Cannot Claim Monopoly Over a Deity's Name: Gujarat High Court Dismisses Trademark Injunction Against 'Kshetrapal Construction'

"Plaintiff Cannot Dissect The Registered Device Mark And Claim Exclusivity Over The Expression 'Shree Kshetrapal'", In a significant ruling at the intersection of trademark law, equitable relief, and religious expression, the Gujarat High Court on March 16, 2026 dismissed an appeal challenging the refusal of an interim injunction in a trademark dispute over the name "Kshetrapal" in the real estate sector.

Justice Niral R. Mehta upheld the trial court's order vacating an ex-parte ad-interim injunction, holding that the plaintiff had approached the Court with suppressed facts, inconsistent stands before the Trade Marks Registry and the Court, and a legally untenable attempt to claim monopoly over a deity's name forming part of a composite device mark. The Court applied the anti-dissection rule under Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the prior user protection under Section 34, and the clean hands doctrine to comprehensively reject the plaintiff's claim for equitable relief, imposing costs of Rs. 50,000 on the appellant.

Background of the Case

The appellant-plaintiff Anil Gopalji Thacker claimed to be the adopter and proprietor of a device mark containing the words "Shree Kshetrapal," used since 2015 in construction and real estate activities in the Bhuj-Kutch region of Gujarat, having launched multiple projects under that name. He obtained registration of a composite device mark under Class 37 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and filed a trademark infringement and passing off suit before the Civil Court at Bhuj-Kutch when the respondent-defendant Davda Jaydeepkumar Jagdishchandra commenced business under the name "Kshetrapal Construction." An ex-parte ad-interim injunction was granted on May 15, 2025, but was vacated by the trial court on August 12, 2025 upon the defendant appearing and disclosing that the parties had been business partners since 2017, that the defendant had been using the mark "Kshetrapal" since 2014, and that the plaintiff had suppressed material proceedings before the Trade Marks Registry. Aggrieved, the plaintiff appealed to the Gujarat High Court.

Legal Issues and Court's Observations

Suppression of Material Facts — Clean Hands Doctrine

The first and most damaging finding against the plaintiff was on suppression of material facts. The Court identified three distinct and serious suppressions that individually and cumulatively disentitled the plaintiff to any equitable relief.

First, the plaintiff had not disclosed in the plaint that from 2017 to April 2025, the plaintiff and the defendant had been business partners who jointly purchased land and launched two real estate projects — "Shree Kshetrapal Square-1" and "Shree Kshetrapal Square-2" — under their shared use of the name "Kshetrapal." Sale deeds and joint development permissions on record confirmed this partnership beyond prima facie satisfaction.

Second, the plaintiff had filed the trademark registration application for the device mark declaring it as "proposed to be used" — thereby making no claim of prior use before the Registrar — yet turned around in the plaint to assert continuous use since 2015. This contradiction between the statutory filing and the court pleading was a material misrepresentation.

Third, when the Trade Marks Registry had raised objections under Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act during registration proceedings, the plaintiff had categorically stated before the Registrar that he was claiming exclusivity only over the device mark as a whole on account of its artistic representation, and not over the word "Kshetrapal" in isolation. This admission before the statutory authority was deliberately withheld from the plaint.

Relying on the Supreme Court's exposition in K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (2008) 12 SCC 481 and Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha (2024) 4 SCC 432, the Court applied the maxim suppressio veri expressio falsi — suppression of truth is equivalent to expression of falsehood — with full force. "The plaintiff cannot be said to have approached the Court with clean hands and appears to have instituted the proceedings with suppression of facts, misleading statements and a distorted presentation of the factual position, apparently with an oblique intention." The Court expressly held that the trial court could have rejected the interim application on this ground alone, without entering the merits at all.

Prior User Versus Registered Proprietor — Sections 28 and 34

The Court next examined whether the plaintiff's registered device mark under Section 28 could prevail over the defendant's prior user defence under Section 34. Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act embodies the cardinal principle that prior and continuous use of a trademark from a date earlier than the registered proprietor's use or registration is protected, and the registered proprietor cannot restrain such a prior user.

