initial stage without invoking this primary remedy.

The Court was categorical in stating:

“The respondent no. 3’s stand that the relief prayed for by the petitioner/union herein, is statutorily governed... has merit.” [Para 22]

“The proper forum for getting recognition of a trade union, is the respondent no. 5 herein, being the Registrar of trade union, whom the petitioner/union has not approached.” [Para 23]

On the issue of the rival union's name allegedly being deceptively similar, the Court clarified:

“The petitioner has to again apply to the respondent no. 5 as per Section 7 of the Trade Unions Act.” [Para 24]

Notably, Section 7(2) of the Trade Unions Act expressly prohibits registration of unions with identical or misleading names. However, it is the Registrar, not the writ court, who has jurisdiction over such disputes.

“Employer Not A Public Authority — Writ Lies Only Against Public Duty”

The Court also rejected the prayer for mandamus against the employer, observing that:

“The said petition seeks relief against a private party which does not perform any public duty.” [Para 11]

“The relief towards grant of recognition by the private employer cannot be sought for through invocation of writ jurisdiction.” [Para 11(iii)]

Citing long-settled precedent, the Court held that the issuance of a writ of mandamus presupposes a legally enforceable right and a corresponding public duty—which were absent in this case.

The petitioner union had relied on issues such as exploitation of workers and collusion between the employer and a rival union to argue for urgent intervention. But the Court reiterated that such factual and industrial disputes are outside the constitutional writ jurisdiction and must be adjudicated within the statutory framework, either through the Registrar or under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Petition Dismissed, Remedies Must Be Sought Before Registrar

In a well-reasoned judgment, the Calcutta High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding:

“The petitioner’s relief thus lies before the respondent no. 5, in respect of all reliefs as prayed for herein... this writ is not maintainable and is thus dismissed.” [Para 27]

The Court further vacated all interim orders and disposed of connected applications.

This decision reinforces a key constitutional principle: when a comprehensive statutory remedy exists, constitutional writ jurisdiction is not to be used as a substitute, particularly in industrial matters involving inter-union rivalry, recognition, and membership disputes. The ruling affirms the primacy of the Registrar of Trade Unions in determining recognition and registration disputes under the relevant legislation.

Date of Decision: 02 February 2026