When High Court Judges Themselves Disagree on the Answer, Can a Law Graduate Be Penalised for Getting It Wrong? Supreme Court Says No

"When the Judges of the High Court Are at Variance in Their Opinion as to the Correct Answer, It Is Least Expected From Mere Law Graduates to Reach a Correct Conclusion", In a ruling that strikes at the heart of fairness in competitive recruitment examinations, the Supreme Court on March 17, 2026 held that a multiple-choice question on the Ninth Schedule's immunity from judicial review was so constitutionally complex and judicially contested that both the answer marked correct by the recruiting body and the answer given by the aggrieved candidate deserved to be treated as right.

A bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, disposing of a civil appeal arising from a Law Officer recruitment dispute in the Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh, directed the Corporation to create a supernumerary post and accommodate both competing candidates — one already in service and one who had been denied selection by a negative marking deduction of 1.25 marks on the disputed question.

"From a Law Graduate's Point of View, Both the Answers May Be Correct"

Background of the Case

The Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh issued an advertisement for one post of Law Officer, to be filled entirely on the basis of a written test of 100 multiple-choice questions carrying one mark each, with negative marking of one-fourth mark for every wrong answer. Both the appellant Charan Preet Singh and the third respondent Amit Kumar Sharma appeared for the examination. Question No. 73 in the test asked: "Which of the following schedule of the Constitution is immune from judicial review on the grounds of violation of fundamental rights? A) Seventh Schedule, B) Ninth Schedule, C) Tenth Schedule, D) None of the above." The recruiting body treated Option B — the Ninth Schedule — as the correct answer. Amit Kumar Sharma answered Option D — None of the above — and consequently lost one mark for the allegedly wrong answer and suffered a further deduction of 0.25 marks by way of negative marking, a total adverse impact of 1.25 marks. This deduction proved decisive, as Charan Preet Singh was selected to the sole post. Amit Kumar Sharma challenged the answer key before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

A Single Judge dismissed his petition, holding that Article 31B of the Constitution kept the Ninth Schedule immune from challenge on grounds of fundamental rights violation, a position upheld through decades of Supreme Court decisions. On intra-court appeal, the Division Bench reversed this finding, holding that the Ninth Schedule's immunity is not absolute and is subject to the basic structure test as laid down in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu — making Option D the legally correct answer. Charan Preet Singh, already in service, appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issue and the Constitutional Complexity at the Core

The legal question embedded in Question No. 73 is deceptively simple in appearance but constitutionally treacherous in substance. The Ninth Schedule was introduced by the First Constitutional Amendment in 1951, and Article 31B provided that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule shall not be deemed void on the ground of inconsistency with fundamental rights. In Shankari Prasad (1951) and Sajjan Singh (1964), the Supreme Court upheld Parliament's power to amend fundamental rights and the validity of this immunity. In Golak Nath (1967), the Court declared Article 31B prospectively invalid — only to be overruled by the landmark thirteen-judge bench in Kesavananda Bharati (1973), which restored Article 31B's validity while simultaneously introducing the basic structure doctrine. Decades later, in I.R. Coelho (2007), a nine-judge Constitution Bench held that while Article 31B immunity remains, laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 — the date of the Kesavananda judgment — are subject to judicial review if they violate the basic structure of the Constitution.

This layered jurisprudence produced exactly the divergence that the Supreme Court found fatal to the answer key. The Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, relying on the continued existence of Article 31B and paragraphs of I.R. Coelho affirming the Ninth Schedule's immunity from challenge on grounds of fundamental rights violation per se, held Option B correct. The Division Bench, relying on the same paragraph 148 of I.R. Coelho but reading it to mean that immunity is not absolute and is subject to the basic structure test, held Option D correct. Two High Court benches, both composed of trained constitutional adjudicators, reading the same Supreme Court judgment, arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions.

The Supreme Court's Reasoning

The Supreme Court took note of this judicial divergence and made it the pivot of its decision. The bench observed that it had heard counsel at length and perused the record, and acknowledged that both Option B and Option D had constitutional support. On a plain reading of the question — which asked which schedule is "immune from judicial review on the grounds of violation of fundamental rights" — Option B, the Ninth Schedule, appeared to be more appropriate given the language of Article 31B and its consistent judicial endorsement. Yet on a deeper analysis of the Court's own jurisprudence from Shankari Prasad through I.R. Coelho, Option D could equally be considered correct, since the Ninth Schedule's immunity is qualified and conditional rather than absolute.

The Court then applied what may be called the standard of the test-taker. The examination was for the post of Law Officer in a municipal corporation — a post for which the minimum eligibility was a law degree. The Court held that it would be unreasonable to penalise a law graduate for failing to resolve a constitutional question that had occupied the Supreme Court itself across several decades and multiple Constitution Bench decisions. "When the Judges of the High Court are at variance in their opinion as to the correct answer to Question No.73, it is least expected from mere law graduates, who are competing for a post of Law Officer in the Municipal Corporation, to reach to a correct conclusion while answering the multiple-choice question by process of interpretation of Constitutional provisions involving this Court's judgments in several decades," the bench declared.

The Court expressly held that both answers may be treated as correct: "From a law graduate's point of view, both the answers may be correct, although Option 'B' (Ninth Schedule) appears to be more appropriate considering the language of the question asked. However, on a deeper analysis of this Court's judgments mentioned above, Option 'D' (None of the above) can also be considered to be correct as has been held by the Division Bench."

On the Relief — Supernumerary Post and Seniority

Having held that both candidates were entitled to credit on the disputed question, the Court turned to fashioning an equitable remedy. Charan Preet Singh was already in service and directing his ouster would cause him serious prejudice. At the same time, Amit Kumar Sharma's constitutional right to fair consideration could not be defeated solely because judicial determination had been delayed. The Court invoked the principle recognised in Vikas Pratap Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh — that creation of a supernumerary post is an appropriate remedy to balance equities in such situations — and directed the Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh to create a supernumerary post and appoint Amit Kumar Sharma to it. As between the two, Charan Preet Singh — having been initially selected, joined service, and been working on the post — was directed to be treated as senior upon Amit Kumar Sharma's appointment.

The Supreme Court's ruling sends a clear signal to recruiting bodies framing multiple-choice questions on contested constitutional law: where a question admits of more than one defensible answer based on evolving judicial interpretation, penalising candidates through negative marking for choosing the non-preferred option is fundamentally unjust.

The standard against which an MCQ answer must be judged is the knowledge reasonably expected of a candidate of the level being recruited — not the output of a Constitution Bench deliberation. When the question is one on which High Court judges themselves disagree, the examination answer key cannot be treated as infallible, and affected candidates must be accommodated rather than excluded. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Date of Decision: March 17, 2026