The Court found the plaintiff's position on prior use wholly unsatisfactory. The plaintiff's device mark was registered as "proposed to be used" — a declaration that negates any claim of prior use at the time of registration. The business entities cited by the plaintiff as evidence of use since 2015 — including Shree Kshetrapal Agritech, Shree Kshetrapal Oil Refinery, and Shree Kshetrapal Building Materials — were demonstrably engaged in agriculture, oil refining, and building materials, not construction. The plaintiff produced no material demonstrating use of the mark specifically in construction activities prior to the defendant.

The defendant, by contrast, filed an application for registration of its own device mark claiming use since January 5, 2014, and produced third-party affidavits from a vendor and an architect confirming use of the name "Kshetrapal Construction" in construction activities since 2014. Joint development permissions and sale deeds relating to projects jointly executed with the plaintiff further buttressed the defendant's prior use claim.

"Mere registration of a device mark under Section 28 does not entitle the plaintiff to claim exclusivity over an individual component of the mark. The statutory exclusivity, if any, would extend only to the composite device mark as registered."

Anti-Dissection Rule — Section 17 and the Composite Mark

The Court's most significant legal finding concerned the plaintiff's attempt to claim monopoly over the word "Kshetrapal" individually, while holding registration only of a composite device mark. Section 17(1) of the Trade Marks Act expressly provides that registration of a composite mark confers exclusive rights in the mark taken as a whole. Section 17(2) further stipulates that registration confers no exclusive right over any part of the mark that is not separately registered or that is non-distinctive in character.

Extensively relying on the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. v. Karnaveer Singh Chhabra (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701), which held that composite marks must be assessed in their entirety and that proprietors cannot claim exclusive rights over individual non-distinctive or descriptive elements, the Court held that the plaintiff's attempt to isolate "Kshetrapal" from the device mark was precisely the dissection that trademark law prohibits.

The word "Kshetrapal" refers to a protector deity — a guardian of a region or temple — carrying deep religious and mythological connotations widely used across communities. The prefix "Shree" is a common honorific entirely lacking distinctiveness. The Court held that expressions with religious significance and common public usage fall within the public domain and are incapable of exclusive appropriation under Section 9 of the Act, unless secondary meaning through long and exclusive use is established — which the plaintiff conspicuously failed to do. The plaintiff's own concession before the Registrar that it was not claiming exclusive rights over "Kshetrapal" in isolation was found to be fatal to its present claim.

"In view of Section 17(2), the plaintiff cannot dissect the registered device mark and claim exclusivity over the expression 'Shree Kshetrapal,' particularly when the said expression is the name of a deity and ordinarily incapable of exclusive appropriation."

Section 31 — Presumption of Validity Does Not Extend to Components

The plaintiff had sought to invoke the presumption of validity under Section 31, arguing that registration creates a presumption of exclusive rights. The Court rejected this contention with precision. The defendant had not challenged the validity of the registered device mark itself — there was no dispute about the registration. The dispute was about whether registration of the composite device mark entitles the plaintiff to claim exclusivity over one of its components. The Court held that the Section 31 presumption operates only in respect of the registered mark as a whole and cannot be extended to confer exclusive rights over individual non-distinctive components that are not separately registered.

"The presumption under Section 31 is prima facie in nature and rebuttable. It cannot be invoked to claim monopoly over the expression 'Shree Kshetrapal,' which forms merely a component of the composite registered device mark and which the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate has acquired secondary meaning."

Average Consumer Test — Real Estate Transactions Demand Deliberation

On the question of likelihood of confusion, the Court applied the average consumer test in the specific context of real estate transactions, and found it did not support the plaintiff's case. Unlike fast-moving consumer goods where a casual consumer might be confused by similar packaging at a shop shelf, purchase of immovable property is a considered, deliberative, and high-value transaction invariably preceded by due diligence, site visits, document verification, and interaction with the developer.

The Court held that even if a prospective buyer were momentarily confused upon seeing the word "Kshetrapal," such confusion would be immediately and easily dispelled upon minimal inquiry revealing the identity of the developer. The possibility of a consumer ultimately purchasing property from the wrong developer was found to be remote and improbable. "The likelihood of confusion or deception, which forms the foundation for grant of relief in trademark disputes, is not sufficiently established in the context of construction and real estate services, where the consumer decision-making process involves detailed inquiry and deliberation."

Date of Decision: March 16, 2026