Child Is Not A Pawn To Prove Mother's Adultery: Andhra Pradesh High Court Dismisses Husband's DNA Test Petition In Desertion Divorce Case

"The child cannot be used as a pawn to show that the mother of the child was living in adultery — the child's right to identity should not be allowed to be sacrificed", In a significant ruling affirming the primacy of a child's rights over a parent's evidentiary ambitions, the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissed a civil revision petition filed by a husband seeking DNA testing of his two children to prove his wife's alleged adultery — in proceedings where he had actually sought divorce on the ground of desertion, not adultery.

Justice Tarlada Rajasekhar Rao held that a husband cannot seek a DNA test of children who are not parties to the matrimonial litigation, particularly when the children are not claiming any maintenance and the divorce petition itself does not rest on a ground of adultery.

Background of the Case

The petitioner, Kona Chinnababu, a cultivator from Dabbirajupeta Village, Vizianagaram District, filed H.M.O.P. No. 45 of 2019 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Vizianagaram, seeking dissolution of his marriage with the respondent Kona Satyavathi under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — that is, on the ground of desertion for a continuous period of not less than two years. While this divorce petition was pending, the petitioner filed I.A. No. 553 of 2022 under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 seeking an order to send the two children of the marriage — Krishna Veni and Santhosh @ Ramesh — for DNA fingerprinting at the Centre for DNA Finger Printing and Diagnostics, Amaravathi. The avowed purpose was to establish that the petitioner was not the legitimate father of the children and that the children were not born out of the wedlock of the parties.

The trial court dismissed this application on July 10, 2024, observing that ordering a DNA test would cause the children to be looked down upon in society and ridiculed, and that the Supreme Court had consistently held that children cannot be mechanically subjected to DNA tests in every matrimonial dispute as a shortcut to establish proof of infidelity. The petitioner challenged this order in the present civil revision petition before the High Court.

Legal Issues and Arguments

The petitioner contended before the High Court that ordering a DNA test would not cause undue prejudice to the respondent-wife, that it merely facilitated the discovery of truth, and that the right to privacy must be balanced against the right to justice, especially when paternity is directly in challenge. It was argued that denial of DNA testing deprived the petitioner of critical evidence necessary to prove his case and amounted to an infringement of his right to a fair trial.

The respondent-wife's counsel relied on the Supreme Court's recent ruling in R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086, which had cautioned that the use of DNA testing is an extremely delicate and sensitive matter, that courts must be reluctant in deploying such scientific tools which invade the right to privacy, and that the result of such a test may bastardise an innocent child even though the mother and her spouse were living together at the time of conception.

Court's Observations and Judgment

On the Foundational Presumption Under Section 112 of the Evidence Act

The Court anchored its reasoning in the well-established legal presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act — that a child born during a valid and subsisting marriage is presumed to be legitimate. Invoking the Supreme Court's seminal ruling in Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1993 SC 2295, the High Court affirmed that courts should not order blood tests or DNA tests as a matter of course. The presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 is very strong and can only be displaced by proof of non-access between the spouses at the time the child could have been conceived. The Supreme Court had emphasised that ordering such tests without strong and compelling reasons may grievously harm the child's reputation and social status — consequences that the law does not permit to be visited upon an innocent child for the convenience of a litigating parent.

On the Child's Right to Identity: The Prism of the Child, Not the Parents

The Court placed particular reliance on the Supreme Court's ruling in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, (2024) 7 SCC 773, which the High Court found directly on point. The Supreme Court had categorically held that the question of whether a DNA test should be permitted on a child must be analysed through the prism of the child — not through the prism of the parents. "The child cannot be used as a pawn to show that the mother of the child was living in adultery. It is always open to the respondent-husband to prove by other evidence the adulterous conduct of the wife, but the child's right to identity should not be allowed to be sacrificed."

The High Court endorsed this principle and held it squarely applicable to the present case. The children, the Court noted, were not parties to the litigation. They were not claiming any maintenance from the petitioner or from any alleged adulterer. The lis was entirely between the husband and wife. Subjecting the children to a DNA test to serve the evidentiary interests of the father in a case to which the children were strangers was not permissible.

On the Argument of Fair Trial

The petitioner had pressed the argument that the right to a fair trial entitled him to produce the best possible evidence, and that denial of DNA testing infringed upon this right. The Court dealt with this contention by drawing upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia, which had confronted the identical argument and rejected it. The Supreme Court had held that while the argument appears attractive at first blush, it carries no legal weight. "The lis in these cases is between the parties to a marriage. The lis is not between one of the parties to the marriage and the child whose paternity is questioned. To enable one of the parties to the marriage to have the benefit of fair trial, the Court cannot sacrifice the rights and best interests of a third party to the lis, namely, the child." The High Court adopted this reasoning entirely.

On the Fundamental Contradiction in the Petitioner's Case

The Court also noted a critical contradiction at the heart of the petitioner's application — one that, in itself, rendered the prayer unsustainable. The divorce petition had been filed on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The petitioner was not seeking divorce on the ground of adultery. Yet the DNA test application was designed to establish adultery by proving that the children were not born out of the wedlock. The Court held that even assuming the wife was committing adultery, a DNA test of the children could not be ordered in these circumstances — particularly when the children were not parties to the lis and were not claiming any maintenance. If the petitioner wished to prove adultery by way of additional or corroborating evidence in some other proceeding, he was obliged to do so through other means. The children's bodies and identities could not be conscripted as instruments of proof.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court's ruling firmly reaffirms the constitutional and legal primacy of a child's right to identity and dignity over the evidentiary preferences of a litigating parent. A DNA test is not a tool to be deployed mechanically whenever a parent suspects infidelity — it is an intrusive scientific intervention that strikes at the very core of a child's identity, social standing, and legitimacy. The Court has made clear that courts must guard the gateway to such orders with great care, that the strong presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act stands as a shield for the innocent child, and that the child's best interests — not the parent's evidentiary convenience — must remain the governing standard. The civil revision petition was dismissed with costs of Rs. 3,000 payable to the District Legal Services Authority within three weeks, failing which the Civil Judge was directed to collect the amount and, if necessary, send the petitioner to civil imprisonment.

Date of Decision: March 12, 2026